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Foreign Aid

MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE CONGRESS[1]

To the Congress of the United States:

The most important ingredient in the development of a nation is neither the amount nor the nature of foreign assistance. It is the will and commitment of the government and people directly involved.

To those nations which do commit themselves to progress under freedom, help from us and from others can provide the margin of difference between failure and success.

This is the heart of the matter.

The proposals contained in this message express our self-interest at the same time that they proclaim our national ideals.

We will be laying up a harvest of woe for us and our children if we shrink from the task of grappling in the world community with poverty and ignorance.

These are the grim recruiting sergeants of communism.

They flourish wherever we falter. If we default on our obligations, communism will expand its ambitions.

That is the stern equation which dominates our age, and from which there can be no escape in logic or in honor.

NO WASTE, NO RETREAT

It is against our national interest to tolerate waste or inefficiency or extravagance in any of these programs. But it is equally repugnant to our national interest to retreat from our obligations and commitments while freedom remains under siege.

We recognize that the United States cannot and should not sustain the burden of these programs alone.

Other nations are needed in this enterprise of mutual help. Encouraging signs exist that the process of sharing the burden is steadily growing.

[1] Transmitted Mar. 19 (White House press release); also printed in H. Doc. 250, 88th Cong., 2d sess., which includes a draft of a bill "To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to allow a credit against tax for certain investment in less developed countries, and for other purposes" and a draft of an act "To amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and for other purposes."

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Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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The best way for the United States to stimulate this growth and to broaden this partnership in freedom is to make our own example an incentive to our friends and allies.

We need the assurance of stability and progress in a world restless with many dangers and anxieties.

PRUDENT AND RESPONSIBLE PROGRAMS

In this program we do not seek to cover the whole world. Aid on a worldwide scale is no part of our purpose.

We seek instead, through prudent and responsible programs, to help carefully selected countries whose survival in freedom is essential—and whose collapse would bring new opportunities for Communist expansion.

There are no easy victories in this campaign. But there can be sudden disasters. We cannot ask for a reprieve from responsibility while freedom is in danger. The vital interests of the United States require us to stay in the battle. We dare not desert.

Economic and military assistance, used at the right time and in the right way, can provide indispensable help to our foreign policy in enabling the United States to influence events instead of merely reacting to them. By committing a small part of our resources before crises actually occur, we reduce the danger and frequency of those crises.

Our foresight becomes a shield against misfortune.

The recommendations contained in this program for fiscal year 1965 are designed to move the aid program in that direction.

They reflect views and experience of the Congress, of the executive branch, and of informed private citizens.

FIVE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS FOR A SUCCESSFUL PROGRAM

First: *The request for funds must be realistic.*

For economic assistance, new authorizations of $917 million for fiscal 1965 are recommended. Specifically, I recommend $335 million for supporting assistance, $225 million for technical cooperation, $134 million for contributions to international organizations, $150 million for the President's contingency fund, and $73 million for administrative and miscellaneous expenses.

For military assistance, I recommend that the Congress provide a continuing authorization, subject to an annual review of each year's proposals by the authorizing committees in both Houses.

For fiscal 1965, I recommend no additional authorizations for the Alliance for Progress or for development lending assistance in Asia or Africa. Existing authorizations for these programs are adequate.

The appropriations recommended for fiscal 1965 total $1 billion for military assistance and $2.4 billion for economic assistance.

In fiscal 1964, the initial request was $4.9 billion, later reduced to $4.5 billion.

This fiscal year, the request of $3.4 billion is $1.1 billion less than last year's request, although about the same as was available last year, taking into consideration the unexpended balance from the year before.

Moreover, more than 80 percent of aid funds will be spent in the U.S. The impact of the program on our balance of payments will be less than ever before.

INSURANCE TO AVOID COMMITTING AMERICAN MEN TO WAR

These requests reflect a determination to continue to improve the aid program both in concept and administration. The overall request represents a great deal of money—but it is an amount which we should, in all prudence, provide to serve essential United States interests and commitments throughout the world.

More than 1 million American men in uniform are now stationed outside the United States. As insurance to avoid involving them and the Nation in a major conflict, we propose to spend through aid programs less than 4 cents out of every tax dollar.

If there is any alternative insurance against war, it might be found in an increase in the defense budget. But that would require not only many times more than $3.4 billion, for a military budget which already takes more than 50 cents out of every tax dollar, but also a severalfold increase in our own military manpower.

The foreign assistance requested will provide

—the crucial assistance we have promised the people of Latin America who are committed to programs of economic and social progress;

—continued economic development in India, Pakistan, and Turkey under the major international aid consortia to which we are a party;

—the United States share of voluntary contributions to the United Nations technical cooperation programs and to such special international programs as the work of the United Nations Children's Fund and the development of the Indus Basin;

—funds to meet our commitments to the freedom of the people of South Vietnam, Korea, and for the other obligations we have undertaken in Asia and Africa.

Second: *The funds I am requesting will be concentrated where they will produce the best results and speed the transition from United States assistance to self-support wherever possible.*

Two-thirds of the proposed military assistance will go to 11 nations along the periphery of the Sino-Soviet bloc, from Greece and Turkey through Thailand and Vietnam to the Republic of China and Korea. These funds are a key to the maintenance of over 3.5 million men under arms, raised and supported in large measure by the countries receiving the assistance.

The need for supporting assistance—funds used primarily in countries facing defense or security emergencies—will continue to be reduced. Fourteen countries which received supporting assistance 3 years ago will receive none in fiscal year 1965.

Four-fifths of the present request will go to four countries: Korea, Vietnam, Laos, and Jordan.

Two-thirds of the *development lending* proposed for fiscal 1965 (including Alliance for Progress lending) will be concentrated in six countries: Chile, Colombia, Nigeria, Turkey, Pakistan, and India.

Funds for *educational and technical cooperation*—to help start schools, health centers, agricultural experiment stations, credit services, and dozens of other institutions—are not concentrated in a few countries. But they will be used for selected projects to raise the ability of less fortunate peoples to meet their own needs. To carry out these projects we are seeking the best personnel available in the United States—in private agencies, in universities, in State and local governments, and throughout the Federal Government.

Wherever possible, *we will speed up the transition from reliance on aid to self-support.*

In 17 nations the transition has been completed and economic aid has ended. Fourteen countries are approaching the point where soft economic loans and grants will no longer be needed. New funds for military equipment grants are being requested for seven fewer countries for fiscal 1965 than for the present year.

Third: *We must do more to utilize private initiative in the United States—and in the developing countries—to promote economic development abroad.*

During the past year:

—the first new houses financed by U.S. private funds protected by AID guarantees were completed in Lima, Peru;

—the first rural electrification surveys, conducted by the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association under contract to AID, were completed and the first rural electrification loan—in Nicaragua—was approved;

—the first arrangement linking the public and private resources of one of our States to a developing country was established, between California and Chile.

This effort must be expanded.

Accordingly, we are encouraging the establishment of an Executive Service Corps. It will provide American businessmen with an opportunity to furnish, on request, technical and managerial advice to businessmen in developing countries.

During the present year, the possibilities for mobilizing increased private resources for the development task will be developed by the Advisory Committee on Private Enterprise in Foreign Aid established under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1963.

In this connection, *two specific legislative steps are recommended:*

One, legislation to provide a special tax credit for private investment by U.S. businessmen in

less developed countries.

Two, additional authority for a final installment of the pilot program of guaranteeing private U.S. housing investments in Latin America.

FOURTH: *We will continue to seek greater international participation in aid.*

Other free-world industrial countries have increased their aid commitments since the early 1950's. There are indications that further increases are in store. Canada recently announced that it expects to increase its aid expenditures by 50 percent next year. A 1963 British white paper and a French official report published in January 1964 point in the same direction. Other nations have reduced interest rates and extended maturities on loans to developing countries.

Of major importance in this effort are the operations of the International Development Association. Under the agreement for replenishing the resources of this Association, which is now before the Congress for approval, other countries will put up more than $1.40 for every dollar the U.S. provides to finance on easy terms development projects certified as sound by the World Bank—projects which the developing countries could not afford to pay for on regular commercial terms. This is international sharing in the aid effort at its best. For to the extent we furnish funds to IDA, and they are augmented by the contributions of others, the needs of developing countries are met, thus reducing the amounts required for our own bilateral aid programs.

Under the program before you the U.S. would be authorized to contribute $312 million over a 3-year period. Against this other countries have pledged $438 million, which will be lost in the absence of the U.S. contribution. Action is needed now so that the Association may continue to undertake new projects even though the first appropriation will not be required until fiscal year 1966.

I urge the Congress to authorize U.S. participation in this continued IDA subscription.

FIFTH: *Let us insist on steadily increasing efficiency in assistance operations.*

After careful study, I have decided to continue the basic organization of aid operations, established after intensive review in 1961. Economic assistance operations will continue to be centered in the Agency for International Development, military assistance operations in the Department of Defense. Both will be subject to firm foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of State.

STEPS TO INCREASE EFFICIENCY OF AID

One officer, Assistant Secretary of State Mann, has been assigned firm policy control over all aspects of our activities in Latin America.[2]

Full support will be given to the newly created Inter-American Alliance for Progress Committee which is designed to strengthen the aspect of partnership in the alliance.

The AID Administrator has instructions to embark on a major program to improve the quality of his staff—and to reduce the total number of AID employees by 1,200 by the end of fiscal year 1965.

The AID Administrator has been directed to continue to consolidate AID missions with U.S. embassies and, wherever possible, to eliminate altogether separate AID field missions.

The Secretary of Defense has been directed to continue to make substantial reductions in the number of personnel assigned to military assistance groups and missions.

In this connection, I recommend two specific legislative steps:

One, legislation to provide the AID Administrator with authority to terminate a limited number of supervisory and policymaking employees notwithstanding other provisions of law, and to extend the existing Foreign Service "selection out" authority to other personnel.

This is essential if the Administrator is to carry out my desire—and that of the Congress—that he improve the quality of the AID staff and, at the same time, reduce its total size.

Two, legislation to permit outstanding United States representation on the Inter-American Alliance for Progress Committee under the leadership of Ambassador Teodoro Moscoso.

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[2] See p. 540.

Finally, I am appointing a general advisory committee, as suggested by Senator [John Sherman] Cooper and others, on foreign economic and military assistance problems. It will be composed of distinguished private citizens with varied backgrounds and will serve as a continuing source of counsel to me. In addition to its general responsibility the committee will examine aid programs in individual countries. These reviews will be made by members of the advisory committee, augmented as necessary by additional persons. I would hope that at least four or five country reviews, including two or three in Latin America, will be completed in the present year.

A PROGRAM TO STRENGTHEN THE FAMILY OF THE FREE

I am convinced this program will enable the United States to live in a turbulent world with a greater measure of safety and of honor.

There is in our heart the larger and nobler hope of strengthening the family of the free, quite apart from our duty to disappoint the evil designs of the enemies of freedom.

We wish to build a world in which the weak can walk without fear and in which even the smallest nation can work out its own destiny without the danger of violence and aggression.

This program, based on the principle of mutual help, can make an essential contribution to these purposes and objectives which have guided our nation across the difficulties of these dangerous years.

I recommend this program to the judgment and the conscience of the Congress in the belief that it will enlarge the strength of the free world—

—aid in frustrating the ambitions of Communist imperialism,

—reduce the hazards of widespread conflict, and

—support the moral commitment of free men everywhere to work for a just and peaceful world.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

THE WHITE HOUSE,
March 19, 1964.

U.S. To Increase Economic and Military Aid to Viet-Nam

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, returned to Washington on March 13 from a 5-day inspection trip to the Republic of Viet-Nam. Following is the text of a White House statement released on March 17 at the conclusion of their report to the President and the National Security Council.

White House press release dated March 17

Secretary McNamara and General Taylor, following their initial oral report of Friday, today reported fully to President Johnson and the members of the National Security Council. The report covered the situation in South Viet-Nam, the measures being taken by General Khanh and his government, and the need for United States assistance to supplement and support these measures. There was also discussion of the continuing support and direction of the Viet Cong insurgency from North Viet-Nam.

At the close of the meeting the President accepted the report and its principal recommendations, which had the support of the National Security Council and Ambassador Lodge.

Comparing the situation to last October, when Secretary McNamara and General Taylor last reported fully on it,[1] there have unquestionably been setbacks. The Viet Cong have taken maximum advantage of two changes of government, and of more longstanding difficulties, including a serious weakness and overextension which had developed in the basically sound hamlet program. The supply of arms and cadres from the north has continued; careful and sophisticated control of Viet Cong operations has been apparent; and evidence that such control is centered in Hanoi is clear and unmistakable.

To meet the situation, General Khanh and his government are acting vigorously and effectively. They have produced a sound central plan for the prosecution of the war, recognizing to a far greater degree than before the crucial role of economic and social, as well as mili-

[1] BULLETIN of Oct. 21, 1963, p. 624.

tary, action to insure that areas cleared of the Viet Cong survive and prosper in freedom.

To carry out this plan, General Khanh requires the full enlistment of the people of South Viet-Nam, partly to augment the strength of his antiguerrilla forces, but particularly to provide the administrators, health workers, teachers, and others who must follow up in cleared areas. To meet this need, and to provide a more equitable and common basis of service, General Khanh has informed us that he proposes in the near future to put into effect a National Mobilization Plan that will provide conditions and terms of service in appropriate jobs for all able-bodied South Vietnamese between certain ages.

In addition, steps are required to bring up to required levels the pay and status of the paramilitary forces and to create a highly trained guerrilla force that can beat the Viet Cong on its own ground.

Finally, limited but significant additional equipment is proposed for the air forces, the river navy, and the mobile forces.

In short, where the South Vietnamese Government now has the power to clear any part of its territory, General Khanh's new program is designed to clear and to hold, step by step and province by province.

This program will involve substantial increases in cost to the South Vietnamese economy, which in turn depends heavily on United States economic aid. Additional, though less substantial, military assistance funds are also needed, and increased United States training activity both on the civil and military side. The policy should continue of withdrawing United States personnel where their roles can be assumed by South Vietnamese and of sending additional men if they are needed. It will remain the policy of the United States to furnish assistance and support to South Viet-Nam for as long as it is required to bring Communist aggression and terrorism under control.

Secretary McNamara and General Taylor reported their overall conclusion that with continued vigorous leadership from General Khanh and his government, and the carrying out of these steps, the situation can be significantly improved in the coming months.

President Johnson Discusses the Presidency

Following are the foreign policy portions of a television interview with President Johnson conducted at the White House on March 14 by William H. Lawrence of the American Broadcasting Company, Eric Sevareid of the Columbia Broadcasting System, and David Brinkley of the National Broadcasting Company.

White House press release dated March 15

Mr. Lawrence: Mr. President, considering the violent and abrupt manner of your succession to the Presidency, I think everyone agrees that the transition has gone remarkably smoothly. Did this just happen, or did you start to plan these things, say, in those few hours in Air Force 1 as you flew back from Dallas?

The President: Well, we had a lot of help in the planning, Mr. Lawrence. A lot of thoughts that went through my mind, as I left the hospital, and on the way to Air Force 1, and while we were waiting for Judge Hughes and Mrs. Kennedy to come aboard—I wasn't sure whether this was an international conspiracy, or just what it was, or what might happen next. I was sure that the whole Nation had been shaken and the world would be in doubt.

As I rode back, I recognized that our first great problem was to assure the world that there would be continuity in transition, that our constitutional system would work. I realized the importance of uniting our people at home and asking them to carry forward with the program; so I immediately planned to have the bipartisan leaders come to the White House upon my arrival.

I asked the members of the Cabinet who were then in town, the Director of the National Security Council, and Mr. McNamara and others to meet me at Andrews, and I appealed to all of those men to work with me on the transition and to try to so conduct ourselves as to assure the rest of the world that we did have continuity and assure the people of this country that we expected them to unite.

Very shortly thereafter, President Eisenhower came down and spent some time with me exploring the problems that he expected to arise confronting a new President. President Truman came in and gave me his counsel, and we started off with the help and plans of a good many people and substantially well organized.

I don't know how well the Government did its part of the transition, but the people's part was well done.

Mr. Lawrence: What were your first priorities, Mr. President?

The President: The first priority was to try to display to the world that we could have continuity and transition, that the program of President Kennedy would be carried on, that there was no need for them to be disturbed and fearful that our constitutional system had been endangered—to demonstrate to the people of this country that, although their leader had fallen and we had a new President, we must have unity and we must close ranks and we must work together for the good of all America and the world.

Mr. Lawrence: Well, did you have any concern about the international posture that you must adopt so that, one, all of our allies would be reassured, and our potential enemies wouldn't get any wrong ideas?

The President: Oh, yes; and I spent the first full week meeting with more than 90 representatives from the nations of the world and trying to explain to them our constitutional system, and what they could expect under it, and how we carry on the program that we had begun, and that I had been a part of the Kennedy-Johnson ticket that won the election in 1960, that we had a Kennedy-Johnson program, that I had been a participant in the formulation of that program, and that we would carry it on—maybe not as well as the late President could have, had he lived, but as best we could—and they need have no fear or no doubt.

Mr. Lawrence: What was the image that you wanted the potential enemy to get?

The President: That we were sure and we were confident that we were united, that we had closed ranks, and not to tread on us.

. . . . . .

Mr. Sevareid: Did you send any kind of private messages to Chairman Khrushchev soon after you became President?

The President: No. We had representatives from all the nations here. I spent 2 or 3 days speaking to those representatives.

Mr. Mikoyan was here, and I had a long visit with him, and I talked to him about the visit that Premier Khrushchev had made me when I was leader in the Senate, and we exchanged views for a period of time here in the office, just about the time of the funeral.

Mr. Lawrence: Did the subject come up of a possible exploratory, get-acquainted session with Mr. Khrushchev?

The President: No. We both expressed desire in our discussion that we understand each other better and that we would be glad to meet at some time when we felt that the agenda was such that would give promise of reaching some solution to the many problems that confront the two countries. But no definite plans were made for a meeting. None were proposed, but it was accepted as a possibility.

. . . . . .

Mr. Lawrence: Mr. President, if I could make you a self-critic for a moment, what, if anything, that has happened in these last 120 days would you do differently were you to do it again?

The President: Well, I don't know about that. I am sure that we have made a good many mistakes, but I don't know of any recommendation that I have made that I would change.

I would favor the same measures that I have recommended to the Congress. I would handle the developments and the foreign policy fields such as Panama and Guantanamo and Zanzibar—Cyprus—as we have handled them.

So while I am sure that we could improve on them if we had more time, in the light of what developed I wouldn't change any.

. . . . . .

Mr. Sevareid: Mr. President, the hundred days are over now, and the transition is over. This is now the Johnson administration. Could you give us an idea—not necessarily specific, unless you care to—what direction you would say your administration would take hereafter?

What new approaches or ideas or philosophies we might see?

The President: Well, I think a message going to the Congress on Monday will indicate one approach. We are determined, and we have a group of dedicated men that are going to try to get at the roots and the causes of poverty that cause 20 percent of our people to live off of less than $3,000 a year.

We are going to try to get at the roots and the causes and find the solution to doing something about half a million men that are rejected each year because of mental or physical reasons for service.

We are going to try to recognize and proceed on the basis that illiteracy and ignorance and disease cost this Government billions of dollars per year and make for much unhappiness.

And the program of poverty this year is one example of what I would like to think will be carried on and grow in the years to come. I want this Government first of all to be dedicated to peace in our time, and do everything that we can conceivably do, any place, any time, with anyone, to resolve some of the differences that exist among mankind.

In order to do that, this Government must be prepared and we must maintain strength and power that would insure our safety if attacked. In order to have peace, and to be prepared, we must be solvent and fiscally responsible. So for that reason we have tried to eliminate waste at every corner. I don't believe that we are going to make the Treasury over by cutting out a few automobiles or turning out a few lights. But I do think it is a good example when you walk through the corridor and you see the closets where lights burn all day and all night just because someone didn't turn them off.

So we have tried to set that example and we want a Government that is seeking peace, that is prepared for any eventuality, that is fiscally solvent, and that is compassionate, that meets the needs of the people for health and for education, and for physical and mental and spiritual strength. And our Government—that is the kind of a Johnson administration I would like to have and that is the kind that we are working toward.

. . . . .

The Situation in Viet-Nam

Mr. Brinkley: You have had reports in the last day or two from the Ambassador to France [Charles E. Bohlen] and from Secretary [of Defense Robert S.] McNamara. Can you tell us anything of what he reported to you from Viet-Nam?

The President: Yes, he made a very lengthy report and I think a responsible and constructive one. We are going to consider it in the Security Council further the early part of the week.[1] We have problems in Viet-Nam, as we have had for 10 years. Secretary McNamara has been out there—this is his fourth trip. We are very anxious to do what we can to help those people preserve their own freedom. We cherish ours, and we would like to see them preserve theirs. We have furnished them with counsel and advice, and men and materiel, to help them in their attempts to defend themselves. If people quit attacking them, we'd have no problem, but for 10 years this problem has been going on.

I was reading a letter only today that General Eisenhower wrote the late President Diem 10 years ago,[2] and it is a letter that I could have well written to President Khanh and sent out by Mr. McNamara.

Now, we have had that problem for a long time. We are going to have it for some time in the future, we can see, but we are patient people, and we love freedom, and we want to help others preserve it, and we are going to try to evolve the most effective and efficient plans we can to continue to help them.

Mr. Sevareid: Mr. Kennedy said, on the subject of Viet-Nam, I think, that he did believe in the "falling domino" theory, that if Viet-Nam were lost that other countries in the area would soon be lost.

The President: I think it would be a very dangerous thing, and I share President Kennedy's view, and I think the whole of Southeast Asia would be involved and that would involve hundreds of millions of people, and I think it's—it cannot be ignored, we must do everything that we can, we must be responsible,

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[1] For text of a White House statement released at the close of a meeting of the National Security Council on Mar. 17, see p. 522.

[2] For text, see BULLETIN of Nov. 15, 1954, p. 735.

we must stay there and help them, and that is what we are going to do.

Mr. Lawrence: Mr. President, during the New Hampshire primary campaign, Governor Rockefeller criticized what he called "divided counsel" that was going out from Washington to the leaders of Viet-Nam. He said that while you and Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara were committed to winning the war and defeating the Viet Cong, the Senate Majority Leader, Senator [Mike] Mansfield, seemed to find favor with the idea of neutralization advanced by President de Gaulle of France. What is your reaction to Governor Rockefeller's criticism?

The President: Well, I think the Governor should know that Senator Mansfield is very experienced in the field of foreign relations, and served as a distinguished member of that committee, and when he made his speech in the Senate, he spoke for himself, and so stated. He was not speaking the administration viewpoint, and he did not leave any such impression. From time to time he has given me his counsel over the years in this general area of Southeast Asia, but when he made this speech he spoke for himself entirely, and there is no division in the administration between Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara and myself. We all feel alike on the matter.

I think that there could even be some division between Mr. Rockefeller and Mr. Lodge [Henry Cabot Lodge, American Ambassador to the Republic of Viet-Nam], judging from what you have said. Mr. Lodge sees things pretty much as we do, and we are going to continue with our program, and it is going to be a responsible one, and we think a fruitful one.

Mr. Lawrence: Do the recommendations that Secretary McNamara brought back from his last trip envisage a continuing role for Mr. Lodge in handling policies in South Viet-Nam?

The President: Yes. Yes, he has a very important role. He met with me in my office 2 days after I became President, and I said to him at that time, "You are my top man there, and I want you to have the kind of people you want, and I want you to carry out the program you recommend and you will have our support here." He has worked very hard at that job, and we have sent him some new people from time to time, and we will be sending more. He has command of the full resources that we have out there, and he works very well with our people.

Mr. Lawrence: One of your speeches at the University of California in Los Angeles indicated a kind of hint to me that we might carry the war to the North Vietnamese if they didn't quit meddling in what you call a "dangerous game."[3] Are there any such plans that you can talk about at this time, sir?

The President: No, and I made no such hint. I said it was a dangerous game to try to supply arms and become an aggressor and deprive people of their freedom, and that is true, whether it is in Viet-Nam or whether it is in this hemisphere, wherever it is.

Mr. Lawrence: Mr. President, do we face the decision on Viet-Nam of the order of magnitude of Korea, for example?

The President: No, I don't think so. I think that we have problems there, we have difficulties there—we have had for 10 years—and as I told you, a good many things have come and gone during that period of time; as long as there are people trying to preserve their freedom, we want to help them.

America's Role in a Changing World

Mr. Brinkley: Well, Mr. President, not only do we have a new administration in this country, but we also have what might be described as a new world, since it is said now that the postwar world is over, and the American leadership is challenged and questioned both by friends and enemy alike in many places now. So it is an entirely different world, very different world, from what it was a few years ago. What is your view and assessment of it? How do you see the American role from here on, now that we are no longer the unquestioned leader of the entire West?

The President: Well, I think that, as long as we are living in a world with 120 nations, we have got to realize that we have got 120 foreign policies. And we are living in a world where we recognize 114 other nations, and some that

[3] For text of remarks made by President Johnson at Charter Day ceremonies at UCLA on Feb. 21, see *ibid.*, Mar. 16, 1964, p. 399.

we don't recognize, and so I think at this time that our nation is held in high esteem and respect and affection generally among the peoples of the world—the free world. I realize that we have discouraging incidents from time to time, and we have problems, and because we try to help with those problems, sometimes the role of the peacemaker is not a very happy one. And so, for that reason, we have to do things that we don't want to do sometimes, and are rather irritating—and sometimes we are abused because we do them, and sometimes we are misunderstood. But if the final result is good, then our action is justified.

Mr. Sevareid: Mr. President, about 10 years ago an American Secretary of State termed neutrality as something immoral. Not long ago President Kennedy talked about making the world safe for diversity. Is a more and more diverse world, with the diminishing of the importance of great alliances, a trend toward a safer world?

The President: Yes, I think so. And you must remember this: that we are having all the new nations that are emerging, and they are coming in without experience, and they have their pride. A good many of them have the feeling that—pent-up feelings that they have nurtured for years and years. And they have an opportunity to express themselves, and sometimes it looks a little odd for the Prime Minister of a new country to come in with a pistol in his hand and arrest an American Chargé d'Affaires.

But that does happen, and we have to be prepared for those developments and try to understand them and try to provide leadership that will keep us from getting in deeper water or more trouble, and that is what we are doing. Sometimes our people become very impatient. They cut the water off on us in Cuba, and I have got a good many recommendations from all over the country as to how to act very quickly. Some of them have said—some of the men have even wanted me to run in the Marines, send them in immediately.

Well, upon reflection, evaluation, and study, realizing not many people want more war and none of them really want more appeasement, you have to find a course that you can chart that will preserve your dignity and self-respect and still bring about the action that is necessary. So instead of sending in the Marines to turn the water on, we sent one admiral in to cut it off and arrange to make our own water, and we think things worked out the best they could under those circumstances.

But there are going to be these demands from time to time, people who feel that all we need to do is mash a button and determine everybody's foreign policy. But we are not living in that kind of world any more. They are going to determine it for themselves, and that is the way it should be. And we are going to have to come and reason with them and try to lead them instead of force them. And I think—I have no doubt but what for centuries to come we will be a leading force in molding the opinion of the world, and I think the better they know us the more they will like us.

Mr. Lawrence: Is there any progress, Mr. President, in the deadlock over Panama and the absence of diplomatic relations with that country?

The President: We have been very close to agreement several times. I have no doubt but what agreement will be reached that will, in effect, provide for sitting down with Panamanian authorities and discussing the problems that exist between us, and being guided only by what is fair and what is right and what is just, and trying to resolve those problems. Now, when that will come about, I don't know. We are anxious and willing and eager to do it any time its suits their convenience.

Mr. Lawrence: What is the hitch right now, Mr. President?

The President: I think, first, they have an election on, and I think, translating our language into their language, that some of the agreements that we have to discuss these matters, they perhaps feel that they would want stronger language than we are willing to agree to and we want a different expression from what they want. It is largely a matter of trying to agree on the kind of language that will meet their problems and that we can honestly, sincerely agree to. We are not going to agree to any preconditions to negotiate a new treaty without knowing what is going to be in that

treaty and without sitting down and working it out on the basis of equity. We think that that language can be resolved and will be resolved in due time.

Mr. Brinkley: Mr. President, what is your assessment now of General de Gaulle's behavior in the last year or two? What do you think about it?

The President: Well, it is not for me to pass judgment on—

Mr. Brinkley: In relation to us, sir?

The President: —on General de Gaulle's conduct. My conversations with him have been very pleasant, and I would like to see him more in agreement on matters with us than he is, such as recognizing Red China. We did not think that was wise for France or for others or for the free world. But that is France's foreign policy. That is not ours, and in his wisdom he decided he would follow that course, and that is a matter for him to determine.

Mr. Lawrence: What do you hear from the people at the United Nations, Mr. President? Has the fact of French recognition now increased the prospect that the Red Chinese may be voted into membership at the U.N.?

The President: The situation changes from time to time, but we don't think that they will be voted into membership and we hope not. I don't believe they will.

Mr. Lawrence: What would be our reaction vis-a-vis the U.N. if they were admitted?

The President: Well, we will have to cross that bridge. I don't want to admit that they are going to be admitted and don't think they will.

Mr. Lawrence: Senator Goldwater, for example, has argued that we should withdraw at once if the Red Chinese are admitted.

The President: Well, that is Senator Goldwater's view, and I don't think they're going to be admitted, and I don't think we will have to face that question.

Foreign Aid and the Alliance for Progress

Mr. Brinkley: One you do have to face soon, Mr. President, is to say something to Congress about foreign aid. That seems to have reached a peak of opposition. It seems to have reached some kind of peak last year. What do you think the future of it is?

The President: I think it is going to be very tough to get a good foreign aid measure through the Congress this year. Last year President Kennedy asked for $4,900,000,000. He later had that request carefully studied and reduced it to $4,500,000,000. We got a $3 billion appropriation after I came to office. I signed the bill, and there was reappropriated about $400 million unexpended balances—$3,400,000,000. Now, I have conferred with the leaders in the House and Senate on that matter, and they all admit it is going to be more difficult this year than it ever has been before, although I don't think that is justified. Nevertheless, I request—we are not going to pad our request. We got $3,400,000,000 this year, and we will ask for something in the neighborhood of that for next year, and we will ask only what we need, and we hope we get what we ask, but it will be appreciably under what was asked last year and approximately the same that we got this year.[4]

We think that we are justified in spending three or four cents of our tax dollar to protect the million men who are in uniform, our men, scattered throughout the world, and to keep them from going into combat, and this is the best weapon that I have.

Mr. Sevareid: Mr. President, is there any one root cause for the apparent slowness of the Alliance for Progress?

The President: Yes. It is very difficult to get 21 nations to all agree and get their systems changed and their reforms effected and to blend into their governmental philosophy the modernization that is going to be required to make the Alliance for Progress a success.

We are distressed that it hasn't been more successful, but we haven't lost faith.

We are having a meeting Monday with all of the ambassadors from the Organization of American States. We are having a meeting Monday with all the ambassadors from the Western Hemisphere. We are calling in all of our own ambassadors, and the three groups are going to meet, and we are going to point out

[4] For text of President Johnson's message to Congress on foreign aid, dated Mar. 19, see p. 518.

the weaknesses, and the slowness of certain reforms that are required, and the cooperation that we must have from their countries, because there is no use of making big investments and taking our taxpayers' funds unless these reforms are effective.

And we are going to make an appeal for a united attack that will give new life to the Alliance for Progress, and we have hopes that it will be successful.

. . . . .

The View From the Inside

Mr. Lawrence: Mr. President, you have now been President for something over 100 days. You have been around Washington for more than 30 years. How is the view from the inside as compared with the view from the outside?

The President: Well, it is a much tougher job from the inside than I thought it was from the outside.

I have watched it since Mr. Hoover's days, and I realized the responsibilities it carried, and the obligations of leadership that were there, and the decisions that had to be made, and the awesome responsibilities of the office.

But I must say that, when I started having to make those decisions and started hearing from the Congress, the Presidency looked a little different when you are in the Presidency than it did when you are in the Congress, and vice versa.

Mr. Lawrence: Mr. President, Thomas Jefferson referred to the office as a splendid misery. Harry Truman used to talk about it as if it were a prison cell. Do you like it?

The President: I am doing the best I can in it, and I am enjoying what I am doing.

Thomas Jefferson said the second office of the land was an honorable and easy one. The Presidency was a splendid misery. But I found great interest in serving in both offices, and it carries terrific and tremendous and awesome responsibilities, but I am proud of this nation and I am so grateful that I could have an opportunity that I have had in America that I want to give my life seeing that the opportunity is perpetuated for others.

I am so proud of our system of government, of our free enterprise, where our incentive system and our men who head our big industries are willing to get up at daylight and get to bed at midnight to offer employment and create new jobs for people, where our men working there will try to get decent wages but will sit across the table and not act like cannibals, but will negotiate and reason things out together.

I am so happy to be a part of a system where the average per capita income is in excess of $200 per month, when there are only six nations in the entire world that have as much as $80 per month, and while the Soviet Union has three times as many tillable acres of land as we have and a population that's in excess of ours and a great many resources that we don't have, that if properly developed would exceed our potential in water and oil and so forth, nevertheless we have one thing they don't have and that is our system of private enterprise, free enterprise, where the employer, hoping to make a little profit, the laborer, hoping to justify his wages, can get together and make a better mousetrap.

They have developed this into the most powerful and leading nation in the world, and I want to see it preserved. And I have an opportunity to do something about it as President.

And I may not be a great President, but as long as I am here, I am going to try to be a good President and do my dead-level best to see this system preserved, because when the final chips are down it is not going to be the number of people we have or the number of acres or the number of resources that win; the thing that is going to make us win is our system of government.

Mr. Brinkley: Thank you, Mr. President.

The Toilsome Path to Peace

Address by Secretary Rusk [1]

The first objective of our foreign policy is, in the words of the preamble to our Constitution, to "secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity." The "Blessings of Liberty" lie at the heart of the world struggle in which we are engaged. The central issue in that struggle is coercion versus free choice, tyranny versus freedom. And the most powerful assets we have in this struggle are the ideas out of which this nation was born and has grown. For these ideas and ideals are shared by most of mankind, including, I am convinced, a majority of those behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains.

As I said elsewhere last month,[2] I believe that every American boy and girl should be familiar with the American system of government and the ideas out of which it developed. I believe that each of our young should know that the priceless liberties which we enjoy did not spring into being overnight, that they were worked for and developed and defended—often with blood—over the generations, that they should never be taken for granted, that they can be preserved only by exercising them and by our vigilance and dedication.

Tonight I should like to look with you at the world around us and appraise where we are in the struggle between tyranny and freedom. Beyond question, this is a dangerous and turbulent world—a world of rapid change, of ever-accelerating scientific and technological advance, of transition from old empires to new nations, of the rise of former colonial peoples to independence and equality, of urgent demand for social and economic progress, for a better life for all. It is a noisy and disputatious world. It gives us in your State Department plenty of work to do.

It is quite true that other nations don't always talk or act as we would prefer. President Johnson reminded us a few days ago that we are living in a world of 120 foreign policies. We don't give orders to other nations—we don't believe in the kind of world in which any government takes its orders from others. As President Johnson said,[3] there are

> . . . people who feel that all we need to do is mash a button and determine everybody's foreign policy. But we are not living in that kind of world any more. They are going to determine it for themselves, and that is the way it should be. And we are going to have to come and reason with them and try to lead them instead of force them.

Bilateral Issues

Let me try to put our problems in perspective. Roughly, there are four different kinds of international problems with which we have to deal.

In the first category are strictly bilateral issues between us and other governments. These usually have to do with trade or the protection of American nationals or property. They rarely involve dangerous issues. At present, we do have a painful dispute with our friends in Panama. Formally, it is a bilateral dispute. But because the Panama Canal is an important international convenience, the dispute affects

[1] Made before a joint meeting of the Western Political Science Association and the International Studies Association at Salt Lake City, Utah, on Mar. 19 (press release 126).

[2] BULLETIN of Mar. 9, 1964, p. 358.

[3] See p. 523.

a great many other countries, especially those in this hemisphere. The Organization of American States has been trying to help move this dispute toward the conference table. We look forward hopefully to the restoration of relations between Panama and the United States and to friendly discussions and adjustments of our common problems and interests.

U.S. Policy Toward Communist States

A second group of problems involves directly the central struggle between international communism and the free world. These include such dangerous and explosive issues as Berlin and Germany, Viet-Nam and Laos, and Cuba. In these issues we do and must play a leading role.

Nobody need tell us in the State Department, or in our sister departments or agencies, that this world struggle is for keeps. Knowing what the Communists are up to and understanding their varied techniques are a major order of business in the State Department. We are fully aware that Moscow, as well as Peiping, remains committed to the Communist world revolution—and that, although they may differ over current tactics, both are determined to "bury" us and are prepared to try to expedite our demise by whatever means they think are effective within the levels of tolerable risk to themselves.

The first objective of our policy toward the Communist states is to prevent them from extending their domains—and to make it costly, dangerous, and futile for them to try to do so. To that end we maintain a nuclear deterrent of almost unimaginable power, and large, varied, and mobile conventional forces. We have also improved our capacity to deal with guerrilla warfare.

Not since Korea has the Communist world attempted to expand by frontal assault. We and other free nations must be determined to put an end also to indirect aggression—to the filtering of men and arms across the frontiers, whether in Southeast Asia, Latin America, or anywhere else.

We also combat Communist imperialism by helping the developing countries to make economic and social progress.

In the main, the world struggle is going well from our viewpoint. West Berlin remains free and prosperous. So does Western Europe as a whole. So does Japan. Many of the less developed nations have moved ahead impressively. And almost all of them, old and new nations alike, are stubbornly defending their independence.

Meanwhile, the Communist world is not only torn by disputes but beset with economic difficulties. The standard of living in mainland China is even lower than it was in 1957, before the "great leap" backward. The Soviet Union has done somewhat better but has encountered a slowdown in growth rates and critical problems of resource allocation. The smaller Communist countries of Eastern Europe lag far behind Western Europe. Even with massive Soviet support, Cuba's economy is limping badly. And nearly all the Communist countries have large and conspicuous difficulties in producing food. The notion that communism is a shortcut to the future for developing nations has been proved false.

While we curb Communist imperialism, we seek agreements with our adversaries to reduce the dangers of a devastating war. The Soviets appear to recognize that they have a common interest with us in preventing a thermonuclear exchange. We and they have reached a few limited agreements. These do not yet constitute a *détente*. We shall continue to search for further agreements. But in the field of disarmament not much progress can be made until the Soviets are prepared to accept reliable verification and inspection of arms retained. And on many vital issues Moscow's views and the West's remain far apart.

Beyond curbing Communist imperialism and trying to achieve specific agreements to reduce the danger of a great war, there is a third element in our policy toward the Communist states. This is to encourage the trends within the Communist world toward national independence, peaceful cooperation, and open societies. These trends are visible in various degrees in different parts of the Communist world. Our capacity to encourage them is very limited. But we may be able to influence them somewhat.

We believe that we can best further our objectives by adjusting our policies to the differ-

ing behavior of different Communist states—or to the changing behavior of the same state.

U.S. Concern About Free-World Disputes

A third category of problems might be labeled "other people's quarrels." The postwar explosion in the number of new states has multiplied disputes about boundaries, some old and some new. These are sometimes accentuated by racial, religious, and tribal frictions whose origins precede the discovery of America. And we are learning that small countries, too, can fear small neighbors.

Then, there are internal outbreaks of violence and coups which add to the headlines, and often to our headaches. In 1963 there were 12 forcible overturns of governments.

Passions are flammable, and all too often the fuse is dangerously short. Ambition and guns seem to be in ready supply. Responsibility and public order are too often in short supply.

Two questions therefore arise—understandably. One is: Does the United States really have to be concerned about all of these quarrels? This question is asked frequently in the Department of State when a new dispute within the free world arises or an old one flares again. And the answer almost always turns out to be: Yes, we do.

Remote and complex as some of these quarrels may be, the reasons for our interest are direct and simple. Unless they are quickly settled through other channels, most of them come to the United Nations, where we have to take a position. The U.N. Security Council is presently seized with 61 matters, of which 57 are disputes. Fortunately, some of these disputes are no longer active. But many are. As a responsible member of the U.N. we could not avoid some involvement in these disputes even if we felt little real concern about them.

Usually, however, we do feel real concern. Disputes within the free world often give the Communists opportunities to cause more serious trouble. And there is often the danger that dispute will lead to crisis, crisis to skirmish, skirmish to local war, and local war with conventional weapons to a confrontation, deliberate or by suction, of the nuclear powers. As long as that possibility exists, the United States has a fundamental national security interest in the peaceful settlement of such disputes.

Then, too, disputes within the free world dissipate energies and resources which are needed for constructive purposes. We have an enduring long-term interest in building the strength of the free world. And we have a dollars-and-cents interest in the most effective use of the aid we provide to the developing nations. If India and Pakistan would settle their quarrels and cooperate with each other in the common defense of the South Asian subcontinent, not only would that part of the world be more secure, but both countries could improve the living standards of their peoples more rapidly and at less cost, overall, to themselves and to the nations which are assisting them.

Finally, we simply are too big to hide: We happen to be the most powerful nation in the world. Parties to any dispute like to have strong friends on their respective sides of the barricades.

I do not recall an international dispute of the last 3 years in which each party has not solicited our support and suggested what we should do to bring our weight to bear against its opponent. Much as we may dislike it, this, of course, often puts us in the middle. But it is from the middle that influence for a peaceful solution can often be exerted.

In this process we obviously cannot agree with all the parties, nor can we usually agree 100 percent with either party. So, to the extent that we are drawn in, we usually leave both sides somewhat dissatisfied and, on occasion, a bit angry with us. The role of the peacemaker is usually thankless, at least on the part of the parties to the dispute. But it is a responsibility we dare not shirk.

Sharing Peacekeeping Responsibilities

Does this mean that the United States must be the policeman—and the judge—for the entire free world? That is the second of the two general questions about our role in "other people's quarrels." The answer is no. It is impracticable and would be presumptuous for one nation to try to patrol every "beat" in the free world.

There are other—and better—ways of making

and keeping peace. These lie in the activities of groups of nations either informal or organized. The advantages are perhaps obvious. But, as the late Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once said: "We need education in the obvious more than investigation of the obscure."

In some cases, a few important neighbors or other friends may be helpful. In others, regional organizations, such as the Organization of American States and the Organization of African Unity, may be useful. In still others, the United Nations may be the most effective instrument.

An international organization is often more acceptable politically than any of its members acting individually. The flag of the United Nations is the emblem of a world community. It can be flown in places where the flag of another sovereign nation would be considered an affront.

When we act in concert with others, the responsibility for success—or failure—is shared. And when we contribute to international peacekeeping missions, the costs also are shared.

There has been some suggestion that the United States has carried somewhat more than its fair share of the financial load, while other nations have carried less than their share or none at all.

Of course we think that all nations should carry their fair share at all times. But not all nations have agreed with us; some have been opposed to keeping or restoring the peace because they believed their interests would be served by conflict.

If we have carried a substantial share of the load, it has been because we considered it in our national interest to do so. That was the case in the Congo. President Eisenhower passed up a request from the Government of the Congo to intervene directly and turned, instead, to the United Nations. When President Kennedy took office, he reviewed the situation and decided to adhere to that policy. Eventually we bore something more than our normal share of the cost of this United Nations operation, but the expense to us was unquestionably much less than that of alternative ways of restoring order and keeping the Communists from establishing a base in this potentially rich country in the heart of Africa.

Now the United Nations has undertaken to restore order and peace in Cyprus and to mediate the dispute between Cypriots of Greek and Turkish descent. The settlement of this dispute involving two of our NATO allies and the security of NATO's southeastern flank is of vital interest to us and all the free world.

It is in our national interest, and in the national interest of all peaceful countries, to help create, train, and finance workable and effective international police machinery—to share our own capacity to act in the service of peace and to share responsibility for keeping the peace.

We applaud the decisions taken by the Nordic countries and by Canada and Holland to earmark and train special units to be on call for peacekeeping duties with the United Nations. We therefore shall continue to work for a much more reliable system of financing such operations: The thought that the issue of peace or war might turn on the availability of relatively small amounts of money is an offense to mind and morals.

But I do not want to place all the emphasis on a police force ready to rush out after disputes have broken into violence. The first order of business is to seek a resolution before violence occurs. And this, of course, means early recourse to negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and any techniques of factfinding and observation that can help to clarify and de-fuse incipient threats to the peace.

If this can be done through regional organizations without recourse to the United Nations, so much the better. If it can be done directly—or with the assistance of an impartial third party—better still. But, the world being what it is, more and more of these disputes are likely, in one form or another, to come before the United Nations.

The United Nations is an imperfect organization; no one knows that better than the policymakers and policy executors who work in it and through it. The need for various improvements in the United Nations machinery has become increasingly clear. And not all of these require amendment of the charter. Recently I suggested the consideration of several steps to improve the procedures of the General Assembly—steps designed to limit irresponsible talk

and symbolic resolutions and to promote responsible decisions and recommendations, decisions and recommendations which will have the support of the nations which supply the U.N. with resources and have the capacity to act.[4]

Despite the difficulties which it has obviously experienced, the United Nations commands our continuing support. As President Johnson said to the General Assembly last December 17:[5]

> . . . more than ever we support the United Nations as the best instrument yet devised to promote the peace of the world and to promote the well-being of mankind.

Building a Decent World Order

Improving and strengthening the United Nations is an important part—but only a part—of our greatest task: the building of a decent world order. Today our nation and our way of life can be safe only if our worldwide environment is safe. By worldwide I mean not only the land, waters, and air of the earth but the adjacent areas of space, as far as man can maintain instruments capable of affecting life on earth. Our worldwide environment will be permanently safe only if mankind succeeds in establishing a decent world order.

An enormous part of our work in the State Department has to do with building, bit by bit, a decent world order. This receives relatively little attention in the headlines, but it goes on, day after day, around the clock. It includes hundreds of international conferences a year, many of them on technical areas of international cooperation and understanding, such as the control of narcotics, commercial aviation, postal services, et cetera.

This vast, constructive task is the heart of all we are doing to develop closer ties between ourselves and other countries of the free world. It underlies our efforts to build under the umbrella of the NATO alliance an effective Atlantic community and to achieve closer unity with our friends in the Pacific. It underlies our efforts to execute the grand design of an Alliance for Progress among the nations of this hemisphere. It underlies our efforts to create an effective partnership between the economically advanced countries and those that are newly developing.

This vast, constructive task involves the lowering of barriers to world trade. It involves our foreign aid programs, which support the independence and the economic and social progress of the developing countries. It involves all that we do to promote cultural and other exchanges with other nations.

We do not—and must not—allow the drumfire of crises in the headlines to cause us to neglect the building of a decent world order, the kind of world set forth in the preamble and articles 1 and 2 of the Charter of the United Nations. We are working toward:

—a world free of aggression—aggression by whatever means;

—a world of independent nations, each with the institutions of its own choice but cooperating with one another to their mutual advantage;

—a world of economic and social advance for all peoples;

—a world which provides sure and equitable means for the peaceful settlement of disputes and which moves steadily toward a rule of law;

—a world in which the powers of the state over the individual are limited by law and custom, in which the personal freedoms essential to the dignity of man are secure;

—a world free of hate and discrimination based on race, or nationality, or color, or economic or social status, or religious beliefs;

—and a world of equal rights and equal opportunities for the entire human race.

We believe that is the kind of world which most of the peoples of the world want. That is the goal toward which we are working, tenaciously and untiringly. And we are making headway. If we persevere, we shall eventually reach our goal: a world in which the "Blessings of Liberty" are secure for all mankind. We dare not falter. For unless the world is made safe for freedom, our own freedom cannot survive.

There are those who would quit the struggle by letting down our defenses, by gutting our foreign aid programs, by leaving the United

[4] BULLETIN of Jan. 27, 1964, p. 112.
[5] *Ibid.*, Jan. 6, 1964, p. 2.

Nations. They would abandon the field to our adversaries. That is, of course, what the Communists want most. It is no accident that their favorite slogan is "Yanks, go home." Insofar as anybody here or abroad pays attention to the quitters, they are lending aid and comfort to our enemies. I feel certain that the American people will reject the quitters, with their prescription for retreat and defeat. I believe that the American people have the will and the stamina to push on along the toilsome path to peace.

Third Anniversary of the Alliance for Progress

Address by President Johnson[1]

Thirty-one years ago this month Franklin Roosevelt proclaimed the policy of the Good Neighbor. Three years ago this month John Kennedy called for an Alliance for Progress among the American Republics.[2] Today my country rededicates itself to these principles and renews its commitment to the partnership of the hemisphere to carry them forward.

We meet as fellow citizens of a remarkable hemisphere. Here, a century and a half ago, we began the movement for national independence and freedom from foreign rule which is still the most powerful force in all the world. Here, despite occasional conflict, we have peacefully shared our hemisphere to a degree unmatched by any nation, anywhere.

Here, and in this very room, we have helped create a system of international cooperation which Franklin Roosevelt called "the oldest and the most successful association of sovereign governments anywhere in the world." Here are 20 nations who, sharing the traditions and values of Western civilization, are bound together by a common belief in the dignity of man. Here are 20 nations who have no desire to impose a single ideology or system on anyone else, who believe that each country must follow its own path to fulfillment with freedom, who take strength from the richness of their diversity.

So it is on this—this history and this accomplishment, these common values and this common restraint—that we base our hope for our future. Today these hopes center largely on the Alliance for Progress that you are all so interested in.

John F. Kennedy has been taken from us. The alliance remains a source for our faith and a challenge to our capacity. The Alliance for Progress owes much to the vision of President Kennedy. But he understood that it flows from the desires and ideas of those in each of our countries who seek progress with freedom. In its councils, all nations sit as equals. This is the special significance of CIAP [Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress]—the organization that we honor today. Through it, the alliance will now be guided by the advice and wisdom of men from throughout the hemisphere.

It needs and is getting the best leadership our

[1] Made at the Pan American Union on Mar. 16 on the occasion of the installation of Carlos Sanz de Santamaría as chairman of the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress (White House press release; as-delivered text).

[2] Bulletin of Apr. 3, 1961, p. 471.

continents have to offer. It has such leadership in Carlos Sanz de Santamaría, one of our most distinguished Americans.

Basic Principles of the Alliance

In the last 3 years we have built a structure of common effort designed to endure for many years. In those years much has been accomplished. Throughout Latin America new schools and factories, housing and hospitals have opened new opportunities. Nations have instituted new measures of land and tax reform, educational expansion, and economic stimulus and discipline.

We are proud of these achievements. But as we take pride in what has thus far been done, our minds turn to the great unfinished business. Only by facing these shortcomings, only by fighting to overcome them, can we make our alliance succeed in the years ahead.

Let me make clear what I believe in. They are not failures of principle or failures of belief. The alliance's basic principles of economic development, of social justice, of human freedom, are not only the right path; they are the only path for those who believe that both the welfare and the dignity of man can advance side by side. To those who prize freedom, there just simply is no alternative.

There is no magic formula to avoid the complex and the sometimes painful and difficult task of basic social reform and economic advance. There is no simple trick that will transform despair into hope, that will turn misery and disease into abundance and health. Those who think that the path of progress in this hemisphere will be easy or painless are arousing false hopes and are inviting disappointment.

The criticism which can give us new vigor and which must guide us is of those who share our beliefs but offer us better ways to move toward better goals. We have learned much about the difficulties and the flaws of our alliance in the past 3 years. We must today profit from this experience. With faith in our principles, with pride in our achievements, with the help of candid and constructive criticism, we are now prepared to move ahead with renewed effort and renewed confidence.

Need for Increased Cooperation

The first area of emphasis is increased cooperation—among ourselves, with other nations, with private and public institutions. We will continue our efforts to protect producing nations against disastrous price changes so harmful to their economies, and consumers against short supply and unfair price rises. We will intensify our cooperation in the use of our resources in the process of development. CIAP itself is an important step in that direction, and CIAP has our full support.

But other institutions as well—the Inter-American and World Banks, the private foundations and cooperatives, the savings institutions and sources of agricultural credit—must in every country focus their energies on the efforts to overcome the massive difficulties of capital shortage and hunger and lack of adequate educational facilities.

So that my own country's participation in this cooperation might receive needed leadership and direction, I have given Secretary Mann, who enjoys my highest confidence, broad responsibility for our role in the alliance.[3] His appointment reflects my complete determination to meet all the commitments of the United States to the alliance.

Our pledge of substantial external help has been met in the past, and my administration will spare no effort to meet it in the future, and my confidence is reinforced by my knowledge that the people of the United States also support that commitment to our fellow Americans.

We urge and we welcome the constructive contribution of developed nations outside this hemisphere. We believe in diversity in the modern world. We can all learn from one another. Capital, technical know-how, access to markets, fair prices for basic commodities—all of these will contribute to the rapid development which is the goal of all of us.

But public funds are not enough. We must work together to insure the maximum use of

[3] Thomas C. Mann is Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Special Assistant to the President, and U.S. Coordinator for the Alliance for Progress. For text of a letter of Dec. 15, 1963, from President Johnson to Mr. Mann at the time of his appointment, see *ibid.*, Jan. 6, 1964, p. 9.

private capital, domestic and foreign; without it, growth will certainly fall far behind. Such capital will respond to a stable prospect of fair earnings and a chance to create badly needed industry and business on a responsible and safe and sound basis. Those who destroy the confidence of risk capital, or deny it a chance to offer its energy and talent, endanger the hopes of their people for a more abundant life, because our abundant life flows from that energy and from that talent that we have given a chance.

The Area of Self-Help

The second area of emphasis is the area of self-help. Progress cannot be created by forming international organizations. Progress cannot be imposed by foreign countries. Progress cannot be purchased with large amounts of money or even with large amounts of good will.

Progress in each country depends upon the willingness of that country to mobilize its own resources, to inspire its own people, to create the conditions in which growth can and will flourish, for although help can come from without, success must come only from within. Those who are not willing to do that which is unpopular and that which is difficult will not achieve that which is needed or that which will be lasting. This is as true of my own country's fight against poverty and racial injustice as it is of the fight of others against hunger and disease and illiteracy—the ancient enemies of all mankind.

By broadening education, we can liberate new talents and energy, freeing millions from the bonds of illiteracy. Through land reform aimed at increased production, taking different forms in each country, we can provide those who till the soil with self-respect and increased income, and each country with increased production to feed the hungry and to strengthen their economy.

Fair and progressive taxes, effectively collected, can provide the resources that are needed to improve education and public-health conditions and the social structure that is needed for economic growth. Measures ranging from control of inflation and encouragement of exports to the elimination of deficits in public enterprises can help provide the basis of economic stability and growth on which our alliance can flourish.

The Pursuit of Social Justice

The third area of emphasis is the pursuit of social justice. Development and material progress are not ends in themselves. They are means to a better life and means to an increased opportunity for us all. They are the means for each to contribute his best talents and each to contribute his best desires. They are the means to the full dignity of man, for the Alliance for Progress is a recognition that the claims of the poor and the oppressed are just claims. It is an effort to fulfill those claims while at the same time strengthening democratic society and maintaining the liberty of man.

So, no matter how great our progress, it will lack meaning unless every American from the Indian of the Andes to the impoverished farmer of Appalachia can share in the fruits of change and growth. Land reform, tax changes, education expansion, the fight against disease all contribute to this end. Everything else that we must do must be shaped by these guiding principles. In these areas—cooperation, self-help, social justice—new emphasis can bring us closer to success.

At the same time we must protect the alliance against the efforts of communism to tear down all that we are building. The recent proof of Cuban aggression in Venezuela is only the latest evidence of those intentions. We will soon discuss how best we can meet these threats to the independence of us all. But I now, today, assure you that the full power of the United States is ready to assist any country whose freedom is threatened by forces dictated from beyond the shores of this continent.

The United States and Panama

Let me now depart for a moment from my main theme to speak of the differences that have developed between Panama and the United States.

Our own position is clear, and it has been from the first hour that we learned of the dis-

turbances. The United States will meet with Panama any time, anywhere, to discuss anything, to work together, to cooperate with each other, to reason with one another, to review and to consider all of our problems together, to tell each other all our opinions, all our desires, and all our concerns, and to aim at solutions and answers that are fair and just and equitable without regard to the size or the strength or the wealth of either nation.

We don't ask Panama to make any precommitments before we meet, and we intend to make none. Of course, we cannot begin on this work until diplomatic relations are resumed, but the United States is ready today, if Panama is ready. As of this moment, I do not believe that there has been a genuine meeting of the minds between the two Presidents of the two countries involved.

Press reports indicate that the Government of Panama feels that the language which has been under consideration for many days commits the United States to a rewriting and to a revision of the 1903 treaty. We have made no such commitment, and we would not think of doing so before diplomatic relations are resumed and unless a fair and satisfactory adjustment is agreed upon.

Faith in the Power of Freedom

Those of us who have gathered here today must realize that we are the principal guardians of the Alliance for Progress. But the alliance is not here, and it is not in office buildings; it is not in meeting rooms in presidential mansions throughout the hemisphere. The alliance is in the aspirations of millions of farmers and workers, of men without education, of men without hope, of poverty-stricken families whose homes are the villages and the cities of an entire continent.

They ask simply the opportunity to enter into the world of progress and to share in the growth of the land. From their leaders, from us, they demand concern and compassion and dedicated leadership and dedicated labor.

I am confident that in the days to come we will be able to meet those needs. It will not be an easy task. The barriers are huge. The enemies of our freedom seek to harass us at every turn. We are engaged in a struggle for the destiny of the American Republics, but it was a great poet, William Butler Yeats, who reminded us that there was doubt if any nation can become prosperous unless it has national faith. Our alliance will prosper because, I believe, we do have that faith. It is not idle hope but the same faith that enabled us to nourish a new civilization in these spacious continents, and in that new world we will carry forward our Alliance for Progress in such a way that men in all lands will marvel at the power of freedom to achieve the betterment of man.

Letters of Credence

Honduras

The newly appointed Ambassador of Honduras, Hernan Corrales Padilla, presented his credentials to President Johnson on March 16. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 118 dated March 16.

U.S. Prepared To Review Differences With Panama

Statement by President Johnson [1]

The present inability to resolve our differences with Panama is a source of deep regret.

Our two countries are not linked by only a single agreement or a single interest. We are bound together in an inter-American system whose objective is, in the words of the charter, ". . . through their mutual understanding and respect for the sovereignty of each one, to provide for the betterment of all . . . ."

Under the many treaties and declarations which form the fabric of that system, we have long been allies in the struggle to strengthen democracy and enhance the welfare of our people.

[1] Read to news correspondents by President Johnson on Mar. 21 (White House press release).

Our history is witness to this essential unity of interest and belief. Panama has unhesitatingly come to our side, twice in this century, when we were threatened by aggression. On December 7, 1941, Panama declared war on our attackers even before our own Congress had time to act. Since that war, Panama has wholeheartedly joined with us, and our sister Republics, in shaping the agreements and goals of this continent.

We have also had a special relationship with Panama, for they have shared with us the benefits, the burdens and trust of maintaining the Panama Canal as a lifeline of defense and a keystone of hemispheric prosperity. All free nations are grateful for the effort they have given to this task.

As circumstances change, as history shapes new attitudes and expectations, we have reviewed periodically this special relationship.

We are well aware that the claims of the Government of Panama, and of the majority of the Panamanian people, do not spring from malice or hatred of America. They are based on a deeply felt sense of the honest and fair needs of Panama. It is, therefore, our obligation as allies and partners to review these claims and to meet them, when meeting them is both just and possible.

We are ready to do this.

We are prepared to review every issue which now divides us, and every problem which the Panama Government wishes to raise.

We are prepared to do this at any time and at any place.

As soon as he is invited by the Government of Panama, our Ambassador will be on his way. We shall also designate a special representative. He will arrive with full authority to discuss every difficulty. He will be charged with the responsibility of seeking a solution which recognizes the fair claims of Panama and protects the interests of all the American nations in the canal. We cannot determine, even before our meeting, what form that solution might best take. But his instructions will not prohibit any solution which is fair, and subject to the appropriate constitutional processes of both our Governments.

I hope that on this basis we can begin to resolve our problems and move ahead to confront the real enemies of this hemisphere—the enemies of hunger and ignorance, disease and injustice. I know President Chiari shares this hope. For, despite today's disagreements, the common values and interests which unite us are far stronger and more enduring than the differences which now divide us.

United States and Norway Extend Educational Exchange Program

Press release 113 dated March 16

Secretary Rusk and Norwegian Foreign Minister Halvard M. Lange signed at Washington on March 16 an agreement extending the binational program of educational exchanges under the Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961. The amended agreement provides for the first time for the program to be jointly financed by Norway and the United States. Under the same act, similar joint financing agreements have been entered into with the Federal Republic of Germany, Austria, and Sweden.

It is the intention of the U.S. Government, subject to appropriation of funds, to contribute the equivalent in Norwegian kroner of $1 million to the financing of this program. The Royal Norwegian Government plans a contribution of 500,000 kroner ($70,000). The program level for the 1964–65 academic year has been established at the equivalent in kroner of $214,000, of which $200,000 will be contributed by the U.S. Government and $14,000 by the Government of Norway.

The original U.S. educational exchange agreement with Norway was signed on May 25, 1949.[1] It is noteworthy that Mr. Lange signed for Norway on that occasion and has also signed all three of the intervening amended agreements[2] between the United States and Norway.

Since the initiation of the program in 1949 the U.S. Educational Foundation in Norway has administered grants to 1,394 Norwegian citizens who have traveled to the United States, and to 478 U.S. citizens who have gone to Norway.

[1] Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2000.
[2] TIAS 3118, 3282, and 4503.

Ambassadors and AID Mission Chiefs in Latin America Meet

The Department of State announced on March 18 (press release 125) that on that day U.S. ambassadors and AID mission chiefs in Latin America had completed 3 days of joint consultations with senior officials in the Department of State and other agencies of the Government. President Johnson met with the ambassadors and other Department officials at the conclusion of their sessions.

On March 16 the President, the ambassadors, the AID mission chiefs, the Latin American ambassadors in the United States, and State Department officials participated in ceremonies held at the Pan American Union to install Carlos Sanz de Santamaría as chairman of the newly created Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress.[1]

The joint consultations on overall U.S. policy in the hemisphere were arranged to give officials from the field an opportunity to engage in a full exchange of views with those in Washington responsible for formulating U.S. policy in Latin America, particularly in relation to Alliance for Progress operations. The exchange of views included a discussion of the reorganization of the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs.[2]

The meeting afforded an opportunity to hold a country-by-country review of political, economic, and social conditions in Latin America. The meeting also provided an opportunity to discuss programs of all other Government agencies whose activities have foreign policy implications besides those directly involved, namely State, AID, USIA, and the Peace Corps.

Officials from the State Department who participated in the meetings included Secretary Rusk, Under Secretary Ball, Under Secretary Harriman, Assistant Secretary Cleveland, and Assistant Secretary Johnson, as well as AID Administrator Bell and Assistant Secretary Mann.

Carl T. Rowan, Director of USIA, Agriculture Secretary Orville L. Freeman, Commerce Secretary Luther H. Hodges, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, and Treasury Assistant Secretary John C. Bullitt also participated in the meetings.

Representatives from Congress and from outside the Government also participated in the meeting. Senators Wayne Morse and Hubert H. Humphrey addressed the ambassadors and discussed with them congressional attitudes affecting U.S. foreign policy. AFL–CIO President George Meany also addressed the meeting in a discussion of labor conditions in Latin America.

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[1] See p. 535.

[2] Following is the text of a statement read to news correspondents on Mar. 16 by Richard I. Phillips, Director of the Office of News:

"Thomas C. Mann, Assistant Secretary of State and United States Coordinator for the Alliance for Progress, will be responsible for the policy direction of U.S. economic assistance programs in Latin America that are within the broad framework of the Agency for International Development. The new arrangement will help carry out President Johnson's call for the United States to speak with one voice on Latin American affairs. It also reflects the President's instruction that the Alliance for Progress receive priority in all AID operations.

"In December the President appointed Mr. Mann as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and announced that he would have broad authority over all Latin American activities of the U.S. Government. With the approval of Secretary Rusk, David E. Bell, Administrator of AID, has delegated to Mr. Mann the authorities of an AID Assistant Administrator with respect to loans, grants, and extended risk guaranties, as well as the selection and assignment of AID Latin American personnel in Washington and overseas missions. Exercise of this authority in cases of exceptional magnitude, significant departures from general AID policies, and in appointments to top-level jobs will be subject to Mr. Bell's concurrence.

"The new arrangement will assure more closely combined operation of the geographic 'desks' in the Department of State's Bureau of Inter-American Affairs and AID's Bureau for Latin America. Under the arrangement the number of office directors will be increased from six to ten, the functional offices in the AID Bureau for Latin America will be retained, and the staff offices will continue to give advisory and supporting services to the alliance operations.

"Mr. William D. Rogers, who is Deputy U.S. Coordinator for the Alliance for Progress, will serve as Mr. Mann's deputy for AID matters."

Journalism and Foreign Affairs

by Robert J. Manning
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs[1]

One in my line of government work, when he faces an audience of journalists, has the difficult choice of talking directly about his own work or dabbling more generally in foreign affairs.

The second alternative is probably easier, and certainly less risky. But I would prefer to talk tonight mostly about our business—journalism and foreign affairs. I think there is much we can discuss; so I'll take the risk that before the night is out, I'll have proved myself akin to the Mark Twainian Daniel whom God, as the story goes "ordered forth into the lion's den, but he slipped and came in tenth."

Information gaps are probably inevitable in the best informed societies, and ours is no exception, however clearly defined the issues of foreign policy may be. What I have been struck by in the past few years are the special reasons for such a gap today—and the special peril it holds.

The reasons lie, of course, in the nature of our world. We live at the floodtide of change in all the continents. We are confronted with a totalitarian ideology that seeks our destruction. And we are riding the crest of a revolution in science and technology.

Each of the challenges we face would tax the wisdom, the ingenuity, and the patience of any generation of Americans. Together they pose a test greater than any our nation has confronted. Most acutely, they pose a test of public understanding.

This is a test made difficult by our history. We Americans are the product of a century of precious isolation. We developed our nation behind the protective shield of great oceans. In the mid-19th century Alexis de Tocqueville wrote that the American system of government was the best ever invented by man. He predicted it would be adequate to meet the needs of our society for many generations, unless the United States became actively involved in foreign affairs. The perceptive Frenchman did not try to predict what would happen in that eventuality because he considered it unlikely. Needless to say, it has happened, and with a vengeance.

Since World War II we have catapulted to a position of world leadership and full world responsibility. Yet our training as a nation for such leadership and responsibility has been minimal. The great and complex problems of this age are difficult enough for our policymakers to comprehend. How then are they to be adequately explained to and contributed to by the general public?

This Republic is in great peril when the public is inadequately informed. We see in many parts of our country today the results of public confusion on questions of foreign policy—a growing sense of frustration, among some groups, that has given rise to extremism; a quest for easy, quick "answers"; a search for scapegoats; a demand for such contradictory "solutions" as smaller budgets and "total victory," higher tariffs and freer trade, cheap security and reckless venturesomeness.

[1] Address made before the third annual government relations workshop of the National Editorial Association at Washington, D.C., on Mar. 13 (press release 109).

Without question, the subject matter of foreign policy is growing more complex. A great deal is happening all the time in foreign affairs all around our planet and, with the advent of rockets, in outer space as well.

We have our own national interest, our own set of foreign policies and foreign crises. These are diverse and complicated to a degree that frequently agonizes the most knowledgeable experts. But ours is a world of 120 other countries, of 120 other foreign policies, of 120 other sets of national goals or national appetites. Keeping track of what is going on, and translating it into terms understandable by large numbers of citizens, is a task that challenges both the press and the government departments concerned with foreign policy, primarily, of course, the Department of State and the White House.

Altering the "Adversary Relationship"

The relationship of you, the press, and us in government in our open society is not a simple thing. It is at least as variegated as human nature, and vulnerable to human frailty. The traditional stance of the press confronting government is the adversary relationship; its heraldic sign is crossed swords with bar sinister on a field of spilled ink. In domestic political matters excessive coziness between any element of the press and a reigning political group quickly and properly draws criticism.

In foreign affairs, however, I question whether the old-fashioned adversary relationship is sufficient to the delicate task our nation faces these days on the world scene. When you print the news, to an important extent you make the larger facts. What the press chooses to emphasize frequently becomes the postulates of public opinion (though I have some reservations on this point) and as such can become an important ingredient of policy. In such a situation is the public interest best served when the press and government stand on separate pedestals and snipe at each other across a mythical abyss? I think you will agree that the answer is no—and that journalism as well as government is aware of the need for something more. I suggest that accurate reporting perhaps requires a closer relationship than may have been traditional, perhaps a closer one than some here tonight would consider wise or possible.

On the basis of long experience in journalism and 2 years' experience in government, I suggest a direct cross-fertilization between American journalism and American government. Let me be as precise as possible, so as to avoid misunderstanding: The separation of journalism and government is as basic and as advisable as separation of church and state. Government intrusion into the functioning of journalism—whether by censorship, by regulatory controls, by economic penetration, or political manipulation—would represent serious jeopardy to our political system.

That accepted, there is more to be said about the subject. Countless times in these last 2 years I have wished that officials in government knew more about journalism, its needs, its practices, its uses, and its shortcomings. Even more convinced am I that journalists—most of them—need to know more, much more, about government, how it works, why it works and, sometimes, does not work; how decisions are made and how they are not made; what are the facts as against the myths and misconceptions.

There is one direct way to accomplish this. Journalism should encourage some of its top established hands, and some of its more promising new hands, to take leave for intervals of a year or two in government service. The government would profit from the infusion of versatility, energy, and enterprise that makes a good newspaperman. The newspaperman would become a wiser and more valuable craftsman. On his return, the newspaper reader would be better served and better informed.

The opportunities for newspapermen in government are not by any means confined to information work (which in many ways is the least demanding and least rewarding of the many activities for which a competent newsman is fitted). The governmental careers of men like Carl Rowan, William Attwood, and John Bartlow Martin, to name a few, suggest the high quality of service and imagination that a journalistic background can produce.

I suppose there are still some editors and publishers who, while sipping at the 19th hole with leaders of industry, banking, and commerce, will shake their heads and maintain that a newspaperman who enters into public service somehow taints himself for further journalism. It seems unfortunate that such thinking should survive the kerosene lamp and the automobile crank. I can think literally of no activity that has been more educational to me as a journalist than these past 2 years in government. In a time when, as H. G. Wells says, "human history becomes more and more a race between education and catastrophe," I heartily recommend a few semesters in Washington or at an embassy overseas.

Whatever steps might be taken to alter or improve the old adversary relationship, one point must be emphasized from the outset: It should neither suggest nor require any abdication of the critical faculties of the reporter and editor. Quite the contrary, the more thorough knowledge which skilled reporters today accumulate about what is happening in foreign affairs serves to invigorate, not weaken, the function of responsible criticism. On a subject like South Viet-Nam—unquestionably one of the most difficult and sensitive issues confronting us—the access to information within the government that has been available to the press has provided the basis for the considerable number of well-informed and critical editorials that have appeared in recent weeks.

Irresponsible criticism is, of course, a different matter, but there is a very high correlation between misinformation, or lack of information, and the kind of wild criticism that graces the "hate sheets" of the right and reveals itself in the latent paranoia of a few newspapers and correspondents around the country. The reckless charges that pass for comment in these forums cannot survive exposure to information. It is no coincidence that with rare exceptions the writers (I hesitate to dignify them, and besmirch the craft, by calling them reporters) who regularly produce the most startling accusations about the State Department do not call my office or any other section of the Department to ask questions or check conclusions. Apparently they feel their concoctions will clang more loudly if not muted by the facts.

"A House With Many Windows"

Leaving aside this category—in which, by the way, I place none of the regular State Department correspondents—it does seem to me that on the whole the job of communicating information about foreign policy is one that the press and the government have in common, not one in which our interests are opposed. The basic elements of my present job are remarkably similar to that of a reporter: to get out the news—fast, accurate, and as complete as possible. Nearly always my associates—several of whom are also former newsmen—and I are in the position of working with, not against, the reporters who cover foreign news and call us daily, if not hourly.

Information flows from the State Department in many ways. In testimony last year before Congressman [John E.] Moss's subcommittee on government information, James Reston of the New York Times described the Department as a "gabby outfit." Ours is a house with many windows, and its daily information output is enormous. Anyone who, as I have, has served as a correspondent in a foreign capital will vouch for the truth of the statement that nowhere in the world are reporters given such complete and unfettered access to the makers and shapers of foreign policy. As a practical matter, every State Department reporter has a government telephone directory which tells him what every officer in the Department does and who's in charge of what desk, area, or section. A reporter is not confined to a few known sources. Whatever the subject that arises, he can quickly pinpoint the individuals with responsibility and can call them directly, by direct dial, without having to filter through a central switchboard. Even home telephone numbers are provided—and are regularly used by reporters with late-breaking deadlines. The newsmen assigned to the State Department make wide use of this access-by-telephone every day. It is a source of information at least as important as the regular press briefings by the Department spokesman and the Secretary of State. Naturally, as in any area, he has to build his own network of sources who are able and willing to serve him. But the sources are there to be cultivated.

In addition, considerable use is made of background briefings. This is the device, treasured by reporters everywhere, whereby a high official will discuss subjects but not for direct quotation and not for attribution. The stories that result are generally authoritative and accurate, and they contribute greatly to the supply of information publicly available about United States foreign relations. They provide important guidance on the government's thinking on a given topic.

I have listened to a lot of nonsense about the so-called iniquity of the background briefing, but most of it comes from distant critics who make me agree with Josh Billings that "it is better to know nothing than to know what ain't so." Anybody with experience in reporting knows two things. One is that a reporter is only as good as his ability to separate fact from fancy, bogus from real. Another is that there is no such thing as goldfish-bowl diplomacy. Show me a businessman who conducts his business in a high-pitched voice at noon on Main Street, and I'll show you a diplomat who does his work by talking out loud on the front page of the Washington Post.

Heisenberg's principle of uncertainty in nuclear physics has a close analogy in foreign relations: It is usually not possible to describe a diplomatic situation publicly, however accurately, without changing it and making it different. The public comment itself becomes part of the situation. An on-the-record statement by the Secretary of State, be it a prepared speech or a response to a question, is instantly filmed, recorded, printed, and otherwise communicated, with all the speed of modern telecommunications, to a mixed audience of friends, partners, skeptics, and enemies all around the globe. Many are ready to seize on a single ill-considered word and blow it up for propaganda purposes. As a consequence, important comments issued formally on the record by high officials often must be planned as carefully as a surgical operation so that no listeners anywhere can have reason to misunderstand or abuse what is said.

That is why most newsmen highly value the background device, which permits a policy officer to speak freely and informally to let reporters in on his thinking without giving our cold-war adversaries the same access. At the briefing conferences conducted twice a year at the Department for the press and other media a mixture of on-record and background discussions have been used. After the most recent conference, we asked the participants to comment on this point; the 800 replies we received favored background briefings by four to one.

In a sense the background rule makes it possible for the government to take a reporter into its confidence. This calls for good faith on both sides, and it is nearly always present. The exceptions are happily infrequent, though no less irritating when they occur. It is a procedure that can be abused. It is an abuse, for example, for the government to use this method to float trial balloons, as a way to sample public opinion without choosing sides in advance, or in any way to mislead or misinform. It can be abused by reporters who fail to maintain the distinction between it and on-the-record briefings. But despite these pitfalls, its overall utility is great. The fact that a knife can be used to kill is no reason to eat with our fingers. The best safeguard against misuse of backgrounders lies in the skill and integrity of the reporters themselves. What is said on background or not for quotation is subject to the same acid tests of accuracy and relevancy as any other government pronouncement, and rightly so.

Joint Responsibility in "Areas of Nondisclosure"

Let me examine another aspect of the government-press relationship. It is frequently argued that it is the government's responsibility to keep secrets, the responsibility of the press to get them and print them. "The press lives by disclosure," opined the Times of London in 1851. If a foreign agent came into the State Department and managed to procure secret information, he would be liable to prosecution and a heavy sentence. When a reporter does the same thing, he wins praise from his editor and gets nominated for prizes. The story is printed, and either way our enemies can read it.

In the year 1964 I think that this simplified, traditional view of the role of the government

and the role of the press is out of date. I prefer to think that the responsibility both for informing the public and for maintaining certain areas of nondisclosure is one which is shared by the press and the government. To be sure, the press's responsibility is heavily weighted toward full disclosure: I would not wish it otherwise. But I believe, and I think I speak for the majority of reporters, that we would lose an important ingredient of the relationship of trust that is basic to how the press gets along with government if the press did not recognize its responsibility in circumstances of great national importance to help us keep some secrets.

I feel that I am on solid ground when I say this because I know from my experience in the past year that with rare exceptions the reporters who regularly cover the Department of State do recognize this responsibility. I know one reporter, for example, who is still sitting on a dramatic first-person story of his involvement in a recent great international crisis. Many others have happened upon or otherwise uncovered information which if immediately divulged would have caused us serious difficulties. They did not immediately rush it into print, recognizing that to do so would not serve their own interests as responsible journalists seeking to report the news accurately and fully, and might seriously prejudice American foreign policy objectives or national security.

Thirst for Foreign Policy Information Rising

The responsibility for getting the news out is also one that we share. A great many things happen each day, only a few of which come to public attention—not because they are kept secret but because they are not considered news. The press itself is highly selective. Only a fraction of the information that pours into a typical city room survives the cutting and paring process called editing and makes its way into print. Douglass Cater has written that the power of the press:

> . . . stems from its ability to select—to define what is news and what isn't. In Washington on an average day, a good many hundreds of thousands of words are spoken, tens of dozens of "events" occur. The press decides which of those words and events shall receive the prompt attention of millions and which, like timber falling in a deep and uninhabited forest, shall crash silently to the ground.

Several independent studies show that an average of 3 to 8 percent of general news space in American newspapers is devoted to foreign affairs items. The average daily newspaper content of foreign news is 4 to 8 columns. Foreign news actually sent by the Associated Press on its main ticker averages 22,000 words per day, or 27 columns. If nonduplicating items from other wire services plus special reports are included, it can be calculated that the average American daily newspaper provides its readers with well under 20 percent of the foreign news actually reported each day. I simply do not think that is enough.

The problem of making manageable the vast outpouring of news on foreign policy that becomes available each day challenges journalism in many ways. The press often still practices methods of makeup, construction, and play that were in use half a century ago. As a result, editors often seem to be overwhelmed by the torrent of events and their readers have served up to them a daily collection of fragments. That approach to foreign affairs may have made sense when the United States was involved in only one crisis at a time. It no longer suffices today, when we are participants or ringside spectators to 15 to 20 crises at a time. The frequent result is that each day's news on each topic is apt to be so brief, so fragmentary, as to be more misleading than no news at all. Too often, each day's fragment remains a fragment. As a result, in the words of the late Joe Liebling:

> Our present news situation, in the United States, is breaking down to something like the system of water distribution in the Casbah, where peddlers wander about with goatskins of water on small donkeys, and the inhabitants send down an oil tin and a couple of pennies when they feel thirst.

Ironically this comes at a time when the national thirst for foreign policy information is rising. The American people want to know what is happening, how it affects them, what we are doing about it. By any indication, including public opinion polls, more people are concerned about foreign policy than at any time in our history. Still one hears editors insisting

that "the people" don't want to read a lot of foreign affairs guff. I do not believe it.

The inability of the daily media to keep abreast of this rising level of interest is reflected in the success of other enterprises, particularly magazines, which give at least the impression of providing a fuller, connected account of foreign news. Volume of information is not the problem; what is needed rather is a more reflective approach to foreign news which relates the snippets to one another, which locates an event in history as well as geography, and which takes more profound account of the fact that other people's domestic politics often influence their foreign policies.

Some Words of Criticism

I do not want to abuse your hospitality, and I therefore hope that some words of criticism will not be taken amiss; they come from a deep sense of involvement in the profession of journalism and a desire to see improvements. I do not presume to tell you how to behave—for I recognize that there is no mightier potentate than the proprietor of an independent newspaper. Many of you, I know, are editors or publishers of weekly newspapers, and I understand there is solid backing to the claim that weeklies are more extensively and carefully read than many dailies. I understand also that in many cases the weekly is the only newspaper its readers read. On both these counts, therefore, it is depressing to know that so many editors of weeklies disdain to provide their readers with much coverage of national and foreign affairs. I realize there are staffing and money problems, but in this age of communications wizardry, joint efforts, and speedy travel, the weekly community could easily and cheaply build up a service providing solid, well-written, and well-thought-out material on the big world issues.

Another more general characteristic of journalism today should cause more concern than it seems to be causing. The press today suffers from a bad case of complacency and self-righteousness, and is noteworthy among all fraternities that perform public services for its lack of self-criticism.

Our press today is keenly, sometimes even stridently, assertive of its rights and prerogatives, but it has a bad case of laryngitis when it is time to talk about its responsibilities. If Congressman Moss will excuse me, I would like to say that the intellectual quality of a great deal of the testimony delivered to his subcommittee after the Cuban crisis was so low as to remind some of us of the old description of the Platte River in midsummer—2 inches deep and a mile wide at the mouth.

When it comes to actual performance, I think the press in this country can be described as not only the freest and most imaginative but also the most responsible and best in the world. (One could make some reservations; for example, I would say that the very best in British journalism surpasses most of the best in ours.) But we cannot afford to stop where we are and be satisfied. There is still too much tendency among editors to operate on the old-fashioned presumption that the reader has the IQ of a 12-year-old child. There is still that ancient reflex that is mindful of the old Chicago city editor who once in anger called his staff together and said, "What this newspaper needs is some new cliches." There is great truth in the indictment that the press is generally too greatly preoccupied by entertainment, by what it takes to reach the easier side of reader interest.

I have the impression that journalism is not doing enough to recruit and properly train top-level people. I have been struck in years since the war to find that newspapers and magazines, even some very good ones, have to go out and cajole people into journalism. The tendency to call it a profession and pay as if it weren't is still strong, once you get away from the metropolitan areas.

As for the long vaunted "power of the press," where does that stand today? I confess that I am in a somewhat ambiguous state of mind; there are moments when I believe too many in government attach too much power or influence to the press; then there are mornings when I question that this is so. I think we have to concede that the power is indeed very great but that in general the press today is powerful more as an exciter than a provoker, and for the most part a channeler of other people's ideas and arguments. There has been a vast increase in

analytical and interpretive reporting since the war, but still not a great deal of political, intellectual, theological, or philosophical inspiration comes with the average newspaper in America.

So the power of the press directly to influence is in great part a negative power, as it is exerted today; it stems in large part from others' ideas. This is also related to the power of omission that comes from the fact that each day the writers and the editors have to choose which large segments of a very large news budget they are *not* going to pass on to the public. I don't mean to suggest that there is not still in our press the power to do great good (and bad)—great power to make or break careers or ideas—but it is clearly limited, and the chief limit is set by the ability and the willingness of the possessors of this power to use it.

Handling of Foreign Policy News

Coming back to my home ground, the handling of foreign policy news, I would like to comment, if I may, on two other tendencies that seem to me to create problems for all three elements—the newspapers, the readers, and the government.

One is the newspapers' feverish preoccupation not with what has happened but what is going to happen tomorrow. I know State Department correspondents who spend literally hours trying to learn the names of new ambassadorial or other appointees before candidates have even been selected. One prestigious newspaper over a period of several months had two separate "exclusive" stories reporting that a certain official had been picked as ambassador to two different capitals. The diplomat did not go to any one of those posts, and when he was actually appointed to his present post the newspaper neglected to report it. This overpreoccupation with getting ahead of events, to be the first to report what is *going* to happen, results in a lot of wasted motion, a lot of incorrect or highly premature stories, and any number of woes for government officials. More than that, however, it takes journalism's eye off the big part of the game—what *has* happened, what does it mean—to the detriment of us all.

Even the best writers and reporters—and I believe that the corps that covers the Department of State and foreign affairs in Washington is by and large the most diligent and most talented group in journalism—are not always able to rise above the mixture of bugaboo and custom that dictates the structure and the play of stories. They are seriously handicapped by their editors' assumption that it is still possible to report the world's major convolutions as if they are innings in a ball game. This frequently leads to the scorecard wrap-up of a number of otherwise unrelated episodes in foreign affairs, a device that few reporters like but one that many editors cannot resist. Usually the attempt is made to summarize a series of events around the world as "victories" or "defeats" for U.S. policy.

Nothing is easier, and few things are more misleading, than to chart the tides of foreign relations with a limited set of phrases taken from the vocabulary of the sports page. The relations of nations in the world arena are not like a ball game; victory and defeat are not determined by the number of times a ball goes out of the park. Evaluating progress in the cold war—forward, backward, sideways, up or down—is a subtle process, one which the most penetrating analysts usually avoid. They see all too clearly the folly of trying to pick out who's ahead from day to day or week to week.

In a world where ideology confronts ideology, and both face the quickening tides of nationalism; where foreign policy pronouncements by the leader of a nonalined state may be motivated by his domestic politics, and may in fact conflict with firm private assurances to the contrary—and are understood as such by all concerned; where around the globe nations and peoples above all are seeking their own form of development, their own definitions of progress; where Communist states swap insults and plot their own, nationally oriented paths in foreign and domestic policy; where our own alliances experience the natural retrenchments that must occur in a changing world—in such a world "victory" and "defeat" are usually no more than words to be played with.

One of the occupational hazards of trying to keep score in foreign affairs is that it sometimes makes the practitioner look silly. Not even on

the AP's weekly top-ten listings do teams plunge from victory to defeat and back again with the erratic swiftness ascribed to U.S. policy.

About 3 months ago a prominent weekly publication put together a scorecard roundup which opened with the sentence: "Russia, the facts are showing, has lost the cold war." Two months later it printed a similar wrap-up which began: "Troubles of the world look somewhat less alarming than at any time in many years." A third installment, 4 weeks later, was summed up with this opening sentence: "America is going from defeat to defeat in almost every corner of the world." It even carried a map pinpointing the "defeats." Surely this must have strained the credulity of some of the magazine's readers. I venture to suggest that the world has not changed that much in 3 months, and to deal with the matter in such a sophomoric manner verges on insult. The cold war goes on, neither won nor lost, but invariably changing in its manifestation. America is not "going from defeat to defeat" (nor does a globe have corners).

A reporter must always guard against reporting the plausible as the actual, and this is certainly true in foreign affairs. What is likely or logical does not always happen in foreign policy; reporting likelihoods as facts before they come true is not far removed, it seems to me, from other kinds of misreporting.

There is an important difference, it seems to me, between the right of a reporter to pursue information about foreign policy, or any other subject, and the responsibility of his newspaper to print all the data thus uncovered. The right of the reporter to try to find out what is happening is limited only by his enterprise. I do not think any check beyond present security restrictions should be placed on a reporter's right to cover the news, which should be limited solely by his enterprise. But the obligation to disclose by publication is not so absolute.

The press discloses in the name of the public's right to know. But the public also has a right to have its interests defended and advanced in the field of foreign policy and national security. These two rights may come in conflict, and when they do, the public may well prefer success to disclosure. There have been many episodes in the past 2 years—of which the Cuban missile crisis was the most dramatic—where the success of American policy depended very directly on the preservation of a period of privacy during which the policy could be formulated and carried out, where disclosure would have spelled defeat.

Where in these cases does the public interest lie? The public, I submit, has a right *not* to know when knowledge can gravely compromise our security or damage our foreign policy. Many reporters, among them the most able, respect both these rights. But their responsibility is less great than that of their editors, who are the ones who finally select what is printed—and is thus disseminated to the world at large, as well as the American people. It is not an easy responsibility to live with; it raises questions to which no single answer is right.

It is not for a government official to presume the right or the wisdom to settle this problem; it is journalism's to contemplate, and I am sure that many of you have pondered it.

Partnership Between Journalism and Government

I have devoted much time to criticism because I have assumed that you share with me a belief that healthy criticism is always needed among those who labor in the world of ideas. I have not taken pains to reiterate the obvious—that the American press today is indeed the "fourth branch of government," in some ways the branch that is least captive of custom and least fearful to tread where the timid fear to enter.

A revelation of government service has been the discovery that this great partnership between responsible journalism and responsible government—wary, sometimes abrasive, sometimes argumentative—works, and it works for the country.

A great nation devoid of intelligence, wrote Horace Mann, is "an obscene giant," destined despite its power and capacities, to "rush with the speed of a whirlwind to an ignominious end." We are together in striving to assure that this does not become our epitaph.

The perils we live with today are perhaps more subtle than those of World War II or

the early days of the cold war. But they are no less real and probably more pernicious. Undeclared warfare backed by the challenge of thermonuclear weapons is a greater danger than we ever faced in the past. These are problems for all of us in press and government. To a very real extent we are partners in adversity.

Department To Hold Conference for Editors and Broadcasters

The Department of State announced on March 20 (press release 127) that it would hold a national foreign policy conference for editors and broadcasters on April 20 and 21 at Washington. Invitations have been extended by Secretary Rusk to editors and commentators of the daily and periodical press and the broadcasting industry in all 50 States and Puerto Rico.

Secretary Rusk will address the conference. Among other officials expected to participate are Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense; W. W. Rostow, Counselor of the Department of State and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council; David E. Bell, Administrator of the Agency for International Development; Carl T. Rowan, Director of the U.S. Information Agency; Thomas C. Mann, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs; Robert J. Manning, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs; and G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.

A new program feature this year will be a series of concurrent roundtable discussions, to be held on April 20, covering Africa, Eastern Europe, Sino-Soviet relations, Southeast Asia, the Near East, the Western alliance, disarmament, and trade.

The conference will be held under the "background only" ground rule. Plenary sessions will meet in the West Auditorium of the Department of State.

This will be the eighth in a series of national foreign policy conferences for editors and broadcasters. The conference program, begun in April 1961, is intended to assist the information media in making available to the American public the maximum possible information in depth on current foreign policy issues.

To evaluate the effectiveness of these conferences, the Bureau of Public Affairs recently circulated a questionnaire to more than 2,000 persons who have attended one or more of the programs since 1961. Thirty-eight percent responded; approximately 800 questionnaires were received in time to be evaluated. A clear majority approved the conferences and evaluated them as "excellent." Well over 600 approved the format of the programs as held in the past. A recurring comment emphasized the need for "greater depth" in the program. The inclusion of roundtable discussions in the current conference is an effort to meet this need.

United States and New Zealand Hold Civil Aviation Talks

Press release 104 dated March 11

Delegations of New Zealand and the United States held civil aviation consultations at Washington from February 25 through March 11, 1964. The discussions were held pursuant to the bilateral air transport agreement of 1946 [1] and were concluded to the mutual satisfaction of both parties.

Agreement was reached on an *ad referendum* basis to replace the existing 1946 agreement with a more modern version and to incorporate in the new agreement certain amendments to the routes exchanged in 1946.

The chairman of the New Zealand delegation was Bruce Rae, Air Secretary. The U.S. delegation was headed by Henry T. Snowdon, chief of the Aviation Negotiations Division, Department of State. Whitney Gillilland, member of the Civil Aeronautics Board, represented that agency.

[1] Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1573, 4645, 4789, 5085, and 5374.

The Requisites of Abundance

by Harlan Cleveland
Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs [1]

As we finish our nourishing lunch, I do not have to remind you that at this very moment about one out of every two people in this world is hungry or malnourished. You know that. That's why you are here.

Nor, I imagine, do I have to persuade you that a world still half hungry is an appalling fact, an intolerable statistic, a shocking commentary on the human condition, and a political danger of the first water. You all agree with this—or you would be doing something else this noontime.

We know the nature and the magnitude of the problem. I shall therefore address my speculations to the nature and magnitude of the solution.

Do we dare speak of a "solution," or the actual accomplishment of our freedom-from-hunger goal? Of course we do. Our moral outrage at a half-hungry world is validated precisely by the fact that we have all the technical answers needed to produce enough food to give all of the people of this teeming planet a decent daily diet.

President Kennedy said it to the World Food Congress last summer: [2] "We have the ability . . . we have the means, we have the capacity, to eliminate hunger from the face of the earth. . . . We need only the will."

And President Johnson recommitted this nation to freedom from hunger in his address to the U.N. last year: [3] "The United States," he said, "wants to cooperate with all the members of this organization to conquer everywhere the ancient enemies of mankind—hunger, and disease, and ignorance."

The trouble, of course, is that world hunger is not just a technical problem—or even a cluster of technical problems. My business with you this day is to suggest just how complex and ramified the solutions must be, what a range of talents and disciplines and people and organizations, including the Freedom-From-Hunger Foundation, must be mobilized in the service of the noble ends we profess.

Sharing Our Abundance

The most obvious fact about world food is the drama of glut in the midst of want. This is the product of the technological revolution in American agriculture of recent decades—a revolution which is spreading rapidly through the Western World. Some agricultural scientists are persuaded that we are only on the threshold of that revolution. They point, for example, to new vistas opened up by isotopic research, to the prospect of manufacturing synthetic proteins, to new ways of bringing sweet water to dried-out land.

Yet even as things stand right now, with present knowledge and practice, the facts are staggering: A single American farmer now produces enough food for 29 consumers—4 of them overseas; agricultural output has gone up 140 percent since the end of the Second

[1] Address made before the third annual trustees meeting of the American Freedom-From-Hunger Foundation at Washington, D.C., on Mar. 9 (press release 102).

[2] BULLETIN of July 8, 1963, p. 58.

[3] *Ibid.*, Jan. 6, 1964, p. 2.

World War—three times the rate of industrial growth; and the farm population has continued to drop—the latest figure being just over 7 percent of the total population.

So we have been forced by circumstance, and pushed by our own sense of justice, to share our abundance. In little more than a decade we have shared some $13 billion worth of food with perhaps 400 million people in 112 countries. This includes school lunch programs, which now reach about 40 million children, not only improving their diets but helping to lure them into learning.

This is surely the humane and sensible thing to do. And in some cases the distribution of food serves as well to help maintain social stability as a basis for peaceful reform. American food has provided a minimal diet for the past 18 months for most of the unemployed of Constantine—and these unemployed, in this third largest city in Algeria, are about 50 percent of the whole working force. We will doubtless be doing more of this, not less, as time goes on.

Yet we know that this kind of thing is at best a valuable stopgap—a way to buy a little more time while more basic solutions are sought. If there were practical ways to take our whole abundance and spread it around evenly in the places where it is needed, diets would be raised to tolerable levels everywhere—for about 3 or 4 weeks. Then the food would be gone and the hunger would be back.

Transferring Farming Techniques

More recently, we have begun to experiment with the more sophisticated idea of employing surplus food as a kind of development capital. This is to say that it is used as part payment for workers engaged in labor—intensive public works projects—land clearing, dam building, roadmaking, well digging, tree planting, and the like. Both the U.S. Food for Peace program and, on a small experimental scale, the joint U.N.–FAO World Food Program are busy along these lines in North Africa and elsewhere. A hundred schools are being built in Bolivia today under a food-for-work program.

Thus can abundance serve multiple purposes beyond the immediate relief of hunger.

But still this does not do much to produce more food on the spot, near where it is going to be eaten. For each of the world's malnourished peoples, freedom from hunger will be achieved mostly by growing more food for themselves.

And that, of course, requires the transfer not only of food but of knowledge, the export not only of surpluses but of techniques. A great deal has been done about this too, since the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations was set up two decades ago, and especially since 1949, when President Truman launched the Point Four program of technical assistance.

There are two major parts of this task. The first is the gathering of data, the exchange of information, the sharing of experience, the pooling of the fruits of research, and the coordination of future research. For some years this was the major activity of the FAO. It is a continuing job and will remain one: 95 of the 500-odd international conferences to which the U.S. sent delegations last year were concerned with some aspect of food and agriculture.

The second—and even more important—part of the task is the transfer and adaptation of farming techniques from one cultural soil to another. And this has turned out to be vastly more complicated than was imagined at first. What works in one place does not necessarily work in another, as most of you well know from experience.

Nevertheless, the various technical assistance programs—operated by the U.N. family of agencies, by the U.S. Agency for International Development and other countries' foreign aid programs, and by private organizations here and abroad—clearly are aimed at the heart of the matter: the technical capacity to grow a bigger crop on an acre of ground.

A word of caution is needed here. There is a tendency, especially in the less developed countries, to invest the words "science and technology" with the connotation of modern magic. Impatient for progress, frustrated by obstacles, too many people have seized upon the rich promise of science and technology, torn it from a meaningful context, and pinned their hopes on an abstraction. There is nothing miraculous in

science until competent technicians, working with real-life farmers, put it to work on real-life farms.

Modern Farming Requires Fertilizers, Water

But the problem of hunger and malnutrition does not begin or end on the farm. Nor will the solution be found on the farm alone.

Modern agriculture, for example, requires discriminating use of chemical fertilizers. But it is not enough to know that. Indeed, it is worse than useless to know that—unless there is fertilizer to be had. Fertilizer can be had for hard-earned foreign exchange. Or it can be had by production at home, which may also require foreign exchange to build the plant. And that in turn may require the education, at home or abroad, of chemical engineers.

Knowing about fertilizer is also worse than useless if the fertilizer, once produced, is not applied on the farm. Last fall that ebullient promoter of modern farming, Nikita Khrushchev, spent much of a long speech in Krasnodar urging the virtues of chemical fertilizer and pouring scorn on communities that waste the precious stuff.

"Shameful things occur in practice," he said. "An enterprise is allocated mineral fertilizer; it is sent from the plant to the railroad station and thrown from the freight car directly onto a side slope, and these riches lie there for months and lose their value. . . . Mountains of fertilizers accumulate," he said, "they are covered with snow and children use these mountains for tobogganing. . . . We are being criticized in the bourgeois press for this mismanagement, which is absolutely fair." "The distribution of fertilizers," said Chairman Khrushchev later on in the same speech, "is a big political issue."

It is indeed a big political issue, not only in the Soviet Union but increasingly in the world at large. If, as we all believe, it is virtuous to distribute food abundance to our friends and neighbors around the world, it is positively angelic to promote the use of modern fertilizers.

Beyond fertilizers, modern farming requires water, lots of water. Here there is much we don't yet know—about the economical desalting of water and about how to use the great resources of ground water that may still lie undiscovered under the bare feet of malnourished millions in the world's developing southlands.

If modern techniques can locate the vast lake which, some say, lies beneath the Sahara, what a change that would make in the geography books of the future! If—or perhaps I should say when—sweet water can be readily produced from the seas or from brackish inland sources, the chance to produce irrigated crops will radically change the destiny of hungry people in many a dusty land.

Education, Institutions, Production Incentives

Beyond fertilizer and water, modern farming requires education—a stream of young scientists and engineers coming out of schools and colleges, a network of experiment stations, a web of extension services reaching out to every farm.

It is not enough to *have* the technology; it has to be *taught* to millions upon millions of sometimes suspicious, often stubborn, and always tradition-bound members of this ornery human race of ours.

Every department of agriculture in the world has learned the hard way how tough it is to persuade the people who work the land to try something new.

The chief obstacle to food production in nearly every developing country is the gag line of that oldest of all county agent jokes: "Why teach me anything more? I ain't farming now as well as I know how." But modern education stresses the application of science to the farm. The first principle of development is this: In a really productive economy there is no such thing as an uneducated farmer.

Beyond fertilizer and water and education, modern farming demands complex institutions to serve the farmer—marketing and distribution services, storage and preservation systems, rural credit banks, co-ops for buying and selling, companies and co-ops for machinery and electric power. Modern farming also rests on viable farming units—and that means each developing country has to plunge into the tangled laws of inheritance, the forbidding mysteries of tax structure and interest rates, and that

thorny political thicket called land tenure reform.

Beyond fertilizer and water and education and complex institutions, freedom from hunger requires incentives for the producers.

The Communists for a time pretended this was not so—and thus converted into food-deficit areas the Communist-held areas we all learned in school to call the "breadbasket of Europe." Now the cumbersome machinery of Soviet propaganda is being turned around, to promote better income for harder work by Soviet farmers. "It is important to materially interest the people . . . to . . . introduce a more rational . . . remuneration of labor." That's what Chairman Khrushchev said in that same speech in Krasnodar. Then he went on, dumping overboard in carload lots the traditional theories of Marxism: "The question of the remuneration is very important. I would even say that it [the remuneration of labor] is one of the most basic questions in economic management." That is quite an admission for a Communist leader to make in a public speech.

In another speech in the Kremlin last month, Chairman Khrushchev took up the theme again. "It takes more than just a Communist Party program and Marxist-Leninist theory," he said, to make sure that "he who does not work does not eat." "We cannot ignore the material factor, we have no right to be visionaries divorced from life. . . . People who achieve high production results should not simply be listed on a roll of honor; they must be rewarded materially in every way. . . . We must fight against egalitarianism."

It has taken half a century for the Communist leaders to learn the basic lesson of production incentives—an education provided at enormous expense by the peoples under Communist rule. Maybe now, at long last, graduation is in sight.

Agricultural Success in a Free Society

Finally, beyond fertilizer and water and education and complex institutions and material incentives, the achievement of freedom from hunger requires freedom. The positive evidence is the spectacular success of American agriculture in the 20th century. The negative proof lies in nearly half a century of food failures in Communist countries.

The record fairly shouts the conclusion: Individual farmers in a police state will stubbornly refuse to produce much more than they need for themselves. As a consequence, there is not a single Communist country that is not in deep trouble in the countryside—with the partial exceptions of Poland and Yugoslavia, which have had the good sense not to pursue collective agriculture to its bitter, unproductive end.

Thus it comes as no surprise that the new look in Soviet agriculture, as proclaimed again by Chairman Khrushchev last month, put the emphasis on personal incentive as the key to raising output per acre.

Marx couldn't be expected to understand the problem; he was a city boy, after all. But his modern interpreters are beginning to learn about productivity, not from looking backward at the teachings of Marx and Lenin but from looking across the world at what a democratic agricultural system can accomplish in a free society.

It may well be that some other system of agriculture can be made to work in other cultural environments. Certainly we are not trying to sell everybody the family-size farm or the commercial farm, both of which have worked so well for us.

But we do hope that the leaders of independent nations—who may still be bemused with Marxist slogans but are perhaps less familiar with the recent pressures within the Soviet bloc itself for the practical modification of Marxist theories—will not repeat that costly, fundamental miscalculation the Communists made: the attempt to raise output on the farms without raising incentives to farmers.

Police state methods just won't work for agriculture. There simply are not enough cops to go around to police the farmers of any country. And if there were enough cops, they would succeed only in reducing the farmers' incentive to produce food. Productivity on the farm is the sum of a hundred small decisions a day: If the farmer is not making each decision in such a way as to maximize his output per acre, no police force in the world can make him do so.

But a system that rewards him and his family for high productivity can—and in our own free society does in fact—produce abundance.

The Population Problem

If you dare to work for world food abundance, you have to face a double dare as well: the growing abundance of mouths to be fed.

I do not intend here to rehearse those frightening boxcar figures and repeat those statistical extrapolations with which the demographers regularly try to raise the hair on our heads. I do want to mention, however, one piece of good news: In the very recent past the "population explosion" has become a respectable subject of discussion—precisely because the demographers made their hair-raising forecasts and insisted that other people begin to pay some attention to them.

So now at long last the taboo has been lifted from the subject of population growth. We are past the point when the mention of the population problem brought a smirk to the face of the listener, as though the subject were dirty or funny or both. The way is clear now for serious discussion of a trend which, if uncontrolled, would commit the search for freedom from hunger to a perpetual treadmill or a chronic failure.

A few years ago it was considered politically impossible to inscribe the subject of population control on a U.N. agenda for rational debate. But a little more than a year ago the General Assembly passed an eminently sensible resolution [4] on the subject which offended nobody yet opened the way for much-needed research and for further U.N. work on the subject.

In that process everyone discovered, to the surprise of most, that the only disagreement is on the outside fringes of a very large subject, and in between there is a wide area of common ground on which intelligent men from every culture and every religious tradition can converge for dispassionate discourse and cooperative action.

No one can hazard even an educated guess as to when or how the population growth rate may be brought within manageable limits. Birth rates in industrialized countries have eventually, but slowly, declined without much encouragement from governments. Now several countries, notably India, Pakistan, Korea, and the United Arab Republic, are launched on active government programs to reduce explosive population growth rates. But by and large, when it comes to population control, there are no developed and underdeveloped countries.

Unlike agriculture or industry or public health or almost any other subject, there is no place to go to learn how somebody else did it first. So in the population field international technical assistance starts from scratch, with little national experience to go on. And that is all the more reason for serious professional attention to the matter.

Role of the Foundation

I have been trying to suggest that there is need for every kind of skill and insight in the complex, difficult, and stimulating task of wiping hunger from the face of the earth. Most especially, there is need for this foundation.

The people who work on the projects you adopt will be dealing not so much with global figures or abstract techniques or social theory but with that ultimate obstacle to freedom from hunger—the man who needs to know but who does not yet know that he needs to know, and does not yet use what he already knows.

You bring to this daring endeavor what is crucially important—your own experience in building the private institutions on which all modern, free societies depend. You provide leadership to the Freedom-From-Hunger Campaign throughout the United States. The quality of that leadership is indicated by the fact that your new president, Mr. [Herbert J.] Sugden, has agreed to take on this job and that he plans to devote a large part of his time and talent and energy to active direction of your work. The kind of interest and devotion you can command is attested by the fact that Mr. Weitz [Charles F. Weitz, FAO Coordinator of the Freedom-From-Hunger Campaign] flew over from Rome to attend this meeting.

"Freedom from hunger" is a slogan and a symbol. We can take it as words, or we can

[4] For background and text of resolution, see *ibid.*, Jan. 7, 1963, p. 14.

take it as a call to action—a moral obligation, a political necessity, and a technical imperative that demands the best from all of us.

I know you take it seriously, and so does your Government. We need you as allies, as colleagues, as coworkers. We look forward to working with you for the remainder of this campaign—and beyond.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

88th Congress, 1st Session

Cuban Refugee Problem. Hearing before the Subcommittee To Investigate Problems Connected With Refugees and Escapees of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Part 3—Minneapolis, Minn. November 9, 1963. 66 pp.

U.S.-Owned Foreign Currencies. Hearings before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations. November 18–20, 1963. 260 pp.

88th Congress, 2d Session

To Amend Further the Peace Corps Act. Hearing before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 9666. January 31—February 6, 1964. 215 pp.

Implementation of the Cargo Preference Laws by the Administrative Departments and Agencies. Report of the Senate Committee on Commerce supplementing its report of October 8, 1962, covering activities undertaken for the purpose of achieving more general compliance with the several congressional acts which reserve certain Government-aid and Government-financed cargoes to U.S.-flag commercial vessels. S. Rept. 871. February 10, 1964. 31 pp.

Message from the President of the United States transmitting the sixth annual report covering United States participation in the International Atomic Energy Agency for the year 1962. H. Doc. 226. February 10, 1964. 27 pp.

Foreign Agents Registration Act Amendments. Report to accompany S. 2136. S. Rept. 875. February 21, 1964. 29 pp.

Peace Corps Act Amendments. Hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on S. 2455. February 24, 1964. 53 pp.

Coffee. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Finance on H.R. 8864, an act to carry out the obligations of the United States under the International Coffee Agreement, 1962. February 25–27, 1964. 204 pp.

Presentation of Monument to Mexico. Report to accompany S. 944. S. Rept. 880. February 26, 1964. 4 pp.

Peace Corps Act Amendments. Report to accompany S. 2455. S. Rept. 881. February 27, 1964. 6 pp.

Use of Foreign Currencies. Report to accompany S. 2115. S. Rept. 932. March 3, 1964. 7 pp.

Immigration and Naturalization. Report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary made by its Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization pursuant to S. Res. 60, 88th Congress, 1st session, as extended. S. Rept. 933. March 3, 1964. 6 pp.

Compliance With Convention on the Chamizal. Report to accompany S. 2391. H. Rept. 1233. March 11, 1964. 10 pp.

Providing for the Recognition and Endorsement of the 17th International Publishers Congress. Report to accompany S.J. Res. 120. H. Rept. 1234. March 11, 1964. 4 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Convention on the international recognition of rights in aircraft. Done at Geneva June 19, 1948. Entered into force September 17, 1953. TIAS 2847.
Ratification deposited: France, February 27, 1964.

Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Done at Moscow August 5, 1963. Entered into force October 10, 1963.
Ratification deposited: Afghanistan, March 13, 1964.

Red Sea Lights

International agreement regarding the maintenance of certain lights in the Red Sea. Done at London February 20, 1962.[1]
Ratified by the President: March 16, 1964.

Telecommunications

Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva, 1959) (TIAS 4893), with annexes and additional protocol. Done at Geneva November 8, 1963.[1]
Ratified by the President: March 16, 1964.

BILATERAL

Bolivia

Agreement supplementing the agreement of September 23, 1955 (TIAS 3404), so as to provide for additional investment guaranties authorized by new U.S. legislation. Effected by exchange of notes at La Paz March 4, 1964. Entered into force March 4, 1964.

Norway

Agreement amending the agreement of May 25, 1949, as amended (TIAS 2000, 3118, 3282, 4503), for financing certain educational exchange programs. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington, March 16, 1964. Entered into force March 16, 1964.

Sudan

Agreement supplementing the agreement of March 17, 1959 (TIAS 4201), so as to provide for additional investment guaranties authorized by new U.S. legislation. Effected by exchange of notes at Khartoum March 2, 1964. Entered into force March 2, 1964.

[1] Not in force.

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings [1]

Scheduled April Through June 1964

Caribbean Organization Telecommunications Meeting	San Juan	Apr. 1–
U.N. ECE Working Group on Public Sector Statistics	Geneva	Apr. 6–
International Coffee Council and Executive Board	London	Apr. 6–
ICAO Panel on Holding Procedures: 2d Meeting	Montreal	Apr. 6–
ITU Administrative Council: 19th Session	Geneva	Apr. 6–
FAO/WHO Conference on Nutrition Problems in Latin America	Montevideo	Apr. 10–
NATO Planning Board for Ocean Shipping: 16th Meeting	Washington	Apr. 13–
SEATO Council of Ministers: 9th Meeting	Manila	Apr. 13–
IAEA Standing Committee on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage	Vienna	Apr. 13–
U.N. Economic Commission for Europe: 19th Session	Geneva	Apr. 13–
IMCO Group on Facilitation of Travel and Transport: 4th Session	London	Apr. 14–
OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party II (Economic Growth).	Paris	Apr. 15–
OECD *Ad Hoc* Drafting Group for the Energy Report	Paris	Apr. 16–
International Cotton Advisory Committee: 23d Plenary Meeting	New Delhi	Apr. 16–
IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: 8th Session	London	Apr. 20–
ICAO All-Weather Operations Panel: 1st Meeting	Montreal	Apr. 27–
CENTO Ministerial Council: 12th Meeting	Washington	Apr. 28–
17th International Film Festival	Cannes	Apr. 29–
6th Round of GATT Tariff Negotiations	Geneva	May 4–
ICEM Executive Committee: 23d Session	Geneva	May 4–
IMCO Working Group on Watertight Subdivision and Damage Stability of Passenger and Cargo Ships: 3d Session.	London	May 4–
IMCO Working Group on Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Sea	London	May 4–
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs: 19th Session	Geneva	May 4–
UNESCO Executive Board: 67th Session	Paris	May 4–
OECD Maritime Transport Committee	Paris	May 5–
IMCO Working Group on Intact Stability of Ships: 3d Session	London	May 11–
U.N. ECE Working Group on Input-Output Statistics	Geneva	May 11–
ICAO Airworthiness Committee: 6th Session	Montreal	May 11–
ICEM Council: 21st Session	Geneva	May 11–
NATO Ministerial Council	The Hague	May 12–
FAO Group on Grains: 9th Session	Rome	May 14–
International Rubber Study Group: 17th Meeting	Tokyo	May 18–
Executive Committee of the U.N. High Commissioner's Program for Refugees: 11th Session.	Geneva	May 18–
BIRPI Working Group on Administrative Agreement	Geneva	May 20–
IMCO Council: 11th Session	London	May 25–
ITU CCITT: 3d Plenary Assembly (including meetings of study groups)	Geneva	May 25–
Universal Postal Union: 15th Congress	Vienna	May 29–
WHO Executive Board: 34th Session	Geneva	May
NATO Civil Defense Committee	Paris	May
3d Consultative Meeting Under Article IX of the Antarctic Treaty	Brussels	June 1–
U.N. ECE Committee on Housing, Building and Planning: 25th Session	Washington	June 2–
UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: 3d Session	Paris	June 10–
U.N. Special Fund Governing Council: 12th Session	The Hague	June 15–
U.N. Special Committee on Friendly Relations	México, D.F	June 15–
U.N. ECE Conference of European Statisticians: Working Group on Productivity Statistics.	Geneva	June 22–

[1] Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Mar. 10, 1964. Following is a list of abbreviations: BIRPI, United International Bureaus for the Protection of Industrial and Intellectual Property; CCITT, Comité consultatif international télégraphique et téléphonique; CENTO, Central Treaty Organization; ECA, Economic Commission for Africa; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; WHO, World Health Organization.

Scheduled April Through June 1964—*Continued*

International Labor Conference: 48th Session	Geneva	June 17–
International Wheat Council: 39th Session	London	June 23–
14th International Film Festival	Berlin	June 26–
U.N. ECA Seminar on Industrial Estates	Addis Ababa	June 29–
FAO Committee of Government Experts on the Uses of Designations and Standards for Milk and Milk Products: 7th Session.	Rome	June

United States Delegations to International Conferences

U.N. Conference on Trade and Development

The Department of State announced on March 17 (press release 122) that Under Secretary of State George W. Ball will head the U.S. delegation at the opening of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development at Geneva, Switzerland, on March 23, 1964. Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs G. Griffith Johnson will head the delegation after Mr. Ball returns to Washington late in March. Mr. Johnson will be chairman of the delegation and one of four U.S. Representatives accredited to the Conference, which is scheduled to conclude on June 15, 1964.

The other three U.S. Representatives accredited to the Conference, who will serve as vice chairmen of the delegation, will be Ben H. Brown, Jr., American consul general, Istanbul; Richard N. Gardner, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, who will attend the Conference May 4–June 14; and Walter M. Kotschnig, Deputy U.S. Representative on the United Nations Economic and Social Council, who will attend the Conference March 23–May 3. The Alternate U.S. Representative will be Roger W. Tubby, U.S. Representative to the European Office of the United Nations and Other International Organizations, Geneva.

The delegation will include four congressional advisers: Senator George A. Smathers, Senator James B. Pearson, Representative Cecil R. King, and Representative Victor A. Knox.

There also will be several public advisers who have not yet been designated.

The delegation also will include members of the Department of Commerce, the Department of Labor, the Department of Agriculture, the Bureau of the Budget, and the Department of the Treasury, as well as consulting advisers.[1]

This United Nations meeting will be the largest trade conference ever called and the first general U.N. conference on trade since the Habana Conference on Trade and Employment in 1947–48. More than 1,500 persons, representing some 122 member countries of the United Nations and its specialized agencies, are expected to participate.

The Conference has been scheduled as part of the program to implement the United Nations Development Decade, as the 1960's have been proclaimed by the United Nations. The purpose of the Conference is to examine ways in which international trade can be made a more effective instrument in promoting the development of the less developed countries and thus facilitate progress toward international stability and well-being.

The provisional agenda for the Conference was drawn up by a 32-nation Preparatory Committee in the course of three sessions lasting a total of 10 weeks. It covers virtually all subjects relating to the need of the developing countries to increase their foreign exchange earnings, primarily through trade. The agenda will be considered by five main committees which will deal with the following subjects:

1. International commodity problems;
2. Trade in manufactures and semimanufactures;
3. Improvement of invisible trade of developing countries and financing for an expansion of international trade;

[1] For names of the other members of the U.S. delegation, see press release 122 dated Mar. 17.

4. Institutional arrangements, methods, and machinery to implement measures relating to the expansion of international trade, and

5. Expansion of international trade and its significance for economic development and implications of regional economic groupings.

The Economic and Social Council of the United Nations made the decision to hold the conference at its 34th session in the summer of 1962. The U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution in December 1962 requesting the Secretary-General to invite all members of the U.N., the specialized agencies, and the International Atomic Energy Agency to the Conference, to appoint a Secretary General of the Conference, and to assist the Preparatory Committee.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Office of Media Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

U.S. Participation in the International Atomic Energy Agency—Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1962. Pub. 7622. International Organization and Conference Series 47. 23 pp. Limited distribution.

Foreign Visitor Programs. A description of the short-term cultural exchange programs and their objectives. This pamphlet, prepared by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the Department of State, points up the many areas of volunteer activities in which the private citizen may play a vital role. Pub. 7631. International Information and Cultural Series 86. 11 pp. 15¢.

Sample Questions From the Examination for Foreign Service Officer or Foreign Service Career Reserve Officer. Pub. 7640. Department and Foreign Service Series 123. 52 pp. Limited distribution.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Republic of the Congo. Signed at Léopoldville February 23, 1963. Entered into force February 23, 1963. With exchange of notes and aide memoire. TIAS 5461. 11 pp. 10¢.

Inter-American Highway. Agreement with Guatemala. Exchange of notes—Signed at Guatemala September 25 and October 3, 1963. Entered into force October 3, 1963. TIAS 5463. 14 pp. 10¢.

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Tanganyika. Exchange of notes—Signed at Dar es Salaam November 14, 1963. Entered into force November 14, 1963. TIAS 5465. 4 pp. 5¢.

Peace Corps Program. Agreement with Senegal. Exchange of notes—Signed at Dakar January 10 and 17, 1963. Entered into force January 17, 1963. TIAS 5467. 5 pp. 5¢.

Maritime Matters—Use of Belgian Ports and Waters by the N.S. *Savannah*. Agreement with Belgium—Signed at Brussels April 19, 1963. Entered into force November 27, 1963. TIAS 5466. 10 pp. 10¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Brazil—Signed at Rio de Janeiro September 11, 1963. Entered into force September 11, 1963. With agreed minutes and exchanges of notes. TIAS 5471. 21 pp. 15¢.

Boundary Waters—Pilotage Services on the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence River. Agreements with Canada, amending the agreement of May 5, 1961, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington August 23 and September 10, 1963. Entered into force September 10, 1963. Operative April 29, 1963. And exchange of notes—Signed at Washington November 19 and December 4, 1963. Entered into force December 4, 1963. Operative August 1, 1963. TIAS 5468. 10 pp. 10¢.

Consular Convention. Convention with the Republic of Korea—Signed at Seoul January 8, 1963. Entered into force December 19, 1963. TIAS 5469. 30 pp. 15¢.

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Sierra Leone, relating to the agreement of May 16 and 19, 1961. Exchange of notes—Signed at Freetown December 28, 1962, and November 13, 1963. Entered into force November 13, 1963. TIAS 5470. 2 pp. 5¢.

Whaling. Amendments to the schedule to the International Whaling Convention signed at Washington on December 2, 1946. Adopted at the Fifteenth Meeting of the International Whaling Commission, London, July 5, 1963. Entered into force October 9, 1963. TIAS 5472. 2 pp. 5¢.

Tracking Stations. Agreement with the Malagasy Republic. Exchange of notes—Signed at Tananarive October 7, 1963. Entered into force October 7, 1963. TIAS 5473. 9 pp. 10¢.

Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV. Agreement with Iraq, amending the agreement of August 27, 1963. Exchange of notes—Signed at Baghdad December 5, 1963. Entered into force December 5, 1963. TIAS 5475. 3 pp. 5¢.

Extradition. Convention with Israel—Signed at Washington December 10, 1962. Entered into force December 5, 1963. TIAS 5476. 17 pp. 10¢.

Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV. Agreement with Bolivia, amending the agreement of February 4, 1963, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at La Paz June 24, 1963. Entered into force June 24, 1963. And exchange of notes—Signed at La Paz November 20, 1963. Entered into force November 20, 1963. TIAS 5479. 7 pp. 10¢.

Aviation—Air Traffic Control. Agreement with Canada. Exchange of notes—Signed at Ottawa December 20 and 27, 1963. Entered into force December 27, 1963. TIAS 5480. 2 pp. 5¢.

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Releases issued prior to March 16 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 102 of March 9, 104 of March 11, and 109 of March 13.

No.	Date	Subject
113	3/16	Educational exchange program with Norway.
*114	3/16	Martin sworn in as Ambassador to Argentina (biographic details).
*115	3/16	U.S. participation in international conferences.
*116	3/16	Bundy sworn in as Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs (biographic details).
*117	3/16	Conference on equal employment opportunity.
118	3/16	Honduras credentials (rewrite).
*119	3/17	Cultural exchange (Far East).
†120	3/16	Rusk: conference on equal employment opportunity.
*121	3/17	Harriman: National Farmers Union (excerpts).
122	3/17	Delegation to U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (rewrite).
*123	3/17	Mathews sworn in as Ambassador to Nigeria (biographic details).
†124	3/17	Tyler: "The United States and a Changing Europe."
125	3/18	Meeting of ambassadors and chiefs of AID missions to Latin America.
126	3/19	Rusk: "The Toilsome Path to Peace."
127	3/20	Foreign policy conference for editors and broadcasters (rewrite).
†128	3/20	Cleveland: "The Thirteenth Alarm."

*Not printed.
†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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The Making of Foreign Policy

This 33-page pamphlet is a transcript of an interview of Secretary of State Dean Rusk by Professor Eric Frederick Goldman of Princeton University, newly appointed consultant to President Johnson. The interview was first broadcast on January 12 on the television program "The Open Mind."

Professor Goldman questions Secretary Rusk on a number of different aspects of the foreign policy process, including the role of the Secretary of State, the relationship of politics to foreign policy, the problems and procedures of administration, the role of the Foreign Service officer, and the influence of public opinion on foreign policy.

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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Vol. L, No. 1294

April 13, 1964

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United States Policy in Viet-Nam

by Robert S. McNamara
Secretary of Defense [1]

In South Viet-Nam, as you well know, the independence of a nation and the freedom of its people are being threatened by Communist aggression and terrorism. In response to requests from the Government of South Viet-Nam the United States since 1954 has been providing assistance to the Vietnamese in their struggle to maintain their independence.

My purpose this evening is threefold. After recalling some facts about Viet-Nam and its history, I want:

—First, to explain our stake and objectives in South Viet-Nam;

—Second, to review for you the current situation there as General [Maxwell D.] Taylor and I found it on our recent trip;

—And finally, to outline in broad terms the plans which have been worked out with General Khanh for achieving our mutual objectives in South Viet-Nam.

[1] Address made before the James Forrestal Memorial Awards dinner of the National Security Industrial Association at Washington, D.C., on Mar. 26.

Description and History

Let me begin by reminding you of some details about South Viet-Nam, that narrow strip of rich coastal mountain and delta lands running 900 miles in the tropics along the South China Sea to the Gulf of Siam. It contains the mouth of the Mekong River, the main artery of Southeast Asia. It has a population of about 14 million—almost that of California—in an area slightly larger than England and Wales. South Viet-Nam does not exist by itself. Mainland Southeast Asia includes Laos, Cambodia, and the two Viet-Nams, together comprising former French Indochina. It also includes Thailand, Burma, and part of Malaysia. The Southeast Asian peninsula is a richly endowed land area of over 800,000 square miles, roughly the size of the United States east of the Mississippi, and containing almost 100 million

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. L, NO. 1294 PUBLICATION 7674 APRIL 13, 1964

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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people. And immediately beyond to the east are the Philippines; not far to the west is India, to the north is Communist China, and to the south is what the Chinese Communists may consider the greatest prize of all—Indonesia's resources, territory, and the world's fifth largest population, whose strategic location straddles and dominates the gateway to the Indian Ocean.

The Vietnamese lost the independence they had enjoyed since the 15th century when, a hundred years ago, the French assumed control in what is now Viet-Nam. A quarter century ago, during the Second World War, the Vichy regime yielded French Indochina to the Japanese. In the power vacuum of the war's end, the Communist Viet Minh moved rapidly to enhance their position and to build their bases for a power grab in North Viet-Nam.

The attempt by the French, following World War II, to restore their rule—to buck the trend toward independence as shown in Burma, India, and the Philippines—failed. The returning French encountered a strong military resistance movement which gradually fell more and more under Communist control. For 8 years France sought to control the country while at the same time gradually granting increasing autonomy to non-Communist Vietnamese. Such actions, however, were not enough. In 1954, after the fall of the French stronghold at Dien Bien Phu on May 7, the Geneva agreements of July 20 were signed, ending the hostilities and ending French rule in Indochina. The country was roughly cut in half at the 17th parallel, creating the Communist regime of Ho Chi Minh in the north and a non-Communist state in the south. Although the United States was not a party to those Geneva agreements, the U.S. unilaterally declared that it would not violate them and that it would regard any violation by other parties as a serious threat to international peace and security.

Under the Geneva agreements, it was hoped that South Viet-Nam would have an opportunity to build a free nation in peace—unalined and set apart from the global power struggle. But the problems confronting the new government were staggering: 900,000 refugees who had fled their homes in the north at the time of partition in order to escape Communist rule; a long-term military threat from the north, which had emerged from the war with large military forces; a government nearly paralyzed by 8 years of war and lacking sufficient trained officials for effective self-government; acute economic dislocation and lack of government revenues; and persisting pockets of southern territory that had long been held by Communists and other dissident groups. In the face of such problems hopes were not high for the survival of the fledging Republic.

That autumn, a decade ago, President Ngo Dinh Diem of the Republic of Viet-Nam turned to the United States for economic assistance. President Eisenhower understood the gravity of the situation, and he determined to give direct American aid to the new government to enable its survival. He wrote to President Diem on October 1, 1954: [2]

> The purpose of this offer is to assist the Government of Viet-Nam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means.

The U.S. therefore provided help—largely economic.

On the basis of this assistance and the brave, sustained efforts of the South Vietnamese people, the 5 years from 1954 to 1959 gave concrete evidence that South Viet-Nam was becoming a success story. By the end of this period, 140,000 landless peasant families had been given land under an agrarian reform program; the transportation system had been almost entirely rebuilt; rice production had reached the prewar annual average of 3.5 million metric tons—and leaped to over 5 million in 1960; rubber production had exceeded prewar totals; and construction was under way on several medium-size manufacturing plants, thus beginning the development of a base for industrial growth.

In addition to such economic progress, school enrollments had tripled, the number of primary school teachers had increased from 30,000 to 90,000, and almost 3,000 medical aid stations and maternity clinics had been established throughout the country. And the South Vietnamese Government had gone far toward creating an effective apparatus for the administration of the nation. A National Institute of Administration had been established with our

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[2] For text, see BULLETIN of Nov. 15, 1954, p. 735.

technical and financial assistance—a center for the training of a new generation of civil servants oriented toward careers of public service as opposed to the colonial concept of public rule.

For South Viet-Nam the horizon was bright. Its success stood in marked contrast to development in the north. Despite the vastly larger industrial plant inherited by Hanoi when Viet-Nam was partitioned, gross national product was considerably larger in the south—estimated at $110 per person in the south and $70 in the north. While per capita food production in the north was 10 percent lower in 1960 than it had been in 1956, it was 20 percent higher in the south.

It is ironical that free Viet-Nam's very achievements in these 5 years brought severe new problems. For the Communists in North Viet-Nam, like many others, had believed that South Viet-Nam would ultimately collapse and fall under Hanoi's control like ripe fruit from a tree. But by the end of 1959, South Viet-Nam was succeeding, despite all predictions; and the Communist leaders evidently concluded that they would have to increase pressure on the South to make the fruit fall.

At the Third National Congress of the Lao Dong (Communist) Party in Hanoi, September 1960, North Viet-Nam's belligerency was made explicit. Ho Chi Minh stated, "The North is becoming more and more consolidated and transformed into a firm base for the struggle for national reunification." At the same congress it was announced that the party's new task was "to liberate the South from the atrocious rule of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen." In brief, Hanoi was about to embark upon a program of wholesale violations of the Geneva agreements in order to wrest control of South Viet-Nam from its legitimate government.

To the Communists, "liberation" meant sabotage, terror, and assassination: attacks on innocent hamlets and villages and the coldblooded murder of thousands of schoolteachers, health workers, and local officials who had the misfortune to oppose the Communist version of "liberation." In 1960 and 1961 almost 3,000 South Vietnamese civilians in and out of government were assassinated and another 2,500 were kidnaped. The Communists even assassinated the colonel who served as liaison officer to the International Control Commission.

This aggression against South Viet-Nam was a major Communist effort, meticulously planned and controlled, and relentlessly pursued by the government in Hanoi. In 1961 the Republic of Viet-Nam, unable to contain the menace by itself, appealed to the United States to honor its unilateral declaration of 1954. President Kennedy responded promptly and affirmatively by sending to that country additional American advisers, arms, and aid.[3]

U.S. Objectives

I turn now to a consideration of United States objectives in South Viet-Nam. The United States has no designs whatever on the resources or territory of the area. Our national interests do not require that South Viet-Nam serve as a Western base or as a member of a Western alliance. Our concern is threefold.

First, and most important, is the simple fact that South Viet-Nam, a member of the free-world family, is striving to preserve its independence from Communist attack. The Vietnamese have asked our help. We have given it. We shall continue to give it.

We do so in their interest; and we do so in our own clear self-interest. For basic to the principles of freedom and self-determination which have sustained our country for almost two centuries is the right of peoples everywhere to live and develop in peace. Our own security is strengthened by the determination of others to remain free, and by our commitment to assist them. We will not let this member of our family down, regardless of its distance from our shores.

The ultimate goal of the United States in Southeast Asia, as in the rest of the world, is to help maintain free and independent nations which can develop politically, economically, and socially and which can be responsible members of the world community. In this region and elsewhere many peoples share our sense of the value of such freedom and independence. They have taken the risks and made the sacrifices

[3] For an exchange of messages between President Kennedy and President Ngo Dinh Diem, see *ibid.*, Jan. 1, 1962, p. 13.

linked to the commitment to membership in the family of the free world. They have done this in the belief that we would back up our pledges to help defend them. It is not right or even expedient—nor is it in our nature—to abandon them when the going is difficult.

Second, Southeast Asia has great strategic significance in the forward defense of the United States. Its location across east–west air and sea lanes flanks the Indian subcontinent on one side and Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines on the other and dominates the gateway between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. In Communist hands this area would pose a most serious threat to the security of the United States and to the family of free-world nations to which we belong. To defend Southeast Asia, we must meet the challenge in South Viet-Nam.

And third, South Viet-Nam is a test case for the new Communist strategy. Let me examine for a moment the nature of this strategy.

Just as the Kennedy administration was coming into office in January 1961, Chairman Khrushchev made one of the most important speeches on Communist strategy of recent decades. In his report on a party conference entitled "For New Victories of the World Communist Movement," Khrushchev stated: "In modern conditions, the following categories of wars should be distinguished: world wars, local wars, liberation wars and popular uprisings." He ruled out what he called "world wars" and "local wars" as being too dangerous for profitable indulgence in a world of nuclear weapons. But with regard to what he called "liberation wars," he referred specifically to Viet-Nam. He said, "It is a sacred war. We recognize such wars. . . ."

I have pointed out on other occasions the enormous strategic nuclear power which the United States has developed to cope with the first of Mr. Khrushchev's types of wars; deterrence of deliberate, calculated nuclear attack seems as assured as it can be. With respect to our general-purpose forces designed especially for local wars, within the past 3 years we have increased the number of our combat-ready Army divisions by about 45 percent, tactical air squadrons by 30 percent, airlift capabilities by 75 percent, with a 100-percent increase in ship construction and conversion. In conjunction with the forces of our allies our global posture for deterrence and defense is still not all that it should be, but it is good.

President Kennedy and President Johnson have recognized, however, that our forces for the first two types of wars might not be applicable or effective against what the Communists call "wars of liberation," or what is properly called covert aggression or insurgency. We have therefore undertaken and continue to press a variety of programs to develop skilled specialists, equipment, and techniques to enable us to help our allies counter the threat of insurgency.

Communist interest in insurgency techniques did not begin with Khrushchev, nor for that matter with Stalin. Lenin's works are full of tactical instructions, which were adapted very successfully by Mao Tse-tung, whose many writings on guerrilla warfare have become classic references. Indeed, Mao claims to be the true heir of Lenin's original prescriptions for the worldwide victory of communism. The North Vietnamese have taken a leaf or two from Mao's book—as well as Moscow's—and added some of their own.

Thus today in Viet-Nam we are not dealing with factional disputes or the remnants of a colonial struggle against the French but rather with a major test case of communism's new strategy. That strategy has so far been pursued in Cuba, may be beginning in Africa, and failed in Malaya and the Philippines only because of a long and arduous struggle by the people of these countries with assistance provided by the British and the United States.

In Southeast Asia the Communists have taken full advantage of geography—the proximity to the Communist base of operations and the rugged, remote, and heavily foliated character of the border regions. They have utilized the diverse ethnic, religious, and tribal groupings and exploited factionalism and legitimate aspirations wherever possible. And, as I said earlier, they have resorted to sabotage, terrorism, and assassination on an unprecedented scale.

Who is the responsible party—the prime aggressor? First and foremost, without doubt, the prime aggressor is North Viet-Nam, whose

leadership has explicitly undertaken to destroy the independence of the South. To be sure, Hanoi is encouraged on its aggressive course by Communist China. But Peiping's interest is hardly the same as that of Hanoi.

For Hanoi, the immediate objective is limited: conquest of the South and national unification, perhaps coupled with control of Laos. For Peiping, however, Hanoi's victory would be only a first step toward eventual Chinese hegemony over the two Viet-Nams and Southeast Asia and toward exploitation of the new strategy in other parts of the world.

Communist China's interests are clear: It has publicly castigated Moscow for betraying the revolutionary cause whenever the Soviets have sounded a cautionary note. It has characterized the United States as a paper tiger and has insisted that the revolutionary struggle for "liberation and unification" of Viet-Nam could be conducted without risks by, in effect, crawling under the nuclear and the conventional defense of the free world. Peiping thus appears to feel that it has a large stake in demonstrating the new strategy, using Viet-Nam as a test case. Success in Viet-Nam would be regarded by Peiping as vindication for China's views in the worldwide ideological struggle.

Taking into account the relationship of Viet-Nam to Indochina—and of both to Southeast Asia, the Far East, and the free world as a whole—five U.S. Presidents have acted to preserve free-world strategic interests in the area. President Roosevelt opposed Japanese penetration in Indochina; President Truman resisted Communist aggression in Korea; President Eisenhower backed Diem's efforts to save South Viet-Nam and undertook to defend Taiwan; President Kennedy stepped up our counter-insurgency effort in Viet-Nam; and President Johnson, in addition to reaffirming last week that the United States will furnish assistance and support to South Viet-Nam for as long as it is required to bring Communist aggression and terrorism under control,[4] has approved the program that I shall describe in a few minutes.

The U.S. role in South Viet-Nam, then, is: *first*, to answer the call of the South Vietnamese, a member nation of our free-world family, to help them save their country for themselves; *second*, to help prevent the strategic danger which would exist if communism absorbed Southeast Asia's people and resources; and *third*, to prove in the Vietnamese test case that the free world can cope with Communist "wars of liberation" as we have coped successfully with Communist aggression at other levels.

The Current Situation

I referred earlier to the progress in South Viet-Nam during 1954–1959. In our concern over the seriousness of the Viet Cong insurgency, we sometimes overlook the fact that a favorable comparison still exists between progress in the South—notwithstanding nearly 15 years of bitter warfare—and the relative stagnation in North Viet-Nam.

The so-called "Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam," with a greater population than the South and only a marginally smaller area, appears to be beset by a variety of weaknesses, the most prominent of which is its agricultural failure. Mismanagement, some poor weather, and a lack of fertilizers and insecticides have led to a serious rice shortage. The 1963 per capita output of rice was about 20 percent lower than 1960. Before the June 1964 harvests, living standards will probably decline further in the cities, and critical food shortages may appear in some of the villages. Furthermore, prospects for the June rice crops are not bright.

The internal transportation system remains primitive, and Hanoi has not met the quotas established for heavy industry. As for the people, they appear to be generally apathetic to what the party considers the needs of the state, and the peasantry has shown considerable ingenuity in frustrating the policies of the Government.

In contrast, in the Republic of Viet-Nam, despite Communist attempts to control or inhibit every aspect of the domestic economy, output continued to rise. In 1963 South Viet-Nam was once more able to export some 300,000 tons of rice. Add to this the pre-1960 record: up to

[4] For a White House statement issued on Mar. 17 at the close of a meeting of the National Security Council at which Secretary McNamara and General Taylor reported to the President and the Council on their inspection trip to the Republic of Viet-Nam, see *ibid.*, Apr. 6, 1964, p. 522.

1960, significant production increases in rice, rubber, sugar, textiles, and electric power, a 20-percent rise in per capita income, threefold expansion of schools, and restoration of the transportation system. One cannot but conclude that, given stability and lack of subversive disruption, South Viet-Nam would dramatically outstrip its northern neighbor and could become a peaceful and prosperous contributor to the well-being of the Far East as a whole.

But, as we have seen, the Communists—because South Viet-Nam is not theirs—are out to deny any such bright prospects.

In the years immediately following the signing of the 1954 Geneva accords, the Communists in North Viet-Nam gave first priority to building armed forces far larger than those of any other Southeast Asian country. They did this to establish iron control over their own population and to insure a secure base for subversion in South Viet-Nam and Laos. In South Viet-Nam, instead of withdrawing fully, the Communists maintained a holding guerrilla operation, and they left behind cadres of men and large caches of weapons for later use.

Beginning in 1959, as we have seen, the Communists realized that they were losing the game and intensified their subversive attack. In June 1962 a special report on Viet-Nam was issued by the International Control Commission,[5] a unit created by the Geneva conference and composed of a Canadian, an Indian, and a Pole. Though it received little publicity at the time, this report presented evidence of Hanoi's subversive activities in South Viet-Nam and specifically found Hanoi guilty of violating the Geneva accords.

Since then, the illegal campaign of terror, violence, and subversion conducted by the Viet Cong and directed and supported from the north has greatly expanded. Military men, specialists, and secret agents continue to infiltrate into South Viet-Nam both directly from the north and through Laos and Cambodia. The flow of Communist-supplied weapons, particularly those of large caliber, has increased. These include Chinese 75 mm. recoilless rifles and heavy machineguns. Tons of explosive-producing chemicals smuggled in for use by the Viet Cong have been intercepted along with many munitions manufactured in Red China and, to a lesser extent, elsewhere in the Communist bloc. In December 1963 a Government force attacked a Viet Cong stronghold in Dinh Tuong Province and seized a large cache of equipment, some of which was of Chinese Communist manufacture. The Chinese equipment included a 90 mm. rocket launcher, 60 mm. mortars, carbines, TNT, and hundreds of thousands of rounds of various kinds of ammunition. Some of the ammunition was manufactured as recently as 1962.

When President Diem appealed to President Kennedy at the end of 1961, the South Vietnamese were quite plainly losing their fight against the Communists, and we promptly agreed to increase our assistance.

Fourteen months later, in early 1963, President Kennedy was able to report to the nation that "The spearpoint of aggression has been blunted in South Viet-Nam."[6] It was evident that the Government had seized the initiative in most areas from the insurgents. But this progress was interrupted in 1963 by the political crises arising from troubles between the Government and the Buddhists, students, and other non-Communist oppositionists. President Diem lost the confidence and loyalty of his people; there were accusations of maladministration and injustice. There were two changes of government within 3 months. The fabric of government was torn. The political control structure extending from Saigon down into the hamlets virtually disappeared. Of the 41 incumbent province chiefs on November 1 of last year, 35 were replaced. Nine provinces had three chiefs in 3 months: one province had four. Scores of lesser officials were replaced. Almost all major military commands changed hands twice. The confidence of the peasants was inevitably shaken by the disruptions in leadership and the loss of physical security. Army and paramilitary desertion rates increased, and the morale of the hamlet militia—the "Minutemen"—fell. In many areas power vacuums

[5] For a Department statement regarding the report, see *ibid.*, July 16, 1962, p. 109.

[6] For excerpts from President Kennedy's state of the Union message of Jan. 14, 1963, see *ibid.*, Feb. 4, 1963, p. 159.

developed causing confusion among the people and a rising rate of rural disorders.

The Viet Cong fully exploited the resultant organizational turmoil and regained the initiative in the struggle. For example, in the second week following the November coup, Viet Cong incidents more than tripled from 316, peaking at 1,021 per week, while Government casualties rose from 367 to 928. Many overextended hamlets have been overrun or severely damaged. The January change in government produced a similar reaction.

In short, the situation in South Viet-Nam has unquestionably worsened, at least since last fall.

The picture is admittedly not an easy one to evaluate and, given the kind of terrain and the kind of war, information is not always available or reliable. The areas under Communist control vary from daytime to nighttime, from one week to another, according to seasonal and weather factors. And, of course, in various areas the degree and importance of control differ. Although we estimate that in South Viet-Nam's 14 million population there are only 20,000 to 25,000 "hard core" Viet Cong guerrillas, they have been able to recruit from among the South Vietnamese an irregular force of from 60,000 to 80,000—mainly by coercion and "bandwagon" effect, but also by promising material and political rewards. The loyalties of the hard core have been cemented by years of fighting, first against the Japanese, then against the French, and, since 1954, against the fledgling government of South Viet-Nam. The young men joining them have been attracted by the excitement of the guerrilla life and then held by bonds of loyalty to their new comrades-in-arms, in a nation where loyalty is only beginning to extend beyond the family or the clan. These loyalties are reinforced both by systematic indoctrination and by the example of what happens to informers and deserters.

Clearly, the disciplined leadership, direction, and support from North Viet-Nam is a critical factor in the strength of the Viet Cong movement. But the large indigenous support that the Viet Cong receives means that solutions must be as political and economic as military. Indeed, there can be no such thing as a purely "military" solution to the war in South Viet-Nam.

The people of South Viet-Nam prefer independence and freedom. But they will not exercise their choice for freedom and commit themselves to it in the face of the high personal risk of Communist retaliation—a kidnaped son, a burned home, a ravaged crop—unless they can have confidence in the ultimate outcome. Much therefore depends on the new government under General Khanh, for which we have high hopes.

Today the government of General Khanh is vigorously rebuilding the machinery of administration and reshaping plans to carry the war to the Viet Cong. He is an able and energetic leader. He has demonstrated his grasp of the basic elements—political, economic, and psychological, as well as military—required to defeat the Viet Cong. He is planning a program of economic and social advances for the welfare of his people. He has brought into support of the Government representatives of key groups previously excluded. He and his colleagues have developed plans for systematic liberation of areas now submissive to Viet Cong duress and for mobilization of all available Vietnamese resources in the defense of the homeland.

At the same time, General Khanh has understood the need to improve South Viet-Nam's relations with its neighbors, Cambodia and Laos; he has taken steps toward conciliation, and he has been quick and forthright in expressing his Government's regret over the recent Vietnamese violation of Cambodia's borders. In short, he has demonstrated the energy, comprehension, and decision required by the difficult circumstances that he faces.

A Program To Meet Our Objectives

Before describing the means by which we hope to assist the South Vietnamese to succeed in their undertaking, let me point out the options that President Johnson had before him when he received General Taylor's and my report last week.

Some critics of our present policy have suggested one option—that we simply withdraw. This the United States totally rejects for reasons I have stated.

Other critics have called for a second and

similar option—a "neutralization" of Viet-Nam. This, however, is the game of "what's mine is mine, and what's yours is negotiable." No one seriously believes the Communists would agree to neutralization of North Viet-Nam. And, so far as South Viet-Nam is concerned, we have learned from the past that the Communists rarely honor the kind of treaty that runs counter to their compulsion to expand.

Under the shadow of Communist power, neutralization would in reality be an interim device to permit Communist consolidation and eventual takeover. When General Taylor and I were in Hue, at the north end of South Viet-Nam, 2 weeks ago, several Vietnamese students carried posters which showed their recognition of the reality of neutralization. The signs read: "Neutralize today, communize tomorrow."

Neutralization of South Viet-Nam, which is today under unprovoked subversive attack, would not be in any sense an achievement of the objectives I have outlined. As we tried to convey in Laos, we have no objection in principle to neutrality in the sense of nonalinement. But even there we are learning lessons. Communist abuse of the Geneva accords, by treating the Laos corridor as a sanctuary for infiltration, constantly threatens the precarious neutrality. "Neutralization of South Viet-Nam"—an ambiguous phrase at best—was therefore rejected.

The third option before the President was initiation of military actions outside South Viet-Nam, particularly against North Viet-Nam, in order to supplement the counterinsurgency program in South Viet-Nam. This course of action—its implications and ways of carrying it out—has been carefully studied.

Whatever ultimate course of action may be forced upon us by the other side, it is clear that actions under this option would be only a supplement to, not a substitute for, progress within South Viet-Nam's own borders.

The fourth course of action was to concentrate on helping the South Vietnamese win the battle in their own country. This, all agree, is essential no matter what else is done.

The President therefore approved the 12 recommendations that General Taylor and I made relating to this option.

We have reaffirmed U.S. support for South Viet-Nam's Government and pledged economic assistance and military training and logistical support for as long as it takes to bring the insurgency under control.

We will support the Government of South Viet-Nam in carrying out its anti-insurgency plan. Under that plan, Prime Minister Khanh intends to implement a national mobilization program to mobilize all national resources in the struggle. This means improving the quality of the strategic hamlets, building them systematically outward from secure areas, and correcting previous overextension. The security forces of Viet-Nam will be increased by at least 50,000 men. They will be consolidated, and their effectiveness and conditions of service will be improved. They will press the campaign with increased intensity. We will provide required additional materiel. This will include strengthening of the Vietnamese Air Force with better aircraft and improving the mobility of the ground forces.

A broad national program is to be carried out, giving top priority to rural needs. The program includes land reform, loans to tenant farmers, health and welfare measures, economic development, and improved status for ethnic minorities and paramilitary troops.

A Civil Administrative Corps will be established to bring better public services to the people. This will include teachers, health technicians, agricultural workers, and other technicians. The initial goal during 1964 will be at least 7,500 additional persons; ultimately there will be at least 40,000 men for more than 8,000 hamlets, in 2,500 villages and 43 provinces.

Farm productivity will be increased through doubled use of fertilizers to provide immediate and direct benefits to peasants in secure areas and to increase both their earnings and the nation's export earnings.

We have learned that in Viet-Nam political and economic progress are the *sine qua non* of military success and that military security is equally a prerequisite of internal progress. Our future joint efforts with the Vietnamese are going to apply these lessons.

To conclude: Let me reiterate that our goal is peace and stability, both in Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia. But we have learned that "peace at any price" is not practical in the long

run and that the cost of defending freedom must be borne if we are to have it at all.

The road ahead in Viet-Nam is going to be long, difficult, and frustrating. It will take work, courage, imagination, and—perhaps more than anything else—patience to bear the burden of what President Kennedy called a "long twilight struggle." In Viet-Nam, it has not been finished in the first hundred days of President Johnson's administration, and it may not be finished in the first 1,000 days; but, in cooperation with General Khanh's government, we have made a beginning. When the day comes that we can safely withdraw, we expect to leave an independent and stable South Viet-Nam, rich with resources and bright with prospects for contributing to the peace and prosperity of Southeast Asia and of the world.

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of March 27

Press release 135 dated March 27

Secretary Rusk: I see the ranks are a bit thin this afternoon. I trust I have not intruded unduly into what I hope will be a long weekend for you. If your boss asks you, I see no particular reason why you need to spend an inordinate amount of time around this department this weekend, but that could change without notice.

I am ready for your questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, rather than get involved in a philosophical question about myths and realities, I ask you more directly your observations on Senator [J. W.] Fulbright's comment that the administration's current policy toward Cuba is somewhat less than successful and that Castro is really an unpleasant nuisance rather than an intolerable danger.

A. Well, Senator Fulbright, as he has done often in the past, has come forward with a thoughtful and a thought-provoking statement. He has made it clear that he was not speaking for the administration, he was speaking for himself; he was not floating a trial balloon for the administration. And we don't have time, and I think it would be inappropriate for me to take up his speech on a paragraph-by-paragraph basis.

There are a number of things in it with which I fully agree. We are in a period of change. I have indicated to you on a number of occasions that we are on the front edge of important changes in the world situation. Things are in motion. And it is very important, therefore, for us to try to understand what those changes mean and how United States interests are related to those changes and how they bear upon the great issue of freedom in the world.

I mean, for example, Senator Fulbright referred to changes in the Communist world. I myself spoke to that point before the Electrical Workers not long ago and tried to outline why we treat different Communist countries differently.[1]

You know that the legislative branch, through the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and executive branch and private groups are taking a look at this question of East–West trade. Although there are severe limitations on the extent to which such trade in any event might develop, it is a matter that is worth further examination after the events of the last several years.

There are other points with which I would not agree. I think that Castro is more than a nuisance. He is a threat to this hemisphere. In the case of Venezuela there was a very direct threat through arms, through a plan, through an attempt to take over that constitutional and democratic Government by violent means at the time of their recent election.

Mr. Castro knows and has known for a long

[1] For text of Secretary Rusk's address before the International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, at Washington, D.C., on Feb. 25, see BULLETIN of Mar. 16, 1964, p. 390.

time that his military and political connection with Moscow and his attempt to interfere in the affairs of other countries in this hemisphere are insuperable obstacles to anything like normal relations between himself and the rest of this hemisphere. And whether he himself could survive a change in those two points is a matter that rests more in Cuba than outside.

But, nevertheless, when a country like Venezuela—when other countries of this hemisphere find themselves under pressure from Castro through agents or funds or subversion of any sort, then it is up to the United States to join with those countries to see that this threat is met and dealt with.

Now, it is true that economic isolation of Cuba has not been complete, but it has been very substantial. There has been a very sharp reduction in Cuba's trade with the free world, a very sharp reduction in free-world shipping, a very sharp reduction in free-world travel with Cuba.

Now, these are important and limiting Castro's ability to work his mischief outside of his own frontiers and to demonstrate both in Cuba and outside that this particular course is not the path of the future.

Now, in Panama, I don't want to get into that very much because we are very close on that, and it may be that we can work out a way to get back to the table without too much delay and get to a frank discussion of any differences that might exist between us. We have had to be concerned about the problem of the type of precommitment, precondition, which would simply postpone for a time a charge of bad faith and possibly erode the validity of existing arrangements through treaties and a number of other agreements which regulate our relations with that country. But I think it is quite clear from the statements made by the two Presidents of the two countries that the common interest here is recognized and that we do hope that we can find a way back to the conference table without undue delay.

I don't want to go into other matters in specific relation to Senator Fulbright's speech, but we travel on a main highway of policy on which there are soft shoulders on either side and our great task is to try to understand realistically what is going on in the world, what the present situation is, what the prospects can be, and avoid the myths that are involved in the soft shoulders in either direction.

On the one side, to avoid illusions that blind us to the actual changes that are going on, try to keep ourselves fully informed and related to those changes. On the other side, the myths that might develop under the impression that changes have already occurred that are much more far-reaching than in fact they are because we do have dangerous and difficult problems in front of us.

And so, I do think that his statement was a contribution to a discussion that is worth while in this country because the people of this country determine our policy and its main lines in the long run. But I think that perhaps I ought not to try to take it up on detailed paragraph-by-paragraph basis.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Senator Fulbright's main point was not that the economic isolation of Cuba was incomplete, as you have put it, but that the economic blockade has failed and that to continue it at the risk of alienating our European friends is just going to lead to more and more trouble. Do you agree?

A. I think that would underestimate the extent of cooperation which countries in this hemisphere have had from other free-world countries in just this field. There have been certain exceptions, as you know. There have been some buses and there have been some other contracts discussed, but there has been a very substantial amount of cooperation with the attitudes of this hemisphere and the needs of this hemisphere with respect to this particular type of security threat so that I would think I would not in the first place characterize it as a failure. I think that there is a pretty broad understanding among our allies generally as to the nature of this problem.

Problems of Cambodia

Q. Mr. Secretary, both the Soviet Union and France have asked the United States to accede to an international conference to guarantee the neutrality and territorial integrity of Cambodia. Could you say what our policy is now toward that?

A. Well, I think that today I would remind you that we have a great interest in the independence, the neutrality, the territorial integrity of Cambodia. We have no special national interest there except in a Cambodia which can play its proper role as an independent member of a family of nations.

Now, its problems apparently are related to its own immediate neighbors, Viet-Nam and Thailand. These problems are of long duration, have deep historical roots, and we feel that since there are signs that these problems can be worked out between Phnom Penh and its two immediate neighbors, that those processes ought to have a chance to find solutions.

I would not want to make a categorical statement today about a conference, but in any event a conference needs the kind of preparation that would be involved in a meeting of the minds between Cambodia and its nearest neighbors. We think that this is a real possibility, and that if pursued with understanding and diligence on all sides this could be achieved, and that that would go a long way toward meeting the needs which Cambodia had in mind when a Geneva conference was proposed.

But we are hopeful that this matter can be prepared, can be worked on in the area among those most immediately concerned to see whether a solution of these problems can't be found.

Q. Mr. Secretary, one of the New York papers this morning reported that you had asked Russia for additional information on Lee Oswald. Can you confirm that, please, for us?

A. Yes. The Soviet Union, as perhaps you know, did furnish us with some information about Mr. Oswald and certain communications between him and their consular officers at one stage of his life. We have been requested by the President's Commission to obtain certain additional information, and we have transmitted that request to the Soviet Union. This has happened in the last few days, and of course there has been no sign of any reply, but this would be a matter for the President's Commission.

Q. Mr. Secretary, when the congressional wool delegation left your office about 10 days ago, Senator [John O.] Pastore said that you said you would contact—or that the Department would contact—the embassies of exporting countries, wool-exporting countries, and then report back to the delegation. Have you done this?

A. We have had some discussions on that subject, but we are not in a position today—perhaps we can next week—to make a report back on that subject. We have not done so.

Regional Relationships

Q. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned the other day the shortcomings of SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization], and you seemed to feel that some regional groupings among the countries concerned in the region—I wondered if you would care to amplify that and exactly what you had in mind?

A. I think perhaps I might have said—and I am not certain on just which occasion you are referring, because I talk a good deal, I find, these days—

Q. —the Foreign Affairs Committee—

A. Beg pardon? Oh, yes. What I had in mind there was that SEATO is not the complete answer to the problems of that area, that it would be a very constructive thing if the countries in the area could find a way to build on their own relations among themselves. You are familiar, for example, with the ASA [Association of Southeast Asia] relationship among the Philippines, Malaya, and Thailand. You are familiar with the discussions, still somewhat painful, among the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia with respect to the possibility of a Maphilindo. We think that these relationships within the area, without regard to the formal structure of a treaty arrangement, such as SEATO, can be a very constructive relationship in terms of strengthening their own mutual interests in each other's independence and security and well-being. That was the chief point that I had in mind, that over and above these regional security arrangements, there ought to be added the closest cooperation in the regions among the members of the region, including those that are in an alli-

ance as well as those who call themselves nonalined.

Q. Mr. Secretary, was the release of the two American flyers today in any way contingent upon public assurances on the part of the United States that there would be no longer any overflights over Communist territories?

A. Well, it is not a contingency because that does not lend itself to a condition. We have already indicated that we recognize that this plane was where it was not supposed to be, and we have also indicated that we have taken additional measures to try to prevent this kind of straying in the future. But this is not a condition in any sense. They were released because the Soviet Union looked at the matter and decided to release them, and I don't know of any conditions or any deals of that sort that were made.

Q. Would you comment, Mr. Secretary, on the Soviet use of the word "expelled" flyers?

A. No. I suppose we sometimes have sent people home, and we call it "deporting." I wouldn't attach any importance to that. We are glad to get them home.

Present Facts About Communist China

Q. Sir, in discussing Senator Fulbright's speech, you mentioned trade, Cuba, and Panama. Do you have any thoughts on his remarks on Communist China's relations?

A. Well, I want to say that, because I picked out certain points there, the fact that I did not allude to other points on either side of the ledger should not be taken as significant. In other words, don't go down the speech paragraph by paragraph and say that, because I didn't mention this, therefore you derive something from it. I think that—well, Senator Fulbright himself pointed out that he would not be disposed to recognize Communist China or to admit it to the United Nations.

Now, here is a situation where we are not dealing with myths, but it is present facts—present facts. It is a fact that within the last 2 years mainland China attacked India. It is a present fact that mainland China is giving aid and assistance to the effort to take over South Viet-Nam. It is a present fact, confirmed repeatedly in our discussions in Warsaw, that they refuse to renounce force in the Formosa Strait and that any improvement of relationships is conditioned upon the surrender of Formosa to the mainland. It is a present fact that mainland China is engaging in various activities of mischief in continents like Africa and South America. It is a present fact that they are pressing a policy of militancy and aggression in a debate even within the Communist bloc itself. So that these are not—these problems don't arise through any fixed turn of mind of 15, 17 years ago, but they are problems that are operational today and we have to deal with them; and I think that his speech indicated that there are some major obstacles to any change of policy in that respect.

Responsibility of Leadership

Q. Mr. Secretary, one of the main thrusts of the Fulbright speech was not so much, I don't suppose, that the administration does not realize or recognize some of these changes but that the American public and the politically expressive parts of that public do not recognize them. To what extent is this true and to what extent is failure, if there is such a failure, to actually inhibit your ability to adjust American policy to that, because, as you know, at the very end he accused you of rather chronic caution and so forth?

A. Well, I referred to his statement as a thoughtful and thought-provoking statement. It is important that these matters be discussed. We ought not to have what he referred to as "unthinkable thoughts" in the American scene. There ought to be a vigorous and lively debate about these matters.

We have found, for example, that there has been—there has been considerable reluctance here to deal with different Communist countries on a different basis, depending upon developments and the possibilities of relationships with these countries. But I think it is our obligation in the executive, in the administration, to base our attitudes on reality and on facts and upon the national interest, and to put our conclusions to the country and to the Congress based upon that, and not to anticipate what is

possible or what the national reaction might be in the absence of leadership. I think we have responsibility of leadership, and this point came out in his statement.

Q. Mr. Secretary, are we to attach any significance to the fact that you used the expression "mainland China" instead of Communist China, and "Formosa" instead of Nationalist China?

A. No, no, no. Those—(Laughter.) None whatever. None whatever. I was just trying to talk about those people over there—(Laughter.) on the other side of the sea. No, we recognize the Nationalist Government of China, as do more than a majority of the members of the U.N.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been reports within the last few days that you have already made up your mind to retire at the end of President Johnson's term. Now, I think you have denied that once before, but you may want to deny it again. (Laughter.)

A. Well, with due respect to my colleagues back there, I have put this on cameras twice. I don't think I need to do it again. (Laughter.)

Yes?

Q. Mr. Secretary, back on the flyers, could you comment on why it took so long—a week—to get them back? And also what about the Russian claim that they have evidence that the flyers were spying? What about that?

A. Well, the answer to the first part of your question is I just don't know. I have been in touch with—we have been in touch with the Soviet Government several times in this period. I have no explanation at the present time for any delay that might have occurred.

On the second point, we are ourselves convinced, because we know what their instructions were, their flight plans were, their reporting was. We know that they were lost, that they were not engaged upon any mission over East Germany.

Now, it is true this was a tactical reconnaissance aircraft as a member of a tactical reconnaissance squadron. It had certain equipment on board. And I suppose the Russians looked at this pretty hard. But I think I will just leave it at that, until we have a chance to talk with these flyers and find out exactly what happened, because it is, quite frankly, a little mysterious as to how they could be that far off course. And we are going to do our best to find out why.

U.S. Policy on Cuba

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you anticipate a shift of our policy in trade toward Cuba—from no trade with Cuba to one of gradual reestablishment of trade with Cuba?

A. No, no, not unless they move to deal with these two utterly fundamental points announced by President Kennedy about 3 years ago and pursued by us and other members of the hemisphere since that time.

Q. Mr. Secretary, just to clarify whatever differences may exist on Cuba, are we as a government still committed to bringing down Castro as the leader of Cuba on the grounds that he does not represent the Cuban people and on the grounds that he has a military connection with Moscow and on the grounds he is seeking to export revolution?

A. I think those three things all add up to the fact that this present regime in Cuba shows no signs of being able to make itself compatible with this hemisphere, as described and spelled out by the hemisphere at Punta del Este. So that I think all those things add up to the notion that Castro in Cuba doesn't mean normal relations with the rest of the hemisphere.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned two points that Castro would have to satisfy in order to bring back normal relations or trade with Cuba. In the first point, about the military connection with the Soviet Union, what would you feel would constitute a break in this military connection—just simply the withdrawal of troops, or sending back the guns that it received from Russia to Russia, or what would you say would be the answer to that?

A. I think the removal of the Soviet military pressure and any implications that the Soviet Union has a military or political commitment to Cuba with respect to its relations with the rest of the hemisphere.

Yes, sir?

NATO Multilateral Force

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us what the situation is at the moment with regard to the political consideration of the MLF force as regards the various countries in Western Europe with whom you are consulting on that subject?

A. Yes. The two committees have been working very well on that—the Military Committee and the Political Consultation Committee. We shall be having their reports very shortly and will be discussing with other governments.

As you know, a number of governments have elected to take part in the experimental multimanned missile destroyer to test out some of the operational and practical questions involved, and partly as a demonstration. But I wouldn't want to try to be precise about the attitude of other governments, particularly on this matter. We have been very much encouraged with the way the discussions have been going, and I think we will expect to see that forward movement continued. But I think you will be hearing more about that in the next month or so as these reports come in.

Q. Well, now, do you anticipate, Mr. Secretary—

A. Excuse me.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if I may follow up by this: Can you anticipate then, as things are going now, that the multilateral force will come about ultimately?

A. Oh, yes. Oh, yes. I am very much assured of that and very much encouraged by what has developed in the course of our consultations in the last several weeks on that.

SEATO Ministerial Council Meeting

Q. Mr. Secretary, your announced trip to the SEATO Ministerial Council meeting in Manila, and the after trip to Taiwan—could you explain the purpose of that a little, in the light of your earlier answer that the members of the alliances should form closer relationships among themselves. Is this a death knell for SEATO?

A. Not at all. This is a stated meeting of SEATO. It is normal for the foreign ministers to meet at least once a year. This has been planned for some time. I think it is the 10th anniversary of SEATO, actually, in Manila. Manila was the actual location of the original signature. So I am going out there for that meeting. And I think that SEATO has shown that—the regional members particularly, as well as the other members—this arrangement, this mutual assurance has been of great importance to the security of the members of that organization. But there is nothing very special about the fact that I am going. I think it would be rather news if I were not going, in fact, under the circumstances.

Q. Thank you.

Security in Department of State

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been a number of assertions in recent weeks to the effect that the charges by a Polish defector named Golenicwski have been covered up, and that a security investigation is under way in the State Department. Do you have any comment on those?

A. Yes. I would be glad to comment. I haven't had this question in some time. I would be glad to comment on this question of security in the Department of State, because it does need better understanding and better public understanding.

Every important Foreign Office, and that includes the Department of State, is subject to attempts at penetration by foreign governments. These attempts are pursued by technical means —for example, you may recall the Great Seal of the United States that Ambassador [Henry Cabot] Lodge displayed once in the U.N. Security Council [2]—and also pursued through the element of human frailty. This goes on all the time. And it requires an unrelenting effort to meet these attempts at penetration.

Now, we here in the Department of State have almost all of our jobs classified as sensitive jobs—I suppose 97 percent or 98 percent of them. We leave out certain people in the warehouses, and things of that sort. The general average around government is 5 percent to 10

[2] For background, see *ibid.*, June 13, 1960, p. 955.

percent. Therefore, because of the nature of our business, we have to expect, and we do in fact obtain, a very high standard of conduct on the part of our people. And I am very proud of the way in which our people live up to these high standards of conduct.

Now, this business of security is never ending—never ending. One can't relax on it, because of the efforts that are being made to penetrate. This means that we bring our security clearances up to date when there is a promotion, or when there is an assignment to a significant position, or, where this does not occur on a regular and periodic basis, we renew these security clearances by periodic investigations and reinvestigations. This goes on regularly.

But, on the other hand, we are going to use a sense of justice and common sense in determining what are security cases and what are problems for us in this field.

I have seen some discussion of this phrase "derogatory remarks" or "derogatory information." This is something which really requires a good deal of just plain, old-fashioned common sense.

I don't want to make light over a matter that is serious, but some years ago I was asked to be a consultant, and in filling out one of these security blanks the question came "Has any member of your family ever tried to overthrow the Government of the United States by force and violence?" And I said "Yes." And the next question was: "If the answer is 'Yes,' who?" And I named both my grandfathers. (Laughter.) Well, things went along until the interrogators came back and said, "About your grandfathers. . . ." I said, "I thought one of them was at Gettysburg." (Laughter.)

Well, I suppose 3 or 4 years from now it is entirely possible that this will be solemnly put down as a derogatory comment—you see?—in this field. (Laughter.)

Now, I have very important duties in this respect as Secretary of State. We are going to pursue those duties to insure the security of this Department. But I have duties also because I am the American Secretary of State. And we are going to do it in the way that is consistent with our standards here in our constitutional society. But we are not going to play around with this element of security; it is far too important. But we are not going to lose our heads in the process.

Now, I have heard some discussion lately about things that happened 10 years ago, that my predecessors got into, resolved, acted upon. People working in this Department have security clearance; and it is going to stay that way. But we are not going to lose our heads about it.

Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

The Hope for Reasoned Agreement

Remarks by President Johnson [1]

. . . . . .

Before I conclude, for a moment, if I may, I would just like to simply talk to you about your family and mine, about their future and their country.

Last Sunday, Palm Sunday, as I sat in church, I thought about all of the problems that faced this world—ancient feuds and recent quarrels that have disturbed widely separated parts of the earth. You have seen five or six different quarrels appearing on the front page of your morning newspaper, and you have heard about our foreign policy.

The world has changed and so has the method of dealing with disruptions of the peace. There may have been a time when a Commander in Chief would order soldiers to march the very moment a disturbance occurred, although restraint and fairness are not new to the American tradition. As a matter of fact, some people urged me to hurry in the Marines when the air became a little hot on a particular occasion recently.

But the world as it was and the world as it is are not the same any more. Once upon a time even large-scale wars could be waged without risking the end of civilization, but what was once upon a time is no longer so—because general war is impossible. In a matter of moments, you can wipe out from 50 to 100 million of our adversaries, or they can, in the same

[1] Made at the conclusion of an address before the national legislative conference of the building and construction trades at Washington, D.C., on Mar. 24 (White House press release; as-delivered text).

amount of time, wipe out 50 million or 100 million of our people, taking half of our land, taking half of our population in a matter of an hour. So general war is impossible, and some alternatives are essential. The people of the world, I think, prefer reasoned agreement to ready attack. That is why we must follow the prophet Isaiah many, many times before we send the Marines and say, "Come now, and let us reason together." And this is our objective: the quest for peace and not the quarrels of war.

In this nuclear world, in this world of a hundred new nations, we must offer the outstretched arm that tries to help instead of an arm's-length sword that helps to kill.

In every troubled spot in the world, this hope for reasoned agreement instead of rash retaliation can bear fruit. Agreement is being sought and we hope and believe soon will be worked out with our Panamanian friends. The United Nations peacekeeping machinery is already on its merciful mission in Cyprus and a mediator is being selected.

The water problem that disturbed us at Guantanamo was solved not by a battalion of Marines bayoneting their way in to turn on the water, but we sent a single admiral over to cut it off. I can say to you that our base is self-sufficient. By lean readiness, a source of danger and disagreement has been removed.

In Viet-Nam divergent voices cry out with suggestions, some for a larger scale war, some for more appeasement, some even for retreat. We do not criticize them or demean them. We consider fully their suggestions.

But today finds us where President Eisenhower found himself 10 years ago. The position he took with Viet-Nam then in a letter that he sent to the then President [2] is one that I could take in complete honesty today, and that is that we stand ready to help the Vietnamese preserve their independence and retain their freedom and keep from being enveloped by communism.

We, the most powerful nation in the world, can afford to be patient. Our ultimate strength is clear, and it is well known to those who would be our adversaries, but let's be reminded that power brings obligation. The people in this country have more blessed hopes than bitter victory. The people of this country and the world expect more from their leaders than just a show of brute force. So our hope and our purpose is to employ reasoned agreement instead of ready aggression; to preserve our honor without a world in ruins; to substitute, if we can, understanding for retaliation.

My most fervent prayer is to be a President who can make it possible for every boy in this land to grow to manhood by loving his country—loving his country instead of dying for it.

Secretary Rusk Heads Delegation to SEATO Council Meeting

The Department of State announced on March 26 (press release 132) that Secretary Rusk would leave Washington April 10 to attend the ninth meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), which will be held at Manila April 13–15.[1]

After the meeting the Secretary will visit Taipei April 16–17 to consult with officials of the Government of the Republic of China.

Foreign Ministers of other SEATO member countries are scheduled to attend the meeting, where they will exchange views on matters affecting the treaty area, as well as review the military and nonmilitary activities of the organization.

The member countries of SEATO are Australia, France, Pakistan, the Philippines, New Zealand, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

[1] For a list of the members of the U.S. delegation, see press release 132.

[2] For text, see BULLETIN of Nov. 15, 1954, p. 735.

The Atlantic Agenda

by W. W. Rostow
Counselor of the Department and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council [1]

Ten months ago I had the privilege of talking in Brussels on the subject of the Atlantic community.[2] At that time I tried to explain the historical roots of American support for the concepts of European integration and Atlantic partnership. I concluded that, so far as we in Washington could perceive, the character of likely changes on the world scene over the foreseeable future would continue to make European integration and the Atlantic partnership the appropriate foundations for policy in the West. Shortly thereafter, as you will recall, President Kennedy authoritatively restated our policy in his Frankfurt speech of June 25, 1963; [3] and President Johnson has subsequently reaffirmed in words and deeds the continuity of a policy which, indeed, reaches back almost a generation in American political and diplomatic life.

The events of recent months have, I believe, strengthened our commitment to this policy, while posing for the West an agenda somewhat different in its balance and emphasis than that with which we had become familiar in earlier years. In considering these matters with you tonight I should like to begin by trying to describe the character of the changes going forward on the world scene and then turn to their consequences for the content of the Atlantic agenda.

[1] Address made before the American Chamber of Commerce at Brussels, Belgium, on Mar. 16 (press release 110 dated Mar. 13).

[2] For an address made by Mr. Rostow before the Belgo-American Association on May 9, 1963, see BULLETIN of June 3, 1963, p. 855.

[3] *Ibid.*, July 22, 1963, p. 118.

Present Situation

It is increasingly clear that the Cuba missile crisis of October 1962 ended one phase in postwar history and began another. It brought to a halt what might be described as the post-Sputnik offensive.

In the wake of the first Sputnik—and heartened by that powerful symbolic event—a tolerably unified Communist bloc launched against the free world a major offensive. The confident mood throughout the Communist world was caught by Mao Tse-tung's post-Sputnik statement: "The east wind is prevailing over the west wind."

It was in 1958 that the ultimatum on Berlin was launched by Moscow; Ho Chi Minh, in violation of the 1954 Geneva agreements, began to press down hard in South Viet-Nam and into central Laos. At the end of 1958 Castro took over in Cuba and began to press out into the Caribbean. The Communists vigorously sought to exploit the aftermath of independence in the Congo, as well as opportunities in Indonesia and elsewhere in the developing areas. This post-Sputnik offensive aimed to gain ground in Europe by the application of nuclear blackmail against the West over the question of Berlin, and in the developing areas by a mixture of subversion and guerrilla warfare, aid and trade, and the projected image of communism as the wave of the future.

Although this offensive was set back in two areas—by the Lebanon-Jordan and Quemoy-Matsu crises of 1958—it had real momentum when President Kennedy came into office. The

first task of his administration was to deal with it.

Roughly between May of 1961 and October 1962, under President Kennedy's leadership, this offensive was halted. Dangerous Communist actions by no means ceased, but the momentum of the post-Sputnik offensive drained away. And Moscow confronted at home, and in its relations with Communist China and Eastern Europe, a set of searching and fundamental problems.

Sensing this historic interval of opportunity, President Kennedy in June 1963, in his American University speech,[4] moved from the position of equilibrium and strength, which had been created under his leadership, in the direction of peace.

My theme tonight is simply this: Whether, in fact, the turning point of 1961–63 becomes a watershed in human history, in which the cold war gradually gives way to the organization of a peaceful and progressive community of nations, or whether it leads merely to a parenthesis between two Communist offensives, depends primarily on what we in the free world make of this interval.

It is evident—in Southeast Asia and in the Caribbean, for example—that the Communist danger remains acute. Peace has not broken out. Our understandings with the Soviet Union cover an exceedingly narrow range. We evidently face danger as well as opportunity. And we confront new problems within the free world as well as in our relations with the Communist nations.

Nevertheless, the initiative is in our hands if we have the will and the vision to seize it; if we deal with present problems in a way that strengthens the Atlantic partnership, both internally and in its ties with less developed areas to the south; and, above all, if we command the capacity to remain together at a time when the most obvious and unifying of the postwar threats—the threat to Berlin—has abated.

In deciding what actions should be taken to these ends, we need to look at main trends in the world about us.

At the moment, as I say, the threat to Western Europe on the central front has subsided; East–West trade is expanding; certain limited East–West agreements have been made; West Berlin is quiet, confident, and vital. On the other hand, the Soviet nuclear missile force is still expanding and remains targeted on Western Europe and the United States, and massive conventional forces remain at Moscow's command.

Within the Atlantic alliance we are moving toward promising trade negotiations; we have made quiet progress in improving consultation about nuclear matters, about our economic aid to developing areas, and about our political moves toward other nations. On the other hand, there are still important problems ahead in the field of Atlantic trade; the question of how to share nuclear responsibility within the alliance remains with us; and we have much work to do in improving our programs of aid to less developed areas and in developing effective techniques of political consultation.

Meanwhile, two forces converge elsewhere in the world scene to produce considerable political turbulence.

First, there is what might be called the natural nationalism of the emerging nations of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. A desire for increased national dignity and stature on the world scene, in the face of technically more advanced nations, is a fundamental motive for the modernization of underdeveloped areas now, as it was in the 19th century. In the past year this tendency has, perhaps, been heightened to a degree in some areas by a sense that the cold-war threats have diminished and that it is possible and rational to pursue more vigorously narrow national objectives. This tendency within the free world is, of course, systematically exploited by Communists.

Second, as President Johnson noted in his state of the Union message,[5] we have seen systematic and purposeful efforts by Communist regimes to destroy the independence of other states by the illegal entry of arms and men across international frontiers to foment subversion. I refer, of course, to the actions un-

[4] *Ibid.*, July 1, 1963, p. 2.

[5] *Ibid.*, Jan. 27, 1964, p. 110.

dertaken by the regimes in Hanoi and Habana and to the general doctrines proclaimed from Peiping, which would assert the legitimacy of support for movements of Communist insurrection conducted across international frontiers. The combination of the low cost to the Communists of doing damage, plus the technical difficulty of interception, has made subversion and guerrilla warfare the most durable Communist technique of the cold war.

Thus, while in the main theater of Central Europe the cold war has at least temporarily abated, and while there are grounds for great confidence about the long trend in the East–West balance, we observe problems, as well as opportunities, within the Atlantic partnership; and we see a rolling succession of crises in the rest of the world compounded, as I say, of exuberant nationalism, heightened by systematic Communist exploitation, plus the sinister and dangerous exercises being conducted by Ho Chi Minh and Castro in Southeast Asia and in the Caribbean.

Our Agenda

In the face of this situation our agenda in the Atlantic alliance has three broad dimensions:

First, here in the northern part of the free world, to maintain and strengthen the cohesion of the free, industrialized countries as Europe gradually moves toward unity.

Second, to work with the great southern areas of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America so as to accelerate their economic development.

Third, while frustrating communism where it still thrusts out against us, to refine our methods of political consultation so we can work together in helping other free nations to protect their independence, while exploring such possibilities as may emerge of moving toward more peaceful and stable East–West relations.

I turn now to each of these three points.

Strengthening the North

Within the north there are two great practical tasks before us in 1964: going ahead in the trade negotiations and continuing to work away at the problem of more effective sharing of nuclear responsibility.

So far as the trade negotiations are concerned—here in a city filled with so much technical expertise—I will confine myself to one brief observation.

Every nation will, evidently, bring to those negotiations strongly felt special interests, charged with political meaning. This will be true of the United States as well as of our European negotiating partners. Under these circumstances, it will be necessary for all the participants to bear in mind the large common interests involved in their success. No country is going to be able to get all that it would like; but the vital economic interests of many nations will have to be respected in bringing the negotiations to successful completion. We can expect hard bargaining. The greatest stake in these negotiations, however, will not lie in this or that disadvantage avoided. It will lie in creating a general world environment of lowered barriers to trade.

I make this observation not merely as an official of the Department of State but as a professional economist. Trade negotiations are one of the few ways that government officials can, so to speak, lay their hands on the economy. The fate of a nation's international trade position and its foreign balance is determined by a great many factors, domestic and foreign, of which the level of tariffs is only one. A certain breadth of economic, as well as political, vision should, evidently, be brought to these important negotiations. For example, the ability of all nations involved to accept a world of lower tariffs would be increased by a strengthening of measures for international monetary cooperation.

So far as sharing of responsibility for nuclear deterrence is concerned, it has been clear for some time that the Atlantic alliance faces three broad alternatives.

First: To retain responsibility solely in United States hands, while strengthening nuclear consultation within the alliance. There is undoubtedly a need for ever closer consultation on nuclear matters, and all of our countries should be constantly seeking for better ways of meeting this need. This is a necessary and important part of any approach to the nuclear problem. But it may not fully meet the long-term desire of a strong and prosperous Europe

to play what it would consider a self-respecting role in strategic deterrence. Major European countries have made clear their view that nuclear consultation, alone, does not accord them such a role. That consultation may, furthermore, not achieve optimum effectiveness, or fully grip the participants, if those taking part lack the knowledge and sense of responsibility that comes from sharing in the costs, ownership, and operation of strategic weapons.

Second: Operational responsibility for strategic deterrence might be shared more fully with Europe on a national basis. When last here, I spoke of the divisions and tensions which such a course would create in the Atlantic alliance. This course would also evidently make it more difficult to build a cohesive European community. For it would either divide this community into first- and second-class citizens by sharing with some but not others, or it would lead to nuclear sharing with all major members of the community, thus extending and embedding in concrete the very notion of national self-sufficiency which the community seeks to erode.

And it would evidently be difficult, on the basis of thus strengthening and extending independent national forces, to progress toward a genuinely integrated European or Atlantic nuclear effort. In the absence of thus sharing nuclear power on a national basis, on the other hand, the chances of integration may be enhanced by the costs and difficulty of making an independent effort succeed. The obstacles to creating a delivery system which can actually penetrate sophisticated Soviet defenses are not trivial, and give some reason to believe that continuing national nuclear proliferation is far from inevitable if we can develop promising alternatives.

If we are neither to hoard sole responsibility for strategic deterrence in the United States nor disperse it nationally within the Atlantic alliance, this brings us to the *third* alternative: some provision for multilateral sharing which is consistent with the concepts of European integration and Atlantic partnership.

One possible approach to this need is represented by the proposed missile fleet: the MLF [multilateral force].

In its military aspects the MLF could provide Europe with an increased share in effective coverage of Soviet weapons systems threatening Europe, such as airfields and missile sites. There would be more than enough such military installations, to which the yield and accuracy of MLF missiles would be suited, to absorb fully the MLF's projected strength. The NATO international military authorities have made clear their view that it would be militarily more advantageous to have these military installations covered by a mix of external and of theater forces, including sea-based MRBM's [medium-range ballistic missiles], than by external forces alone. The United States is sufficiently convinced of the MLF's military effectiveness so that it would, as Secretary [of Defense Robert S.] McNamara said at the last NATO meeting, be prepared to substitute the MLF for increased United States missile forces which it would otherwise have to build to meet important military needs.

In its political aspects the MLF would provide an enlarged role for Europe in the ownership, operation, and control of strategic nuclear power. The major participants would play a key role in MLF planning and thus in control of a force far larger and more effective than any which could be created by independent national effort in Europe. That role could grow as Europe unified. President Johnson said, in speaking of this proposed missile fleet's creation, here on November 8:[6]

> The movement to Atlantic partnership makes this possible. The movement to European unity makes this desirable—as a first step toward a greater European voice in nuclear matters. Evolution of this missile fleet toward European control, as Europe marches toward unity, is by no means excluded.

This evolution would, of course, hinge, among other things, on a greater consensus—a genuine consensus, freely arrived at—among the potential major European members of MLF than now exists about this matter. In dealing with this question of nuclear control we must be careful not to consider as differences between the United States and Europe what are actually, in good part, unresolved issues among the European nations themselves. These are complex

[6] For text, see *ibid.*, Dec. 2, 1963, p. 852.

and difficult questions; European agreement on them may well depend on progress toward European unity.

Because the MLF could provide European nations with a solid share in strategic deterrence, it would also enhance the effectiveness of nuclear consultation. MLF participants—particularly major members—would be taking part in that consultation as responsible partners, rather than as bystanders. They would bring to it a background of information and a sense of responsibility which would enable them to play a more meaningful part in the process. And they would be responding to a clear operational need to coordinate powerful strategic forces, which would lend heightened urgency and importance to the task.

Improved nuclear consultation and creation of a multilateral force—two of the three courses of action I outlined—can thus be viewed not as alternatives but rather as mutually reinforcing steps to the same end—to be taken within the same time frame. The one may well enhance the other's effectiveness; together, they may provide the framework for an increasingly effective approach to the problem of nuclear sharing.

Such an approach must, of course, be consistent with our disarmament efforts. A joint missile fleet would be even more proof against national dissemination than existing arrangements for deploying missiles to allied forces, i.e., the arrangements which were used for past IRBM [intermediate-range ballistic missile] deployments to Europe. For the MLF missiles would be under mixed multilateral manning and ownership, instead of under the national manning and ownership called for by present arrangements; and the warheads would be under multilateral control, instead of under the bilateral control called for by present arrangements. It would thus be a step away from—not toward—national proliferation.

The MLF evidently depends on both our interested European partners and the United States. It is for each of us to consider the possible courses of action and decide how the important problem of nuclear sharing is to be approached. Our own careful studies, since the MLF was first put forward by the Eisenhower administration, have not indicated any alternative approach which would be more effective in reconciling the needs of European integration and Atlantic defense.

We believe that these two concepts, European integration and Atlantic defense, should support and reinforce—not contradict—each other. Effective Atlantic defense helps to create a secure and cohesive military environment in which progress toward European integration is more likely to take place. European unity, in turn, helps to reinforce Atlantic defense by creating a stronger European partner in building that defense. That is why the United States has always paralleled its efforts for Atlantic defense with steadfast support and encouragement for the cause of European integration—in the political as well as the economic area.

The issue is thus not whether to seek Atlantic defense *or* European integration; it is how to seek *both* these goals.

This trend toward mutual confidence and interdependence within the Atlantic alliance is one of the great achievements of modern history. After the Berlin and Cuba crises in 1961–62, I do not believe there are many in Europe who really doubt the American commitment to defend Europe's frontiers as our own, or the American commitment to risk New York for Brussels, or Washington for Paris, or Detroit for Ankara. Certainly no one in Moscow does. This commitment does not rest only on sentiment. As President Kennedy pointed out at Frankfurt,

> . . . war in Europe, as we learned twice in 40 years, destroys peace in America. . . . That is why no administration . . . in Washington can fail to respond to such a threat—not merely from good will but from necessity.

That is why we cannot wait until an aggressor has bitten deep into Europe before throwing our full strength, nuclear as well as nonnuclear, against him.

We have seen, over the postwar years, how firmly the alliance knits together at moments of acute danger and crisis. The United States and Europe can and should go forward and build on this confidence, not destroy it. They should approach the nuclear problem with this end in view.

North-South Economic Ties

Turning to the second item on our agenda, north-south affairs, our first common task is to consider with our friends from the developing areas, at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,[7] what measures of trade and aid we can mount together to accelerate their development.

It would be inappropriate for me to discuss the various proposals which may shortly be considered at Geneva; but it is clear that the more industrialized nations of the free world bear a common responsibility, rooted in enlightened self-interest, steadily to maintain over the years ahead a flow of capital and technical assistance to the nations of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America; and we have an equal interest in their developing an ability to earn by their own efforts an enlarged flow of foreign exchange.

If these nations are to maintain their independence, move toward political stability, and assume on the world scene roles of increased importance and responsibility, they must modernize their societies and provide for their citizens an environment of regular growth in welfare. That is a job which they must, mainly, do for themselves. But the margin of assistance which we of the Atlantic world and Japan can provide, through aid and trade, is a critical margin.

We have been much heartened to see in recent years the expansion in the contribution of Western Europe and Japan to this enterprise, but much remains to be done in several major respects.

First, there is the question of the *volume* of aid. The assistance provided by nations other than the United States has doubled over the past 7 years. So has that of the United States. Nevertheless the requirements continue to be large. More needs to be done.

Second, there is the *type* of aid to be provided. The fact that many of the loans initially granted to the developing nations from Europe were relatively short-term has resulted in a buildup in their requirement for repayment which is likely to strain excessively the balance of payments of some of the developing nations in the years ahead. We shall have to provide longer term financing if we are not to risk frustrating the momentum of their development.

Third, there is the question of *where* our aid goes. The willingness and the ability of European nations to continue to render assistance to new nations formerly linked by colonial ties is a heartening and constructive fact on the world scene—for example, the continuing contribution of talent and funds provided by Belgium in the Congo. But with the passage of time we can and should expect Europe to widen its portfolio, to engage in constructive enterprises with the developing nations in every quarter of the globe.

As I underlined in a talk in London last Tuesday[8]—on the Alliance for Progress—we believe it would, for example, be strengthening to the whole of the West if Europe would engage itself more deeply in the many constructive enterprises going forward in Latin America; for, while our ties within the Western Hemisphere are close and deeply rooted, Latin America is also bound to Western Europe by ties of commerce and culture, religion and history. For Europe now to share in the great adventure of modernization going forward in Latin America would give these old ties new meaning and draw Latin America increasingly into the Atlantic world, of which it is so natural a component.

Fourth, there is the question of *coordination*. Building on the increasing vitality of the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development], and through consortium arrangements of the IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development], we must increasingly concert our development efforts. And the International Development Association of the IBRD offers an effective channel for increasingly multilateral provision of aid in some cases.

Behind this need to work together is a political fact: To the extent that we work together in these enterprises, the political task faced by

[7] For background, see *ibid.*, Apr. 6, 1964, p. 557.

[8] *Ibid.*, Mar. 30, 1964, p. 496.

our governments is rendered easier, as they confront their Parliaments and the Congress, and as they confront the citizens to whom they are ultimately responsible. In democratic societies, where citizens have many legitimate claims on the public revenues, it is not a simple matter to persuade elected representatives of the wisdom of voting or otherwise granting assistance to the citizens of other nations. The case must be made with lucidity and conviction year after year. But to the extent that it is better known and understood by our peoples that our assistance to developing nations is an equitably shared common venture of the advanced democracies—in the pursuit of large common interests—we increase the likelihood and the stability of public support.

Private citizens have a major role to play in generating that support. I would hope that interested citizens on both sides of the Atlantic could find ways of working ever more closely together to this end. The concept of Atlantic partnership should find expression in such private, as well as governmental, efforts.

Fifth, and finally, there is the question of the *role of private enterprise.*

In the field of economic development there are, I believe, new opportunities for private enterprise. In the first postwar generation of development there have emerged in many nations the beginnings of a vital private enterprise sector. Thus far its efforts have been mainly focused in the large cities and on the production of import substitution goods for a relatively small upper middle-class market. The time is coming when private enterprise can begin to assume in developing areas the great social function it has come to perform in Western Europe, North America, and Japan, that is, to produce and to market efficiently the goods which the poor want and would buy if prices were lower and which they would work harder to acquire if they were cheaply and efficiently available. The problem is to produce that widening of the market which Adam Smith correctly identified as the basis for efficient industrialization almost two centuries ago.

In this widening out of the markets within the developing areas, the local private enterprise sectors must take the lead; but there exists also a great opportunity for foreign private enterprise to assist on the basis of knowledge and experience gained in the more advanced parts of the world, as well as with respect to capital.

Political Consultation

Our north–south problems evidently transcend the question of economic development. As I suggested earlier, the inherent dynamics of the transition to modernization is compounded by Communist efforts to exploit difficult and dangerous regional problems in every quarter of the globe. Some of these are deeply rooted in history; others are the product of frictions arising from postcolonial settlements.

Some nations in the Atlantic community are inevitably drawn into these regional conflicts by past or current ties. We in the United States, because of our world role, tend to become involved even though we have no long historical connections with many of these problems.

It is evidently not appropriate for all of us in the North Atlantic community to engage ourselves directly in all efforts to maintain stability and to seek peaceful solutions. It is appropriate, however, for all of us to understand with sympathy the character of the problems involved and to be helpful where it is possible. The fate of all of us in the West is involved, in some degree, in the pacific resolution of each of these regional tensions. It is not enough for us each to stand back in those cases where we are not directly involved and be grateful that the burdens are carried by others in the Atlantic partnership.

The political consultative machinery of NATO should be used more intensively to exchange information about these problems and to produce an understanding of their complexity and of the common interests involved where active collaboration and engagement by all of us is not appropriate.

We must try to move toward a common perspective, not merely on the inner problems of the north but also toward common perspectives on problems throughout the world. There must evidently be, within the Atlantic partner-

ship, heightened attention to political consultation in all its dimensions.

This perspective must also extend to East–West problems.

With respect to these problems, it will be important, I believe, over coming months that all of us in the Atlantic alliance focus our minds clearly on the problem posed for the free world by the purposeful shipment of arms and men across frontiers by the Communists in support of insurrectional movements.

Illegal crossing of frontiers poses a special problem, in view of the economics of guerrilla warfare and other forms of subversion. A relatively small number of men and volume of arms can throw a heavy direct burden on a weak society, quite aside from the catalytic role of this kind of subversive activity, which Castro accurately described in his speech of December 1961 as "the match you throw in the haystack."

At the moment, Moscow appears somewhat less involved in these aggressive enterprises than other Commmnist regimes. Nevertheless they could lead to major confrontations which would affect all of us in the Atlantic alliance.

Communist regimes must not be encouraged to believe that the enlarged commercial or other contacts which are being created in the present international situation provide them with license to foment insurrection by illegal means in other nations. Specifically, it is important that the Communists in Asia understand well that the West is not ready to turn over Southeast Asia to Communist rule, either directly or through a process of neutralization which the Communists and others would understand as tantamount to Communist hegemony.

Our interest is the continued independence of the nations of Southeast Asia.

On the Caribbean it is important for our friends in the Atlantic community to recall that during the Punta del Este conference of January 22–31, 1962, important resolutions were passed by an overwhelming majority of the members of the Organization of American States, which defined the Communist offensive in America; affirmed that the principles of communism were incompatible with the principles of the inter-American system; and urged member states to take those steps that they may consider appropriate for their individual or collective self-defense and to cooperate, as may be necessary or desirable, to strengthen their capacity to counteract threats or acts of aggression, subversion, or other dangers to peace and security resulting from the continued intervention in the Western Hemisphere of Sino-Soviet powers.[9] We would hope that these resolutions, rooted in the same principle of regional self-defense on which NATO itself is based, would be understood fully in Europe.

We intend to consult fully with our allies about the continuing problems that must be faced in combating Communist aggression in Southeast Asia and the Caribbean. We hope that European nations will approach this consultation with the same desire for full and frank discourse that we do.

Aside from the problems in Southeast Asia and the Caribbean, we face a searching challenge in exploiting together the possibilities of moving toward a position of greater stability and reduced tension between Eastern and Western Europe and in the field of arms control. In this enterprise, which requires once again intensified political consultation within the alliance, we should be conscious that the Soviet Union has up to the present set very narrow limits on the possible scope of negotiations. There is no indication that Moscow is prepared to contemplate the application of the principles of self-determination to East Germany. And thus far the Soviet Union has made clear that it will not contemplate arms control measures which involve effective international inspection in the Soviet Union as well as in the West. Clearly, then, the key problems of the cold war remain far from solution.

Nevertheless, there are a good many specific limited issues affecting East–West relations under discussion. In dealing with them the interests of all members of the alliance must be taken into account. In none of these fields will any move be taken without fullest and most extensive consultation with interested allies. This is the time for the alliance to learn how to work as closely together on problems of negotia-

[9] For background and texts of resolutions, see *ibid.*, Feb. 19, 1962, p. 270.

tion with the Soviet Union as we have learned in the past to deal with problems of the common defense. It is good to know that there has been significant progress in this direction within the North Atlantic Council. My country hopes to join its partners in seeking further progress toward effective consultation.

Movement toward European integration should be conducive to this progress. For there is no doubt we can consult more readily with a single strong European entity than with a number of separate and weaker partners. I cannot do better on this point than to quote what the present President of the United States said in Paris nearly 3 years ago.[10] In the political field, he said, the need

> . . . is to discover and act on the most basic of the various Alliance interests that are at stake and thus increase the Alliance's capacity to influence events in the world at large constructively.
>
> Progress toward an integrated European community will help to enhance that capacity and thus to strengthen the Atlantic Community. A more cohesive and powerful Europe within a developing Atlantic Community is needed to undertake the large tasks which lie ahead. The essentially national and loosely coordinated efforts of the past will no longer suffice.

That is one reason we support the movement toward European integration. The goals that Europe and the United States shared when they first set out down this road, with the original United States loan to the Coal and Steel Community, still seem to us valid, necessary, and feasible. We look to continued progress toward their attainment. There will, of course, be obstacles and delays. But there should be no doubt of the outcome, if we stay the course.

Facing the Future With Confidence

As I suggested earlier, the common characteristic of the current Atlantic agenda is that it requires the nations of Europe to take increasing responsibility for issues which transcend the NATO area itself. But this, after all, is what we in the United States and our European friends hoped and expected would happen. When the Marshall Plan was launched, the revival of Europe was begun, and we all threw our weight behind the concept of European integration. That early postwar commitment was an act of faith—faith that the ultimate logic of the Atlantic connection, already tested in two world wars and then under a third test by Stalin, would prevail and that an integrated Europe would build its policy on the fundamental overlap in our respective interests, not on the potential cross-purposes and divergencies—which were, and are, evident enough.

As we look out on the problems before us—almost a generation later—we believe that initial postwar judgment was wise. The simple truth about the world in which we live is this: Neither its military technology, its communications, its economic relations, nor its politics make it rational for any one of us to go it alone. The scale of the problems and the intimacy of our interdependence leave us only one sensible course—to work, both within Europe and across the Atlantic, toward higher degrees of concert in our international policies.

If we can do this—if we can avoid lapsing back to comfortable but outmoded patterns of narrow nationalism—those of us who bear within our societies the stream of Western civilization and the responsibility for its continuity can face the future with confidence. We have every reason to believe that the principles in which our societies are rooted are historically viable: that the combination of personal freedom and personal responsibility on which successful democracies are erected is valid for the second half of the 20th century as it has been in the past; that we have the opportunity to weave together a great partnership, stretching from Japan to Berlin, which would combine the diverse resources, energies, and moral commitment of the advanced nations of the free world; and that, from such a base, we can patiently and confidently search for a peaceful resolution to the cold war on terms which would enlarge the areas of human freedom and national independence.

None of this will happen automatically—without great public and private effort. There may well be dangerous crises still to surmount. There will certainly be long, difficult tasks of construction to carry forward stubbornly, in

[10] *Ibid.*, Apr. 24, 1961, p. 581.

building an integrated European community and a cohesive Atlantic partnership, day after day, month after month, year after year. But I deeply believe that it lies within the grasp of this generation to make the years 1961–1963 the hinge of history in the second half of this century—the interval of intense crisis, surmounted with strength and moderation, which opened the way to peaceful victory for the forces of diversity and freedom.

The United States and a Changing Europe

by William R. Tyler
Assistant Secretary for European Affairs[1]

I'm very glad to be with you this evening, and I thank you sincerely for having invited me. I told Mr. Duffy that I have no Irish blood in me and thus am not entitled to wear the green on St. Patrick's Day. And yet, perhaps I may lay claim to being allowed to do so: I have been three times to Ireland in the last 2 years. The last time was with President Kennedy, and that experience convinced me that any American's heart belongs in part to Ireland.

Well, it is a very different world today from the times of St. Patrick, or 100 years ago, or even 25 years ago. We are living in a world of change. The pace of history is not even, like that of a river. Its course is marked by periods of sudden intensity in the varying fields of human endeavor, whether it be in the arts, in literature, or in the sciences. The keynote of our times is change. All countries and all continents are experiencing in some degree the impact of new forces, generated partly from within themselves and partly by the experience of others.

I was thinking the other day that we will shortly be marking the 15th anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty. Let's take a brief look at Europe as it was then, compared with the situation today. Such a comparison may serve to make us feel that, in spite of the problems we still face, the record gives us cause for some legitimate satisfaction at what has been achieved and averted, and for some hope that further progress is within our reach, that our efforts have not been in vain, and that many of the changes that are occurring are working for us.

Europe Today

In 1949 the economy of Europe lay in ruins.

Today the member countries of NATO account for 62 percent of the world's gross national product, as against 21 percent for the Soviet bloc.

In 1949 Europe lay defenseless but for us, under the direct threat of Soviet military aggression.

Today the members of NATO combined have more men under arms and greater overall military capability than the Soviet Union and her allies.

In 1949 Europe was a mosaic of prostrate national units.

Today, thanks to our massive assistance under the Marshall Plan and thanks to the efforts of the Europeans themselves, Europe is becoming increasingly integrated, economically, commercially, and technologically.

National boundaries are diminishing in im-

[1] Address made before the Hibernian Society of Baltimore at Baltimore, Md., on Mar. 17 (press release 124).

portance. National responsibilities are being increasingly subordinated to common responsibilities. The vision of enlightened Europeans after the war—such as Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman of France, Konrad Adenauer of Germany, and Alcide de Gasperi of Italy—has given impetus to a new conception of the role and the destinies of Europe which, a quarter of a century ago, would have been dismissed as lunacy.

We are witnessing today the emergence of conditions which will surely result in the establishment of a partnership between the two sides of the Atlantic. Neither temporary setbacks nor hesitations can obscure the fact that common considerations of interest, of security, of responsibility toward the less developed countries of the world, are pressing the United States and Europe forward along the converging lines of a common purpose and toward a shared goal.

We are about to engage in negotiations with 60 other nations to reduce further the tariffs which inhibit trade between nations. If the free world is to benefit from the efficient use of resources, and from a more open trading system, this requires agreement in the first instance between the United States and the European Common Market, for together we conduct 90 percent of free-world trade.

If there is to be an international financial system capable of supporting an increased flow of goods, this requires cooperation between ourselves and Europe.

If there is to be an adequate flow of capital to meet the needs of less developed countries, it must come from North America and Western Europe, for there are no other major sources.

Differences of view within the Western alliance should not blind us to the fact that there is complete and unhesitating unity on the basic issue of the defense of the West. This was clearly demonstrated at the time of the Cuban crisis in 1962 and of the attempts by the Soviet Union to test the unity of the alliance by creating incidents on the Berlin autobahn last fall.

In other words, the essential political unity within NATO in terms of the East–West struggle, the prosperity of our free societies, and the strength of our defense—all this makes it possible for us to air certain differences in public without impairing the foundations of our association.

A true alliance between free peoples must be evolutionary in character. We face new challenges and new opportunities in our world of change.

I do not wish to sound Pollyannish to you. I do not underestimate the disappointments and difficulties ahead of us. But I would not be speaking frankly if I did not express to you my conviction that, in the long run, the road before the free world runs forward and upward.

Changes in Eastern Europe

Now let us look for a few minutes at the changes which are taking place in Eastern Europe. There we see peoples who also have kindred ties with us but who were cut off from their share in European liberation and revival by the outcome of the war. In Poland, Czechoslovakia, Eastern Germany, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania, Stalin envisaged a sphere of Soviet domination as a base for ultimate expansion over the rest of Europe.

The Eastern European peoples were sealed off from the West and held down by Soviet-patterned police apparatuses. Their widely varying economies and national institutions were forced into a single Communist mold, through which the resources of the entire area were put at the disposal of the Soviet Union. Polish coal, Rumanian oil, Czechoslovak uranium were drained off for Soviet use. The peasant agriculture of Eastern Europe was thrown into chaos and its productivity virtually killed by collectivization, to fit Stalin's blueprint of uniformity. When even native Communist leaders balked at the disregard for differing national needs, Stalin had them eliminated. To all appearances he had succeeded in reducing the Eastern European countries to identical satellites, only a step removed from disappearance by absorption into the Soviet Union. They formed the westward protrusion of a seemingly monolithic bloc, threatening the security of the rest of Europe from which they had been involuntarily cut off.

But this monolith endured only as long as

Stalin was there to impose it; after him it began to crack. Actually its weaknesses had begun to show already in Stalin's last years, when, in 1948, the Yugoslav Communists rejected his interference and made their country independent. Since then Poland, Hungary, Albania, and Rumania in differing ways have challenged Soviet control, and throughout Eastern Europe the pattern imposed by Stalin has eroded away.

We can see many reasons why this has happened:

1. Stalin's successors, struggling for his power, lacked his relentless grip. Furthermore, they saw that changes were unavoidable to rule Eastern Europe successfully; but in repudiating Stalin's methods they opened the gates to the forces of change.

2. Economic difficulties, popular misery, and mounting national resentment over the years have exerted irresistible pressure on the Eastern European Communist regimes for change.

3. The Sino-Soviet split in the world Communist movement has encouraged the Eastern European regimes to act more independently and to try to solve their own pressing problems, as the differing circumstances of each country may dictate.

4. The strength and dynamism of the West, and Western economic and cultural magnetism, exerted on Eastern Europe at its very doorstep, have exerted a strong pull on the Eastern European Communist governments toward ties with the West.

5. The example of the front-runner in change—"revisionist" Yugoslavia—has encouraged some of the Eastern European members of the Soviet camp to follow a more independent course both in relation to Moscow and in programs at home.

All of these factors played a part in the rise of strong nationalist and reformist factions in the Polish and Hungarian parties in particular, and in the outbreak of the great crises of 1956. In Poland they led to reforms that, for Communists, were drastic: abolition of collectivization, withdrawal of direct Soviet control over the armed forces, a grant of considerable freedom to the church, a turning to the West for economic support. In Hungary they caused the historic uprising that pushed the Communists to the point of asserting full independence from Moscow, until the Soviets suppressed this move by armed force.

The military crushing of the Hungarian independence movement, however, arrested the tides of change only momentarily. These tides are the same forces of nationalism, economic need, demand for more freedom, and Western attraction as before. The measures of Yugoslavia and of Gomulka's Poland have strengthened the hand of those in other Eastern European regimes who want to seek similarly unorthodox ways of making socialism work better in their own countries. More recently, the Chinese Communist challenge to Moscow's authority, apart from attracting the hard-shell Albanian leaders into shifting their allegiance to Peiping, has given added impulse to the independent tendencies of other Eastern European rulers. As a result, a quiet revolution is going forward—at an uneven pace among the different Eastern European countries, it is true, but with effects that seem bound to change all of them in the long run.

Take Rumania as a leading example. Its leaders have recently revealed their intention of building up the Rumanian industrial system on a national plan of their own, in opposition to proposals of Moscow to subordinate Rumania to a scheme of Soviet-Eastern European joint development. They are turning to the West for the needed equipment. Meanwhile they have been further identifying their regime with the Rumanian nation by a new emphasis on the national culture and by some downgrading of things Russian.

In Poland the posture of equality with Moscow assumed by the Gomulka regime in 1956 has been maintained, as have generally Gomulka's unorthodox experiments with more freedom, individual farming, and close economic ties with the West. In trade, the Poles have recently even entered a far-reaching accord with their principal wartime foe, the West Germans.

In Hungary the Government has been steadily easing restrictions and opening jobs and education to non-Communists in an effort to conciliate the peoples; and, to spur output, it is resorting to such unorthodox steps as encour-

aging private production by peasants on collective farms. It recently stopped jamming Western broadcasts, and it now permits Hungarians, by the thousands, freely to travel to the West. It is trying to shift more of Hungary's trade to the West, as well.

Czechoslovakia is tardily and only gradually discarding some of its leaders and trappings of the Stalin era. It has lightened its travel restrictions and is seeking improved relations with the West, including the United States. For the first time in years there are no American citizens in Czechoslovak prisons.

In Bulgaria a spy trial was recently staged to warn the population against contacts with Americans. But the Government needs and seeks Western ties; it has settled United States claims, for example, and it invites us to exhibit at its trade fair. Though a strict police regime, it is also showing a novel flexibility in some of its economic policies, such as promotion of private production on peasant household plots.

In Soviet-occupied East Germany even the Stalinist regime of Ulbricht, stained with the shame of the Berlin wall, is attempting to devise ways of remedying its failures by borrowing capitalist-type incentives to help its ailing economy. There are other indications that the winds of change now blowing in Eastern Europe are beginning to be felt in East Germany. The time will surely come when the people of Germany will be reunited with each other in freedom and when the heroism and steadfastness of the people of West Berlin will thus be vindicated.

These shifts and changes in the Eastern European scene have important meaning for the United States, in view of our stake in a united and peaceful Europe. If the forces of history, geography, and change are tending to pull this or that Eastern European country back into more normal contact with European life despite Communist control, it is to our interest to assist as we can. To do this, it is essential for the American public to keep abreast with the evolving realities in the eastern half of Europe and to realize that this area is not now a solid bloc of nations, as Stalin tried to make it, or merely a group of satellites of the Soviet Union. The present trend presents a challenge to us and our Western European friends to rebuild our contacts with the Eastern European peoples on a broad scale, through exchanges, trade, and other natural means.

To sum up, we are today engaged in new and changing relations with both Western and Eastern Europe.

The larger, long-range objectives of the United States with respect to Europe are constant: We want Europe to be unified, secure, strong, free, and prosperous.

As conditions in Europe change, so the means that the United States uses to work toward the attainment of its objectives must also necessarily change and evolve as the times require.


The further implication of this truth is that the attitude of the American people toward the phenomenon of change must itself take into account the march of events. In this way we will be in a position to devise and support those policies which are best calculated to serve our own broad interests.

Secretary of Interior Named to Export Expansion Committee

AN EXECUTIVE ORDER[1]

DESIGNATING THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AS A MEMBER OF THE INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON EXPORT EXPANSION

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, Section 1(a) of Executive Order No. 11132[2] of December 12, 1963, is hereby amended by inserting "the Secretary of the Interior;" immediately after "the Secretary of Defense;".



THE WHITE HOUSE,
March 23, 1964.

[1] No. 11148; 29 *Fed. Reg.* 3695.

[2] For text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 6, 1964, p. 25.

Foreign Policy and the Individual: Identity in Diversity

by Mrs. Katie Louchheim
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Community Advisory Services [1]

I appreciate that the theme of your conference is "Progress Toward a World of Law and Order." While talking on this in general terms, perhaps you will allow me to relate the progress I hope to see with the individuals who must bring it about. In a world of some chaos and great diversity let us keep our eye on the individuals who, by a quickened sense of responsibility and perceptive analysis of issues, have the strength to move us forward.

Let me quickly add that the other speakers on the program and this audience represent the best example of the individuals I have in mind.

In thinking over the awesome conference subject it was apparent that the most reasonable approach to a world of order, in one of disorder, is through a world of law and the role of the individual in living by it.

We know there are disorders in the world. Look at events, even at the surface level of news bulletins and weekly developments in Cyprus, Cuba, Panama, the Congo, Kashmir, Laos, and Viet-Nam. We also admit of differences of opinion within the Atlantic community and profound divisions between the power centers of Moscow and Peiping. But these divisions, differences, and disorders are facts of life we are getting used to living with in a rapidly changing, turbulent, and complicated world. We would have more to worry about if the factors of change and turbulence were not present—if, for example, the great colonial revolutions that have doubled U.N. membership within two decades had not taken place. We are, after all, talking about progress toward law and order and not the precise arrival time of the millennium.

Despite the crash of daily headlines it is important to understand that, in perspective, the 20th century, as the late 15th and early 16th centuries, may well be one of the watersheds of history. The Middle Ages saw the rise of capitalism in the form of nation-states built on the decay of feudalism; the 16th century released the individual from the corporate life of the Middle Ages and flowered in the humanism of the Renaissance and the revolutionary expansion of man's horizon.

Today, with the infinite horizons of the nuclear age and voyages of discovery in outer space upon us, we again look to the individual in our midst. We ask whether man's intellect and energy, striving always for a perfect world of law, will insure equality for all citizens of the new society.

With the world expanding—in terms of people, nations, and possible points of friction—at an alarming rate, we must take a hard look at the pace and quality of progress if our mood of cautious optimism is to be justified. We would be well advised to discard what President Kennedy once referred to as the "comfort of opinion" for the "discomfort of thought."

The Pattern of Change

The pattern of change—revolutionary change—is so undisputable a fact of international life that it takes a good deal of thought just to keep up with developments. But since

[1] Address made before a World Affairs Conference at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C., on Mar. 12 (press release 105 dated Mar. 11).

our focus is on the world of law, our best register of progress is through the United Nations and a system of some 77 international organizations and programs, including the World Court, the elder statesman of law and order. Most of you, I believe, are well aware of this because of the fact that, for many technical and political reasons, international organizations are a plain necessity of our times.

Some statistics are perhaps of interest:

The United States is a member of 51 international organizations and a contributor to 26 international operating programs.

At its last session the U.N. General Assembly took action on 125 separate matters, and more than 14,000 votes were cast in which we had a substantial interest, in addition to all the preliminary work in committees. Its 111 members were increased to 113.

Our State Department receives approximately 1,300 cables every working day and sends out approximately 1,000 cabled replies, as well as 600 bags of daily mail.

Last year alone, the U.S. Government attended 547 international conferences.

All together, this represents a prodigious effort on the part of men to build the common law of mankind—the accepted practices, programs, and principles which cannot automatically guarantee but consistently build the structure of peace.

But, going beyond statistics, you perhaps ask what we mean by peace and the objectives of foreign policy. One begins to answer by quoting the preamble to the Constitution, "to secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity."

If you ask how we relate this to the United Nations, I would refer to the kind of world described in the preamble and articles 1 and 2 of the U.N. Charter—ratified by an overwhelming show of bipartisan support at the end of a great war which had purged us of much of our parochial thinking and had taught us the lesson of interdependence.

Let me be specific. The kind of world we are working toward would be:

—free of aggression—aggression by whatever means;

—a world of independent nations, each with the institutions of its own choice, but cooperating with one another to their mutual advantage;

—a world of economic and social advance for all peoples;

—a world which provides certain and equitable means for the peaceful settlement of disputes, and which moves steadily toward a rule of law;

—a world in which the powers of the state over the individual are limited by law and custom, in which the personal freedom essential to the dignity of men is secure;

—a world free of hate and discrimination based on race, or nationality, or color, or economic or social status;

—and a world of equal rights and equal responsibilities for the entire human race.

Individual Involvement in Community Life

But the approach to such a world—a world of law and order—however great our dependence on international institutions, must rely on the individual: people who are deeply involved in the issues of their times.

Whether we are physicists or farmers, doctors or divines, housewives or horticulturists, we must be involved in the quality of life around us. Our understanding is sharpened by involvement. As we participate, we are fulfilled. If our kind of world is to succeed and if the spirit of democracy is to flourish in the land, we cannot withdraw into our professions, we cannot seclude ourselves completely in specialization. We must watch many horizons, expecting to see a few falling stars.

As a contemporary philosopher, Scott Buchanan, said: "The human individual is responsible for injustice anywhere in the universe." Crisis comes with the morning coffee; concern is a lengthening shadow; change and challenge are our birthright.

Mr. Buchanan's remarks should not be taken to mean that each of us is responsible for injustice anywhere but that every one of us has the responsibility for dealing with these injustices.

To set the universe as the limits of our responsibility may seem to you to be exaggerating the case. But if we were to ask that each indi-

vidual assume responsibility for dealing with injustice in his own community, there would undoubtedly be acceptance of the proposition. A reasonable assignment—but if we ask, "What can one individual do?" let us remember the attorney Charles Morgan, whose statement of conscience last fall answered the question of who was to blame for the death of four children. He said: "We all did it. Every last one of us is condemned for that crime and the bombing before it, and the ones last month, last year, a decade ago. We all did it."

Who's to blame? All of us, to the extent that as individuals we are empty of inner voice or too full of material possessions.

We cannot alter, perhaps, what is going on at the other limits of the globe. But the world is now the kind of place where events in our own community affect our standing at the other ends of the earth. Through the mediating mechanism of TV, films, radio, and press, the small print in our own community can now be read at the farthest ends of the globe.

And so, for the informed, involved, participating citizen, the educated man and woman, the community expands. It is not only his or her town or city. It is Rome, Cairo, and Council Bluffs, U.S.A., as well as Rome, Cairo, and Capetown in the world outside.

To be effective as a citizen does not mean that you have to be a member of the State legislature or a delegate to the United Nations. What you do and say on a local committee to clear urban slums, to save national parks, or to guarantee equal opportunity to all citizens may make the difference between orderly progress and the often imperceptible decline of free institutions.

We justify our heritage only by becoming involved in the life of our community and nation.

The Challenge of America

The life of John Kennedy is a case in point. He was a young man, impatient with the imperfections of the world, who used his anger to give him strength. Although he recognized the realities of the world—cruelty, injustice, and disease—he worked ceaselessly, always through the orderly process of law, slow as this must have seemed, for the people and principles in which he believed. His life reminds us of challenges to every sector of American life—city, State, Federal, and the local community—which await our action.

And it is these same principles which President Johnson laid down so eloquently in his state of the Union address. The administration's plans for a concerted and cohesive war against poverty put our problems into even sharper focus.

We must all awake to the challenge of America, for poverty is neither a spur to progress nor some heavenly ordained penalty for failure or error. But it is of our making, our neglect, and must be repaired. We are determined that those who cannot satisfy minimum needs, who "live on the outskirts of hope," isolated from the mainstream of American life and alienated from its values, must be restored to health if the fabric of a free society is to be strong.

A free society has no easy options, no escape either into rigidity or into anarchy. It must survive the endless clash, which is what makes it both the most precarious and the most adaptable social order ever worked out by men.

As we turn to the war on poverty we know the needed reforms are not easy. They require multiple and radical changes. It is not simply the disabilities under which millions of our citizens have accepted defeat, but the stark fact that perhaps 20 percent of our people, including 11 million children, live below the poverty line; that urban decay, linked with this poverty and exacerbated by racial tension, is eating out the heart of our great cities; that automation is demanding higher skills just as a new flood of postwar children, all too unskilled, begin their search for work.

We shall not exorcise these problems by the politics of verbal violence. We shall not exorcise the violence by turning our backs on the problems themselves. We have to brace ourselves for a social effort as great, perhaps, as the waging of war itself if the promise of a free society is to be made good.

I say this because we all must know that our ability to influence the course of events abroad is dependent tremendously on the quality of progress at home. A United States which fails to deal properly with its problems of race rela-

tions, education, urban renewal, unemployment, and old age is unlikely to win acceptance for long as a leader on the world scene.

The Role of the "Uncommon Man"

In facing up to these problems I think it is healthy to appreciate that although we frequently talk about the "universality and brotherhood of man," we should pay more attention to the valuable and interesting differences that distinguish all brothers, whether 30 or 3,000 miles apart.

In a world of overpopulation, high production, and mass consumption we have almost lost the sense of man as an individual. We have surely lost the noble, heroic view of man that used to be called humanistic—the view that existed in the Renaissance—the view that was portrayed in Shakespeare's heroes and in Michelangelo's great frescoes.

If we are to be sure of our identity in a world of diversity, we are going to have to lean more heavily on the "uncommon man" than on many of the stereotypes presently in circulation.

As believers in freedom of speech, we all respect the independent view, the original cast of mind. We must, however, be troubled by the expressions of fanatic intolerance which are still heard in the land and, more distressing, the apathy, the silent indifference of so many enlightened men and women. In their hearts they condemn fanaticism, but they neither speak out to rebuke it or take action to repress it.

Part of the answer to this problem may well be that, as a result of the nuclear age, the historical release of popular emotion and tension through war, fortunately, is no longer possible. However, we see in the nostalgic quest for war the perfect catharsis and the simple solution to complex issues in demands for "total victory." The truth is that the era of peace through mutual terror creates a new environment characterized by a policy of nuclear restraint on the part of the more sophisticated world powers.

There is a great opportunity here, for we must appreciate that, apart from the issue of human survival, the greatest goal being pursued within the framework of the United Nations is the steady extension of human rights.

When President Johnson addressed the United Nations in December he said,[2]

> All that we have built in the wealth of nations, and all that we plan to do toward a better life for all, will be in vain if our feet should slip, or our vision falter, and our hopes end in another worldwide war.

We look, he said, for "a peaceful revolution in the world, through a recommitment of all our members, rich and poor, and strong and weak, whatever their location or their ideology, to the basic principles of human welfare and of human dignity."

Here is a challenge to which we must all respond—a challenge, in a world of greater diversity than disorder, by which individuals can reaffirm the peculiar talent, genius, and adventure of the American spirit.

This spirit of adventure is dramatically expressed in Catherine Drinker Bowen's biography of Francis Bacon. In describing the temper of the times, she says, "People spoke of America as today we speak of the moon, yet far more fruitfully." In Francis Bacon's own words we were "That great wind blowing from the west . . . the breath of life which blows on us from that New Continent." "Columbus," Bacon said, "has made hope reasonable."

It is reasonable to be hopeful today—but only if America is still fresh with the breath of life, bringing new men and ideas to the service of society.

King Hussein of Jordan Visits United States

The Department of State announced on March 26 (press release 134) that arrangements were being completed for the visit of His Majesty Hussein I, King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, who will visit the United States April 13–23 at the invitation of President Johnson.

His Majesty will arrive at Washington, D.C., from Philadelphia, Pa., on April 14 for a 2-day visit. On April 16 His Majesty will depart for New York City and a trip to other areas in the United States.

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[2] BULLETIN of Jan. 6, 1964, p. 2.

The Foreign Assistance Program

Statement by Secretary Rusk[1]

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: Thank you very much for the opportunity of appearing before you to make the initial presentation to the Congress of the mutual defense and development programs for fiscal year 1965.

This committee has been dealing with our foreign assistance program for many years. You have been generous in your support and frank in your advice. The experienced judgment of the committee will continue to be of great assistance to us in making the program more effective, and we look forward to a productive review this year.

This bill before you will provide authority for continuing a basic instrument of U.S. foreign policy—foreign aid.

The goal of this program is simple and bears repeating: to provide assistance and encouragement to nations so that they can grow in independence, security, and freedom. We seek no satellites; we seek no domination; we are not trying to buy friends.

America is working to make the world safe for freedom. For I believe an important lesson has been learned in the postwar world—that as all people grow in freedom and independence, so the security of the U.S. is strengthened; and as others grow in economic strength, so the U.S. will continue to prosper.

Foreign aid can only do a small part of the job. American private enterprise must bear a heavier burden of investment in the underdeveloped world; our prospering allies must do more; and most of all the recipient nations must do their share—through self-help and reinvestment in their own economies.

It is important to view the aid program in perspective. We have made a commitment to the free world. It is a long-term commitment, not made in anticipation of quick or dramatic results. We are dealing with nations striving to solve in a matter of years problems which took many decades to overcome in what we now regard as the developed countries.

We should expect neither too much nor too little. Foreign aid should not be expected to win support from each recipient for our view on every international issue. And let us not levy on the mutual defense and development programs our disappointment in yesterday's coup, or tomorrow's vote in the United Nations. The forces at work run deep. Let us expect, instead, to see in the years to come the growth of an international community in which the actions of nations are not based on insecurity, fear, or frustration, but on basic independence of outlook and confidence in the future.

II.

This committee is being asked to provide $917 million in new authorization for fiscal year 1965 for the economic assistance program. No new

[1] Made before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on Mar. 23 (press release 129).

authority is needed for development lending or for the Alliance for Progress.

This committee is also being asked to provide a continuing authorization for the military assistance program.

We are requesting, under the new and the existing authority, a total appropriation of $3.4 billion—$2.4 billion for economic assistance and $1 billion for military assistance.

Secretary [of Defense Robert S.] McNamara, Mr. Bell [David E. Bell, Administrator of the Agency for International Development], and witnesses from the State and Defense Departments will deal with these requests in greater detail. However, I should like to emphasize the need for providing the full amounts requested by President Johnson for fiscal year 1965.[2] In keeping with the President's instruction that all budgetary requests be at minimum amounts, this year's program is a tight, realistic one. In previous years, the practice has been to plan the foreign aid program according to estimates of the best performance that could be expected by recipient nations. We are, of course, still hopeful that the nations we are assisting will come forward with the necessary self-help and reform measures. But we have learned it is unrealistic to expect them all to do so and we have budgeted accordingly.

On the other hand the 1965 budget does not allow for sudden opportunities that sometimes present themselves in international economic affairs. We must be able to take advantage of opportunities in which swift action can advance us dramatically along the road to free-world cooperation and prosperity. Should such opportunities arise, we will request prompt action by the Congress to provide any additional funds needed to meet emerging requirements.

III.

I should like to take this opportunity to express my strong support for the military assistance program.

In spite of recent hopeful developments, the Sino-Soviet threat continues. It is a direct military threat against the countries on the periphery of the bloc, and an indirect one—in the form of subversion and guerrilla war—against many of the underdeveloped countries of the world.

Our military assistance often has made it possible for these nations to survive. It is essential to their continued security and is vital to our own security as well. It is the key to the maintenance of more than 3.5 million men under arms. These men are an effective deterrent to aggression; and, moreover, without them our own defense costs would be much higher and more U.S. troops would have to be in the line.

Military assistance helps to forge a vital link in our mutual defense.

IV.

In fiscal year 1965, the foreign aid program will be even more concentrated than in the past. Two-thirds of all development lending funds are planned for seven countries—Chile, Colombia, Nigeria, Turkey, Pakistan, India, and Tunisia. Two-thirds of all military assistance funds will go to 11 countries along the Sino-Soviet periphery. Four-fifths of supporting assistance funds will go to four countries: Korea, Vietnam, Laos, and Jordan.

We intend to provide major development assistance only in cases where the countries themselves are willing to make a substantial effort. For one of the clear lessons of recent history has been that unless a nation is willing to carry the major burden—in terms of reinvesting savings, enacting tax reform, land reform, and other necessary legislation, and in terms of careful management of its own resources—no amount of outside assistance, whether from the U.S. or others, will have the necessary impact. We will continue to be strict in the disbursement of funds, in order to assure the greatest possible return from the taxpayers' money.

During the coming fiscal year, there will be a speedup in the transition from reliance on aid to economic self-support for a number of countries. Fourteen countries are now approaching the point where they will no longer need soft economic loans and grants. In 17 nations the transition has been completed and economic aid ended.

We have a solid record of success in these countries and many others. The quiet, slow, yet very real progress being made around the

[2] For text of the President's message to the Congress on foreign aid, see BULLETIN of Apr. 6, 1964, p. 518.

world is too often obscured in the day-to-day news of crisis and turmoil. A real revolution is taking place in the underdeveloped world as more and more people are acquiring the skills and the means for moving into the modern world and taking their place beside other free and independent peoples. We have played a major role in this effort—a role of which we can be proud.

V.

A central element of the fiscal year 1965 program is improved coordination of our assistance with the stepped-up efforts of other prosperous nations to help all of us improve our programs. The DAC agreement of April 1963 was a major step in this direction and is already showing results. The appointment of your former colleague, Mr. Frank Coffin, as U.S. representative to the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] should greatly strengthen our efforts to have other DAC members bear a greater part of the burden.

In the past year, the British and the Canadians have announced new policies calling for both increased aid programs and liberalized lending terms. France, which already devotes a higher percentage of GNP to aid than do we, has recently released an official report pointing toward a continued increase of aid in the future. Germany's bilateral aid program has grown steadily for 3 years and its loan terms have been progressively liberalized, reaching an average of 20 years' maturity in 1963.

However, the desired balance among donors in both amounts and terms has not yet been reached. Recent reports from Europe have cast some doubt on the size of the increases that can be expected from others; certainly a serious reduction in our effort would be reflected elsewhere.

We hope to make increased use of international lending agencies in the years ahead. Under matching formulas, U.S. dollars provided to these organizations are supplemented by substantial contributions from other countries. One of the most effective of these instruments is the International Development Association—an affiliate of the World Bank. I strongly urge House approval of U.S. participation in replenishing the resources of this organization.

VI.

I should like to turn, if I may, to a brief discussion of some key problem areas where U.S. aid is a factor. Witnesses from the State and Defense Departments and AID will be prepared to discuss these matters in detail.

South Vietnam. This troubled part of the world is, of course, of major concern to all Americans. As this committee knows, Secretary McNamara and Administrator Bell have just returned from an on-the-spot appraisal of the situation and have reported to the President.[3]

South Vietnam is and will continue to be a major recipient of U.S. assistance. We are providing direct support for the anti-insurgent military activities, while at the same time supplying needed key commodities for both defense and economic development of the country. As the Congress knows, this assistance has played a crucial role in the war against the Communists and must be maintained if this war is to be won. I share Secretary McNamara's concern that the fullest possible support be provided to the new Government.

Africa. In the past few months we have seen a series of flareups in some of the new nations on the continent of Africa. The U.S. is, of course, concerned about such instability.

However, these recent events should not obscure the real progress toward independence and African unity that has been made. And it is most encouraging that where troubles have erupted the African nations collectively are taking steps to reach peaceful solutions.

In several nations, the frustrations of poverty and difficulties inherent in the early years of independence have resulted in instability and have also provided possibilities for Communist penetration and exploitation. However, most are those where the Western Europeans bear primary responsibility for supporting stability and growth and U.S. assistance is quite limited. We hope that with increased experience and with the inflow of training and capital from the Europeans and ourselves, the new nations of

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 522.

Africa can overcome the strains of their post-independence periods and attain the stability and unity required for sustained economic development.

Cyprus. The present crisis on the island of Cyprus is a matter of grave concern to the United States. Not only is the future of an island involved, but the relations between two of our stanch allies and two major recipients of U.S. foreign assistance—Greece and Turkey. As long as the issue continues to poison the atmosphere between these two nations and as long as the people of Cyprus live in terror, the free world is endangered.

We are encouraged by the decision of the United Nations [4] to assist in restoring order and hope that this will lead to solution of the problems which divide the island. As this committee knows, the U.S. has committed itself to providing funds for support of the Emergency Force. Mr. Cleveland [Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs] will discuss this request in detail with you in subsequent hearings.

Indonesia. Another major area of concern in Southeast Asia is Indonesia. This committee is familiar with the situation and with the efforts of the American Government to promote peaceful relations between Indonesia and neighboring Malaysia.[5] It is our strong hope that negotiations will continue and prove successful. There is no persuasive reason why the countries of this area cannot live in peace. There is much to be done in terms of internal development, particularly in the case of Indonesia. It is the fifth largest and potentially one of the richest countries in the world. In recent years, however, there has been little economic progress. The present situation in Indonesia is not conducive to effective economic stabilization which would provide a basis for development. The U.S. and other Western nations discontinued their efforts to help Indonesian stabilization last September when Indonesia intensified its "confrontation" policy toward Malaysia. Since then the U.S. has initiated no new aid projects in Indonesia.

Last year, the Congress enacted a new subsection (j) of section 620 of the Foreign Assistance Act relating to assistance to Indonesia. This subsection requires a determination by the President that it is in the U.S. national interest to extend assistance to Indonesia under the act. The President, in considering whether to make this determination, has awaited the outcome of negotiations among Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines which should indicate the prospects for peace in that area. Meanwhile, only limited established programs of technical assistance, education, and malaria eradication have been continued with new funds.

Arab-Israeli Relations. The U.S. has continued to provide assistance both to Israel and to a number of the Arab states. These nations have a history of conflict and animosity. The U.S. will continue to work for a settlement of the disputes between Israel and her neighbors and for a general settlement in the Near East. There are resources and potential in the area sufficient to provide all peoples with a better standard of living. Resources which are diverted from the job of providing economic growth and used to build armaments are a regrettable waste.

Last year the Congress enacted a subsection (i) of section 620 of the assistance act, prohibiting assistance to any country which the President determines is engaging in or preparing for aggression. The activities of all recipient countries—including those in the Middle East and Asia—are under continual examination by this country but no determination has been made under the provisions enacted last year. I can assure you that careful study is being given in every instance to determine the application of the amendment.

Cuba Shipping. Another amendment which was added to the Foreign Assistance Act last year was designed to cut off shipping of materials to the island of Cuba. As this committee knows, section 620(a)(3) went into effect on February 14, 1964. Under the terms of the amendment, small amounts of assistance were terminated, involving the United Kingdom, France, and Yugoslavia. We will continue to monitor shipments to the island and examine the application in each situation of the congressional directive to us.

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[4] For text of resolution, see *ibid.*, Mar. 23, 1964, p. 466.

[5] For background, see *ibid.*, Feb. 19, 1964, p. 239.

VII.

Last week the nations of this hemisphere marked the third anniversary of President Kennedy's announcement of the Alliance for Progress. It has been a fruitful 3 years—a period of victories and of some disappointments.

As President Johnson said in his address marking this anniversary: [6]

> Today my country rededicates itself to these principles and renews its commitment to the partnership of the hemisphere to carry them forward. . . .
>
> With faith in our principles, with pride in our achievements, with the help of candid and constructive criticism, we are now prepared to move ahead with renewed effort and renewed confidence.

The United States and the members of the alliance pledged themselves to a decade or more of effort. Although less than one-third of the period has passed, much has been done. Millions of children are being fed and educated; hundreds of thousands of new homes have been built; millions are free from the scourge of diseases. And, perhaps most important of all, the Latin American Continent looks to the future with hope.

The period of planning and initial commitment is over. The alliance is building momentum. Several of the members are making very satisfactory progress; the Central American economic integration movement is growing faster than was expected; tax laws passed since the inception of the alliance are having their effect.

The appointment of Thomas Mann to be Special Assistant to the President as well as Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America—to have firm policy control over all aspects of our activities in the area—is an indication of the prime concern of the administration.

The recent appointment of Ambassador [Teodoro] Moscoso to be our representative to the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress—which will provide better cooperation among all member nations—is a most encouraging step.

In sum, in spite of numerous shortrun problems and crises—and these will continue—the long-range prospects are promising. It will be a long, tough battle against poverty, illiteracy, and disease, but it is one that all Americans—in both our continents—working together—can win.

VIII.

The bill before this committee requests a total of $225 million in new authority for technical cooperation and development grants. In addition, up to $85 million is being requested under the Alliance for Progress technical cooperation program.

This request underscores the reliance we place on these programs as a prime element in the development process. This request is only a small part of our total aid program—about one-tenth—but it is a vital part. For this is the seed money; these are the funds that get things moving in the underdeveloped nations.

Three aspects of the technical cooperation program bear emphasizing:

First, it is an area in which Americans are uniquely qualified, for we have skills, training, and experience that are needed in the underdeveloped countries.

Only decades ago, many of what are now prosperous areas of our country could have been termed "underdeveloped." But through our agricultural extension services, rural electric cooperatives, trade schools, land-grant colleges, knowledge was applied to the problems of development and the U.S. economy grew. The old saying that "knowledge is power" might be amended to read "knowledge is prosperity."

This experience and these skills can be put to use in other lands, and technical cooperation is an effective means of transmitting them.

Second, technical cooperation is one of the most effective means of demonstrating what kind of people we are and of giving direct evidence of our interest in the welfare of others. There is a great reservoir of good will toward America in the underdeveloped world. A major reason has been the people-to-people efforts of both government and private groups—our technical assistance, Point 4, the Peace Corps, CARE, our missionaries, worldwide charities, our great foundations and universities. The doctor with his mobile health unit, the technician who frees a village from malaria, the

[6] *Ibid.*, Apr. 6, 1964, p. 535.

agricultural specialist, and the teacher are to millions of people in the world the symbol of America.

Third, technical cooperation focuses on the present need of many countries. The basic factor in economic development is, of course, people—healthy, well-trained people. Without citizens who can work hard and effectively, no country can grow—no matter how much capital is pumped into the economy from the outside.

By concentrating on the most basic needs—education and health for example—our technical cooperation program enables other nations to take the first steps toward eventual self-sustaining economic growth.

I urge the full authorization for this program in the coming fiscal year. I know of no program which brings greater dividends.

IX.

In his message of March 19—on the mutual defense and development programs—President Johnson said:

> We must do more to utilize private initiative in the United States—and in the developing countries—to promote economic development abroad.

Five elements of the 1965 program are especially designed to carry out this purpose:

1. *Tax Credit.* The President will send to the Congress an amendment to the Internal Revenue Code providing a special tax credit incentive to encourage private investment in less developed countries.[7] Under this legislation, a tax credit would be granted to a U.S. taxpayer against total tax liability on income from all sources equal to 30 percent of the new investment in selected types of business activity. It would be available when there was either new direct investment or when over 50 percent of the profits were retained in an underdeveloped country for investment. I urge congressional approval of this important legislation.

2. *Advisory Committee.* A nine-man advisory committee on private enterprise in foreign aid will soon be appointed as authorized by last year's foreign aid bill. This committee will make a detailed study of the role of private resources and recommend ways in which this role can be increased and strengthened. We look forward to their report.

3. *Investment Guaranties.* The past year has seen a major increase in activity in the investment guaranty program and this trend is expected to continue during the coming fiscal year. This is one of the most important direct efforts of the U.S. Government at encouraging private investment. A total of $1,125 million in guaranties is now outstanding, an increase of $362 million in calendar 1963.

In addition, we are requesting authority for a final installment of the pilot program for guaranteeing U.S. housing investments in Latin America.

4. *Use of Private Firms.* AID will also place increased emphasis on contracting with private firms and organizations in providing technical assistance. Virtually all capital projects are already carried out under private contract. In this way, the best possible utilization will be made of the skills and knowledge in the private sector—skills and knowledge not available to the Government.

5. *Executive Service Corps.* We fully support the efforts of private industry to organize an Executive Service Corps. This corps, to be composed of men of experience in private business, would help to channel the knowledge and techniques of American private business to underdeveloped countries.

X.

As I said at the beginning of my statement, it is the firm hope of the administration that this year's review will be a frank and fruitful one, based on the facts and the program.

The facts are clear:

—aid is highly concentrated; two-thirds of development lending goes to 7 countries, and two- thirds of military assistance goes to 11 countries;

—three-fifths of economic aid is now in the form of dollar repayable loans;

—80 percent of foreign assistance funds is spent in this country;

—development assistance is provided under strict criteria and the self-help efforts of recipient nations are carefully assessed;

[7] For text, see H. Doc. 250, 88th Cong., 2d sess.

—our allies are doing more;

—this year's aid request is $1.1 billion less than last year's; it represents less than 4 cents out of every tax dollar;

—we are mobilizing increased participation of U.S. and recipient country private resources.

There have been mistakes, and I cannot guarantee that there will not be others. A program of this magnitude and difficulty run by human beings cannot avoid some waste. We are involved in a highly complicated process, perhaps the most complex social and economic undertaking in the history of nations—the development of modern societies and economies. In the past 177 years of our own economic development we made mistakes, had successes and failures, experimented, and often were inefficient and wasteful. We cannot expect perfection from others.

I can assure this committee that under the leadership of Mr. Bell we have the best run, best administered program since the days of the Marshall Plan.

The basic organizational structure—established in 1961 and tested in action—will be maintained. But operations will be increasingly efficient, the number of employees reduced by 1,200 by the end of fiscal year 1965, and overseas missions consolidated with embassies wherever possible.

Working together, the Congress and the executive branch can assure the most prudent and effective use of foreign assistance in the years ahead.

XI.

The foreign aid program of the 1960's—as it was in the 1940's and 1950's—is planned and administered to serve the vital interests of the U.S. It is a prime instrument of U.S. foreign policy. U.S. foreign policy and U.S. security would be in great jeopardy without the aid program. As Mr. Bell and the regional witnesses will demonstrate in later testimony, U.S. assistance fits into a carefully planned pattern based on a study of each country and an analysis of U.S. interest.

The program which we are presenting for 1965 is a tight, realistic one. It represents our minimum expectation. I strongly urge that this committee authorize the full amount requested.

We often hear talk about what we are doing to future generations of Americans and about the legacy which we give to our grandchildren. I would certainly not want mine to grow up in a world where the richest nation—having nearly half the world's wealth—ignored for decades the needs of two-thirds of the people, who lived in poverty, disease, and hunger. It would surely not be a very safe or stable world. And even more, it would not be a very great heritage or tradition to pass on.

We would want to help others to move forward even if there were no such thing as Communist imperialism. But the Communist threat converts what we would want to do anyway into a vital necessity, a matter of the survival of freedom.

The economically advanced countries are too strong and too healthy to be taken over either by force or by subversion. Few would dispute that this was one of the great achievements of the Marshall Plan and our postwar diplomacy.

But the Sino-Soviet efforts have not ceased. Their drive is now centered on the less developed areas. If they can take these over, they could hope eventually to strangle the economically advanced part of the free world.

Aid is a vital tool in this struggle.

There are no easy answers; and it is wrong to expect the foreign aid program to solve all our problems. But without it the field would be left to our adversaries—not only 20th-century communism but the age-old enemies of man: ignorance, disease, and poverty.

We are seeing results.

The quiet victory is being won.

This is not the time to quit.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

88th Congress, 1st Session

Military Aspects and Implications of Nuclear Test Ban Proposals and Related Matters. Hearings before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Part 1, May 7–August 9, 1963, 540 pp.; part 2, with index, August 12–27, 1963, 455 pp.

88th Congress, 2d Session

Winning the Cold War: The U.S. Ideological Offensive. Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Part VI, U.S. Government Agencies and Programs (Department of State, U.S. Information Agency). January 13–February 20, 1964. 126 pp.

Recent Developments in the Soviet Bloc. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Europe of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Part I, Recent Trends in Soviet and East European Literature, Arts, Human Rights (Law and Religion), and the Younger Generation. January 27–30, 1964. 173 pp.

Fishing in U.S. Territorial Waters. Hearings before the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee on S. 1988, H.R. 7954, H.R. 8296, H.R. 9957, H.R. 10028, and H.R. 10040. February 19–26, 1964. 208 pp.

Compliance With the Convention on the Chamizal. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on S. 2394. February 26–27, 1964. 61 pp.

Second Transisthmian Canal. Hearings before the Senate Commerce Committee on S. 2428, a bill to authorize a study of means of increasing the capacity and security of the Panama Canal, and for other purposes, and S. 2497, a bill to provide for an investigation and study to determine a site for the construction of a sea-level interoceanic canal through the American isthmus. March 3–4, 1964. 79 pp.

International Coffee Agreement Act of 1963. Report, together with minority and individual views, to accompany H.R. 8864. S. Rept. 941. March 12, 1964. 56 pp.

The United States Balance of Payments. Report of the Joint Economic Committee, with additional views. S. Rept. 965. March 19, 1964. 30 pp.

Foreign Assistance. Message from the President transmitting recommendations relative to foreign assistance. H. Doc. 250. March 19, 1964. 44 pp.

Amendments to the Request for Appropriations for Foreign Assistance—Economic and Military Assistance. Communication from the President transmitting amendments to the request for appropriations transmitted in the budget for 1965 for foreign assistance—economic and military assistance. H. Doc. 285. March 24, 1964. 2 pp.

Exportation of Aircraft Engines as Working Parts of Aircraft. Report to accompany H.R. 1608. H. Rept. 1268. March 24, 1964. 4 pp.

Antiques Which May Be Imported Free of Duty. Report to accompany H.R. 2330. H. Rept. 1269. March 24, 1964. 3 pp.

Free Importation of Instant Coffee. Report to accompany H.R. 4198. H. Rept. 1272. March 24, 1964. 4 pp.

Providing for the Free Entry of One Mass Spectrometer for Oregon State University and One Mass Spectrometer for Wayne State University. Report to accompany H.R. 4364. H. Rept. 1273. March 24, 1964. 2 pp.

Suspension of Duty on Manganese Ore. Report to accompany H.R. 7480. H. Rept. 1274. March 24, 1964. 3 pp.

Prevention of Donble Taxation in Case of Certain Tobacco Products. Report to accompany H.R. 8268. H. Rept. 1275. March 24, 1964. 4 pp.

Tariff Classification of Certain Particleboard. Report to accompany H.R. 8975. H. Rept. 1277. March 24, 1964. 2 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as amended. Done at New York October 26, 1956. Entered into force July 29, 1957. TIAS 3873, 5284.
Acceptance deposited: Nigeria, March 25, 1964.

Northwest Atlantic Fisheries

Protocol to the international convention of February 8, 1949 (TIAS 2089), for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries relating to harp and hood seals. Done at Washington July 15, 1963.[1]
Ratification deposited: Iceland, March 23, 1964.

Marriage

Convention on consent to marriage, minimum age for marriage, and registration of marriages. Done at United Nations Headquarters, New York, December 10, 1962.[1]
Signatures: Cuba, October 17, 1963; Czechoslovakia, October 8, 1963; Denmark (with reservation), October 31, 1963; Italy, December 20, 1963; New Zealand, December 23, 1963; Rumania, December 27, 1963.

Wheat

International wheat agreement, 1962. Open for signature at Washington April 19 through May 15, 1962. Entered into force July 16, 1962, for part I and parts III to VII, and August 1, 1962, for part II. TIAS 5115.
Accession deposited: Belgium and Luxembourg, March 10, 1964.

BILATERAL

Belgium

Agreement amending annex B of the mutual defense assistance agreement of January 27, 1950 (TIAS 2010). Effected by exchange of notes at Brussels February 6, and March 11, 1964. Entered into force March 11, 1964.

Korea

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1701–1709), with exchanges of notes. Signed at Seoul March 18, 1964. Entered into force March 18, 1964.

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[1] Not in force.

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*130	3/23	U.S. participation in international conferences.
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132	3/26	Delegation to 9th SEATO Council meeting (rewrite).
†133	3/25	Ball: U.N. Conference on Trade and Development.
134	3/26	Itinerary for visit of King of Jordan (rewrite).
135	3/27	Rusk: news conference of March 27.
*136	3/28	Cultural exchange (Central America).

* Not printed.
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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The Making of Foreign Policy

This 33-page pamphlet is a transcript of an interview of Secretary of State Dean Rusk by Professor Eric Frederick Goldman of Princeton University, newly appointed consultant to President Johnson. The interview was first broadcast on January 12 on the television program "The Open Mind."

Professor Goldman questions Secretary Rusk on a number of different aspects of the foreign policy process, including the role of the Secretary of State, the relationship of politics to foreign policy, the problems and procedures of administration, the role of the Foreign Service officer, and the influence of public opinion on foreign policy.

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Vol. L, No. 1295

April 20, 1964

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NATO, a Growing Partnership

Remarks by President Johnson [1]

Fifteen years ago tomorrow, here in Washington, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed.[2] Less than 5 months later, after due constitutional process in all the signing countries, the treaty entered into force. From that time to this, the treaty has served the peace of the world.

This short treaty commits its parties to meet an armed attack on any of them in Europe or North America as "an attack against them all." For 15 years it has prevented any such attack. Created in response to Stalin's Iron Curtain and the loss of Czechoslovakian freedom, this treaty has lived through war in Korea, the threat of war over Berlin, and a crisis without precedent in Cuba. Each great event has tested NATO, and from each test we have gained increased strength.

We began as 12 countries; today we are 15. Those we have gained are among our most determined partners: Greece, Turkey, and the Federal Republic of Germany.

What began as a treaty soon became a command and then a great international organization. The number of ready divisions, including 6 from the United States, has multiplied by 5. The number of modern aircraft has multiplied by 10—all more effective by far than any were in 1949. So the alliance is real. Its forces operate. Its strength is known. Its weapons cover the full range of power, from small arms to nuclear missiles of the most modern design.

From the beginning, this treaty has aimed not simply at defense but has aimed at the cooperative progress of all its members. On the day of its signing back there 15 years ago, President Truman described it as a "bulwark which will permit us to get on with the real

[1] Made at the White House on Apr. 3 (White House press release) at a ceremony in observance of the 15th anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on Apr. 4, 1949.

[2] For text of treaty, see BULLETIN of Mar. 20, 1949, p. 339; for texts of remarks made at the signing ceremony and an address by President Truman, see *ibid.*, Apr. 17, 1949, p. 471.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. L, NO. 1295 PUBLICATION 7677 APRIL 20, 1964

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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business of government and society, the business of achieving a fuller and happier life for our citizens." This treaty, in fact, came 2 years after we and other friends had begun our historic enterprise of economic recovery under the Marshall Plan. Our "real business" was already pretty well advanced.

The 15 years since 1949 have seen the longest upward surge of economic growth that our Atlantic world has ever known. Our production and trade have more than doubled; our population has grown by more than a hundred million; the income of the average man has grown by more than 50 percent. Our inward peace and our outward confidence have grown steadily more secure. The internal threat of communism has shriveled in repeated failure. A new generation, strong and free and healthy, walks our streets and rides in our cars. Yes, we have done well.

Danger has receded, but it has not disappeared. The task of building our defenses is never really done. The temptation to relax must always be resisted. Our own Atlantic agenda has changed, but it is not short.

Our first common task, therefore, is to move onward to that closer partnership which is so plainly in our common interest. The United States, for one, has learned much from 15 years of danger and achievement. In 1949 the solemn commitment of this treaty was for us an historic departure from isolation, and we have many great men, some among us and some away today, to thank for their leadership.

Now it is a tested and recognized foundation stone of America's foreign policy. What Robert Schuman said for France in 1949 I repeat for my country today:

> Nations are more and more convinced that their fates are closely bound together; their salvation and their welfare can no longer be based upon an egotistical and aggressive nationalism, but must rest upon the progressive application of human solidarity.

The ways of our growing partnership are not easy. Though the union of Europe is her manifest destiny, the building of that unity is a long, hard job. But we, for our part, will never turn back to separated insecurity. We welcome the new strength of our transatlantic allies. We find no contradiction between national self-respect and interdependent mutual reliance. We are eager to share with the new Europe at every level of power and responsibility. We aim to share the lead in the search for new and stronger patterns of cooperation.

We believe in the alliance because in our own interest we must, because in the common interest it works, and because in the world's interest it is right.

We have other duties and opportunities. Our trade with one another and the world is not yet free and not yet broad enough to serve both us and others as it should. Our monetary systems have grown stronger, but they still too often limit us, when they should be, instead, a source of energy and growth.

In ever-growing measure we have set ourselves and others free from the burden of colonialism. We have also set new precedents of generous concern for those that are less prosperous than we. But our connection to the less developed nations is not yet what it should be and must be. This is not a one-way street, but we must work to do our full part to make it straight and make it broad.

We remain vigilant in defending our liberties, but we must be alert to any hope of stable settlement with those who have made vigilance necessary and essential. In particular, we must be alive to the new spirit of diversity that is now abroad in Eastern Europe. We did not make the Iron Curtain. We did not build the wall. Gaps in the Curtain are welcome, and so are holes in the wall, whenever they are not hedged by traps. We continue to believe that the peace of all Europe requires the reunification of the German people in freedom. We will be firm, but we will always be fair. Our guard is up, but our hand is out.

We must build on our tradition of determined support for the United Nations. We are pledged to this purpose by the very articles of our treaty, and we have kept our pledge. The members of NATO provide most of the resources of the United Nations and most of its ability to help in keeping peace. When we began, we promised that our treaty was consistent with the charter. Today we know that the charter and the treaty are indispensable to one another. Neither can keep the peace alone.

We need them both, in full effectiveness, for as many years ahead as any of us can see.

The Atlantic peoples have a magnificent history, but they have known too much war. It is the splendor of this great alliance that, in keeping peace with its opponents, it has kept the road clear for a worldwide upward march toward the good life for free people. Proven in danger, strengthened in freedom, and resolute in purpose, we will go on, with God's help, to serve not only our own people but to serve the bright future of all mankind.

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of April 3

Press release 143 dated April 3

Secretary Rusk: This—what is for me an early morning press conference—was not a conspiracy against those of you who attended the White House photographers' dinner last night, but I was asked to vary as between morning and afternoon for the benefit of the afternoon papers and some of our European friends. So I will have some in the morning and some in the afternoon.

I am ready for your questions.

Change of Government in Brazil

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you see any improvement in relations and any expansion of United States aid to Brazil as a result of the change in government there?

A. Well, I think that we are ready, as we have been before, to work very closely with Brazil to enable them to get on with their great problems of economic and social development. We, as a matter of fact, thought we had an agreement about a year and a half—2 years—ago by which we under the Alliance for Progress program would provide very important assistance for Brazil in relation to steps which we hoped that they would be taking in their own behalf. Unfortunately that plan did not work out because the agreements we had worked out with Finance Minister [San Tiago] Dantes did not prove acceptable in Brazil. They did not proceed with them.

But, of course, we are deeply interested in the economic vitality of that great country. It is a great sister Republic in this hemisphere, as large as the United States, with 75 or 80 million people, and we should be in closest touch with them about how we might be able to assist them in their necessities in this situation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you anticipate that the establishment of a new government or the succession of a new leader would improve Brazil's cooperation with the other nations of the hemisphere on problems such as Castro Cuba?

A. Well, I am sure you understand my reticence in commenting in detail about what has happened internally in Brazil—again, that great sister Republic. We have had the impression that in the past several weeks considerable concern developed within the Congress and among the Governors of the principal States, in the Armed Forces, and among large segments of the people, that the basic constitutional structure of Brazil was under threat and that Congress, the Governors, the Armed Forces, moved to insure the continuity of constitutional government in that country.

Now, part of the concern is expressed by leading Brazilians, and a concern, which we shared, was that extremist elements were having more and more influence in the administration of President [João] Goulart. One does not have to say that independently. One can quote the concern about that expressed by many moderate and forward-looking Brazilians.

I would suppose that the new administration would, I think, mark time for the moment until the election of a new President by the Congress

within this 30-day period provided under their constitution. But I would also suppose that the deep commitment of all those who have been working on this problem in Brazil to constitutional government and to representative democracy would mean that Brazil would take a leading part in the hemisphere and in the OAS on this issue of totalitarian regimes and particularly this threat from the extreme left.

Q. Mr. Secretary, since Brazil is so large a country and so important a country in the Latin American scene, do you feel that the method of this change of government, since it was forced largely by the military, could conceivably have an adverse effect on the democratic movements in the hemisphere?

A. I would not think so. I think that in the first place it has been demonstrated over the last several years that the Armed Forces of Brazil basically are committed to constitutional government in that country and that this action did not occur until there were many signs that President Goulart seemed to be moving to change the constitutional arrangements and to move toward some sort of authoritarian regime.

This is a matter of controversy in Brazil and outside, but this was the fear that the basic, the moderate, democratic elements in that country had in their mind. I think this is also a matter on which millions of the people have testified in the streets in the last day or two in their demonstrations in support of what has been done there.

But I want to emphasize that what has happened has not resolved all of the problems by any means. Brazil has been in the process of dynamic development for as long as I can remember—since childhood—a country with great resources, a country which has been moving with great vitality in its economic development. But in that process there are problems. There have been problems of inflation, problems of investment, problems of external debt, some of the problems that we ourselves have known at a certain point of our history when we were in that process of almost dramatic development in respect to national resources.

So that I would not suppose that what has happened in Brazil would suggest to people in other parts of Latin America that the traditional kind of *golpe* is any solution, because this is not that kind of situation in Brazil. This is a matter of where a much broader spectrum of the political, economic, social life of the country expressed itself in support of constitutional government.

President Sends Good Wishes to New President of Brazil

Following is the text of a message of April 2 from President Johnson to Ranieri Mazzilli, President of the United States of Brazil.

White House press release dated April 2

Please accept my warmest good wishes on your installation as President of the United States of Brazil. The American people have watched with anxiety the political and economic difficulties through which your great nation has been passing, and have admired the resolute will of the Brazilian community to resolve these difficulties within a framework of constitutional democracy and without civil strife.

The relations of friendship and cooperation between our two governments and peoples are a great historical legacy for us both and a precious asset in the interests of peace and prosperity and liberty in this hemisphere and in the whole world. I look forward to the continued strengthening of those relations and to our intensified cooperation in the interests of economic progress and social justice for all and of hemispheric and world peace.

U.S. Commitment to Constitutional Process

Q. Mr. Secretary, while you are on that theme, I don't think you have ever addressed yourself to the controversy that flared around Washington a few weeks ago about the alleged remarks of Mr. Mann [Assistant Secretary of State Thomas C. Mann] on this subject. Could you from your point of view suggest whether there has been even a subtle change of attitude here, not connected necessarily with the change of Presidents but whether we felt that Peru, Dominican Republic, and so on, should not be a rule of thumb any more?

A. Well, that controversy, if there was one, flared outside the Department of State and not inside. We have committed ourselves in this hemisphere to the strong and vigorous support of democratic and constitutional institutions.

As a matter of fact, the inner purpose of the Alliance for Progress was to make it possible for the necessary changes to occur within the structure of democratic and constitutional process, and we have affirmed very strongly with other countries of this hemisphere in places like Punta del Este a little more than 2 years ago [1] that commitment of the hemisphere to democratic and constitutional process.

Now, if unhappily in a particular situation, in a particular country, there is a disturbance—there might be a military takeover—this does not present us with a situation which we can simply walk away from because we and other members of this hemisphere necessarily have an interest in what happens in that situation. Therefore we have to continue to live with it, work with it, try to assist a particular country in coming back to constitutional process. This happened in Peru; it has happened in other countries. So that we stop short of saying that we simply lost interest in a country the moment it might depart from the constitutional path because our interest is in assisting that country in getting back to the constitutional path, finding its way back to the commitments of the hemisphere.

So I don't know of any difference in the Department of State on this matter. There was, I think, a fragmentary report out of context of the particular discussion which alleged some speculation on this matter, but I think this was entirely beside the point and missed the main issues involved.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on that point, how would you describe the policy of this Government on the matter of recognition? This has been—the United States has had different attitudes on this over the years. Do we recognize governments simply because they control the country, or do we take some other standard?

A. Well, I don't believe that there is a single rule, a single formula, by which you can answer this question in relation to some 114 countries with which we have relations. In many situations we consult others who are directly and immediately concerned with the problem, to see whether we ought to move with them in concert with regard to a particular situation. When it is in Africa, it is with African countries; when it is in Latin America, it is with Latin American countries.

I would think that recognition is basically a political act which normally, in the usual circumstance, applies where a government is in control of the country and accepts its international responsibilities, but this will vary from time to time because as a political act it needs to be taken alongside of the other interests of the United States in a particular situation, including our interest in moving jointly with others whenever possible in a concert of policy.

Now, in the case of Brazil, of course, this matter does not arise because the succession there occurred as foreseen by the constitution and we would assume that recognition is not involved in that particular issue or point.

Q. Well, in fact, you are saying we still do use some of Woodrow Wilson's touchstone on this, that there is something beyond the actual control of the country by the government of that country?

A. I think so, I think so.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what is going to happen now to those Brazilian external debt negotiations that I believe began a couple of months ago?

A. Well, I think that those conversations will of course be resumed, perhaps in a new framework. There are some important problems for the Government of Brazil to deal with, such as external debt, problems of inflation, problems of investments, but we would hope that the new government would turn its attention to these matters promptly and that we should go ahead in an effort to deal with these critical problems that any government of Brazil will have before it in the next several months.

Castro and Cuba

Q. Mr. Secretary, the debate that Senator [J. W.] Fulbright set off in foreign policy seems to be continuing and the latest yesterday was a speech by Senator [Thomas J.] Dodd in which he predicted that eventually there would be a revolution in Cuba which would sweep out Cas-

[1] For background, see BULLETIN of Feb. 19, 1962, p. 270.

tro. Do you see any signs of such a revolution building up now?

A. If I were speaking of the next weeks and months ahead, I would say that I do not see any immediate prospect that internal forces in Cuba would be able to unseat the apparatus of police control that Castro has fastened on that island. What happens in the longer run is of course for the future, but I see no immediate prospect of that.

Q. In that connection, sir, there has recently been a political trial in Cuba which seemed to demonstrate some degree of division within the Communist apparatus in Cuba. What is the State Department's assessment of the degree of factional disputes between the Communist groups in Cuba?

A. Well, quite frankly, I haven't made or haven't had before me a detailed analysis of that particular trial or the evidence that was devised there, but I do have the impression that there has been some discussion inside Cuba among the leadership for some time, with perhaps three main trends expressed in one way or another: one, those who feel closer to Moscow; and some, apparently a lesser number, who feel interested in Peiping's approach to these matters; and once in a while there are comments or suggestions that sound as though some Titoist kind of policy might be for Cuba's future.

But so far as I know there has not been any serious discussion among the leadership in Cuba about the basis on which Cuba might find its way back to the hemisphere and rejoin the hemisphere on a basis of compatibility. But this internal discussion within the Cuban leadership is something on which we only get fragmentary reports. I just can't answer you very specifically on that.

Nondissemination of Nuclear Weapons

Q. Mr. Secretary, in Geneva there now has been public confirmation that there has been a series of U.S.–Soviet talks on nondissemination of nuclear weapons. Does it appear to you that that has come to a dead end at this point, or is there some further course of progress that you anticipate?

A. I would hope that it is not at a dead end, and as a matter of fact I don't really believe that it is, because this is a subject on which all of the nuclear powers necessarily have an interest. It is true that we have from time to time discussed this matter with the Soviets. I was a little surprised to have it appear that this was something new. I would suppose that everyone had assumed that we have been talking about this with the Soviets. I have had some talks with Mr. Gromyko [Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko] about it, there have been talks with the Ambassador [Anatoliy F. Dobrynin], there have been talks in Geneva.

Now, it is not going to be easy to bring this question of nondissemination of nuclear weapons to a formal agreement. On their side the Soviets have raised objections about our proposals for a multilateral force. Now, we know ourselves that the multilateral force will not involve the dissemination of nuclear weapons to other national nuclear capability or to other national armed forces, and from that point of view it is some protection against the further spread of nuclear weapons on a national basis. But I think that one would have to be fair and say that, until we have completed our discussions of the multilateral force and make those arrangements or prospective arrangements public, the Soviets themselves can't know that. They can hear me say it. They can hear our announced policy on the matter. But they won't be able to make their own assessment until the arrangements of the multilateral force can be completed and made public.

I would hope that at that time they would themselves understand that the multilateral force has nothing to do with the dissemination of nuclear weapons to additional national nuclear forces.

Now, on our side we have a very substantial interest in the nondissemination idea as it applies to Peiping, but there is no evidence whatever that Peiping would engage in the kind of agreement that we have been talking with other governments about, and so at least some of our sense of urgency diminishes if it is clear that Peiping will not take part.

But I would like to add this further note. The fact that it might be difficult to bring this question to a formal agreement is not the whole story. It is my impression that Moscow,

Paris, London, Washington have a certain coincidence of policy on this matter, that no one of these four governments is now in the process of distributing nuclear weapons to national forces—to additional national forces—and that this coincidence of policy is at least a part of the problem, and that if these four governments adhere to that policy, then at least some of the problem is resolved without agreement on the basis of the nature of nuclear weapons and the nature of the interests which any nuclear power has in not having these weapons distributed indefinitely around the earth.

Q. But would you say—

A. Excuse me. Go ahead.

Q. Would you say then, sir, in your view you believe that there is at present a de facto, a tacit understanding not to disseminate nuclear weapons?

A. No. I specifically said that there is no agreement and there is no understanding. This is not in the picture. There is nothing—no one has, that I know of, has said among these four governments that we now agree that, or we now understand that. I am simply referring to our estimate with respect to a coincidence of policy. I do not have the impression, for example, to be very specific about it, that the Soviet Government is furnishing assistance to the Chinese in the development of nuclear weapons, and it is my impression that the other three nuclear powers are following the same policy with respect to other national nuclear forces.

But this is a question that is not now in motion. That is, we are not making much headway on it, but I would hope that this is a question which is not closed, because we may come to a point at a somewhat later date when we can find a more formal agreement on this matter.

Viet-Nam and Laos

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been interesting reports from Southeast Asia saying that General Khanh [Nguyen Khanh, President of the Republic of Viet-Nam] has been meeting with Phoumi [Gen. Phoumi Nosavan of Laos] and that they have an agreement for hot pursuit in chasing the Viet Cong into Laos. Now, the question is, where does the Premier, which is Souvanna [Phouma], come into this act? Has he been contacted? Do you believe that this report is correct?

A. Oh, I don't have details on any such discussion as has been reported. It is well known that we are concerned about the violations of the Geneva accords of 1962 on Laos, which include the use of Laotian territory for the infiltration of assistance to the Viet Cong from North Viet-Nam. And what happened along that border is a matter of great interest, I think, both to Laos, which has a stake in the Geneva accords of '62, and to South Viet-Nam, who suffers from any violations of those accords.

But I don't have any information about any arrangements. And Souvanna Phouma, the Premier—we keep in close touch with him on this—on this type of problem, and he, too, knows of our concern about these possible subterranean violations of the accords of '62 and the infringement of Laotian neutrality that results from it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, we heard, out of Bonn, that Chancellor [Ludwig] Erhard is coming to the United States in June and is going to see President Johnson. Would you tell us what is on the mind of the Americans—what subject would the Americans like to discuss with the Chancellor?

A. Oh, I think that—my understanding is that he is coming here on a private visit. Of course, while he is here, President Johnson will be delighted to see him. But I should imagine that in terms of what subjects would be discussed you could make your own list and it would be very accurate. (Laughter.)

Q. Sir, the Indian Defense Minister [Y. B. Chavan] is supposed to be coming here in the near future. I was wondering whether you could tell us what this signifies? And, secondly, under what political framework would these talks take place between India and the U.S.A.?

A. Well, we have had discussions with the Government of India for some time now about the nature of the threat which is posed against India from the north, the problem of their own

security, and the assistance which we and Britain have been giving to India in this regard. I think this is a continuation of those discussions. I think there is no significant or important change in any political structure or basis on which these talks would occur. These have been going on all the time. Often they occur in New Delhi, whenever one or another of our high officials go out there. We are glad to have them come here so we can pursue those talks here.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Ambassador [Charles E.] Bohlen saw President de Gaulle yesterday. My colleagues in Paris are distressed because they can't find out what has happened. Could you tell me?

Q. Can't hear the question.

A. I wouldn't want to embarrass your colleagues in Paris by giving you something which they couldn't get over there. (Laughter.) It was a general review of the situation. The Ambassador had not seen President de Gaulle for some time. A number of questions did come up. I think, again, perhaps you could make your own list and it might not be too inaccurate.

Q. Could you say anything at this time about the Panama situation, Mr. Secretary?

A. Well, I am very hopeful that we can bring this matter back to the conference table. I think that the statements of President Johnson and President Chiari have indicated that there is a recognition on both sides that our interests on both sides require us to bring our differences, such as they are, to the conference table in order that we can find an answer to them. I think we are very close; we are getting closer. The Organization of American States has played a very constructive and helpful role in this matter, and I would hope that we can move on this without too much delay.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you feel the publication of this Suslov letter [2] marks some kind of new stage in the Sino-Soviet dispute which raises new policy questions for the West?

A. No. I think this is a matter of some importance in that it is a Soviet response to what was a very vigorous presentation of the Chinese point of view. I am a little reluctant to comment from the bleachers on this matter.

We will be studying, of course, that statement with great care. And although we do have considerable interest in the outcome of the discussion, as between militancy and coexistence, we are not inclined ourselves to try to intervene in that discussion in any significant way. I think we will just have to let that go forward and see what happens on it.

Aid to Indonesia

Q. Mr. Secretary, when this—

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it possible we will have to reevaluate our aid program to India, rather, Indonesia, in light of some of President Sukarno's recent comments about it?

A. Well, I did not myself interpret his recent remark as an intergovernmental communication. (Laughter.)

We have a very limited aid program there at the present time. Some of it is of great importance almost regardless of any particular political situation. For instance, the antimalarial program. This is the kind of thing that must not be allowed to lapse, because, if it lapses, then a large investment of some $30–40 million or more of effort goes down the drain and neighboring countries then become the victims of the failure of an antimalarial campaign in a place like Indonesia. So there is some aid progress.

But, on the other hand, questions of future aid and enlargement of aid turn very much on not only the measures that Indonesia is prepared to take inside the country but also the adjustment of their relations with their own immediate neighbors. We hope this can move forward.

Q. Mr. Secretary, last week you said [3] you might have a report from Congress this week on the chances for an international wool agreement. Can you tell us whether you have made this report yet and what the chances are?

A. Yes, my report is that we will see them next week. (Laughter.)

[2] A report by Soviet Presidium member M. A. Suslov to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, dated Feb. 14, 1964, and released for publication on Apr. 2.

[3] BULLETIN of Apr. 13, 1964, p. 570.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been another flareup in Anglo-U.S. relations over shipping, and the charge has been made in Britain in the last few days that new regulations which came into force today—by these regulations, being United States regulations—infringe the sovereignty of shipping, other shipping nations. Would you like to comment, please?

A. Well, I have looked into this more than once and in some detail, and I think that I am well enough informed about it to know that there isn't much that I can say that can be helpful today.

It is true that we have the Bonner bill, which is aimed at dual pricing and shipping rates. That bill has been on the books for almost 3 years now. We have deferred the application of that bill in respect to these dual rates for more than a year, in order to try to find a way to work out this matter with friendly maritime governments.

The Maritime Commission here is doing what it is required to do under the law. Now, this creates some problems, and we will of course be in touch with other governments concerned and will try to find some answers to the problems. But it's a highly technical matter, and it's not something that can be dismissed with a slogan about sovereignty or interference, and that sort of thing. There are serious problems in both directions, and we hope that we can find some solution. But the problem is not new. It has been there for almost 3 years, and the application of these regulations has been deferred in an effort to find a solution. But the Maritime Commission is under a very severe mandate of law in this matter, and we will have to see where we go from here.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Cuban newspaper Hoy has charged that the Brazilian revolution was prepared, ordered, and paid for in the United States. Would you care to comment?

A. That is—did you hear the question?

Q. No. No.

A. That the Brazilian revolution was prepared, ordered, and paid for in the United States, according to Cuban newspapers, was it?

Q. That's right.

A. Or a broadcast. Well, there is just not one iota of truth in this. It's just not so in any way, shape, or form.

Status of East-West Issues

Q. Mr. Secretary, at the time of the test ban last summer, some people at least thought it was related to a new stage in the Sino-Soviet quarrel. Since the temperature has been going up again, have you noticed any further breaking of the ice on any East-West issues? Are the Russians showing any increased interest?

A. I think that there is at present, except for one or two bilateral things, such as the consular agreement—at present there is not great movement. I suspect that part of it is because of the Moscow-Peiping dialog and the preoccupation of the Communist world with that difference.

I do believe that, quite apart from ideological questions, the Soviet Union, the Russian people, as Russians, are concerned about the prospect of living next door to 800 million Chinese by 1970, armed with nuclear weapons. And I think that their interest in the test ban treaty, and our common interest in such things as the nondissemination of nuclear weapons, is based upon some understanding of the future dangers of a continued nuclear arms race among those who now have them and the further spread of these weapons among those who don't have them.

But I don't see this leading to major dramatic developments, to new questions on which we and the Soviet Union, or the West and the Soviet Union, could agree in the next few weeks.

We do continue to work at these disarmament questions in Geneva. We do, not because we think that we are going to get miraculous answers next week but because we just cannot afford to stop the effort. We have got to keep trying, because the alternatives are not very inviting. And it's the duty of diplomacy to keep working at these things, to see whether we can make some headway, even though it may be small, at particular points, at particular moments, to keep working at it.

Q. Thank you, sir.

The Anatomy of World Leadership

by Adlai E. Stevenson
U.S. Representative to the United Nations [1]

I do not have to tell you that next year San Francisco will be host to a commemorative meeting of the General Assembly to mark the 20th anniversary of the signing of the Charter of the United Nations. But I can report to you that the members of the United Nations in general and the Secretariat in particular are more than grateful for the interest and generosity of San Francisco and the State of California which will make this meeting possible.

In the twilight of the war and the dawn of a new era, the charter was born here in San Francisco. For those of us who were involved in that historic conference—and there are still some of us around—the memories are still there.

And this brings me to what Beardsley Ruml said about the U.N. in 1945. It was one of the better prophecies of our age, and it goes like this:

> At the end of five years you will think the UN is the greatest vision ever realized by man.
>
> At the end of ten years you will find doubts within yourself and all through the world.
>
> At the end of fifteen years you will believe the UN cannot succeed. You will be certain that all the odds are against its ultimate life and success.
>
> It will only be when the UN is twenty years old that . . . we will know that the UN is the only alternative to the demolition of the world.

What a prescient bit of crystal-ball gazing that turned out to be!

And I think by now—19 years later—a great many people have arrived at the fourth stage in Ruml's 20-year prophecy—that stage where we know that "the UN is the only alternative to the demolition of the world."

Improving Machinery of Peaceful Settlement

Let me be emphatic: This is not said in any rhetorical sense. It is said in a very down-to-earth sense. The world abounds in conflicts between nations—some old and some new—some silly, some serious—some minor and some potentially climactic. A few of these conflicts may be de-fused by direct negotiation, or by agreement to settle for the *status quo*, or even by the attrition of time. But many of them will require some changes—in boundaries or people or resources or leaders, or in claims, practices, procedures, positions, or attitudes.

If change is not to be effected by the institution of war, which has been the great instrument of change through the ages, then it must be effected by institutions for peaceful settlement and peaceful change—meaning, inescapably, by international organizations at the regional and global level. The only alternative to the disaster of war is the machinery of peace, because there is no way to exorcise conflict from the human breast or the politics of nations. And international machinery for the peaceful resolution of conflict already has a better record than many people seem to realize.

During the past decade and a half there have been some 20 occasions when the armed forces of two or more nations engaged in active hostilities. In only one case did the fighting end the way wars have ended traditionally—by the surrender of one side to the other. On at least

[1] Address made before the Commonwealth Club, San Francisco, Calif., on Apr. 3 (press release 142 dated Apr. 2).

20 other occasions there has been minor fighting on disputed frontiers, or armed revolts in the outcome of which other states had a national interest. In no case has the fighting spread to international warfare.

Fifty-seven international disputes are now on the agenda of the Security Council of the United Nations. Some are settled, others dormant—and some are hardy perennials. One thing is clear about the 57 varieties of postwar disputes: Far less blood has been shed than would have been shed if the disputes had not found their way onto the agenda of the U.N. Security Council.

The Organization of American States and, more recently, the Organization of African Unity have also dealt successfully with violence in their areas.

Hostilities have been opened with gunfire and closed with cease-fires in the Far East, in the Western Pacific, in Southeast Asia, in the Middle East, in the Mediterranean, and in Africa—in some areas more than once since the end of the Second World War.

And in the Caribbean, a year and a half ago, a nuclear giant got on—and then got off—a nuclear collision course.

Meanwhile, the most massive political transformation in history took place as the British, French, Belgian, and Dutch empires were dissolved and the trust territories of the United Nations shifted from tutelage to independence—with astonishingly little bloodshed all around. The world has never seen such a spectacle of peaceful change.

But there are too many nuclear and conventional arms to doubt that grave danger to peace in our times still persists. There have been too many confrontations, too many close calls, too many pullbacks in the nick of time, too many rescue operations at one minute before midnight.

Yet, if the record so far is no guarantee of peace, it offers the hope that if hostilities break out somewhere tomorrow, the next step will not be the sound of trumpets but the call to cease-fire. That hope can be hardened if we and other members of the United Nations have the sense and the will to improve the machinery of peaceful settlement and cultivate the profession of peacemaking.

Changes in World Relationships

In recent weeks and months there has been a lively ferment about U.S. foreign policy in some of the scholarly and popular publications, in some of the columns and commentaries, and from some of the public platforms in Washington and elsewhere.

Conditions in the world are changing, we are told. I could not agree more. The President, the Secretary of State, and others have noted the point more than once in both general and specific terms. Indeed, I was speaking myself just last week at Princeton [2] about the extraordinary change in world affairs and international relationships in the 3 short years since Dag Hammarskjold was killed—some of which have been discernible only since the resolution of the crisis over Soviet missiles in Cuba.

When President Kennedy took office, a global stalemate, which was the logical outcome of the cold war, was virtually complete but still being tested to see whether steel was backed by nerves. In the less than 3 years that were given to him, President Kennedy had to show force on three occasions.

First, he called up the reserves to convince the Soviets we would no more give in to a third ultimatum on Berlin than we would on the previous two [3]—though his first words in office included an offer to "those nations who would make themselves our adversary" to "begin anew the quest for peace." [4]

Second, he was forced to resume nuclear testing in the atmosphere because the Soviets broke a moratorium in the futile search for an elusive nuclear superiority—though in that very announcement he insisted that ". . . in the long run, the only real security in this age of nuclear peril rests not in armament but in disarmament." [5]

And, third, President Kennedy was forced to throw an armored noose around Cuba to prevent a clandestine shift of the balance of power in

[2] For text, see U.S./U.N. press release 4374 dated Mar. 23.

[3] For text of a report to the Nation by President Kennedy on the Berlin crisis, see BULLETIN of Aug. 14, 1961, p. 267.

[4] For text of President Kennedy's inaugural address, see *ibid.*, Feb. 6, 1961, p. 175.

[5] For text, see *ibid.*, Mar. 19, 1962, p. 443.

Soviet favor—though in doing so he simultaneously mobilized the peacekeeping machinery of the Western Hemisphere and the United Nations.[6]

Yet now, in the early months of President Johnson's administration, we can see a much different and a much more complex and a somewhat more hopeful world emerging:

—a world which is no longer simply bipolar but in which multiple centers of power and influence have come into being;

—a world in which the most extreme forms of power are the least likely to be used;

—a world in which realities are eroding rigid political dogmas;

—a world in which there can be no ideological agreement but where there can be agreement on mutual survival;

—a world in which imperialism is dying, and paternalism is dying too;

—a world in which old trading systems, monetary systems, market systems, and other elements of the conventional wisdom are being challenged and changed;

—and finally, a world in which fundamental issues of human rights, which have been hidden in closets down the long corridor of history, are out in the open and high on the agenda of human affairs.

We can see, in short, that the world was never as bipolar as it looked and that a misleading impression was created by the temporary weakness of other powers and by the challenge of Stalinist ambitions in the first postwar years.

But let us recall that there was nothing mythical about the physical annexation of occupied states in the Soviet empire, nor about the military pressures, the insurrections, the infiltrations and coercion and blackmail and propaganda that Stalin launched in the postwar world, nor about the more recent attempts at nuclear blackmail and power politics.

Let us agree that a cold war—unlike a hot one—does not have a sharp beginning and a sharp end: It is better understood as a state of affairs—a world condition.

Let us also agree that the changes we just noted, fundamental as they are, are not events but trends. They may continue in the same direction; they may become stalled; they might even be reversed for reasons beyond our control. And if the present leaders of the Soviet Union have come to see that expansion by armed force is irrational in the nuclear age, the leaders of Communist China have gone to spectacular ends to make clear that they still live in the age of Stalin—with what dangers to all of us we can scarcely discern.

While we're at it, let me point out that it takes two to make a *détente*. We on our side may be encumbered by some myths but not by metaphysical dialectics. We may suffer from tired cliches but not from fixed dogma. We may conform to conventional wisdom, but we are not bound to secular scriptures. I mention this not to score propaganda points but to suggest that if we have trouble adapting to new realities, think of the difficulties of men who have been taught the "iron laws" of history and the "inevitability" of events which stubbornly refuse to happen.

No Shift Required in U.S. Aims

So our task is twofold.

On the one hand, let us by all means discard any obsolete labels—especially the black-and-white labels; let us try to be sure that the spade we still call a spade has not rusted away while our eyes were averted. On the other hand—and at the same time—let us be sure to get a firm grip on our sense of direction in the world that is changing about us.

Let me say here and now that there has been a clear sense of positive direction at the base of our policies.

We recall that United States support helped Turkey stand up to Stalin's threats—and tend to forget that the main function of that aid was to help build up a Turkish economy overtaxed by its own defense requirements.

We recall that our aid helped the beleaguered Greeks to put down a Communist insurrection—and tend to forget that most of that aid was economic.

We recall that the Marshall Plan made it possible for Europe to rearm and help build up NATO—and tend to forget that its purpose was directed "not against any country or doc-

[6] For background, see *ibid.*, Nov. 12, 1962, pp. 715–746.

trine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos." [7]

And so it goes, for the Point 4 program and all the rest. The positive, constructive, progressive, and hopeful driving force of our postwar foreign policy has been obscured by the confrontation of military alliances, by the arms race, and by recurrent crises.

Our consistent and forthcoming contributions to the work of the whole United Nations family of agencies, which seek to build better lives for the undernourished two-thirds of humanity, has been overveiled by political wrangling in the Security Council.

Our steady encouragement of the growth of regional organizations and institutions for economic and social and technical progress has been half-hidden because we also were concerned with the physical security of the same areas.

Now we have reason to hope that with the test ban treaty, the resolution banning weapons of mass destruction in outer space, the installation of the "hot line" between Moscow and Washington, the first halting steps toward U.S.–Soviet cooperation in exploring the universe, and, above all, the hardening conviction about a mutual interest in survival—we have reason to hope, as I say, that the end of the cold war, in the particular form in which we have known it, may now be possible. Other rivalries may take its place in time, rivalries that will require a revision of tactics. But between the two thermonuclear powers we have reason to hope that additional areas of common interest can be identified and further agreements reached—until this particular cold war fades into history. One of the imperatives of our foreign policy is to hasten that day.

But my point here is this: To adjust to a world of lesser tensions from different directions does not require the painful discovery of shiny new policies, nor a sharp shift in our aims, nor a reexamination of our motives. Our policies will, as they have in the past, seek:

—to help build up the capacity of the United Nations to effect peaceful resolution of conflict and change;

—to similarly support the growing capacity of regional organizations to handle their own family problems and move toward unity in the economic, social, and technical spheres;

—to step up the flow of resources and technology from the industrialized to the newly developing countries;

—to offer cooperation in such exciting new ventures as creating a World Weather Watch, a global system of satellite communications, the exploration of the universe, and in a thousand less spectacular jobs;

—to keep everlastingly at the search for the next safe steps toward arms control and disarmament;

—to insure the defensive strength of free and peaceful societies while the quest for peace continues;

—to hammer away at the manifold and sometimes tedious task of creating a world—in President Kennedy's phrase—that is "safe for diversity" because it rests on consent and not coercion.

Certainly we shall have to be adaptive and flexible, and even imaginative and inventive, as we pursue these ends. But there is nothing new in the ends. They are the ends we have pursued for better than a decade and a half. They are good ends, and no degree of complexity—no evolution in world affairs—should be allowed to obscure them or to divert us from their pursuit.

But to take full advantage of the real mutations in power and influence will require us to be even clearer in our heads and even faster on our feet than we have been so far.

As realists we must see the world as it is, not as we might like it to be. And what do we see? We see the world as a neighborhood—interdependent in space, interdependent in communications, interdependent in economic life, and overshadowed by a fantastic Wagnerian possibility of instantaneous annihilation. We cannot conceal these fundamental facts. We dare not behave as though they did not exist. This is the reality science and technology have thrust upon us.

And when we look back and ask ourselves, how have we hitherto dealt with the realities of our century? the answer is, I must confess, a little cheerless. Through two world wars and

[7] For remarks by Secretary Marshall on June 5, 1947, see *ibid.*, June 15, 1947, p. 1159.

a cataclysmic economic depression, we, the self-styled realists, produced a record of disaster. While every day the facts of interdependence were drawing our nations into closer and more vulnerable proximity, we marched with a sovereign illusion of state power boldly into shattering catastrophe.

I often think no war had been as tragic as that of 1939, for, in retrospect, it seems almost a precise, sleepwalking repetition of the war of 1914—the same actors, the same pressures, the same causes and provocations. And all this for the reason that in 1919 the victors left intact virtually all the causes of violent nationalism and irresponsible sovereignty that had sparked the first conflict. America withdrew into an impossible isolationism. The League, the ancestor of the U.N., was crippled at its birth. The concert of Europe broke down. The old, uneasy, unstable balance of power returned.

Even so, the powers might perhaps have evaded the final tragedy if Europe and America had not also been compelled to act out on the economic stage the full consequences of separate, isolated nationalism.

But this is not the place to go into the multiple causes of the Great Depression, out of which sprang so many of the evils of Hitlerism, the demoralization of Europe, and the inevitable drift to war.

Nature of Leadership in the Postwar World

I make no apology for this brief excursion into our not-very-distant history, for, as George Santayana remarked: "Those who will not learn from history are destined to repeat it." And believe me, the world cannot afford to repeat its history from 1914 to 1945. In the nuclear age total, unabridged national sovereignty, operating blindly in the new era of growing interdependence, can produce the final lethal catastrophe. If there is any realism in politics, any realism in economics, it must be to insure that such follies, such excesses, such disasters never reoccur.

Is this too big an order? Must men always behave in their individual interest in such a way that their collective interests invariably suffer? Of course not. And that brings me to some concluding words about the anatomy of world leadership. For the nature of leadership in a world safe for diversity—there's a subject on which some careful and perhaps painful rethinking will be needed in the years ahead, and not only here at home.

We have heard a great deal about leadership in the postwar world—leadership of the two contending blocs engaged in a struggle described as cold war. It is a simple statement of historical fact to say that for a number of years one side was led unquestionably by the Soviet Union and the other side was led unquestionably by the United States of America.

There was a fundamental difference in the character of the two leaderships: One was imposed by the leader and his Red Army; the other was imposed upon us by our resources and our capacity to act in a war-torn world. We have no apologies to make about our acceptance and performance of that role; indeed, we can be deeply proud of both.

But the days of unquestioned and unchallenged leadership are past. The fear of external threat, which is the cement of alliances, has subsided somewhat—and some of the followers have grown strong enough to strike out on their own.

And again there is a fundamental difference in the change that has occurred on the two sides. Communist China has broken away violently from the leadership of the Soviet Union in a split of unprecedented bitterness. There is hardly a Communist party anywhere in the world which has not felt the divisive repercussions of that schism. Meanwhile, the other members of the old Soviet bloc twist and turn and maneuver to put a bit more daylight between them and the old leader. That is just about the last thing that the Soviet leaders wanted to happen—and they have done their best to prevent it.

On our side an old friend within the alliance now sometimes declines to see things the way we see them for reasons which sometimes seem quite obscure to us from where we sit. Other old friends occasionally disagree—as we do with them—though very often, when we talk things out, we find our way to common ground.

But our differences, even when they persist, do not set us at each other's throats in alleys and villages around the world. A basic pur-

pose of our whole postwar policy has been to help Europe get back on its feet, stand up on its own, and look us in the eye as equals. If we sometimes do not like what they say when they look us in the eye, let us not forget that we know something the Communists don't know: Lasting unity can be attained only among nations that are not dominated by any member of the group. Lasting unity is created not by the overlordship of the strong but by leadership of the strong in a community in which every member is equal because he is free.

As the world of the two great blocs and the unalined states is breaking into a pluralism of power and prestige, the most powerful nation in the world still cannot throw up its hands and resign from a job which it never sought anyway. Leadership always will be needed; leadership always will be welcomed—provided it is the right kind of leadership in the right places at the right time.

What is the right kind of leadership in a world in which the prevailing political passion is national independence? What is the right way to exercise national power in an age when the most powerful nations cannot use their most powerful weapons?

There is diplomacy, of course. There is joint military planning with close allies. There is common trade policy and development policy. There is technical cooperation and the export of science. There is information and cultural exchange. All these—and other tangible things—come to mind.

But what I have in mind is something less tangible than the spending of money and the organizing of resources. What I have in mind is leadership by attitude—and by example.

A wise Asian said not long ago that, in our time, his people would expect Americans to make a great effort to understand them, without themselves making a great effort to understand the Americans. It is not easy for Americans to get used to a world in which they have to try hard to understand the sentiments and feelings and prides and prejudices of others—and then find that those others continue to cherish unfair, false, even outrageous opinions about the purposes and motives of the United States of America.

Put it this way: A man who serves as a leader in his community has to accustom himself to the fact that individual citizens and special-interest groups will often berate him for his actions because they have not considered all the angles the leader must consider before he acts. Much of this criticism the leader will think unfair; yet, while he never can give way to pressure merely because it comes from the weak, neither can he give way to the temptation of responding in kind, of lashing out at his adversaries, of talking or acting as irresponsibly as his less powerful but noisier critics. He has to do what he thinks is best—consulting all the elements of the community, but consulting his own independent best judgment as well. His patience, his restraint, his self-control, his magnanimity, his compassion—in a word, his maturity—will be often and sorely tried. But this is the price of power. He either learns that simple lesson, or he stops trying to be a leader among his fellow men.

So it is with the leadership of a nation, among its fellow nations in a world not yet safe for diversity. We are, quite simply, too strong to react in kind to every ugly street cry, every student placard, every irresponsible act. In this kind of world, wielding our kind of power, real toughness is not bluster but maturity. If we want to know how to act in such a world, we could do worse than to reread Kipling's *If*.

Alongside the mature *attitudes* of the powerful leader, I would place the impact of *example* as an instrument of leadership in the world that is emerging. And this leads me directly to two issues before our society right now: civil rights and the war against poverty.

There was a time when some people lamented the exposure of racial discrimination in this country only because Communist propagandists could use it against us around the world. This was a mean and shallow view, an unworthy way to relate civil rights to foreign policy.

Then, when an aroused nation at last decided to do something definitive about equality for all our people, it was quite properly said that this was not being done to please a foreign audience but to cleanse our own conscience, to make our own society whole at last, to elevate the quality of our domestic life.

And so it is. But civil rights—the equality of and dignity of the individual human being—is a universal issue, whatever form it may take within domestic jurisdiction. Indeed, after peace and war, it is the ultimate issue in almost all societies, the gut issue of the modern world. It is, I suppose, one of the things that makes the modern world modern.

So when we in this nation, tending our own business, make a reality of the bright promise of equal rights for all, when we break down the artificial and ignorant barriers that limit the lives of a minority race, when we put an end to intolerance and open our schools and our neighborhoods and our hearts to fellow humans regardless of race or other distinction, we are, willy-nilly, exercising leadership in world affairs. We set an example for all to see—and in doing so we add immeasurably to the prestige and influence of our voice around the world, whether that was intended or not. We add to our stature in all things because we have added to the quality of our own life. Those societies which fully enfranchise all their members are also the most productive and stable—bright evidence that justice and morality constitute the most enlightened form of self-interest.

Much the same thing can be said about President Johnson's war on poverty. When the richest nation on the face of the earth, when the society which has produced the highest standard of living in history, turns as a matter of national priority to the needs of the underprivileged 20 percent, we likewise are indulging in world leadership. We are showing that no level of social accomplishment satisfies the free human spirit.

And poverty in nations, as President Johnson pointed out last week, is like poverty in families. Our foreign aid program is not a matter of doles and handouts. Whether the war on poverty is waged at home or abroad, the aim is the same: the creation of opportunity, the transfer of skills, and the investment of capital to help others to help themselves. Here again we are showing that it is up to the great and powerful to lead the way.

For in this new world of diversity that is shaping up, the true leader is not the one who gives orders but the one who shows the way.

The true leader is not the one who embraces agreeable myths but who faces the facts even when they are ugly.

The true leader is not the one who expects followers but who welcomes the company of all who wish to join him.

The true leader is not one who insists that *his* way is the *only* way but who is ready to share his own experience for what it is worth to others.

These, it seems to me, are some of the parts of the anatomy of leadership that will be needed in a world which, indeed, is changing rapidly but which is concerned to the last with building a good society. The nation which leads the way to the good society need never fear for its influence in this world, for that nation will be setting the pace for all others.

I believe the emerging world society in which we have to operate offers us possibilities for creative improvement at home and for creative diplomacy and initiative abroad. That world is more plastic, more open to influence, than ever before. Hence it is our duty and our opportunity to work in this new society for the great purposes that have always lain at the roots of America's domestic experiment: for a world in which life is held secure against arbitrary violence, in which the pursuit of happiness is not crippled by lack of education and the lack of skill, in which men can find the ultimate liberty—to seek truth as they see it and to express their infinite diversity, unified through brotherhood, not fear.

And that, it seems to me, brings world affairs into everyone's front parlor and everyone's backyard.

The Thirteenth Alarm

by Harlan Cleveland
Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs[1]

Just a week ago the United Nations answered the peacekeeping firebell for the 13th time. This time the alarm came from a troubled island in the Mediterranean Sea: one island with two warring ethnic communities. As a result, two of our friends and NATO allies found themselves locked in an ever-tightening spiral of tension—closer to serious armed conflict than most Americans would believe.

Even before the fighting began last Christmastime, the issues were touchy in the extreme. Cyprus got its independence as part of a complex treaty structure which left British, Greek, and Turkish troops on the island, and a constitution that required both Turk and Greek Cypriots to agree on acts of the independent government. Now the first task became to break the vicious and lengthening chain in which incident begat incident and violence spawned violence. The second was to work out an agreed solution that would go to the root of the trouble.

Talks among North Atlantic allies produced no workable answer. A regional peace force linked to the U.N. was agreed in principle but not in practice. Meanwhile, arms flowed in and local fighting infected first one village and then another. The Communists, everywhere the scavengers of independence, began to work to turn the situation to their advantage. And a few thousand harassed, heroic British soldiers tried to keep the island from exploding again in communal strife.

And so the Cyprus issue came to the United Nations—for peacekeeping and peacemaking is the U.N.'s major business. Once again the United Nations Security Council had to listen to acrid debate and then agree to call up volunteers for an international bucket brigade. For in Cyprus, as in 12 other cases, Shakespeare's wisdom well applies:

> A little fire is quickly trodden out;
> Which, being suffered, rivers cannot quench.

Beginning with Greece in 1947, the U.N.'s record of on-the-spot peacekeeping operations runs through Palestine, Kashmir, Indonesia, Korea, Trieste, Suez, Lebanon, Laos, the Congo, West New Guinea, Yemen, and now Cyprus. Some of these once-ominous problems still persist, but none of them seriously endangers world peace or threatens to involve the great powers in catastrophic contest. The United Nations has succeeded in moving them away from the battlefields and barricades into the chambers and corridors where peace is made by lengthy and tedious talk. Solutions may not follow quickly or easily, but the guns are checked outside the conference halls. And that is what counts when the issue is peace or war.

Now that the world has lived through a baker's dozen of these traumatic near-wars, we have a right to ask what progress we are making in keeping the peace. And the real test of progress, of course, is not whether emergencies stop occurring—because in this highly flammable world there are quite a few oily rags lying around and too many careless people with matches.

The real test is whether we are better able

[1] Address made before the Midwest Model United Nations at St. Louis, Mo., on Mar. 21 (press release 128 dated Mar. 20).

to cope with crises when they do occur than we were, say, a decade ago. Is the world profiting from its ticklish experience, or are the peacemakers still playing each crisis by ear—on the same primitive instruments? What does the record show?

Diversity of Solutions

The record so far tells us at least five things worth telling:

First, threats to the peace can, and do, break out almost anywhere. Over the past 17 years, peacekeeping operations have been undertaken by the U.N. four times in the Middle East, twice in Southern Europe, twice in Southeast Asia, and once in the Far East, the Western Pacific, South Asia, Africa, and now in the Mediterranean. And while action was in every case left to the Organization of American States, the Security Council has had on its docket 13 crises in the Western Hemisphere. As of tonight the Security Council still has 57 large and small disputes listed on its agenda—some of which have been settled long since and some of which are dangerous enough still to require a watching brief by the Council.

Second, the record tells us that each of these disputes—being different—has required different kinds of peacekeeping machinery. In the Korean operation, uniquely large and uniquely destructive of young lives, the United Nations defended a nation against outside Communist aggression. In the Congo a major military police force was attacked and had to defend itself. In the Middle East and in Kashmir the need was for armed peacekeepers to patrol armistice lines. In other cases observation teams, factfinders, and mediators have filled the bill.

What's more, the weaponry, the political sponsorship, the racial composition, and the financing arrangements have all been different—each tailored to the necessities of the case.

In retrospect this diversity of solutions makes the original idea of a standing U.N. army look rather naive and simplistic. But there was no experience to go on when the founders of the U.N. were trying to figure out, on paper, how to organize for peace in an unpredictable postwar world.

The Congo Experience

Third, our experience in the U.N. demonstrates that an international police force, once on the ground, has a mission unlike most national military missions—because it's much less national and often less military.

Members of U.N. peacekeeping forces are soldiers from the military establishments of the nations contributing units. They are commanded by professional military officers. They wear uniforms and carry guns. They sleep in tents or barracks and eat military rations.

But once they put on the blue beret or, if need be, the blue helmet, they find they are supposed to be soldiers without enemies, fighters without rancor, members of an armed force without a military objective—their mission not to start shooting but to stop it, not to win a battle but to see to it there is no battle to be won or lost.

The implications that flow from this strange state of affairs for soldiers-turned-peacemakers are large and fascinating—and were seen most clearly in the Congo experience. Having spent some time talking about these things with U.N. officers during the tough days of the Congo operation, I should like to dwell for a moment on what was learned there.

In a remote section of the Congo I visited with a brigadier general from Malaysia, commanding a Malayan U.N. brigade. In a real war, he said, he would be merely commanding a brigade, but with the U.N. force he had to command each platoon. His point was that the smallest incident in the life of a minor patrol can easily become a major political issue. In the jungles of Malaya the Communists that had been shooting at these same soldiers were clearly the enemy—no doubt about it. "But here," said the brigadier, "if somebody shoots at our soldiers, it is a political question whether they should even shoot back."

The point was clear enough in the case of Indian troops manning a checkpoint who were attacked by a howling mob of several thousand women organized by secessionists under Moise Tshombe. The women kicked, spat, slapped, ripped shirts, and tore insignia from the stoic Gurkhas who had been ordered not to fight even in self-defense. As the mob began to tire of this one-sided fight, the Indians fired exactly nine

rounds of ammunition over the heads of the crowd and advanced to disperse the mob, using only their batons. The Indian officer in charge told me that an army unit brought in to put down such an outbreak under what he called a "normal situation" could readily have caused dozens or scores of civilian deaths.

One commander in the Congo told me that when opposing troops run from a police force, the "no enemy" principle may require the U.N. force to let them get away. But curiously enough, he did not think this is necessarily a military disadvantage: "If a man has to run away from you," he said, "he will deliberately exaggerate the size and effectiveness of your force, in order to look better in the eyes of his own people."

If the rank and file of a peacekeeping force has to make a difficult adjustment, so do the officers. The commander of a peace force often must go out ahead of his troops. This used to be a standard operating practice back in the Middle Ages, when a commander would ride out to parley with the opposing commander, to see whether things could be settled without anybody getting hurt. In more modern warfare the commanding officer doesn't spend much time in no man's land. But in this sense, U.N. peacekeeping has brought the sensible Middle Ages up to date—for the object, once again, is to pacify.

The brigadier commanding the Indian brigade in the Congo made a regular and successful practice of going out ahead of his troops and persuading hostile local forces to return stolen helicopters, retire gracefully from the field without battle, and even to give up cities. It is remarkable, this officer reported, how well this sort of thing works in situations where the other side is not quite sure of itself or its orders. "If you do something that looks deliberately stupid, it is sometimes so surprising to others that you get away with it."

A final distinction between an international peace force and a conventional military one is that a peacekeeping force in an underdeveloped area is often drawn deeply into the civil life of the community. U.N. units in the Congo found themselves providing leadership, supplies, transportation, and other services to local governments and sometimes to private firms in an effort to help the economy get moving again. The U.N. force even had to develop a scale of charges by which businesses could be billed for hauling goods to market in U.N. military vehicles.

Soldiers without enemies operating on behalf of the world community are a new kind of people doing a new kind of work. Their doctrine, their mandate, their training manuals, are still first drafts—and not yet ready for final printing.

Let me return to the record of U.N. peacekeeping so far and what it tells us about this unprecedented, pragmatic, and fateful business.

Further Record of U.N. Peacekeeping

Fourth, the record shows clearly that the United Nations peacekeeping machinery is not an alternative to regional organizations or to direct diplomacy. All three are essential—to be employed separately or in some combination depending upon the task at hand.

Issues directly involving basic national interests of the major powers will be settled between them or not at all. Regional disputes are handled preferably within the framework of regional organizations—like the Organization of American States and the Organization of African Unity—when they are up to the job. In others, the United Nations must play the leading role—and in all disputes the United Nations by the terms of its charter is the last resort, the peacemaker in reserve.

The best example of combined use of national, regional, and world facilities was the fateful crisis over Soviet installation of missile sites in Cuba. Our response to that effort to change the world's power balance brought into action—at one and the same time—national power, the OAS, and the United Nations. Each played a mutually supporting role in a textbook case of crisis diplomacy. The Cyprus case is another fascinating study in irony and paradox: Here the United Nations, by keeping the peace on the island, can prevent the southern flank of NATO from bursting into flames.

Fifth, and finally, the record shows that the peacekeeping machinery of the United Nations has operated in the national interests of the United States, as well as in the interest of every

other nation that cares about the peace of the world. And that *should* include every responsible government in the world, regardless of its political, social, or economic structure.

For there is a nuclear seed lurking somewhere in almost any open conflict anywhere today. Even where major power interests do not appear to be directly and immediately involved, there is the danger that organized fighting at any level, and with any kind of arms, could eventually engage the interests or prestige of major powers and drag us into a nuclear war that nobody wanted. As long as nuclear arms exist, the threat exists that an armed skirmish can wind up in a mushroom cloud.

So what serves peace anywhere serves our interests everywhere. This is one all-important area where we share common interests with the Soviet Union. And there is some reason to hope that the Soviet leaders agree.

Maybe that is why Chairman Khrushchev, in his New Year's Day message,[2] put the case for settlement of all territorial disputes by peaceful means, including recourse to the United Nations. We are still dubious whether concrete policies will follow this general declaration; but it is the task of our diplomacy to find out—and to keep on seeking agreement on how to back the doctrine with effective machinery for peaceful settlement.

Reassessing U.N.'s Capacity To Act for Peace

Thus, the record of the peacekeeping experience of the United Nations to date shows:

—that threats to the peace can and do arise almost anywhere;

—that every peacekeeping operation is likely to require a different kind of peace force than has ever been needed before;

—that the conduct of peacekeeping forces must be drawn more from the police books than from the military manuals;

—that when crisis comes, national, regional, and world action are not mutually exclusive but mutually reinforcing; and

—that the U.N.'s capacity to keep the peace has a lot to do with our national interests and, indeed, our personal chances of survival in the age of the ultimate weapons.

But does that mean the peacekeeping machinery of the United Nations is all that it should be—that it is up to such an awesome assignment? It does not, and it is not.

We can take some comfort in the fact that the U.N.'s peacekeeping performance to date has been heartening in most instances and brilliant in some.

We can all be grateful that the Secretary-General is able to assemble a force of a few thousand men for Cyprus; though if the British had not been holding the fort and had not then contributed half of the manpower, it would have been enormously difficult to mount the peacekeeping mission in Cyprus at all.

We can be grateful, too, that the Canadians and the Nordic countries and Holland have agreed to earmark forces for future emergency duty with the United Nations.

But there is something eerie about the spectacle of the United Nations having to plead and scrounge and cajole to help tack together a minimal peacekeeping force in the nick of time. There is something nightmarish about the notion that in a world which spends some $120 billion a year in the name of defense and keeps some 20 million men under arms, peace could hang on the overnight availability of a few thousand men and a few million dollars.

In short, the performance of the world community is not yet nearly good enough. There will need to be many more earmarked units from every continent, from a variety of nations, large and small—contingents always on the alert for prompt assignment in an emergency—so that once a peacekeeping mission has been authorized, the right mix of forces can be put together, if need be, in a matter of days, not weeks.

We are entitled to hope that U.N. members will search their souls, reexamine their attitudes, and reassess their own national interests to make sure that the United Nations never wants for men or money to act in the interests of peace. We are entitled to hope that acquiescence will give way to enthusiasm, that reluctance will give way to responsibility, that service with the United Nations will be seen not

[2] For text, see BULLETIN of Feb. 3, 1964, p. 158.

as a burden but as an honor worthy of some of each nation's best men with the best training and talent and experience.

And I speak not only of soldiers called to service as peace*keepers* but of statesmen called to serve as peace*makers*. I see no reason why the United Nations should not have available a distinguished international panel of peacemakers—and should not be able to reach into any public or private institution and command the finest talents in the world to serve as fact-finders or observers or mediators or arbitrators to disputes which tear at the fragile fabric of world peace. The very difficulty the Secretary-General has been having this week in locating a mediator for Cyprus on whom all concerned can agree illustrates the need for more of this kind of talent already at the service of the world community.

Meanwhile, the prickly problem of financing peacekeeping operations in the Middle East and the Congo has produced a situation in which the United Nations is deeply in debt, a large number of nations are in arrears on their peacekeeping assessments, the Soviet Union and others are headed toward collision with the dictum laid down in article 19 of the charter which says that any member owing more than 2 years of assessments "shall have no vote in the General Assembly," and a shattering constitutional crisis could be in the making.

Apart from the difficulties of cleaning up the past, there is the very likely prospect that the United Nations will be called upon again and again to restore the peace, to keep the peace, and to build at last a dynamic system of world order which will permit peaceful change in a world which will endure the *status quo* only until something blows up.

Will the members of the United Nations have the wit and the will to provide the United Nations with enough resources to do the jobs it is likely to be asked to do? The returns are not in, and nobody can say for sure. But I think the U.N.'s members will endow the U.N. with the capacity to act for peace, simply because it's there and it's badly needed. Nations, like people, seldom do things that require decisions, especially expensive decisions, until the need for action is obvious and compelling. And most learning is by doing.

The margin between success and failure in getting a peacekeeping mission on the island of Cyprus was all too narrow for comfort. But I suspect that this has been noticed by others as well. I suspect that the service of the United Nations in response to 13 fire alarms and scores of other warning signals is being reassessed in more than one capital around this globe. And, bit by bit, I suspect the world community is being drawn by events into an unspoken consensus: Now, in these perilous years of our days, we cannot afford to be without effective, reliable, and operational machinery for peace.

Trade Benefits To Be Continued to Poland and Yugoslavia

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

Press release 144 dated April 3

By direction of the President, the Secretary of State on April 3 reported to the Congress, as required by section 231(b) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, that a determination has been made to continue the extension of the benefits of trade agreement concessions made by the United States to products of Poland and Yugoslavia.

MEMORANDUM FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON[1]

March 26, 1964

Memorandum for
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury

Subject: Determination under Section 231(b) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as Amended, Permitting Continuation of Nondiscriminatory Trade Treatment for Poland and Yugoslavia

Pursuant to section 231(b) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, I hereby determine that extending the benefits of trade agreement concessions made by the United States to products, whether imported directly or indi-

[1] 29 Fed. Reg. 4851.

rectly, of the Polish People's Republic and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, both of which were receiving trade concessions on December 16, 1963, will be important to the national interest and will promote the independence of these two countries from domination or control by international communism. The reasons for this determination are contained in the attached statement.

The Secretary of State is directed to report this determination and the reasons therefor to the Congress, as required by section 231(b) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended.

The Secretary of the Treasury is directed to inform the Commissioner of Customs of this determination.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

TEXT OF STATEMENT

SUBJECT: Determination under Section 231(b) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as Amended, Permitting Continuation of Non-Discriminatory Trade Treatment for Poland and Yugoslavia.

The principal objective of United States policy in Eastern Europe is to encourage peaceful efforts toward loosening of control from Moscow. Both Yugoslavia and Poland have demonstrated that they are prepared to undertake considerable risks to maintain and increase their independence. Trade with the free world, and in particular with the United States, is one of the basic ways in which these countries can resist Soviet control. Depriving them of the opportunity to trade on competitive terms with the United States would be a sure way to reverse the trend in Eastern Europe and to increase the power and influence of the Soviets in Eastern Europe.

A. *Yugoslavia*

Although Yugoslavia is a communist country, its determination to maintain its independence from Soviet bloc domination has been demonstrated over the past fifteen years. The Yugoslav Government has encouraged a broad range of contacts between Yugoslavia and the West and has made Yugoslavia accessible to people, ideas, and information coming from the West.

Yugoslavia is not a member of the Warsaw Pact nor of the Soviet Bloc's Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA). On the other hand, Yugoslavia has long been associated with all of the major free world economic organizations, including the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund, the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] and the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade]. In addition, it has been seeking the opportunity to discuss trade arrangements with the EEC [European Economic Community]. More than 70% of Yugoslavia's foreign trade is with the free world, and Yugoslavia has undertaken important reforms in its foreign trade system to bring it more into line with Western practices.

Since 1948, when Yugoslavia's refusal to submit to domination by the USSR caused its expulsion from the Soviet Bloc, the United States has followed a policy of supporting Yugoslavia's desire to make its way as an independent state. This policy has served the national interest of the United States in important ways. Yugoslavia's assertion of independence greatly weakened the strategic threat of Soviet-controlled military power in Eastern Europe. Indeed, the final victory over communist guerrillas in Greece was made possible by the closing of the Yugoslav border against them. Yugoslav self assertion began the destruction of the image of monolithic communist solidarity, and it showed that a country can successfully refuse to submit to domination by the Soviet Union.

These considerations are still valid and remain important to United States national interest today. The significance of Yugoslavia's independence has not diminished. As long as its example exists, the pressures on other communist parties and governments to seek similar advantageous solutions based on the exercise of national independence will grow.

The continuation of nondiscriminatory trade treatment of Yugoslavia by the United States is of fundamental importance in supporting the independence of Yugoslavia. Such trade relations with the United States demonstrate to the Yugoslav leadership and people, as well as to the other nations of Eastern Europe, that the United States will permit normal trading possibilities to countries which assert their independence from domination by international communism.

Nondiscriminatory trade is also essential to enable Yugoslavia to maintain its exports to the United States so that it can import from us and earn the dollars required to meet its debt repayment obligations to the United States. Yugoslavia's payments on dollar repayable obligations will be well over $10 million in each of the next several years.

The Soviet Union and other countries of the Soviet bloc are now, once again, making a concentrated effort to improve economic and other relations with Yugoslavia. United States failure to continue nondiscriminatory trade treatment would contribute to forcing Yugoslavia into greater dependence upon the Soviet-controlled communist countries and thus undermine our efforts to assist Yugoslavia to pursue an independent, unaligned policy.

B. *Poland*

Poland has not achieved the degree of independence from Moscow that Yugoslavia has. Nevertheless, since the events of 1956, Poland has attained a large measure

of autonomy both in internal affairs and in foreign relations.

After 1956, Poland reversed its policy toward collectivization of agriculture. Today, 87% of the arable land of Poland is privately held.

A far greater degree of freedom of speech has been permitted in Poland since 1956, and intellectual activity remains stimulating and lively. Poland has discontinued jamming broadcasts of the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe and has participated in certain USIA programs by which American books and periodicals have been made available to the people of Poland. Poland has also permitted relatively free emigration to the West and has regularly permitted Poles to come to the United States to visit.

Finally, basic freedom of worship is possible in Poland today. Poland permits religious education for children as well as a Catholic university and seminaries. A number of religious holy days are observed as national holidays. While religion remains anathema to the Communists, and the Gomulka regime has probed for ways of bringing the Church under some control, Catholicism in Poland remains a potent force and an obstacle to complete communist domination. The regime, well aware that an all-out attack on the Church would prejudice its beneficial relationship with the West, must show restraint so long as there is anything to gain in Poland's relation with the West.

The United States and Poland have made good progress in resolving outstanding financial and economic problems. Over the past seven years the volume of trade has grown and there are good prospects for steady growth in the future.

Nondiscriminatory treatment for Poland products permits that country to earn dollars with which it can buy American goods and meet its substantial financial obligations to the United States Government and to private American citizens. Poland's payments on these obligations have reached almost $11 million annually and will increase to over $20 million in 1967. These debts include, among others, the obligations arising from the settlement of claims of United States nationals whose properties were nationalized in Poland, and the obligations to repay in dollars for previous purchases of surplus agricultural commodities under PL 480. Cutting off trade on the present nondiscriminatory basis would impair Poland's ability to meet these obligations.

As a consequence of the Polish events of 1956, Secretary of State Dulles determined, for purposes of section 107 of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (PL 480), that Poland was not a nation dominated or controlled by the foreign government or foreign organization controlling the world communist movement. Since that determination the United States has kept the Polish situation under close and continuing scrutiny. In November 1961 Secretary of State Rusk reaffirmed the determination of 1956. This is still our judgment today.

Conclusion

Continuation of nondiscriminatory trade treatment for the products of Yugoslavia and Poland is important to our national interest. The maintenance of commercial trade relations between the United States and these countries will further the objective of encouraging and promoting their independence from domination or control by international communism.

United States and Italy Discuss Air Relations

Joint Communique [1]

Delegations representing the Governments of the United States of America and of Italy met in Rome from March 9 to March 20, 1964, to consult on problems of mutual concern relating to air relations between the two countries and to interpretation of the Air Transport Services Agreement between the two countries. The United States Delegation was under the chairmanship of Mr. Allen Ferguson, Coordinator for International Aviation, Department of State, and the Italian Delegation was under the chairmanship of General Felice Santini, Director General of Civil Aviation, Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation.

The two Delegations confirmed their confidence in the development of air relations between the United States and Italy and in the continued growth of air traffic between the two countries. To this end each Delegation noted the suggestions expressed by the other and each agreed to submit them to its respective Government for the purpose of reaching resolution at an early date.

With respect to all-cargo services, the United States Delegation expressed its understanding that such services are governed by the Air Transport Agreement between the two countries, and the Italian Delegation expressed its understanding that all-cargo services are not included in that Agreement. Both Delegations agreed that the question was one of fundamental importance. Following the proposal of the United States Delegation, the Italian Delegation agreed to submit the question to arbitra-

[1] Released at Rome on Mar. 23.

tion, as provided in Article 12 of the Air Transport Agreement. The two Delegations agreed to an interim arrangement for prompt commencement of scheduled all-cargo jet services pending the outcome of the arbitration, to be operated through eight jet all-cargo services per week, of which up to four may be operated by the designated airlines of the United States and up to four by the designated airline of Italy.

The two Delegations expressed their appreciation of the usefulness of their full, free and friendly exchange of views on matters of common concern in the civil aviation field, and looked forward to a further meeting in the near future.

Equal Employment Opportunity

Remarks by Secretary Rusk [1]

Once again it is my pleasure to welcome you to the Department and to see a considerable number of friends among you. A great many changes have taken place in the 2½ years since we last met in this room. A courageous President has passed from our midst, and another President has taken the reins and is pushing ahead with our hopes and aspirations and established policies in the entire field of civil rights and fair employment.

Abroad we have faced and continue to face the enemies of peace and freedom. At home we are closer to a civil rights bill than ever seemed possible even a year ago. And we hope that with the passage of this civil rights bill our Negro citizens will come closer to their full heritage guaranteed them under our Constitution. I continue to say to my friends in the Congress that the most important single thing that they can do to assist us in foreign policy is to pass that civil rights bill that is now before them—although that is not the principal reason why that bill should be passed.

You may recall that 2½ years ago I said that the biggest single burden we carry on our backs in our foreign relations in the 1960's is this problem of discrimination here at home, and today I would have to say again that discrimination at home is still our biggest burden.

In July I appeared before the Senate Commerce Committee [2] and had an opportunity to speak of the relationship of discrimination at home to our foreign policy. I said that "racial discrimination . . . has important effects on our foreign relations. . . . the United States is widely regarded as the home of democracy and the leader of the struggle for freedom, for human rights, for human dignity. We are expected to be the model—no higher compliment could be paid to us."

In a way, the Department of State bears an even greater responsibility than any other agency of government to practice at home what it preaches to the world. We have been trying to live up to this responsibility.

Let us take a look at the picture here in the Department. What progress can we report to you over the past 2½ years? How have we carried out the recommendations you made to us on your last visit here?

You know, as well as I do, that you can do almost anything with statistics. For example, I could tell you that, since January 1961, there has been a 130-percent increase in the number of Negro Foreign Service officers. And there has been a 112 percent increase in Negro civil servants at the GS–9 to –18 level. Looking at percentages, we may look good, but the actual figures show a different correlation when they are put side by side against total employment in the Department. For example, in January 1961, there were 20 Negro Foreign Service officers. Today there are 50 against a total figure of some 3,800 Foreign Service officers, and about the same is true on the civil service side. In 1961, there were 25 Negro officers, grades 9 to 18. Today there are 58, but against a total figure of 1,750.

One important indication is the increasing number of higher level positions being held by Negro officers. Two and one-half years ago when we met, there were two Negro ambas-

[1] Made at a conference on equal employment opportunity at the Department of State on Mar. 12 (press release 120 dated Mar. 16). For a report on the meeting, see press release 117 dated Mar. 16.

[2] BULLETIN of July 29, 1963, p. 154.

sadors. We gained one, as you know, since then, and recently lost him to the United States Information Agency. I wish I could give you the names of the Negro ambassadors and other high-level Negroes who are being considered for appointment by President Johnson, but I cannot do so at this time. I also wish I could give you the names of some of those who were invited to serve but felt unable to do so. There are now two Deputy Assistant Secretaries, one Deputy Chief of Mission, a principal officer in charge of a consulate, two lawyers (both of whom are women), two security officers, plus many more, but this will give you at least some idea of the progress in this area.

But going back to comparative statistics, I can tell you that there are more Negro officers in higher paying positions in the Department of State than in any other agency of the government. But, quite frankly, that isn't itself good enough. There are now 10 Negro officers at the GS–16 level and above. Our closest competitor in this is our sister agency, the Agency for International Development.

You will recall that I told you at our last meeting how important personal contact is, how important it is for a "circle of gossip" to pass along the names of candidates for the foreign affairs field. We still need this kind of help if we are to show greater intake at the middle and senior levels.

We also have to keep in mind the timelag between finding people who are able and willing to take jobs in the foreign affairs field—and I emphasize both *able* and *willing*—and their actual entrance on duty. The selection, processing, and placement functions all take time, but I do believe we are well along in our campaign to increase the intake of top Negroes into the Department. It is relevant in this matter of timelag, for example, for you to know that every post in the Department of State is rated a sensitive post. This is because every important foreign office is a target for penetration by other governments. Now, the general average of sensitive posts around government is between 5 and 10 percent. Here we are 100 percent. Now, that means that we have to have the fullest background investigation, and this means delays of several months sometimes between our desire to appoint someone and their actual entry on duty, and that applies of course to all of our employees and not just to any one particular group.

Now let us look at the intake at the entrant level into the Foreign Service. In the past 12 months, three young Negro Foreign Service career officers have entered on duty. One of them is our second Negro woman in the Foreign Service. As our examining panels are in the field right now, we don't know yet how many Negro officers may enter the career corps this year as a result of the 1963 examination. We have been, as you know, trying to increase our recruitment, but we do have the problem of successful completion of the examination.

One of our main problems has been that the number of Negroes seeking positions in the State Department by means of the Foreign Service entrance examination is relatively small. Out of 3,815 candidates who took the exam in 1961, only 119 of these were Negroes. In 1962, 110 Negroes took the exam out of almost 3,000 candidates.

I am concerned that many young Negroes with potential for outstanding Foreign Service careers, who might well welcome the chance to serve their country abroad, do not seek entrance to the State Department by means of this open, competitive examination. And one of the things that you could do that would be very helpful to us is to help us overcome the relative lack of attraction of the Foreign Service for able young Negroes. If equal opportunity is to mean fair representation at all levels of the Department, it is essential that more Negroes apply for positions in this way.

As you know, we have great hopes for the success of the Foreign Affairs Scholars Program which is under way now with a grant of $600,000 from the Ford Foundation.[3] I see Dr. Vincent Browne here, and I know he plans to give you a full report on the progress he is making. But briefly I want to say that, out of this program, some 160 minority group youngsters will be benefited by the experience of a summer internship in one of the foreign affairs agencies, and we hope that a high percentage

[3] For background, see *ibid.*, Oct. 28, 1963, p. 684.

of the 100 receiving graduate training will enter the foreign affairs agencies. We will not of course know the full effects of this program immediately, but the Department, and the government service, and the public, all stand to gain very substantially from it, and we would be very much interested in your comments on this program as it will be discussed during your meeting.

Among the briefing materials given you is a report on progress made on your recommendations of 2½ years ago. Your cooperation has been splendid. We could not possibly have achieved these results without your help and your constant encouragement. I am sure you will all have some comments to make during the discussion on these recommendations.

Now, what more should we be doing to bring about better representation? We know we have not exhausted the talent available to us, but somehow we are not connecting with all of it. I hope you are going to be able to help us today in this area.

Let me say just a few words on equal employment opportunity for another group that has been called a minority group, although they are very much the majority, and that is the women. As you know, President Johnson has directed that steps be taken in every department and agency to open doors for the appointment of women, especially to higher level positions. It is a source of satisfaction to us—though not complacency—that the State Department, including the Foreign Service, has the highest number of women in the top grades of any agency of our government. We are eager to increase the number of women Foreign Service officers and to that end are encouraging more women to take the Foreign Service entrance examination. We lose a good many of them, chiefly to men, but nevertheless we have some very distinguished members of the Foreign Service who are women and the opportunities there are very large. In the last 2½ years, of the 473 junior officers brought into the Foreign Service, 10 percent were women. It is my hope—although I am fearful of any numerical quotas for anyone—it is my hope that in the coming years the percentage of Negro and other minority group candidates who are appointed will be at least as good.

In summary, I want you to know how pleased we are to have you here in the Department once again. I hope you will be completely frank in your conversations today. And I want you to know that we welcome your comments and your criticisms and your suggestions. I am sorry that I can't spend the rest of the day with you. But this morning I must go to a requiem mass for the King of Greece. I know that Under Secretary Ball is going to speak at your luncheon today and that Mr. Crockett [William J. Crockett, Deputy Under Secretary for Administration] will be with you during the course of the day.

So we want to close by expressing appreciation to you for the time you are giving us and to assure you that we have the liveliest and keenest interest in equal employment opportunity in the Department of State, that we are constantly on the search for talent and that we know that talent can come from any quarter, that we have the most demanding jobs to offer that one can find, I suspect, anywhere in the world, that the stakes of success in our business are very high, and that there are great satisfactions in that service for young people who want to dedicate themselves to their country and derive some sense of contributing in the most fundamental way to the well-being of mankind and to the success and the prosperity of our own and other peoples.

So thank you very much for coming, and I will be watching with the greatest of interest the results of your conversations and will certainly take into the fullest possible account the suggestions and recommendations which you make in the course of your discussions.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

88th Congress, 2d Session

Duty on Alumina and Bauxite. Report to accompany H.R. 9311. H. Rept. 1278. March 24, 1964. 3 pp.

Tax on Light Bulbs Imported in Sets. Report to accompany H.R. 2855. H. Rept. 1291. March 24, 1964. 3 pp.

Foreign Policy Needs People—Including You

Remarks by William J. Crockett
Deputy Under Secretary for Administration[1]

However perplexing the problems of foreign policy, whatever our goals may be, whatever the party in power, our policy cannot succeed without involving the efforts of capable, dedicated people.

It takes such people to put a policy into effect, to judge its success, to assess its weakness, to alert us to pitfalls ahead, to evaluate the intentions of our friends as well as our enemies, and to make recommendations as to what policy will best serve America. This kind of responsibility takes good people—trained people, courageous people, loyal people, people who hold the United States interest above all else.

The men and women who serve you around the world in your Foreign Service Corps are among the best in the world. They are representative of our country—geographically, socially, culturally, educationally, ethnically, and economically.

We strive to attract to this service the best young men that our society produces. Our entrance standards are tough—tough intellectually, tough physically, and tough by moral standards. From more than 8,000 applicants this year we shall finally take less than 200 into the service of your country. We are selective.

We want people who can speak languages, who have the knack of getting along with other kinds of people, and who will represent America faithfully—often in strange and even unfriendly lands, with risks to health and to life itself. We do not want security risks or persons disloyal to America. We have a rigorous security program designed to insure that your national interests are in safe hands. You are being well served—ably served, loyally served—by the finest and most dedicated corps of men and women ever assembled in one group.

Finally there is you, the American citizen. How can you help with our foreign policy problems? What can one man or one community do?

We are a government "of the people, by the people, for the people." This means that all decisions ultimately must pass the test of public acceptance. You elect a House of Representatives and one-third of the Senate every 2 years, and a President every 4. Exercise your responsibilities as citizens. Be well informed—accurately informed—and then vote for the candidates of your choice; but do it to serve one simple purpose—what is best for America!

Although the President and his executive branch are the initiators and negotiators of policy, they can go only so far as you will.

There is an even more intimate involvement between the individual citizen and foreign policy. It has been said that how we dispose of our affairs at home can decide elections, but how we dispose of our relations with the rest of the world can decide the survival of mankind. In a larger sense, how we as individual citizens dispose of our affairs at home will also decide how the world will dispose of its problems—including the survival of mankind.

As we look about our great country with its beautiful cities, its wonderful highways, its productive farms, its mountains and forests and rivers, its educational institutions, we can be justly proud. Bnt if we look closer, we see widespread unemployment, young people dropping out of school before they have acquired the skills with which to earn a decent living, juvenile delinquency, and dismal slums. We see polluted streams and other natural resources ruined forever by our greed. We see a whole people—a people of a different color—who have been denied the fruits of the democracy and justice we proclaim so loudly. No, we don't believe in segregation, but—

Each day we hear, or see in print, words of hatred and bigotry and half-truth that cast doubt upon the honesty, the loyalty, and the competence of those who represent us in positions of leadership. "The Congress is no good"—"the executive branch can't be trusted"—"the Supreme Court has betrayed us." So runs the evil theme. Ah yes, America has many unsolved problems!

What does all this have to do with foreign policy? Why do we have to insure the proper settling of these problems to insure the final victory over communism?

Because a strong America is the only kind that can survive and influence the affairs of the world. The world's judgment of America is as harsh as the judgment of your own conscience. Every American citizen must personally assume responsibility for making America really what we proclaim it to be.

Working on these problems, personally and as a part of the community, is what you can do for your country. It places you shoulder to shoulder with the men and women who are working for American interests around the world.

[1] Made at the conclusion of an address before the 1964 Greater Hastings Dinner at Hastings, Nebr., on Jan. 20.

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings [1]

Adjourned During March 1964

U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights: 20th Session	New York	Feb. 17–Mar. 18
U.N. Economic Commission for Africa: 6th Session	Addis Ababa	Feb. 19–Mar. 2
U.N. Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation: 13th Session.	Geneva	Feb. 24–Mar. 4
IA-ECOSOC Special Committee on Latin American Coordination.	Alta Gracia, Argentina	Feb. 24–Mar. 7
GATT Contracting Parties: 21st Session	Geneva	Feb. 24–Mar. 20
IAEA Board of Governors	Vienna	Feb. 25–Mar. 6
U.N. ECOSOC Advisory Committee on the Application of Science and Technology to Development.	New York	Feb. 25–Mar. 6
OECD Special Committee for Iron and Steel	Paris	Mar. 2 (1 day)
International Coffee Council: Executive Board	London	Mar. 2–5
IMCO Subcommittee on Tonnage Measurement: 4th Session.	London	Mar. 2–6
U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East: 20th Session.	Tehran	Mar. 2–17
U.N. ECOSOC Committee on Industrial Development: 4th Session.	New York	Mar. 2–19
OECD Committee for Scientific and Technical Personnel	Paris	Mar. 3–6
UNESCO Intergovernmental Advisory Committee of the Major Project on the Extension and Improvement of Primary Education in Latin America: 5th Session.	Brasilia	Mar. 3–6
Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission: 5th Meeting	Valparaiso	Mar. 3–7
FAO Working Parties on Rice Production and Protection; on Rice Soils, Water, and Fertilizer Practices; and on Agricultural Engineering Aspects of Rice Production, Storage, and Processing.	Manila	Mar. 3–14
17th World Health Assembly	Geneva	Mar. 3–21
U.N. ECOSOC Committee on Nongovernmental Organizations.	New York	Mar. 9 (1 day)
U.N. *Ad Hoc* Tungsten Committee: Technical Working Group.	New York	Mar. 9–10
UNESCO Conference on the Planning and Organization of Literacy Programs in Africa.	Abidjan	Mar. 9–14
U.N. Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: Legal Subcommittee.	Geneva	Mar. 9–26
OECD Pulp and Paper Committee: Statistical Working Party.	Paris	Mar. 16–17
Caribbean Organization: 4th Meeting of Standing Advisory Committee of the Caribbean Plan.	St. Thomas	Mar. 16–18
NATO Petroleum Planning Committee	Paris	Mar. 16–18
U.N. ECE Working Party on Construction of Vehicles	Geneva	Mar. 16–20
Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences: 9th Meeting of Technical Advisory Council, and 3d Meeting of Board of Directors.	Montevideo	Mar. 16–22
UNESCO Governmental Experts on the Preparation of a Draft Recommendation Concerning the International Standardization of Statistics Relating to Book and Periodical Production.	Paris	Mar. 16–25
OECD Manpower and Social Affairs Committee	Paris	Mar. 17–19
GATT Trade Negotiations Committee: Group on Cereals	Geneva	Mar. 17–20
UNESCO Conference of Ministers of Education of African Countries.	Abidjan	Mar. 17–24
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission: 16th Annual Meeting.	San Diego	Mar. 18–19

[1] Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Apr. 2, 1964. Following is a list of abbreviations: ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; IA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

Adjourned During March 1964—*Continued*

OECD Development Assistance Committee	Paris	Mar. 19–20
OECD Committee for Agriculture: Working Party I (Agricultural Policies).	Paris	Mar. 19–21
U.N. *Ad Hoc* Tungsten Committee	New York	Mar. 23–25
GATT Trade Negotiations Committee: Subcommittee on Agriculture.	Geneva	Mar. 23–25
NATO Civil Aviation Planning Committee	Paris	Mar. 23–25
OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party IV (Expert Group).	Paris	Mar. 23–25
U.N. ECE Steel Committee: 31st Session (and *Ad Hoc* Group of Experts on the Competitive Use of Steel).	Geneva	Mar. 23–26
UNESCO Executive Committee for the Preservation of the Nubian Monuments.	Paris	Mar. 23–27
FAO European Commission for the Control of Foot-and-Mouth Disease: 11th Session.	Rome	Mar. 24–26
OECD *Ad Hoc* Committee on Social Sciences	Paris	Mar. 25 (1 day)

In Session as of March 31, 1964

Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament	Geneva	Mar. 14, 1962–
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development	Geneva	Mar. 23, 1964–

Common Problems of Industrial and Developing Countries

Statement by Under Secretary Ball[1]

Within the past few years the world has focused great attention on the relations between what we have come to call the developed and the developing nations. There has been a wide acceptance of the proposition that 20th-century concepts of humanity require that all the world's peoples have the opportunity to secure a decent standard of living. There has also been recognition of the fact that, until this goal is secured, the world will not attain the stability essential to the maintenance of peace.

The tasks of development are familiar to all nations, no matter what may be their average levels of income. In the United States, for example, within this generation we have seen the development of a substantial part of our South, many of whose problems approximated those of the developing nations. And, as you know, President Johnson has launched a comprehensive program to push back the margins of poverty which still remain in the United States. But it is a major achievement of the postwar years that we have all come to accept the problem of economic development as a matter of international interest and obligation.

We have had many conferences to discuss separate aspects of this general subject. This Conference is, I think, unique. It is organized on a world scale, and it is addressed to the whole problem in its full dimensions.

The general frame of our discussions in the next few weeks must inevitably be the relations between the industrial and the developing countries, but this Conference should reduce those

[1] Made before the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development at Geneva, Switzerland, on Mar. 25 (press release 133). For an announcement of the U.S. delegation to the Conference, which convened at Geneva on Mar. 23, see BULLETIN of Apr. 6, 1964, p. 557; for an address by Assistant Secretary G. Griffith Johnson entitled "A Perspective on the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development," see *ibid.*, Mar. 16, 1964, p. 410.

relations to practical terms. It should consider all of the means by which the developing countries can obtain capital—and particularly foreign exchange—necessary for development, whether through the transfer of public resources in the form of foreign aid, through external private investment, through the enlargement of internal markets, or through the expansion of external trade. And all of these questions must be considered in the context of a world environment that is compatible with our larger objectives.

In the careful and imaginative papers that have been drafted in preparation for this Conference, the problem facing the developing countries has been expressed in terms of a trade gap. I think none of us—least of all, our distinguished Secretary General [Raúl Prebisch]—believes in a mechanistic approach to this question. I am sure he would agree with me that the trade gap should be regarded not so much as an arithmetical statement but as a figure of speech broadly suggesting the scale and the challenge of the problem of development.

I know he would agree also that there are no single or easy or even independent solutions to this problem. It is the responsibility of this Conference to consider all the feasible ways of expanding our efforts in all relevant fields.

Of necessity, therefore, the Conference must grapple with a series of interdependent issues. It is altogether proper that the major focus for this Conference should be on the means for making trade a more effective instrument for development. But these possibilities cannot be considered in isolation. We must also explore the means of increasing and making more effective use of the flow of foreign capital and technical assistance—both public and private; the economic merits of forming or expanding regional economic groupings; and generally the full range of internal policies that are critical to the mobilization and use of capital and that will necessarily shape the contribution that the external environment can make to development.

Given the magnitude of the development problem, there is ample room for imagination and fresh ideas. At the same time, we must be wary of approaches that do not closely reflect the economic or political realities—approaches that begin and end in discussion and thus obscure the actions really needed for progress.

The representatives of my country are here to participate in the full and responsible discussion of all the relevant problems, problem by problem and policy by policy. Since the end of World War II, we Americans have been greatly preoccupied with the task of creating better economic conditions in the world. This preoccupation has been manifest in our trade policies, in our economic and technical assistance programs, in our Food for Peace program, and in the Peace Corps.

I am not here, however, to point out the merits of the policies my Government has followed. We have a great deal of business to do together in the weeks ahead, and I hope that we will all set aside the temptation to file self-serving briefs that consume the time of the Conference without advancing its objectives. Our problems lie ahead of us—not behind us.

It is in this spirit that I wish to comment briefly on the broad questions before the Conference—not as separate issues but in terms of how they fit into the requirements for an effective development strategy.

Responsibilities of Industrial Countries

I shall begin with the central assumption of this meeting—an assumption in which, I am sure, we all concur—that if the developing countries are to achieve self-sustaining growth, they must be able to earn a growing volume of foreign exchange in world markets. To do this, they must develop expanding markets for their raw materials at reasonably stable and equitable prices. They must also find growing world outlets for the products of their nascent manufacturing industries. This will not happen automatically. The expansion of trading opportunities involves difficult problems of policy and decision for both the industrial countries and the developing countries.

Let me begin by reviewing the contributions that the industrial countries can make to the trade prospects of the developing countries and, at the same time, to the more effective use of world resources which expanding trade can promote.

President Pledges U.S. Cooperation in Task of Economic Improvement

Message From President Johnson[1]

White House press release dated March 25

The great task of our time is to bring the fruits of economic well-being to all peoples in a world of peace and freedom. The nations of the world have gathered in Geneva for the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development to discuss together how to move ahead in accomplishing this task. On behalf of the people and Government of the United States of America, I hereby pledge our strongest cooperation in this great joint endeavor.

[1] Read before the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development at Geneva on Mar. 25 by Under Secretary of State George W. Ball.

First, and in my view most important, is the need for industrial countries to achieve and maintain full employment and a high rate of economic growth. These conditions will improve both demand and prices for the exports of the developing countries. For example, sustained economic recovery in the United States and Canada and continued high growth in Western Europe and Japan were largely responsible for the recent sharp turnaround in prices for industrial materials. They also contributed to a stronger market for some tropical products. This improvement in demand and prices, if sustained, will make a difference of at least $1 billion on an annual basis in the export earnings of the developing countries.

Full employment in the industrial countries is also necessary to create a favorable climate for the structural readjustments that accompany trade liberalization. We must devise ways and means of cushioning sudden and sharp disruptions in the markets of importing countries. On the basic issues, however, we in the industrial countries need more education in trade—both to deflate the mythology that still surrounds competition from the so-called low-wage countries and to produce a better understanding of the large potential for gains from freer trade. Such education can best be conducted in an atmosphere of full employment.

Second, the industrial countries as a group must be prepared to reduce tariffs and other barriers to the imports of primary products, semiprocessed materials, and manufactured goods of special interest to the developing countries. The industrial countries have done much in recent years to reduce these barriers. More can be achieved by deep, across-the-board tariff cuts in the Kennedy Round, and we are prepared to have these benefits accorded to the developing countries without asking reciprocity. Such tariff cuts can be of immediate help to the developing countries. But even more important, they can provide an environment that will make it possible for them to build productive export industries. It is at this point that the present Conference and the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] Conference, which is to follow, so strongly complement each other.

Third, the industrial countries should be prepared to cooperate, wherever and whenever feasible, in perfecting arrangements that would reduce instabilities associated with trade in commodities and thus enhance development.

We have made some progress in cushioning the effects of fluctuations in commodity prices through the new drawing rights in the International Monetary Fund.

We also support efforts to stabilize prices of specific commodities in chronic oversupply at levels consistent both with market forces and development requirements. These problems can be usefully approached only on a commodity-by-commodity basis, and the arrangements we work out must be designed both to deal with the underlying supply imbalances and to promote development. There is no grand design for the myriad of individual commodity situations and problems. We should frankly recognize that such agreements, important as they may be for some commodities, are feasible for only a small number.

Principles of Nondiscriminatory Trade

These lines of action all stem from the responsibilities and obligations of a multilateral and nondiscriminatory trading system. We have worked throughout the postwar period to try to build such an open trading society in the

conviction that it would promote a rational and effective use of the world's resources, that it would benefit all participants in world trade, and that it would be most fully responsive to the constantly changing conditions of a dynamic trading world.

We still hold this conviction. We believe that the principle of nondiscrimination has great inherent values, that proposals to depart from that principle should be rigorously scrutinized, and that we should encourage such departures only where the case for doing so is strong and fully proven.

During the period of preparation for this Conference, there has been considerable discussion of various forms of preferential tariff arrangements designed to benefit the developing nations. Proposals have also been put forward for the organization of regional or global markets for the products of these countries. As I mentioned earlier, the United States believes that we should objectively examine any proposals that might contribute to development. But we must all be quite sure that proposals are defined with sufficient precision so that there is no misunderstanding as to their meaning. This is essential if their implications are to be fully comprehended and thoughtfully considered.

We must be sure also that such proposals will not create more problems than they solve. In other words, we must satisfy ourselves that they will produce significant economic benefits for at least some countries and that those benefits will outweigh the costs to all countries of departing from the principles of nondiscriminatory trade.

With respect to preferential arrangements, for example, we must be clear whether a proposal is global or regional in character—whether it contemplates an application to all countries or only to specific countries or groups of countries.

In the postwar world there have been two competing concepts as to how the industrial and developing countries might most usefully organize their relations. In principle, my Government has assumed that all industrial countries should accept a responsibility to advance the economic well-being of all developing countries. But the view has also been advanced—sometimes more by way of emphasis than as an assertion of discrete principle—that it would be better to organize these relationships on the basis of special responsibilities between individual industrial countries or groups of countries and individual developing countries or groups of countries.

I do not think that we can fully resolve this major conceptual question in the course of this Conference. But I do feel that, in discussing proposals for special trading relationships between the industrial and developing countries, we must be quite clear whether they fall within one pattern or the other. Moreover, we should conduct our discussions during the coming weeks in full awareness that special trading arrangements have historically evolved in the context of special political relationships and that special responsibilities in the area of trade are likely to carry with them special responsibilities in the areas of politics and even of defense.

I do not make these points to support either one approach or the other but rather to point out that serious departures from the principles of nondiscriminatory trade—particularly in relation to trading arrangements between the industrial and the developing countries—inevitably involve the question as to how key relations among nations should be organized.

Improving Home Markets

I have mentioned certain measures that industrial countries can take to improve access to their markets and to expand their demand for imports from the developing countries. Simply stated, the more access, the more trade—and the United States strongly favors lower tariffs and greater market access.

But tariffs have become less of a barrier to exports, and this will be true all the more after the Kennedy Round. To exploit the opportunities that stem from greater market access for their manufactures, the developing countries must be able to compete not merely with other exporting countries but with the domestic industries of the importing countries.

It is essential, therefore, for the developing countries to market their manufactures on a competitive basis. This, in turn, will often de-

pend on their ability to develop mass national markets—or, where necessary, regional markets.

It is in such markets that the economies of scale originate. This fundamental point is well documented in the history of countries going through the process of development. Apart from a very few special cases, manufactures have been sold massively abroad only after they have been produced for an extensive market at home.

Under these circumstances, we might all give more consideration and support to ways of expanding internal markets in the developing countries. In most cases this will require actions in both the rural and urban areas and the use, in combination, of private and public capital—domestic and foreign.

In rural areas higher priority might well be accorded to raising agricultural productivity and modernizing systems of marketing. In urban areas more could be done to break away from the traditional and restrictive marketing patterns that characterize many of the narrowly based industries in the developing countries and to aim at larger scale and lower cost production for the home market.

These two lines of action could reinforce each other and result in a rise in productivity, a reduction in costs, and an increase in demand. In these ways production for a large domestic market could help the developing countries produce and sell manufactured goods competitively on the world market.

Economic Cooperation on Regional Basis

Many countries, of course, are too small to provide domestic mass markets. The benefits of such a market may be achieved by economic cooperation on a regional basis.

Unquestionably the postwar dismantling of colonial arrangements and the birth of 51 new countries has involved some serious economic costs. As our Secretary General has pointed out, nearly 100 of the nations represented at this Conference have populations of less than 15 million. Of these, two-thirds have populations of less than 5 million.

The integration of national markets into regional markets offers possibilities for recouping these economic costs—and much more. Manufacturing industries based on the larger internal needs of a regional market will reach a competitive position in international markets much earlier and much more effectively.

The United States supports further efforts in this field. We favor changing the GATT rules to give developing countries more flexibility to pursue various forms of economic integration—partial or comprehensive. But the industrial countries should continue to be subject to strict standards in this regard.

This is, in other words, a case where special trade preferences among groups of developing countries could make a contribution to economic growth large enough to outweigh the costs of a departure from nondiscriminatory trading principles.

But let us have no illusions as to the underlying requirement for real progress through integration. The economic advantages of such a course depend on the degree to which competitive principles are permitted to guide the use and movement of labor, capital, and materials within an economic union or trading group. This requires that the participating nations put aside considerations of political prestige and advantage and that they commit themselves from the outset to a full line of action. Thus, each step forward will make it that much more difficult to reverse the entire process.

Need for Private Foreign Investment

When we talk of a development gap, we are talking in large measure of the need of the developing countries to be able to draw on greater capital resources for investment. Part of these capital resources must be used to finance the import of equipment and other materials from abroad. All these capital resources are required to enable a nation to use its human and material resources more effectively and to gain access to the benefits of the constantly widening revolution in technology.

Private foreign investment can itself provide a major source of such capital. In addition, it can stimulate the mobilization of domestic capital in the developing countries. Finally, it normally brings with it technological skills and a knowledge of foreign markets that can

facilitate the efforts of developing countries to expand their export industries.

However, the data on the flow of private investment in recent years are very disturbing. In 1956 the net flow of private capital from all member countries of the Development Assistance Committee to the developing countries amounted to $2.4 billion, or 43 percent of the total flow of foreign capital moving to those countries. By 1962 the contribution of private capital was still $2.4 billion, but it represented only 29 percent of the total capital flow.

Over the past two or three decades standards of conduct in international business have undergone drastic change for the better. Yet many developing countries are, I fear, still influenced by the cliches of the past. Would it not be useful to examine carefully the experience of countries that have been attracting a flow of private foreign investment? Would it not also be useful to study the new techniques, new attitudes, and new procedures that have arisen in this field in response to the conditions of this century?

In raising these questions I do not wish to be misunderstood. My country, while itself committed to free enterprise, does not seek to dictate the form or shape of the economic systems of others. I recognize that there are internal political and emotional pressures that may create opposition to the investment of external capital in many countries. I am well aware of differences in conditions and outlook among the nations of the world that require diversity in business as well as in other forms of social organization. I am aware also that even the facilities and organizational modes for providing such capital require adjustment to changing conditions. They have evolved in the past, and further evolution is in progress.

But nations must make their choices of national policy with full awareness of inescapable economic facts. Nations that elect to pursue policies that tend to eliminate the private sector or discriminate against outside investment should be aware that they are denying themselves a source of capital that could otherwise greatly speed their own economic development.

I suggest, therefore, that in the course of these proceedings we reexamine the possibilities of expanding the flow of external private investment capital.

Private capital admittedly cannot be more than one element in an interrelated approach to development. Yet, with regard to this question as to so many others, the developing countries have it within their own hands to determine how fast they will move in achieving growth. Their attitudes and their laws and their procedures will, in most cases, determine whether the flow of external private capital and technology takes place. Experience gives us no limits on how far the process can carry.

Role of Foreign Aid

I turn finally to the question of foreign aid—bilateral and multilateral. Clearly this is neither the least important nor the residual element in the package. But economic assistance is made more—or less—effective by what happens in the other fields we have discussed.

My Government believes that foreign aid should assist developing countries with a supplemental source of capital. This capital can contribute to development in the following specific ways:

First, as a supplemental source of long-term capital for certain projects that will not produce immediate returns but which are a necessary base for other projects and a stimulant to the development process as a whole;

Second, as a source of capital to finance imports of materials and equipment that could otherwise become serious production bottlenecks in a situation of foreign exchange stringency;

Third, as a source of seed capital that can stimulate the mobilization and effective use of capital from internal sources.

We believe, in short, that foreign aid will play an essential role if it exercises the catalytic effect it is designed to produce. This, in turn, will depend on cooperation between donor and recipient countries.

We are looking forward to an extensive and frank discussion at the Conference of the requirements for aid and the functions aid can perform. At this point such a discussion could serve a healthy purpose. Almost without exception the industrial countries now command the resources that enable them to participate in

supplying foreign assistance. Yet more and more of the donor countries are becoming concerned over whether their efforts are producing the results for which they had hoped. In allocating capital assistance they sometimes find a shortage of what they consider to be soundly conceived projects. The developing countries, on the other hand, have now acquired the experience to speak with some assurance on how they themselves can contribute to the process.

A constructive exchange of views can resolve misunderstanding. It can lead to the time when industrial countries, in speaking of the need for self-help, and developing countries, in emphasizing their requirements for foreign capital, will not be talking at cross purposes. In fact, at the working level where development decisions are made from day to day, there is already a wider common basis of concepts, vocabulary, and experience than is generally understood. I believe this Conference can enlarge these understandings among us.

Collective Obligations and Responsibilities

There are, it seems to me, a few general comments that we should bear in mind during our discussions.

First, the economic growth of any nation is a mixture of interrelated elements. We can emphasize one element or another at this Conference, but it would be unwise for us to focus on any single element to the exclusion of the others.

Second, economic development should not be studied simply in terms of aggregates. It is a phenomenon of individual countries. It is not the summation on a world basis of unrequited needs but the reflection of individual country programs, carefully drawn up, faithfully executed, and reflecting a national purpose.

Third, economic development is an intricate and difficult process. It has proved difficult for the industrial countries who have gone through it in the past, and it will be so for the newer countries that are going through it now. The developing countries of today, however, have the advantages of today's technology and of close international cooperation. These advantages can accelerate the process of growth.

These three propositions could, I think, set the tone for the Conference. After all, this is no adversary proceeding between the industrial and developing countries. The distinction between the two groups is not a clear one, and the differences within the two groups are very large.

We are here to solve problems we accept as common problems—not to debate. We are here to draw nations standing at different points along the historic paths of growth closer together—not to divide them.

The progress of the developing countries requires the cooperation of all, and it is futile to test proposals on the assumption that what one gains the other must necessarily lose.

All of us—the industrial and developing countries—have unfilled aspirations at home. But we are also part of an interdependent world with collective obligations and responsibilities. We each have vested interests in the other's welfare.

My country believes strongly in this kind of interdependence and in these kinds of vested interests. We have been, and continue to be, committed to help those who wish to help themselves, and we undertake this commitment, as President Kennedy said in his inaugural address, for one reason only: "because it is right." [2]

Advisers Named to Delegation to U.N. Trade Conference

The Department of State announced on April 2 (press release 141) the designation of the following four public advisers to the U.S. delegation to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development:

Nathaniel Goldfinger, director of the Department of Research, AFL–CIO, Washington, D.C.

Mrs. Claire Giannini Hoffman, director of the Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association, San Francisco, Calif.

Orin Lehman, board chairman, Colgreen Broadcasting Group, and executive director of the Eleanor Roosevelt Memorial Foundation, New York, N.Y.

Bertrand Seidman, European economic representative of the AFL–CIO, Paris.

The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development opened at Geneva, Switzerland, March 23 and is scheduled to conclude on June 15.

[2] *Ibid.*, Feb. 6, 1961, p. 175.

U.S. Makes Proposals for Safeguards for Peaceful Nuclear Activities and for Bomber Destruction

Following are statements made before the Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva by Adrian S. Fisher, Deputy Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

STATEMENT OF MARCH 5

At present only a few countries can produce nuclear weapons. It is in the interest of all the world that their number not be increased.

An increasingly large number of countries have peaceful nuclear programs. It is in the interest of all that their number continue to increase.

However, without effective safeguards, the materials and technology which are acquired for peaceful uses of nuclear energy may be diverted to produce nuclear weapons. Unless effective safeguards are applied, what started out as a use of the atom for peace may turn into the development of the atom for war. Should this happen, the benefits to mankind which we hope to obtain by the wide uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes may be far overshadowed by the dangers resulting from the increase in the number of nations having the capacity to produce nuclear weapons. It is, therefore, of great importance that we create effective safeguards against this. To do so is not easy, but it is possible.

It is in that light that I should like to discuss today two of the proposals contained in the fifth point of President Johnson's message to this Conference.[1]

The fifth point of the President's message calls for an agreement:

> . . . that all transfers of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes take place under effective international safeguards. . . .

It also calls upon the major nuclear powers to:

> . . . accept in an increasing number of their peaceful nuclear activities the same inspection they recommend for other states. . . .

I should like, first, to review the major international activities and policies of the United States in the field of atomic energy. Against that background, I shall then develop further those two proposals in the President's message for international safeguards.

A series of agreements for cooperation provides the basic framework within which the United States participates in peaceful nuclear activities with other countries and international organizations. These include agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency and with various regional organizations active in the field. They also include bilateral agreements for cooperation with some 35 countries.

The nuclear materials which we have distributed abroad under agreements for cooperation are valued at approximately $82.5 million. Reactors and critical assemblies supplied by the United States are located in 24 countries. Each is subject to safeguards to insure against diversion of the materials or equipment to military uses. The system of safeguards applied bilaterally by the United States Government is administered by the United States Atomic Energy Commission.

The United States has also given its strong support to the development of an effective system of international safeguards by the Inter-

[1] For text, see BULLETIN of Feb. 10, 1964, p. 224; for a statement made by William C. Foster on Jan. 31 on President Johnson's proposal of a "verified freeze on the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles," see *ibid.*, Mar. 2, 1964, p. 350; for a statement made by Mr. Foster on Feb. 6 on the President's proposal to curb the spread of nuclear weapons, see *ibid.*, Mar. 9, 1964, p. 376.

national Atomic Energy Agency. The United States bilateral system is fully consistent with that IAEA system.

In recent years the IAEA has made significant progress toward the development of a comprehensive system of international safeguards. Agency safeguards for small reactors of less than 100,000 thermal kilowatts were adopted on 31 January 1961. Final action extending the system to large reactors of 100,000 thermal kilowatts or more was taken on 26 February 1964. That final decision of the Board of Governors of the IAEA was unanimous. In particular we welcome the cooperation of the Soviet Union in extending the Agency safeguards system.

We hope that in the future the IAEA will extend further its system of safeguards to cover fuel fabrication and chemical reprocessing facilities.

It is the policy of the United States to transfer the administration of safeguards under its existing bilateral agreements to the IAEA as rapidly as possible. In pursuance of this policy, the United States and Japan, for instance, have recently transferred to the IAEA responsibility for administering safeguards under their existing agreement for cooperation. The United States is currently negotiating additional transfers with a number of its other bilateral partners.

Some 2 years ago, the IAEA was also invited by the United States to apply Agency safeguards to several of its own smaller research and power reactors. Three reactors in the United States are at present being inspected by the IAEA. Two are research reactors located at Brookhaven, New York; the third is a 45,500-thermal-kilowatt power reactor located in Ohio. The opening of these facilities to IAEA inspection has, we believe, been a step in developing the principle of safeguarding the peaceful uses of atomic energy. It has also assisted the IAEA in gaining practical experience in field-testing inspection techniques.

The United States does not believe that the opening of these reactors to international inspection is a derogation of its national sovereignty. Nor is the safeguard system onerous. It involves recordkeeping, reporting, and inspection—the same kind of controls as prudent management would naturally set up internally. For the purposes of a safeguard system, such controls must be checked and inspected by an external agency.

For the necessary external check, we prefer international to bilateral safeguards. There is little reason for any country to doubt the objectivity of inspections conducted by an international inspectorate in which nationals of a variety of countries participate.

I should now like to develop further the United States proposals regarding international safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities.

First, the United States proposes that all future transfers of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes take place under effective international safeguards. We believe that this proposal could be implemented by appropriate agreements, which would grow out of this Conference, covering all such future transfers. Fissionable materials or raw materials or equipment essential to the production of fissionable materials would be covered. Suppliers would agree to transfer materials and equipment only under IAEA safeguards or similar arrangements. Recipients would agree to receive materials or equipment only under such safeguarded arrangements. Provisions relating to open technology and authorized visits by scientists for study and observation might also be included.

We believe that the agreement regarding transfers should, in addition, provide for the extension of IAEA or similar safeguards to an increasing number of the peaceful-use facilities of all states receiving assistance.

Second, the United States proposes that the major nuclear powers accept in an increasing number of their own peaceful nuclear activities the same inspection as recommended for other states.

As a first step in that direction, the United States has already accepted IAEA safeguards on certain of its peaceful-use facilities, as I have described previously.

As a second step, the United States will invite the IAEA to apply safeguards to a large power reactor in the United States. The Yankee power reactor at Rowe, Massachusetts,

has been selected for this purpose. This privately owned reactor, which is rated at a power level of 600,000 thermal kilowatts, is one of the largest nuclear power reactors in operation in the United States. In 1963 it produced over 1 billion electrical kilowatt hours.

We are offering the Yankee reactor for IAEA inspection for two reasons. First, it will assist the IAEA further in developing and demonstrating the effectiveness of its inspection techniques for large reactor facilities. Second, we intend it as an example to other nuclear powers. We hope that other states will join us in this step and invite the application of IAEA safeguards on some of their large civil reactors; indeed, we urge them, and in particular we urge the Soviet Union, to do so.

Progress toward development of an effective system of international safeguards for peaceful nuclear activities is an important objective in itself. Therefore the United States will invite IAEA inspection of the Yankee reactor whether or not other states reciprocate. But, as I have said, we urge the Soviet Union in particular to reciprocate. If it should do so, we could then discuss the possibility that we might both place additional peaceful atomic energy installations under IAEA safeguards.

Some members of the Committee may wonder about the significance of these proposals as regards a slowing down of the arms race. Today I have talked about IAEA safeguards, not general and complete disarmament. I have talked of inspection of peaceful nuclear reactors instead of the destruction of armaments. Yet I believe that the proposals which the United States has put forward this morning could, if acted upon, produce one of the most significant developments of this Conference.

In the future, atomic energy will become an increasingly important resource for fulfilling man's daily needs. As that happens, transfers of nuclear materials between states for peaceful purposes will increase both in frequency and in size. Participation in atomic energy research and civil power programs will become more and more widespread.

It is of the utmost importance, therefore, to take the steps which will insure that these peaceful atomic energy activities are not diverted to military purposes. It is essential to build up the international safeguards which will keep that from happening.

If we do not, we shall find that in extending the benefits of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes we have not sown a field with choice seed which will ripen into a field of grain for the benefit of all mankind. We may find instead that we have sown the field with dragons' teeth and, when harvest comes, it will bristle with nuclear weapons. What the United States proposes are practical steps to keep that from happening.

STATEMENT OF MARCH 19

In our search for measures of common interest the United States has presented to this Conference a series of proposals which would in the first instance prevent the acceleration or extension of the arms race and would result eventually in a reversal of its course. Proposals such as those for a freeze of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear vehicles and a cutoff of the production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons embody this approach.

Today I should like to present to the Committee a proposal for the physical destruction of armaments. The arms we propose to destroy are of real significance. They are bomber aircraft which can carry weapons of immense destructive capability. Agreement on and implementation of this measure would present a graphic example of armament reduction to the entire world.

The United States proposes destruction by the United States and the Soviet Union of an equal number of B–47 and TU–16 bombers. We propose that this destruction be carried out at the rate of 20 per month on each side, the bombers to be taken from the operational inventory. We are prepared to continue destruction of these bombers at this rate for a period of 2 years. In addition, we are prepared to increase the total number destroyed by adding to the monthly quota an additional agreed number to be taken from bombers stored and preserved for emergency mobilization.

We are prepared to negotiate the manner in which this destruction will be verified. The verification should be relatively simple. It

should include no more than the observation of the destruction of the monthly quota of agreed bombers from each country at designated depots.

The B–47 bomber, which we are ready to destroy as our part of this agreement, is a truly formidable weapon. The B–47 is a six-engine jet bomber which can fly over 4,000 miles without refueling. With in-flight refueling, it is an intercontinental bomber. It can carry a multimegaton bomb load. We can gather some measure of the danger of our times by noting that the explosive yield from the bomb load of one B–47 is greater than that from all bombs dropped by all bombers in the Second World War.

As long as such bombers remain in existence in the hands of the nuclear powers—whether actually flying or stored so that they can easily be rendered flyable—they remain a substantial factor of military power. In the hands of nonnuclear powers—and used without nuclear weapons—these planes are no less a factor of military power. The B–47 is superior in many respects to any other bomber outside the forces of the United States and the Soviet Union.

The representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. [Semyon K.] Tsarapkin, summed it up last Thursday when he said of bomber aircraft: "They still are a powerful means for attack."

The United States and the Soviet Union are the possessors of the world's greatest military arsenals. That is particularly true with regard to nuclear delivery vehicles.

The B–47 and TU–16 bombers are logical armaments with which to start the process of physical destruction of arms. The United States and the Soviet Union possess roughly comparable numbers of those aircraft. The two types of aircraft have been assigned generally similar strategic roles. Thus, the balance in the overall force structure of the two sides would be maintained at the reduced levels resulting from their destruction. This, of course, is in keeping with the fifth principle in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles:[2] that measures of this kind should be balanced so that no state or group of states should gain a military advantage and that security should be insured equally for all.

The verification required would be simple. It would not involve areas of great sensitivity.

Some may argue that the destruction of B–47 and TU–16 bombers makes no real difference because the United States plans to phase out the B–47. The United States does have plans to phase B–47's out of its battle-ready forces. I assume the Soviet Union also has phaseout plans for the TU–16. But the phasing out of aircraft does not mean destruction. Bombers in storage can be flying again in short order.

What the United States is now proposing is to negotiate a rate of destruction which, if immediately implemented, would be significantly faster than the recent destruction rate. Moreover, phaseout plans are subject to reconsideration in the light of changing international circumstances. That has happened in the past; it could happen again. The United States is now proposing the actual physical destruction of an equal number of bombers on each side. Once actual physical destruction has been accomplished, the aircraft can no longer be returned to operational status.

I have already explained that the B–47 bomber is a truly formidable weapon. It makes a great deal of difference whether these bombers and the TU–16's are physically destroyed, as the United States proposes, or are retained in active forces, preserved for emergency mobilization, or transferred to third countries.

The United States, in the proposal which we are discussing today, and the Soviet Union, in its proposal of 28 January, have both dealt with the destruction of bomber aircraft. We should, therefore, be able to follow the directions given us by the eighth principle of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles and work out the widest possible area of agreement between us at the earliest possible date.

From the position which the Soviet Union has thus far put forward at this Conference we are not yet able to determine the extent and nature of the destruction of bombers it envisages; but that should be no obstacle to agreement on the United States proposal. Agreement on our proposal can be reached now, without involving us in the highly difficult issues raised by an all-encompassing plan.

[2] For text, see *ibid.*, Oct. 9, 1961, p. 589.

An agreement for the destruction of all bomber aircraft would raise a series of complex questions. For example, there is the question of the participating nations, not all of which might be able to agree to eliminate their bombers in the absence of alternative means of protecting themselves. Again, there is the matter of coverage: What would constitute a bomber for the purposes of such an agreement? There are many types of aircraft, both civil and military, which might be capable of carrying bombs, although we would not consider them as bombers and could not reasonably be expected to agree to their destruction. Perhaps the most serious question is the imbalance which would result from such a proposal. There are great differences among nations in the size, mission, and strategic role of the bomber fleet of each, and consequently great differences in the effects which the elimination of all bombers would have on national security.

The proposal of the United States makes it possible to get on promptly with the objective of the Soviet proposal—the physical destruction of bombers—without having to deal with those vexatious problems. The aircraft we propose to destroy would be included within any possible interpretation of the Soviet plan. Therefore the nations have everything to gain and nothing to lose by agreeing promptly to our proposal and by promptly putting the agreement into effect.

The proposal to destroy an equal number of B–47's and TU–16's, if acted upon, could be of real significance to this Conference.

First, it would provide a tangible reduction in one important category of the world's inventory of weapons. The advantages of that can be seen in relation to such broad measures as a freeze of strategic nuclear vehicles, where a reduction in bombers would mean freezing at an even lower level than would otherwise be possible.

Second, it would insure that the bombers destroyed could not be transferred to the armament inventories of other nations. That would impose an important restraint on the proliferation of highly sophisticated weapon systems. It would insure that the resources of other nations would not be diverted from the task of national development to maintaining and operating these costly weapons.

To summarize briefly what I have said, we propose that the United States and the Soviet Union agree to destroy an equal number of B–47 and TU–16 bombers on a one-for-one basis, at an agreed rate, with simple verification.

This proposal is only a step toward solving the problem of disarmament; but by taking it we can begin to reduce the destructive capability present in the world and lessen the dangers of its proliferation. We can take one more step toward reducing the nuclear threat which hangs over all mankind.

For those reasons we should surely carry on with this proposal and do so right away.

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.

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Letters regarding the Somali-Ethiopian border dispute:
- Representative of Somalia to the President of the Security Council requesting that the Security Council be convened. S/5536. February 10, 1964. 1 p.
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- Representative of Somalia to the President of the Security Council, transmitting a cable dated February 13, 1964, from the Prime Minister of Somalia, superseding the request for convening of the Security Council pending action by the Organization of African Unity. S/5542. February 14, 1964. 2 pp.
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Report by the Secretary-General on the organization and operation of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus. S/5593, March 12, 1964, 10 pp., and Add. 1, March 12, 1964, 1 p.

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MULTILATERAL

Automotive Traffic

Customs convention on temporary importation of private road vehicles. Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into force December 15, 1957. TIAS 3943.
Accession deposited: Algeria (with reservation), October 31, 1963.

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Accession deposited: Algeria (with reservations), October 31, 1963.

Consular Relations

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at Vienna April 24, 1963;[1]

Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on consular relations concerning the compulsory settlement of disputes. Done at Vienna April 24, 1963.[1]
Ratification deposited: Dominican Republic, March 4, 1964.

Cultural Relations

Agreement on the importation of educational, scientific, and cultural materials, and protocol. Done at Lake Success November 22, 1950. Entered into force May 21, 1952.[2]
Extension to: Cook Islands (including Niue), February 28, 1964.

Customs

International convention to facilitate the importation of commercial samples and advertising material. Done at Geneva November 7, 1952. Entered into force November 20, 1955; for the United States October 17, 1957. TIAS 3920.
Accession deposited: France, February 7, 1964.

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Optional protocol to Vienna convention on diplomatic relations concerning compulsory settlement of disputes. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961.[1]
Ratification deposited: Dominican Republic, February 13, 1964.

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Acceptance deposited: Zanzibar, February 29, 1964.

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Ratifications deposited: Uganda, April 2, 1964; Yugoslavia, April 3, 1964.

[1] Not in force.
[2] Not in force for the United States.

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Accession deposited: Madagascar, February 12, 1964.

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Dated at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into force October 21, 1950; for the United States February 2, 1956. TIAS 3364, 3362, 3363, and 3365, respectively.
Accession deposited: Nepal, February 7, 1964.

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BILATERAL

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Ivory Coast

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1701–1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at Abidjan March 10, 1964. Entered into force March 10, 1964.

Jamaica

Agreement concerning United States defense areas in the Federation of The West Indies, with annexes, memorandum of understanding, agreed minute and exchanges of notes. Signed at Port of Spain February 10, 1961. Entered into force February 10, 1961. TIAS 4734.
Terminated with respect to Jamaica: March 19, 1964.

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Terminated: March 18, 1964 (superseded by agreement of March 18, 1964, *supra*).

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†138	3/31	Williams: "New Patterns of African Trade."
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*140	4/1	Parking regulations for foreign diplomats.
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142	4/2	Stevenson: "The Anatomy of World Leadership."
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144	4/3	Continuation of trade concessions to Poland and Yugoslavia.

*Not printed.
†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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President Johnson reaffirmed United States support of the alliance and emphasized the various areas that require the full cooperation of the 20 American states in order to assure the program's success.

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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The Atlantic Alliance

Address by Secretary Rusk[1]

Sixteen years ago last Friday, the Economic Cooperation Act, authorizing the Marshall Plan, became law. Fifteen years ago last Saturday, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed.

You will recall the circumstances which led to these undertakings: the economic chaos in Europe resulting from the Second World War and the military threat resulting from Stalin's aggressive actions.

Having learned from painful experience the price of failing to act together, and in good time, to curb aggression, the free nations of the North Atlantic decided to concert their resources and their policies for their common welfare and protection. Both of these great enterprises accomplished their primary purposes.

The economic recovery of Europe has been achieved; present levels of productivity and prosperity are unprecedented in Europe's history.

The territorial integrity of every member of NATO has been preserved. And there has been no great war.

The NATO nations contain half a billion people, with the great skills accumulated over a long history. Their total output has about doubled in 15 years and now exceeds $1,100,000,000,000.

The members of NATO, together with the other economically advanced countries of the free world, account for roughly 60 percent of the world's total production. This is almost 2½ times the total production at the disposal of all the Communist nations. The average per capita income of these free-world nations is four times that of the Communist world.

Within this framework of security and prosperity, free Europe has moved toward unity. The ancient quarrel between Germany and France, which cost their peoples and the world so much in blood and treasure, has been mended. Three European Communities have been built, and their executives are being merged this year. Thus, new concepts of integration and new institutions have replaced the separate national

[1] Made before the Overseas Press Club of America at New York, N.Y., on Apr. 7 (press release 148).

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The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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actions and loose and ephemeral alliances of the past.

These are accomplishments which are sometimes so much taken for granted that their importance is underrated. Let's not forget where we stood 15 years ago, where we might well be today but for the Marshall Plan and NATO and the European Communities—or where we might be tomorrow should NATO relax its vigilance and the North Atlantic nations abandon the principle of collective action in facing new tasks.

As President Johnson said last Friday,[2] the North Atlantic alliance, "From the beginning . . . has aimed not simply at defense but . . . at the cooperative progress of all its members." Therefore, he said, we must "move onward to that closer partnership which is so plainly in our common interest."

Tonight I should like to discuss some of the specific tasks to which we think the North Atlantic nations should address their efforts.

Security in a Changing Environment

The first of these tasks is to maintain security in a changing environment. Dangerous issues between the Communist and free worlds remain unresolved. Although the Central European front remains quiet, massive Soviet ground and nuclear forces are still arrayed against Europe. In the absence of assured arrangements for the mutual reduction of arms, it would be foolhardy to dismantle the military strength of NATO. The task is rather to adapt that strength to a changing political and military environment. This means two things:

First: While maintaining our efforts to deter or defeat deliberate attack with every needed weapon, we should continue also to increase NATO's capability to cope with lesser forms of conflict—effectively and without automatic escalation to the type of conflict no one can rationally seek.

Second: There is a need to respond, in ways consistent with nonproliferation, to European desires for a responsible role in strategic nuclear deterrence.

Several hundred Soviet medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles are aimed at free Europe—many more missiles than are aimed at the United States. To cover some of these targets which threaten Europe, two successive NATO Supreme Commanders have proposed that MRBM's be deployed to the European area.

We believe that it makes more sense to put MRBM's thus deployed to the European area at sea, instead of in heavily populated European areas. One way of deploying sea-based MRBM's would be under procedures involving national Allied manning and ownership of the missile and bilateral United States–Allied control over the warhead's use. New nationally owned and manned strategic missile forces could, however, be divisive within the alliance and unsettling in terms of East–West relations.

If Allied forces are to participate in MRBM deployment, but not under national manning and ownership, the only remaining possibility is mixed manning and ownership.

These conclusions suggested the need for an imaginative breakthrough to a new pattern of ownership and control of medium-range nuclear weapons—a new pattern involving a greater degree of Allied integration than anything yet attempted.

This is the origin of the so-called multilateral missile fleet—or MLF [multilateral force]. Eight nations are now discussing this concept in a working group at Paris, where substantial and encouraging progress has been made.

The MLF will effectively discharge the task to which it is addressed. General [Lyman L.] Lemnitzer has said that its 200 well-protected MRBM's would be effective in covering some of the airfields and missiles threatening Europe. Indeed, its capabilities will be taken into full account in the development of future American forces, because we consider it a reliable component of overall NATO defense.

The MLF plan also would permit nations interested in this specific problem to move ahead, without requiring the participation of nations which do not wish to take part.

Furthermore, the plan follows the classic pattern of Atlantic partnership: The United States will be in the venture from the start, but the concept and structure of the force is such that Europe's role and influence can grow as more

[2] BULLETIN of Apr. 20, 1964, p. 606.

European countries join and as Europe moves toward unity.

The MLF is, of course, not the end of the process of bringing our allies closer together in the field of nuclear defense. From this first step, much could flow.

First, this truly integrated force will provide practical experience suggesting perhaps further applications—and even new ventures in Atlantic partnership.

Second, this venture is bound to give the participants a deeper insight into the responsibility and the problems that go with strategic nuclear weapons. In so doing, it should make possible improved interallied consultation about the use of strategic forces, toward which a good start was made in the arrangements agreed to at Ottawa last year.[3] And it should contribute to a common approach to the problems of disarmament.

Third, military integration may have important nonmilitary implications. Countries which join in owning, manning, and managing a major nuclear force are likely to find themselves drawn into increasingly intimate relations in a wide variety of ways.

Finally, let me emphasize this: We do not see security for anybody in a world of proliferating national weapons systems. The detailed arrangements for the MLF will include mutually agreed strong and enduring safeguards against any one nation's securing control of any of the MLF weapons. We believe that when the Soviet Government understands this, it will recognize that the MLF does not constitute a proliferation of national nuclear systems but, on the contrary, is an alternative to it.

These are important reasons why support for the MLF is the firm policy of President Johnson's administration, as it was of two previous U.S. administrations. They are reasons why we expect to move ahead vigorously with other interested countries in its execution. As President Johnson said at Brussels last November:[4]

> The movement to Atlantic partnership makes this possible. The movement to European unity makes this desirable—as a first step toward a greater European voice in nuclear matters.

Political Consultation Within NATO

We have never, however, considered the North Atlantic partnership as purely military—or as temporary or static.

The great goal of our foreign policy is a world in which both peace and freedom are secure. We regard the nations of free Europe as senior partners in this vast effort.

For various tasks, new patterns of collective action will be needed.

In the political field we have increasingly recognized the need for consultation about policies both toward the Communist nations and in other areas.

We continuously review together the changes that are occurring within the Communist world—the dispute between Peiping and Moscow, the trends toward more autonomy in Eastern Europe, the economic troubles of the Communist countries, the modest signs here and there of yearnings for more individual freedom. We must remain alert to opportunities for constructive action growing out of these changes.

We should not forget that the division of Germany is a continuing obstacle to permanent peace in Central Europe. A major task of our diplomacy should be to mitigate and eventually to eliminate this danger by moving toward German self-determination and unification. We believe that this can be done under terms which meet the legitimate security concerns of the Soviet Union and the smaller states of Eastern Europe.

We must try unceasingly to abate the perils of the arms race. We hope that the Soviet Union will agree to various safeguards against war from miscalculation or accident. We should like to see real progress in reducing armaments. We hope that the Soviets will make that possible by modifying their opposition to effective verification and inspection.

The North Atlantic nations should also deal cooperatively and effectively with Communist aggression and subversive threats—in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. I have in mind

[3] For text of a communique adopted by the North Atlantic Council on May 24, 1963, see *ibid.*, June 10, 1963, p. 895.

[4] *Ibid.*, Dec. 2, 1963, p. 852.

especially such countries as Laos and South Viet-Nam, which are targets of aggression by Hanoi, with the support of the Chinese Communists; and Cuba, which is engaged in the export of arms, subversive agents, and guerrilla leaders to other Latin American nations. We believe that the North Atlantic nations should recognize a common interest in seeing that these aggressions are brought to an end. They should also contribute, where they can, to the settlement of disputes within the non-Communist world.

I do not intend to lay out here a precise blueprint for improved political consultation within NATO. A great deal has been accomplished in that direction in the last 3 years. But more can be done to the mutual benefit of all concerned. I would suggest a few broad guidelines, which we are trying increasingly to follow.

Consultation should focus on specific problems and should include the countries most interested in joint action on these problems, while insuring that all the Atlantic allies are kept closely informed about concerted actions.

Officials who bear responsibility for these problems in their own governments should be intimately involved. This expedites agreement and makes it possible for those who do agree to move ahead in concert.

The means of fulfilling these principles will vary. Continuing discussions of Cuba in the North Atlantic Council, the latest involving Under Secretary Ball,[5] have improved understanding of the purpose and effectiveness of restrictions on trade with Cuba. Consultation about Berlin and Germany in the Washington quadripartite group [France, Federal Republic of Germany, U.K., U.S.] has resulted in agreed Western positions. It is not generally realized that the NATO permanent representatives continually carry on consultations regarding a broad range of political subjects. These include not only problems within the NATO treaty area but outside as well. In the past year the United States has initiated consultation or exchange of information in NATO on approximately 30 issues of significance.

[5] Mr. Ball attended a meeting of the NATO Council at Paris on Mar. 27.

In addition to the regular consideration of current political problems, geographic experts from the NATO countries meet in Paris twice a year to exchange views and prepare reports on the various areas of the world—such as Africa, the Middle East, and Far East. These reports are considered by the NATO ministers at their spring and winter meetings. The NATO Council also benefits from the periodic meetings of the Atlantic Political Advisory Group (APAG), NATO's long-range planning arm, whose members seek to anticipate problems or crises around the world.

There is particularly close consultation within NATO on disarmament issues and questions of European security. Approximately every 2 weeks, for example, a senior representative of one of the four Western Powers at the Geneva Disarmament Conference visits Paris to brief the NATO Permanent Council on developments in the disarmament talks. And before any major United States initiative in the disarmament field is put forward at Geneva, it is subjected to close consultation with our allies to insure that it does not adversely affect their interests.

Our political consultations are, of course, not confined to NATO. We have other allies and friends. We consult intimately with many other countries in all parts of the world about problems of common interest, including some of those which are discussed in NATO. And our NATO allies do the same.

We intend to go forward pragmatically and flexibly in political consultation within NATO, adapting the procedure in each case to the end in view. And we shall bear in mind, as we do, the possible need for evolution in these procedures as Europe moves toward unity. As President Johnson said at Brussels last year:

> If the European nations agree on how the voice of a uniting Europe should be heard more effectively in political consultations, we will consider their proposals sympathetically.

But this is a matter in which we must wait for our European friends to come to a common view.

We support European unity, but the future of Europe is for the free peoples of Europe to

determine. We have been consistently unwilling to try to settle Europe's future in bilateral dealings with individual European governments. For that reason, we have not been prepared to provide additional help to the development of national nuclear capabilities or to accept proposals for a directorate of a self-chosen few to manage the affairs of the West. These are not issues in bilateral relations with individual European countries. They are issues which affect the interests of, and must be settled by, the Atlantic allies together. But let no one mistake the free discussion of these issues which goes on within the alliance for disunity on the prime question of mutual defense; the Cuban crisis of October 1962 demonstrated again how quickly NATO closes ranks in the face of an external threat.

Concerted Action Needed in Economic Field

New tasks also confront us in the economic field. There are three main areas in which concerted action is needed.

First, there is trade. The achievement of a truly integrated European Economic Community has created large opportunities here.

We cannot afford to lose sight of the basic goal of trade liberalization that motivates the Common Market and that led our Congress to enact the Trade Expansion Act. Liberalization must apply to both industrial and agricultural trade. The inherent difficulties in easing restrictions on trade can be overcome, and the Kennedy Round can succeed, only if the negotiations are approached on both sides of the Atlantic with statesmanship and mutual understanding. It is essential that we keep in mind that the reductions in tariffs resulting from these negotiations will be to the mutual advantage of all the participants and will serve to strengthen the foundation of the free world.

At present in Geneva the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development is highlighting the vast needs of the developing countries for expanded export markets.[6] These countries depend in part for their growth on enlarging trade with Europe and the United States. The Kennedy Round negotiations, which will follow immediately upon this conference, should and will offer concrete and tangible progress toward this end.

Joint economic action is also needed in the field of monetary and financial policy. For a considerable period after the war, when the United States and the United Kingdom disposed of almost all the West's international reserve assets, full and multilateral consultation was not as essential as it is now. The large accumulation of gold and foreign exchange assets on the Continent in the last several years has necessitated a more general pattern of Atlantic cooperation.

Such cooperation is well advanced in insuring orderly conditions in foreign exchange markets. Further steps are needed to ease the international flow of capital and to make sure that liquidity can expand as the volume of trade expands. We must seek arrangements through which the Atlantic nations can work out their temporary balance-of-payments problems in an orderly fashion, without hampering the larger ends of Atlantic policy. The countries of the European Economic Community have special responsibilities, under the Treaty of Rome, for helping each other to this end. We are confident that progress toward both European and Atlantic cooperation will continue in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

Finally, joint action is needed in aid to developing countries. The time when it was fitting for the United States to provide the lion's share is past. It is essential that all the economically advanced countries act together to help the developing countries expand their economies and improve their welfare.

The members of the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, which include Japan, have increased materially the flow of resources to the developing countries. From 1958 to 1962 the total flow of governmental aid from the DAC countries to the developing countries increased from $4,300,000,000 to $6,000,000,000. Aid from DAC countries other than the United States rose from $1,900,000,000 to $2,400,000,-

[6] For a statement by Under Secretary Ball, see BULLETIN of Apr. 20, 1964, p. 634.

000. Members of this Committee have also been seeking to improve consultation on important aid problems and to achieve better coordination of their individual aid programs. We must expect needs in this respect to grow, rather than to diminish.

In each of these economic fields, therefore, closer concert is necessary—and is being sought with increasing effect.

"The Time Is Now Ripe for Wider Tasks"

My theme, as you have seen, is simply this:

NATO is an alliance of free men determined to remain free, in full knowledge that peace and security are indivisible.

It has performed the central task for which it was created. It remains essential for the protection of its members and the security of the free world. The time is now ripe for wider tasks—in sharing responsibility for nuclear power; in concerting policies toward Communist nations and the settlement of disputes within the free world; and in cooperating more closely on worldwide problems of aid, trade, and monetary policy.

These new tasks can be fulfilled only by developing new forms of common action.

We are moving ahead to do just this—joining with those nations which wish to cooperate, leaving the door open for others and for a larger European role as Europe moves toward unity.

So let us proceed with quiet determination, avoiding both the drag of inertia and outmoded concepts and the seduction of sloganeering and apparent shortcuts, seizing the opportunities for more cohesive action with vigorous and open minds. In so doing we will demonstrate anew the vitality of the North Atlantic alliance in meeting the needs of the time.

As far ahead as any of us can perceive, the preservation of the values and ideals of the West requires that the parties to this partnership work with increasing intimacy.

As Carl Schurz reminds us: "Ideals are like stars; you will not succeed in touching them with your hands. But like the seafaring man on the desert of waters, you choose them as your guides, and following them you will reach your destiny."

United States and Panama Reestablish Diplomatic Relations

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON, APRIL 3 [1]

White House press release dated April 3

Your Excellencies, Members of the Congress: Today's agreement is both a beginning and a renewal. It provides that we will reestablish diplomatic relations; we will immediately appoint special ambassadors with sufficient powers to seek the prompt elimination of the causes of conflict between the two countries without limitations or preconditions of any kind.

I have already talked to the distinguished President of Panama and informed him that the United States has selected the former distinguished Secretary of the Treasury, a great law professor, Mr. Robert B. Anderson, to be our Ambassador to carry on these discussions.

We will also send the regular Ambassador to Panama's name to the Senate as soon as we have received approval from the Panamanian Government.[2]

We are thus embarking upon the solution of our problems without preconditions or limitations of any kind, believing that a lasting agreement depends upon the utmost freedom and the utmost flexibility of approach. We will now immediately renew relations, appoint special ambassadors, and begin a process which aims at a final resolution of our difficulties.

Arrival at this agreement in the presence of understandable but intense emotions and convictions is a tribute to our essential unity of interest. We share much history. We share a commitment to the liberty that we have achieved in the past and to the progress that we intend for the future. We can now proceed not only to solve today's difficulties but toward the increased welfare of all the people of the Americas under the Alliance for Progress.

So, gentlemen, let us approach our search for

[1] Made in the Cabinet Room at the White House following a meeting of the National Security Council.

[2] The Senate on Apr. 7 confirmed the nomination of Jack Hood Vaughn to be Ambassador to Panama.

a solution with the openness and the generosity of those who seek only the strengthening of friendship. Let us meet as sovereign nations, as allies, and as equal partners in the inter-American system.

Panama can be confident, as we are confident, that we each desire an agreement which protects the interests and recognizes the needs of both our nations.

I would also like on this occasion to especially and particularly thank the OAS for its very important role. This is further proof of the unmatched effectiveness of the inter-American system. For decades disputes between the American nations have been settled at the conference table. This achievement in this hemisphere offers a hopeful model for all those who pursue peace in every continent. This is truly a great day for America, for Panama, for all the people of the Western Hemisphere, and for all freedom-loving people everywhere.

We welcome you to the White House. We thank you for having come. We greet especially the ambassadors who are here and the members of the National Security Council, who only a few moments ago approved this agreement.

Thank you very much.

OAS ANNOUNCEMENT, APRIL 3

The Chairman of the General Committee of the Council of the Organization of American States acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation is pleased to announce that the duly authorized Representatives of the governments of the Republic of Panama and of the United States of America have agreed, on behalf of their governments, to a Joint Declaration which in the English and Spanish languages reads as follows:

Joint Declaration

In accordance with the friendly declarations of the Presidents of the United States of America and of the Republic of Panama of the 21st and 24th of March, 1964, respectively, annexed hereto,[3] which are in agreement in a sincere desire to resolve favorably all the differences between the two countries;

Meeting under the Chairmanship of the President of the Council and recognizing the important cooperation offered by the Organization of American States through the Inter-American Peace Committee and the Delegation of the General Committee of the Organ of Consultation, the Representatives of both governments have agreed:

1. To re-establish diplomatic relations.

2. To designate without delay Special Ambassadors with sufficient powers to seek the prompt elimination of the causes of conflict between the two countries, without limitations or preconditions of any kind.

3. That therefore, the Ambassadors designated will begin immediately the necessary procedures with the objective of reaching a just and fair agreement which would be subject to the constitutional processes of each country.

Washington, D.C.,
April 3, 1964

Declaración Conjunta

De conformidad con las amistosas declaraciones de los Presidentes de los Estados Unidos de América y de la República de Panamá del 21 y 24 de marzo de 1964, respectivamente, adjuntas a la presente, que coinciden en un sincero deseo de resolver favorablemente todas las diferencias de los dos países:

Reunidos bajo la Presidencia del señor Presidente del Consejo y luego de reconocer la valiosa cooperación prestada por la Organización de los Estados Americanos a través de la Comisión Interamericana de Paz y de la Delegación de la Comisión General del Organo de Consulta, los Representantes de ambos gobiernos han acordado:

1. Restablecer relaciones diplomáticas.

2. Designar sin demora Embajadores Especiales con poderes suficientes para procurar la pronta eliminación de las causas de conflicto entre los dos países, sin limitaciones ni precondiciones de ninguna clase.

3. En consecuencia, los Embajadores designados iniciarán de inmediato los procedimientos necesarios con el objeto de llegar a un convenio justo y equitativo que estaría sujeto a los procedimientos constitucionales de cada país.

Washington, D.C.,
3 de abril de 1964

The Chairman of the General Committee of the Council of the Organization of American States acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation records that the parties agree that both texts are equally authentic and that the words "agreement" in the English version and "convenio" in the Spanish version cover all possible forms of international engagements.

Washington, D.C.
April 3, 1964

[3] Not printed here; for text of President Johnson's statement of Mar. 21, see Bulletin of Apr. 6, 1964, p. 538.

The Open System in North-South Relations

by Under Secretary Ball[1]

You have been addressing yourselves during this past week to the general theme of "National Security and the Aims of a Free Society." I understand that I am supposed to talk with you on "Values and the Individual." While normally I am very obedient to the terms of any mandate I may be given, I intend tonight to take some liberties.

I am encouraged in this audacity by the freedom you yourselves have been showing during the past week in challenging some of the fixed positions of American policy. I find this heartening. Those of us who spend our days and nights as active practitioners of foreign affairs are fully persuaded that there is no American policy that should be regarded as sacrosanct, no position or attitude that should not be constantly reviewed and scrutinized to make sure that it accords with the realities of the day.

For the one unchallengeable fact about the time in which we live—this mid-20th century—is that it is a time of change, one of those fascinating periods in history when cataclysmic forces are at work giving a new shape and form to the world.

During such a time, debate, skepticism, even iconoclasm are not only useful but essential. Yet, if they are to lead us to the right decisions, challenges to our existing policy must be based on a full recognition of the meaning of America's strength and preeminence—and of the responsibilities that go with it. Nothing could be more sterile or harmful than for this country to occupy itself with the invention of rationalizations to justify the abandonment of our responsibilities. We are in the midstream of events. We cannot resign from history.

U.N. Conference on Trade and Development

I emphasize this theme tonight because I have only recently returned from an extraordinary meeting that has given me a new sense of the reality of America's leadership and power. I refer to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, now under way in Geneva.[2]

That Conference can well be a landmark in the relations between the peoples and governments of the rich industrial nations and the billion individuals who live in what we have come to call the less developed countries.

The remarkable aspect of this Conference is not merely its size—122 nations are represented and there are more than 2,000 delegates—nor its length—for it will continue for 3 months—but rather that it is a conference of, and for, the less developed countries. It is the leaders of those countries who have given the Conference its drive and impetus and provided its intellectual guidance.

The Conference is pervaded by a sense of urgency, a sense of impatience. One can discern in the rhetoric of the representatives of the developing countries the beginnings of a common and strident doctrine. As one delegate put it:

> In this conference we all should seek to advance the attainment of collective economic security under which developing countries can fully exercise their rights to develop.

[1] Address made before the North Carolina University Symposium at Chapel Hill, N.C., on Apr. 9 (press release 156).

[2] For a statement made by Mr. Ball at Geneva on Mar. 25, see BULLETIN of Apr. 20, 1964, p. 634.

And then he added:

> If, to this day, these rights have in fact been denied us, it is due, to a large extent, to the actions and omission of the developed countries.

Structural Relations Between North and South

We have, of course, talked a great deal in the United States about the less developed countries, the new nations that have been rather romantically referred to as the Third World. But I fear that too often we have tended to discuss the problems of these nations in rather too narrow terms. We have talked about foreign aid, or we have talked about commodity agreements. But we have not thought or talked enough about the great structural relationships that must be established between the handful of industrial nations located almost entirely in the Temperate Zone, in which 90 percent of the world's industrial development is concentrated, and that billion people who have in the last 20 years made the fateful progress from colonialism to juridical independence.

These structural relations cannot be ignored. After all, we must not overlook the fact that there is not one division in the world but two. There is the horizontal division between East and West which has been the constant preoccupation of our Western governments for the last 20 years. There is also a vertical division between the industrialized North and the impoverished South. Lord Franks called attention to this division 5 years ago in referring to "the relationship of the industrialized nations of the North to the under-developed and developing countries that lie to the South of them, whether in Central or South America, in Africa or the Middle East, in South Asia or in the great island archipelagoes of the Pacific."

In my remarks to you tonight I intend to talk about the nature of the relationships that must be established between the North and South—and I refer to Lord Franks' definition rather than to the domestic one with which we are more familiar. I intend also to mention the problems that this poses for the United States as the one Western nation organized on a scale commensurate with world responsibilities. Finally, I shall touch briefly on the relevance of the North-South division to the division between the East and West.

The Third World

The billion people in the developing countries are a constant preoccupation of chancelleries and Foreign Offices. The shift in status of this vast population from colonial dependence to juridical independence has added a new dimension to foreign policy—an additional element in an already complex and crowded equation.

From the point of view of the United States, the creation of 48 new nations since the war has required a substantial reorganization of the whole apparatus of our foreign policy. Even as late as 20 years ago, the United States could do the bulk of its business around the world through embassies in a handful of industrial countries. But today we recognize 114 countries and maintain 274 foreign posts. Our affairs with the billion newly independent people are no longer conducted indirectly through the Foreign Offices of Europe. Today we deal directly with the governments of the new states.

These billion people and the new states they have created are by no means homogeneous. The Third World is marked by a wide diversity. The new states range all the way from loosely knit agglomerations of tribes to peoples with ancient cultures and deep sophistication.

What unites them is the common bond of poverty. More accurately, it is not so much poverty as the awareness of poverty. This awareness, this refusal to accept poverty as something preordained and unalterable, is a new phenomenon.

It is not that, over the centuries, these peoples have grown poorer—for the most part, they are better off than were their ancestors. (And remember that even Imperial Rome by today's standards would be a less developed country.) What has created their impatience and discontent is that in the past century and a half, following the Industrial Revolution, a handful of states, composed mostly of white populations living in the Temperate Zone, have grown fabulously rich.

The peoples living outside the Temperate area began to recognize about two decades ago

that their poverty was not an irrevocable judgment of fate. This realization came about when the cumulative impact of two world wars shook the underpinnings of colonial structures. It was given added impetus as fast transport and communications spread far and wide that most dangerous *agent provocateur*—the idea of nationalism. Nationalism meant for the colonial peoples political independence. Political independence was identified with a better material life, a share of the ample fruits of modern technology.

Today these billion people—this Third World—are driven by a sense of purpose that tends to give a special political character to their activities.

It tends also to bind together disparate peoples who would otherwise have little in common. The Afro-Asian bloc in the United Nations, for example, is an extraordinary alliance mobilized under the banner of anticolonialism. That banner, that slogan, has intense symbolic significance. It means much more than the dismantling of colonial empires. It is an amalgam of memories, resentments, and aspirations—the insistence on a place in the sun, the demand for equality, the hope for improvement in economic well-being.

Need for Mutual Confidence and Understanding

The complete absorption of the less developed countries with their own immediate problems of survival and growth has often led to a lack of understanding on the part of the industrial world. Flying the flag of nonalinement, many of the less developed countries have been indifferent to the contest between East and West. They have withheld commitment from the larger power struggle, which they have regarded as lacking relevance to their own insistent concerns.

This difficulty of understanding is but one of the elements that must be counted in the establishment of an effective relationship between North and South. Obviously, such relations must be of a different character from those among industrial nations. The main component must be a conscious and systematic effort on the part of the industrial countries to help the less developed countries progress toward economic, social, and political betterment. There must be a redressing of the balance of advantage. This requires more than money or equipment. It means technical help and advice, commercial relations that will contribute to stability in the markets for their products, military assistance—more often than not some form of assurance that their vital interests will be protected from the aggression of their neighbors.

Finally, and perhaps most important of all, it requires a high degree of mutual confidence and understanding—the creation of an environment in which both sides can work together toward a common purpose.

Open System Versus Closed

How are the relations between North and South, between the industrialized and developing countries, to be organized in such a manner as to create this environment?

Throughout the postwar period there have been two competing approaches to the organization of these relations. One approach is that of an open system. The other is that of a series of closed systems.

Under the open system all free-world industrial countries would accept responsibility for the economic, commercial, and political well-being of all developing countries without discrimination. They would, through systematic consultation, concert their efforts to achieve this objective.

Under the closed system specific industrial countries or groups of countries in the North would maintain special relations with selected developing countries or groups of countries in the South—and would establish preferential and discriminatory arrangements for carrying this out. This is the situation, for example, that exists with regard to the African states of the French Community and, to a lesser degree, within the British Commonwealth.

During the postwar period, these two systems have operated alongside one another. But I think the time may well be approaching when all of us together—industrial and developing countries alike—may need to make a conscious choice as to the direction in which our relations should evolve.

The United States has been the leading proponent of the open system. Under the onslaught of a tidal wave of nationalism, the war-weakened European colonial powers were forced to retreat first from one and then another overseas possession. To fill the vacuums thus created and to prevent them from being filled by Communist power, the United States progressively extended its responsibilities.

In moving to assist and defend these countries we were not influenced by considerations of specific national interest or historic ties, since we carried no baggage of colonial history. We were simply the only free-world power capable of providing the strength and resources that were urgently required. In most of these situations we operated on a postulate of general responsibility for stability and peace.

We have, for example, no national interest of trade or investment in Viet-Nam, where we are providing the material assistance for a shooting war; nor do we have any discriminatory commercial preferences in Latin America, where we are joined in the Alliance for Progress.

It is this willingness to accept world responsibilities unrelated to specific national interests that is America's unique contribution to the postwar world. This is most clearly seen in the context of foreign aid. There is nothing new about foreign aid *per se*. Subsidies between princes are as old as recorded history, and grants and loans between modern states in the 19th century were regarded as quite normal. But such transactions were historically related either to alliances or imperialism.

Where the United States has broken the pattern is in the diversity of its assistance programs; we have not confined our assistance to countries with which we had special relationships or to situations in which we might expect a *quid pro quo* of special favors—and today we provide some form of assistance to 100 countries.

In many of these cases we have acted in pursuance of a generalized purpose—that the less developed nations as a whole should have the chance for a better life. We have pursued this purpose out of the conviction that only in this way can world peace and stability be assured.

Consistent with our belief that there should be equality of opportunity for free-world growth, we have remained faithful to the most-favored-nation principle in our commercial relations. While we participate in special regional agencies for political consultation and action, such as the Organization of American States, we have sought no privileged markets for our products and we trade with all the world on a nondiscriminatory basis.

Ties Deriving From Colonial Past

Other Western nations in organizing their affairs with the developing countries have emphasized closed systems. They have created special and discriminatory relations. They have preferred to direct their contributions to the improvement of the lot of the developing countries on a selective basis and within the framework of ties that derive from a colonial past. These special relations have involved not merely the provision of assistance but special financial arrangements and special trading concessions under which products of the specific overseas countries have been given preferential access to metropolitan markets and where, quite frequently, reciprocal preferences have also been accorded.

Obviously, in assisting their former colonies, these Western nations are contributing—in many cases substantially contributing—to the advancement of the developing world. And in many cases, in addition to supporting these special arrangements, they are, through contributions to international organizations, assisting the developing nations on a more generalized basis.

But, without intending any disparaging implications, it is nonetheless true that, in the general pattern of their relationships with the Third World, the principal Western nations have tended to direct their efforts more to the advancement of specific national interests than to the discharge of generalized world responsibilities.

The choice between these competing concepts for organizing relations between North and South is a difficult one for the industrial countries. For quite different reasons, it is also difficult for the less developed countries.

Struggling new nations now enjoying positions of preference and discrimination in metro-

politan markets may find it hard to give them up. Yet most of these nations are aware that special trading relations are likely to carry with them special political, financial, and economic relations that will impair their freedom of choice or action. Given the brooding fear of what is loosely called "neocolonialism," special ties of this kind may be too suggestive of "spheres of influence" to be wholly comfortable.

Need for More Equitable Balance

How this issue is decided can have a particular importance for the United States. For it bears directly on the achievement of a more equitable allocation of responsibilities among the industrial nations. This is one of the major pieces of unfinished business of the postwar period.

For the last 20 years the United States has been expanding its responsibilities around the world as the European powers, weakened by war, have withdrawn before the impact of the anticolonial wave. Fortunately, our resources were equal to the task, and in absolute terms they have expanded in pace with our expanded responsibilities. Today we are stronger than ever before.

At the same time, however, our allies in Europe have also grown strong. So has Japan in the Far East. Yet, for a period of time until the colonial chapter is finally closed, it is likely that our responsibilities will continue to expand as our allies complete their withdrawal from outmoded colonial positions. In other words, we find ourselves today, and may continue to find ourselves for some time, in a period when our responsibilities will be still expanding while our *relative* strength vis-a-vis other free-world industrial powers is diminishing.

In the face of these facts we must, of necessity, search for the means of working out a more equitable balance of responsibilities with other free-world industrial powers. This means, of course, that the European metropolitan powers must, more and more, move back into the world in order to assume responsibilities commensurate with their growing resources.

This process relates directly to the question of how North-South relations are organized. The question is this: Through what means will the other industrialized powers turn their strength and resources toward our common task in the less developed areas?

At the moment this question remains unanswered. Certainly we can see great advantages in trying to build a world in which the free industrial powers unite in a common effort for the developing nations as a whole. This would not, of course, preclude special bonds of friendship and intimacy between industrial and developing nations, nor even some distribution of tasks among industrial nations on a geographical basis. But there is a major difference between ties based on cultural friendship or military necessity and ties predicated upon special financial or commercial regimes that are discriminatory in character. Discriminatory regimes tend not only to result in a poor use of world resources, but they also limit the possibilities for effective cooperation among nations, both in the North and South.

European Unity and the Open System

In principle, therefore, we should much prefer to see all the industrial nations work toward a kind of collective responsibility for all of the less developed countries—or, in other words, toward an open system. But this is on the assumption that the other industrial nations would be prepared to join wholeheartedly in such an effort. Would they, in other words, put forward the same or greater exertions to assist the developing nations under a regime of generalized responsibility as under the present selective relationships?

Time alone can answer that question. The habits of nations for centuries have been to relate action to national interest—usually, in a rather narrow sense. The attainment of a minimum size or scale—the possession of a minimum volume of resources, of material, of technology, of manpower—has proved a key element in determining the role, and the attitude, of nations. The willingness to identify national interest with a generalized world responsibility may, in today's world, be possible only for very large nations—only for nations such as the United States, which command resources on a scale adequate to the requirements for leadership in the 20th century.

If this assumption be right, there is probably a direct correlation between the willingness of European nations to accept world responsibility and the speed with which they move toward economic and political unity. The European leaders who have worked to unify Europe have long believed that only by unity can Europe achieve the scale requisite for an effective leadership role in the modern world. Only in this way can the peoples of Europe contribute the full measure of their capacity to the building and maintenance of a free and stable world.

This proposition has long been a postulate of American policy. In supporting European unity we have acted on the assumption that a united Europe, as an equal partner, would be willing to undertake major world responsibilities that did not reflect narrow national interests. We continue to regard that assumption as sound. There is an underlying harmony, in other words, between our support for European unity and our support for the open system.

Bearing on East-West Problems

In my remarks so far I have talked solely about relations between the North and South without discussing their bearing on the familiar East-West problems. It is significant that the Soviet Union, in spite of its efforts to appear as the sympathetic companion of the less developed nations, has been clearly marked as an industrial power at the United Nations Conference.

In its own North-South relations the Soviet Union clearly pursues the policy of seeking to establish relationships of dominance through the tactics of bribes, threats, and subversion. It has made the Third World an arena of contention in the East-West struggle.

When Lord Franks first identified the problem, he suggested that the relationships between the North and South might ultimately become as important as those between East and West. That time, in our judgment, is rapidly approaching.

The problem for us is how we can conduct our North-South relations in a manner that will best serve the needs of the less developed countries while at the same time advancing the interests of the free world.

For this purpose it seems clear to us that the open system has many advantages. It would, in President Johnson's words, best help the poorer countries of the world to "find a path to development through freedom—and freedom through development." [3] It would banish the specter of colonialism and tutelage. It would provide that chance of diversity which is the mark of freedom.

Letters of Credence

Haiti

The newly appointed Ambassador of Haiti, André Théard, presented his credentials to President Johnson on April 8. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 152 dated April 8.

Iraq

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Iraq, Nasir al-Hani, presented his credentials to President Johnson on April 8. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 154 dated April 8.

Kenya

The newly appointed Ambassador of Kenya, Burudi Nabwera, presented his credentials to President Johnson on April 8. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 153 dated April 8.

Portugal

The newly appointed Ambassador of Portugal, Vasco Vieira Garin, presented his credentials to President Johnson on April 8. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 149 dated April 8.

Tunisia

The newly appointed Ambassador of Tunisia, Rachid Driss, presented his credentials to Presi-

[3] For an excerpt from the Economic Report of the President, see *ibid.*, Feb. 10, 1964, p. 222.

dent Johnson on April 8. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 150 dated April 8.

Export Expansion and Balance of Payments

Remarks by President Johnson[1]

Secretary [of Commerce Luther H.] Hodges, members of the Cabinet, ladies and gentlemen: I guess once a businessman, always a businessman. Luther is one of the great prides and products of our free enterprise system, but I did not say we had everything straightened out last Saturday. And don't ever mistake a temporary recognition of a partial job well done for anything like you said.

I made the statement that I had been informed, I hope reliably, that our exports are going at a rate of about $7 billion a year; that was the balance in our favor; that I interpreted that as something that we could take some pride in; that I did not anticipate that that would necessarily be a permanent situation, but it is a very fine thing to observe. I should like to commend all those who have, along with the Secretary of Commerce, been engaged in this mission to expand the exports of the United States. I think there are few tasks that are more important or closer to my own concerns for the future of this country.

An increase in our overseas trade, as all of us are aware, brings great benefits to every single sector of our American life. They benefit business by providing increased markets for our production. It will benefit the strength of the dollar by improving our balance of payments, and because I observed, Mr. Secretary, that our balance of payments for the first quarter—not necessarily the last quarter—look good, that didn't mean that I underwrote everything that might happen during your tenure of office!

It will benefit labor and help in the war against poverty, since every billion dollars by which we increase exports 100,000 new jobs will be created. It will increase our world responsibilities by establishing closer commercial relations with industrialized countries in providing for the developing world the trade which can make them flourish and progress. That is why I am so happy to see so many of the various departments and agencies of Government interested in this particular field here this morning.

Through much of our history we have spent most of our effort on expanding and satisfying the vigorous domestic market. We have concentrated our production, our salesmanship, and our trade on a vast common market which spans the continent and embraces 200 million people. Our success in doing this has raised us to our present high level of prosperity here at home. But the very opportunities which this market provided often left us to neglect the opportunities for trade abroad, and neglected them we have.

Other countries, forced to trade in order to survive, did develop sharper tools, more sophisticated techniques for penetrating other markets. Our own share of the world trade has not been proportional to our capacity to produce goods that are needed and wanted by other lands. At this point in our own history, in world history, we can no longer afford to neglect opportunities for overseas trade. We cannot let those opportunities pass for lack of knowledge, or for lack of appropriate Government assistance. The prosperity of Europe and Japan, which we helped create, means not only larger markets for our goods but sharply increased competition for world markets.

The rise of new nations in the developing world offers a large prospect for increased commerce, and it has placed on us a national responsibility to provide a solid commercial basis for their development and their stability. Our commitment to the defense of freedom around the world means that exports must substantially exceed imports if we are to keep our currency sound, as we intend to do. I took a great deal of pride last Saturday in making

[1] Made at the White House on Apr. 7 before the Interagency Committee on Export Expansion (White House press release). For text of an Executive order establishing the Committee, see BULLETIN of Jan. 6, 1964, p. 25.

that observation, and I hope that we can take the example we have set and continue that very fine pace.

We have the same productive genius and ingenuity which built this nation. So let us now apply those same qualities that we have applied here at home to increasing commerce with the world. Last September at the White House Conference 300 businessmen met and discussed problems and framed recommendations.[2] This Committee has now been established to act on these recommendations and to press forward the export drive on every front. Such action is imperative.

I await your decisions; I await your actions. I have designated Mr. [Daniel L.] Goldy, who has just been sworn in, as the National Export Expansion Coordinator. He will help assure that the decisions of this Committee are implemented through the Government in order that we miss no opportunity to increase export trade. He has my highest confidence. If your efforts are successful, as I hope they will be and as I would like to encourage them to be, future generations will recognize what you have accomplished as one of the great cornerstones of our national strength and the well-being of our people.

I know of no subject that intensely interests me more. I know of nothing that I will be prouder of than to see the record that you ring up. I hope that you can continue the very fine balance that now exists and expand it in the days to come. I thank each agency represented here and each person who is participating in this meeting. Any encouragement I can give you, I want to do. Any help that I can extend, I want to do. I congratulate the Secretary for the leadership he has taken in this field and say to the Secretary of Commerce, I hope when I have another Saturday news conference that I can increase that $7 billion figure and that I can have as optimistic a report next quarter on balance of payments as I did this quarter.

New Patterns of African Trade

by G. Mennen Williams
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs [1]

It gives me great pleasure to meet today with a group of businessmen interested in expanding American economic relations with Africa. We are in a period when new patterns of trade are beginning to reshape the African market of the future. It is an especially good time to embark upon new business ventures on that continent.

Frankly, I am optimistic about Africa's future. My optimism is based on the years of intimate contact I have had with the African peoples and their leaders, for whom I have great respect. Africa's nations—both old and new—are seeking to develop themselves as rapidly as possible, and they are working arduously to build modern economies. In these efforts they are encouraging foreign investors to help them create modern, independent societies, and they are anxious to increase their import and export trade with the United States. To these goals we can only give our hearty concurrence and encouragement.

There are many reasons why we can be optimistic about the economic future of Africa, and there are many reasons why American business

[2] For background, see *ibid.*, Oct. 14, 1963, p. 595.

[1] Address made before the International Executives Convention at New York, N.Y., on Apr. 1 (press release 138 dated Mar. 31).

should take a closer look at the opportunities offered by Africa's developing nations.

The richness of Africa's mineral resources is well known, and the importance of these resources to the United States is substantial. Africa is a major world supplier of gold and diamonds, of cobalt and chrome, of copper, of manganese, of antimony. Recently, large deposits of petroleum, iron ore, and bauxite have begun to be developed, in many cases with substantial U.S. investment. Yet much of the continent has not been fully explored by U.S. businessmen. Undoubtedly many new opportunities await the more enterprising firms.

Prospects also are favorable in other resources. There is generally little, if any, population pressure in Africa, and in some areas there is even unused agricultural land to be made fruitful. Electric energy potential abounds in many areas—among them, the Congo River basin alone is estimated to have one-third of the total world hydroelectric generating capacity.

Then there are social factors favorable to economic growth. There is no highly rigid caste or class structure, as in other areas of the world, and there are few land tenure patterns which restrict mobility. The more enterprising African is able to move to the city and rise quickly in business or the professions when he has the necessary skills and capital.

At the same time there are drawbacks and hazards in expanded American business relationships with Africa, and I think we must recognize such risks frankly.

There are a number of factors which seriously limit progress in Africa: a low level of education; the lack of a substantial number of upper- and middle-level administrators, technicians, and professional people; low productivity rates; a shortage of entrepreneurs and indigenous capital; and an inadequate network of transportation, communications, and other services. It would be difficult for Africa to overcome those conditions with its own resources, and it is in those areas that foreign trade, aid, and investment can make important contributions to African progress.

On another plane, there have been severe political disturbances in many parts of the continent in recent months, and it is likely that there will be more unrest as long as aspirations remain unfulfilled. There is no need for me to catalog recent troubles; they have been widely reported in the American press. Those serious matters cannot be dismissed lightly, but we should, nevertheless, view such disturbances in perspective. Most of the current conflicts and crises are typical of the trouble newly independent countries encounter on the road to nationhood. The problems spring from the frustrations created by poverty and the lack of swift progress, from the inevitable struggles between the old and the new, from the problems of societies moving from rural to urban life.

Our concern with those troubles, however, should not lead us to lose sight of the quiet, steady progress being made throughout the African Continent. Increases in gross national product, rising electric power production, or improved secondary schools cannot compete in the headlines with news about an army mutiny. Yet in terms of human involvement, the quiet progress is really the big news in Africa, and it is far more widespread and lasting than Africa's troubles.

A third problem that American businessmen should be aware of is found in the artificial barriers to trade and investment which arose during Africa's colonial era. This is a system which tended to bind, almost inextricably, the economy of a colony to that of a colonial power. Although much of Africa—and, indeed, the most populated part of the continent—is relatively open to American trade and investment, there are some areas, such as the Spanish and Portuguese territories and some former French territories in tropical Africa, in which it is difficult for American and other foreign business to trade. Through such devices as preferential tariffs, bilateral trading arrangements, licensing systems, and exchange controls, nationals of the present and former metropolitan powers protect a predominant influence in the economies of those areas by sharply limiting commodity exchanges with third countries. At the same time, however, the European powers are providing significant amounts of aid and related public funds to those areas, and maintenance of their commercial privileges there is often defended on that basis.

While the United States recognizes the desirability of encouraging the European nations to continue to provide a high level of aid to Africa, we do not feel we should be precluded from efforts to improve the U.S. business position. We feel that a broadening of our trading relations in these areas is not only in our own interest but in the interest of the African areas and of the European nations themselves. For that reason we have studied with interest the recent Jeanneney report, which recommended that France diversify its assistance programs to embrace areas of Southeast Asia and Latin America. And we have noted President de Gaulle's overture to Mexico only 2 weeks ago, when he encouraged Mexicans to rely on more than one source for their economic associations. We hope that such diversification of economic interests will also occur in those parts of Africa which now have trade relations with one predominant source.

Continent-Wide Cooperation

Now let me hasten to assure you that, despite the hazards and problems I have mentioned, there is a great deal of progress being made in Africa. There is much going well on that continent, both politically and economically.

One instrumentality that is contributing much to Africa's progress is the Organization of African Unity, which came into being last May at the historic African heads-of-state conference at Addis Ababa. It is now a 34-member, Africa-wide organization, embracing all independent states except South Africa. The OAU already has begun to function as a vehicle of continental political, economic, social, and cultural cooperation. It has made an impressive record for itself in the 10 months of its existence—notably in encouraging a cease-fire and then a settlement of the Moroccan-Algerian border dispute. Last week it played a similar role in bringing Ethiopia and Somalia together for talks aimed at arranging a cease-fire and at ending the sporadic border clashes between those two nations.

Another Africa-wide body making an important contribution to Africa's growth is the Economic Commission for Africa, a U.N. body operating under able African leadership. The ECA has begun to play a vital role in Africa's economic planning. In particular, it is building a philosophy of regional economic integration and a program of regional projects to realize economies from large-scale enterprises and to avoid the duplication and competition inherent in basing development on a large number of small economic units in Africa.

At its most recent meeting at Addis Ababa last month, the Economic Commission for Africa marked an important milestone in the efforts of the African states to achieve economic integration.[2] That conference reflected a greater determination among African nations to find a common approach to the wide range of problems impeding Africa's economic development.

In addition there was a growing awareness that the existing fragmented markets of the continent restrict Africa's efforts to develop. Prevailing economic units, it was argued, are too small to permit the use of the most up-to-date technology and mass market techniques. For these and related reasons, Africans showed an increasing desire to enlarge the size of their markets to enable them to realize the benefits that can be derived from large-scale operations. In this respect, ECA missions have been working in East, North, and West Africa to explore the possibilities of setting up such industries as iron and steel complexes and chemical operations, to be located at sites considered optimum for natural resources and markets.

One important result of all of these efforts by the Economic Commission for Africa will be the expansion of opportunities for foreign trade and investment in many parts of the continent.

U. S. Aid in Africa

For its own part the United States Government is encouraging the growth of a climate in Africa which will be conducive to an expansion of U.S. trade and investment. This is a coordinated effort in which the principal instruments are the Department of Commerce, the

[2] For texts of a message from President Johnson and a statement made before the Commission on Feb. 25 by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs J. Wayne Fredericks, see BULLETIN of Mar. 30, 1964, p. 509.

Department of State and its African posts, the Agency for International Development, the Department of Agriculture, and the Export-Import Bank.

At this time of year I am particularly concerned with the United States AID program. In a few days I will appear before Congress to explain why I think AID is an essential element of our African foreign policy. I am well aware that our AID program has critics—and I concede that constructive criticism is needed to keep the program healthy. However, I do believe that some of the dissatisfaction with AID is due to misconceptions about its nature and its goals.

The true purpose of AID is to encourage and enable countries to develop and preserve their independence and stability. We believe that economic and social well-being and progress are integral parts of true independence and stability. While we recognize the importance of efforts undertaken by Africans themselves—and our AID program is geared to encourage Africans to help themselves—it is in the best American tradition to assist where we are able and where our aid is desired.

All Americans have an important interest in the economic growth and betterment of life in Africa because of the long-range bearing these factors have on world peace and order. You as businessmen, however, have an even more direct stake in foreign aid. United States economic aid programs in Africa provide many opportunities for U.S. exporters and investors. These opportunities stem from the present requirement that aid dollars be spent for U.S. goods and services and from the inducements offered by AID to encourage United States investment abroad. Combined with the growth of African markets resulting from an accelerating pace of economic development, our AID efforts provide a wide variety of business opportunities.

So successful have these efforts been that Farrell Lines *African News Digest* has written:

> Because of A.I.D., the entrepreneur of today, if his ideas are truly worthwhile, stands less risk than at any other time in our commercial history. The potential of American investment and interest in Africa is therefore dependent upon the creativity and imagination of American businessmen.

Although not the largest single donor in Africa, the U.S. Government in fiscal year 1962 and again in fiscal year 1963 provided about $500 million in economic assistance to 34 African countries. Surplus food and fiber, under the Food for Peace program, accounted for nearly half of this amount. In contrast, other free-world governments provided $1,200 million, and the Sino-Soviet bloc extended $200–250 million in credits. Thus the United States contributed roughly one-fourth of Africa's $2 billion in external economic assistance from government sources. In addition, important contributions are made by U.S. private foundations, religious organizations, and other nongovernment groups.

In carrying out our AID program, we strive in various ways to encourage the fullest participation of U.S. private concerns in African operations. While we are naturally interested in having American business take advantage of all opportunities for profitable new business ventures, we also are interested in the participation of United States concerns because of the entrepreneurial skills which American business can help transfer to Africa. A good example of such participation is the new Education Center at the University of Ibadan in Nigeria, which was opened only 2 weeks ago by IBM World Trade Corporation to help English-speaking Africans acquire basic and technical education in such fields as data processing, accounting, government, economics, and mathematics. Next year, in Dakar, Senegal, IBM will open a second such center for French-speaking Africans.

One part of our program that stands in direct support of American business is a series of investment guaranties which have been arranged between the United States and 20 African countries. Through these agreements, U.S. investors in Africa are protected against the risks of inconvertibility of currency and expropriation. In addition, 17 of these agreements cover war risk and 14 of them cover extended-risk guaranties and guaranties against loss caused by revolution and insurrection.

Even before deciding to invest in Africa, however, an American firm may be able to obtain financial assistance from AID to make a feasibility study to determine whether a proposed

African business venture is sound. Three such investment survey grants have been made in Africa, and five applications for grants are being processed.

There are also the so-called Cooley loans available in Guinea, Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia. These loans are made from local currency accounts that have been built up by the AID program and are available to United States firms getting established in those countries—particularly to businesses which will increase sales of U.S. farm products.

Even if you are not immediately interested in establishing a plant or sales operation in Africa, you should be aware of the stake of American business in our AID program. Between 80 and 90 percent of our economic aid expenditures, for example, are for U.S. goods and services. The approximately $500 million spent last year on African aid provided jobs, income, profits, and service contracts for tens of thousands of workers and farmers, and hundreds of U.S. factories, universities, engineers, building contractors, and many others.

AID estimates that 550,000 nongovernment jobs in the United States were provided by our worldwide aid expenditures in 1962. In New York State alone, major AID contracts amounted to more than $30 million in 1962 and some $45 million in 1963. And between 1960 and 1963 AID-administered cargoes on American-flag cargo liners rose from just over $40 million to approximately $108 million.

When our AID program provides a bulldozer, telecommunication equipment, or a shipload of wheat from our farm surplus, the story does not end at that point. The first shipment may be paid for by a grant or loan provided by the U.S. taxpayer. But bulldozers need spare parts and must be replaced one day, and telecommunication networks are often extended. Even dietary habits may change through increased use of American food products. New tastes and needs for American products can lead to new commercial sales, and this development can be an important end result of our AID program around the world. But unless the countries of Africa are helped to grow out of their low-level economies at an early date, they may not become important markets for our products.

Growth of U.S. Trade and Investment in Africa

In addition to United States aid, both trade and investment with Africa have been of rapidly growing importance to America in recent years. Total direct investment by United States firms grew fourfold in Africa from 1950 to 1962, far more than our rate of increase of foreign investment in any other continent. In 1962 United States investments in Africa totaled nearly $1.25 billion, an increase of $200 million over 1961. This increase was spread throughout Africa. In a similar manner, our total exports to Africa have more than doubled in value since 1950. In 1962 these exports amounted to almost $1 billion. Our imports from Africa came to $750 million in 1962 and were about 50 percent above the 1950 level.

Thus it is clear to me that many American businessmen are betting on Africa as a good place to do business, to invest, and to make a profit.

The largest African markets for U.S. products are the United Arab Republic, South Africa, Congo (Léopoldville), Liberia, Morocco, and Nigeria. Nigeria, with a growing economy, the largest population in Africa, and a central location, bears careful consideration as a place for exports, a place to set up a regional sales office, or a place to build a branch plant. The Arthur D. Little Company of Boston, on a contract with the Nigerian Government, has been seeking out investment opportunities for foreign firms in Nigeria for several years. There has been a remarkable increase in U.S. business activity in that country since it became independent in 1960. In these 4 years U.S. firms in Nigeria have increased from 9 to 72, including 3 banks, 6 petroleum companies, 13 manufacturing and assembly plants, and 20 service companies.

Regional, rather than national, markets also bear watching, as closer relations develop among African nations. In terms of regional cooperation, the East African nations of Kenya, Tanganyika, and Uganda provide a well-developed example of how sovereign nations can work together in harmony. Through the East African Common Services Organization—a multinational body—the area's 25

million people share a common currency, common communications and transportation facilities, common tax administration, common research facilities, and common customs and tariffs. And outside of the framework of the EACSO, they have pooled their intellectual resources in the University of East Africa.

All of these joint efforts make those three countries one of the world's advanced areas in cooperation and provide the area's people with services of a quality that would be difficult for individual nations to match. In addition, the effectiveness of such international cooperation makes a significant contribution to the area's overall stability. A further factor is that this cooperation has helped to make foreign assistance more effective in the area. Although U.S. efforts are primarily directed to individual countries, there are some programs we conduct on an East African regional basis.

Throughout the continent there is a whole range of immediate opportunities open to American private business. There is room for export and import businesses, large and small. Transportation and communication facilities are also among the very highest priorities of African leaders. In addition, opportunities include such areas as insurance, banking and loan associations, hotels and low-cost housing.

There will be many sales opportunities in Africa as that continent's purchasing power rises and its population grows. Africa already is a significant market for a variety of U.S. products. In 1962 the most important of these products were foodstuffs, which accounted for $178 million. Other products and their value were textile fibers and manufactures, $72 million; industrial machinery, $140 million; tractors, $53 million; and chemicals, $46 million.

There also are opportunities for purchasing in Africa that I want to touch upon. Admittedly, the range of goods available for such purchases is not as great as the range of opportunities for investment and sales, but some do exist and others can be sought and found.

Most of our principal imports from Africa—minerals, cocoa, coffee, and precious stones—are accounted for by American firms that have invested in extractive and production facilities in Africa. But there are some purchasing opportunities and markets for such products as African handicrafts and art objects, which are exotic and profitable items in this country. There are also various raw materials of a specialized nature that are available to American purchasers, such as spices, sisal, and scarce minerals needed for technological research and development.

A relatively unexplored and growing field for purchasers is that of processed and semiprocessed goods. As Africa's economic development progresses, there is increasing interest among the nations of Africa to process their raw materials domestically for export to foreign markets. Thus, sisal is being exported as twine, as well as a raw material. Another example is iron, which is being sold not only as ore but as ferromanganese or ferrochrome. This is a trend which will accelerate in the future, and it opens up many possibilities for American buyers.

Five Steps for American Businessmen

In conclusion, there are five steps I would suggest to businessmen interested in looking into the African market:

1. Make a serious survey of the African market. Talks with banks and with other American firms experienced in African business would enable you to get a view of what the continent has to offer and what are some of the special problems of operations there. You should become acquainted with the Agency for International Development and with the Department of Commerce Field Office in New York, or wherever you operate, to be fully aware of the services the U.S. Government offers to the foreign trader and investor. The foreign trade publications of the Commerce Department can be especially helpful to you. In the last 13 months alone, the Commerce Department in Washington had 2,174 conferences with businessmen and processed 2,671 written inquiries on trade or investment in Africa.

2. Make a survey trip to Africa to look over opportunities on the spot. Here again you can enlist the services of the Department of

Commerce, and the Department of State can advise its embassies in Africa and their staffs, particularly the commercial officers, of your visit. Thus, when you arrive in, say, Lagos, Dar-es-Salaam, or Tunis, the U.S. Embassy will be prepared to assist you in understanding the area and making important contacts there. The number of our commercial officers in Africa has risen from 4 in 1959 to 13 in 1964, to give you an idea of our increasing desire to provide services in Africa to American businessmen. In addition to these special commercial officers, there are economic officers at every post who are ready to help you.

3. To give the African market a fair chance, I would recommend the following procedure. Allow enough time in visiting a country to learn about it; no one can adequately survey a market in a day or two. Sales representatives and sales literature should use the commercial language of the country, and prices should be quoted in local currency. Businessmen have often had difficulties in French-speaking Africa in particular because they were unable to use that language.

4. Most important in any business operation in Africa, in my view, is the need to make a business venture a cooperative venture involving Africans in all phases. This is not only good politics but good business as well, because it means sharing American business know-how and developing Africans for more sophisticated work. Much attention should be given to the training and upgrading of Africans into increasingly responsible positions. It should be readily apparent that costs will be much lower if you employ Africans instead of sending Americans and their families abroad.

5. Finally, gear your products and sales to the needs of the market. Some businessmen rather quickly decide that the African capacity to buy expensive or sophisticated products is too limited to be worth the trouble. If you should so decide, perhaps you should consider African or U.S. manufacture of special products more suited to the current stage of development in Africa and gradually develop a market for more complex or more costly items.

The principal fact to remember is that you are dealing with a changing market. Past patterns of production and trade are being radically altered in Africa. New urban communities are coming into being. Large-scale mining, industrial, and agricultural projects are under way in many parts of the continent. Purchasing power is rising.

In some instances there are promising prospects for immediate opportunities for marketing and investment. In other cases the prospects are for the long term.

In any event, the future of Africa is in African hands, and American business can assist those hands as they approach their tasks of nation building. From such joint efforts, Africans and Americans alike have much to gain.

U.S.-Canadian Economic Committee To Meet at Ottawa

Press release 157 dated April 9

The ninth annual meeting of the Joint United States-Canadian Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs will be held in Ottawa, April 29–30.

Representing the United States will be the Honorable Dean Rusk, Secretary of State; the Honorable W. Walton Butterworth, United States Ambassador to Canada; the Honorable Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the Treasury; the Honorable Stewart L. Udall, Secretary of the Interior; the Honorable Orville Freeman, Secretary of Agriculture; the Honorable Christian A. Herter, President's Special Representative for Trade Negotiations; the Honorable George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State; and the Honorable Walter W. Heller, Council of Economic Advisers. Secretary Rusk will attend the meeting on April 30.

The Government of Canada will be represented by the Honorable Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs; the Honorable Walter Gordon, Minister of Finance; the Honorable Mitchell Sharp, Minister of Trade and Commerce; the Honorable Harry Hays, Minister of Agriculture; the Honorable Charles M. Drury, Minister of Industry; Mr. Norman A. Robertson, Chief Negotiator for the Government of Canada on Trade Negotiations; Mr. Louis Rasminsky, Governor of the Bank of

Canada; Mr. A. D. P. Heeney, Canadian Chairman of the International Joint Commission; and Mr. C. S. A. Ritchie, Canadian Ambassador to the United States.

The Joint Committee was inaugurated in 1953 to provide an opportunity for Cabinet officers of both governments to consult and examine economic and trade matters of common interest and concern to the two countries. Meetings have been held approximately once a year, alternately in Ottawa and in Washington. The last meeting of the Joint Committee was held in Washington, September 20–21, 1963.[1]

[1] For text of a communique issued at the close of the meeting, see BULLETIN of Oct. 7, 1963, p. 548.

The Role of Agriculture in Trade Expansion

by Christian A. Herter
Special Representative of the President for Trade Negotiations [1]

Trade is front and center on the international stage this year. The U.N. Conference on Trade and Development got under way in Geneva last week,[2] as you know. And the sixth round—the Kennedy Round, as it is widely called—of negotiations under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, for short) will open in the same city May 4.

It is the Kennedy Round for which my office is responsible and which I shall discuss today; but I hope you will follow the course of the U.N. Conference in your newspapers, for it will have a considerable bearing on the GATT negotiations, particularly as they relate to the less developed countries.

It was the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 which made the Kennedy Round possible. Because the European Common Market was often mentioned in the course of the debates leading to the enactment of this historic legislation, there is still in many quarters, I believe, a tendency to think that these negotiations amount to a duet—sometimes harmonious, sometimes sounding less so—between the European Economic Community (the EEC) and ourselves.

Here in Detroit, where you export with vigor, ingenuity, and enterprise to the whole wide world, you take a broader view. Our biggest single market—Canada—is just a tunnel's length away. Taking exports and imports together, total U.S. trade with our northern neighbor adds up to almost $8 billion a year, whereas the total with the Common Market is $6.5 billion. Indeed, our trade with the rest of Europe (mainly Britain and her fellow members of the European Free Trade Association, the so-called Outer Seven [3]) is $5.4 billion a year, almost as much as with the Common Market. Our trade with Asia, Australia, and New Zealand amounts to $9 billion, 36 percent of it with Japan alone, and our trade with Latin America $7.6 billion.

Thus, the Common Market is not in fact our principal trading partner—nor are we theirs. The Common Market does almost $20 billion worth of trade with the rest of Europe, including the Soviet bloc—three times what they do with us. With EFTA alone, they do $14 billion worth of business, over twice what they do with us. Their trade with Asia, Australia, and New Zealand is $7 billion and with Africa $6.6 billion, both slightly more than with the United States.

[1] Address made before the Economic Club of Detroit at Detroit, Mich., on Mar. 30.

[2] For a statement by Under Secretary Ball at Geneva on Mar. 25, see BULLETIN of Apr. 20, 1964, p. 634.

[3] Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the U.K. comprise the Outer Seven.

I cite these figures not to imply in any way that our trade with the Common Market is not important; it is, and it should expand with the dynamic growth of this new and vigorous trading entity. I cite these figures rather to show that, great as our stake and that of the EEC is in trade with each other, the stake each of us has in the general expansion of world trade is much greater. And it is the overall expansion of world trade which is the goal of the coming GATT negotiations. If all of us could match the pace set by the European Free Trade Association, which, per capita, does roughly double the amount of external trade that either the Common Market or the United States does, we would all be better off.

Obviously, this is easier said than done. This thought comes to mind when I am asked, as I sometimes am, what we have been doing in the 17 months that have passed since the Trade Expansion Act was enacted. The answer is that we have been hard at work—both on our own preparations here at home and in many consultations, multilateral and bilateral, with our negotiating partners abroad. Preparing for negotiations like these, involving so many nations and so many diverse interests, is somewhat like launching a new model of automobile—only 10 times as complicated and time consuming.

As we go into the home stretch, 5 weeks before the negotiations formally open, we have identified five problems as of major importance: tariff disparities, exceptions from the negotiations, nontariff barriers, the role of the less developed countries, and trade in agricultural products.

The Problem of Plenty

The most difficult and complex of the problems that face us is that of trade in agricultural products.[4] I make no apologies for stressing this, here in one of the major capitals of American industry. Agriculture and industry are interwoven at every point in our economy. Farmers buy a great many of your products, and farmers are more dependent upon export markets than any other major segment of the American producers. The crops on 1 out of every 5 acres cultivated here are shipped abroad. Farmers derive 15 percent of their income from exports, whereas the United States as a whole exports only 3.8 percent of its gross national product. Moreover, total farm exports, running at $5.6 billion a year, amount to 27 percent of our exports as a whole.

This is not a one-way street. Other nations benefit greatly from access to our reasonably priced and wholesome food. This is an important factor in restraining inflation, which is currently giving a number of governments cause for serious concern.

The problem of agriculture is, basically, the problem of plenty. Modern agricultural methods have, like the sorcerer's apprentice, opened the floodgates to abundance. The agricultural revolution of the mid-20th century is as dramatic a leap forward as the achievement of mass production here in Detroit a half-century ago. It began here, and it is now in full flood in Europe.

A new element has been introduced into an already complex situation by the effort of the European Economic Community to establish a common agricultural policy for its six member nations—an essential step in progress toward the unification of Europe. The implementation of this policy is a matter of major importance to us, for we export over a billion dollars' worth of farm products annually to the EEC. It is our biggest single cash market for agricultural products.

We have made our view clear that the common agricultural policy should be designed so as to preserve the opportunity of efficient suppliers to compete in the EEC market. Moreover, we believe that the Community's agricultural policies, like our own, must be negotiable in GATT. This, indeed, was the consensus of the GATT ministers when they met in Geneva last May and adopted a unanimous resolution calling for "the creation of acceptable conditions of access to world markets for agricultural products in furtherance of a significant development and expansion of world trade in such products." [5]

We had a sharp warning last year of pro-

[4] For an address on "Policy Problems in International Trade of Agricultural Products" by Clarence W. Nichols, see BULLETIN of Mar. 16, 1964, p. 416.

[5] For statements by Mr. Herter at the GATT ministerial meeting and text of a resolution adopted on May 21, 1963, see *ibid.*, June 24, 1963, p. 990.

tectionist tendencies in the EEC. The implementation with respect to poultry of the common agricultural policy [6] had the effect of tripling the import charges on the poultry we shipped to Germany and sharply raising the price to German consumers. After patient and persistent efforts over many months had failed to secure any significant easement of these onerous charges, we were compelled, at the beginning of this year, to raise tariffs upon items involving an equivalent volume of EEC exports to the U.S.[7] We regretted doing this, but we felt we had to make the point—and make it forcefully—that the Common Market, in putting its agricultural policy into effect, cannot with impunity ignore the interests of its outside suppliers.

High Level of Proposed Grain Prices

Meanwhile, the EEC came forward in December with two highly important proposals in the field of agriculture.

The first deals with the fixing of wheat and feed grain prices at a common level within the EEC, a step required for a common agricultural policy. Presently, there is a wide range of grain prices within the EEC, with Germany having the highest and France the lowest. The EEC proposed that the common prices be fixed at levels between these extremes—levels which are, however, far above world prices.

Without going into details, I can say that we think that these proposed prices are too high. They will artificially stimulate increased grain production, particularly in France. They will tend to make the European Economic Community more dependent upon uneconomic production and hence threaten the markets which we and other efficient farm products exporters presently enjoy there.

Here again, European interests are affected as well as ours. The price of grain is a basic element in the cost of living. In particular, the proposed high prices for feed grains will lead to higher prices for meat and milk, which are increasingly important in the European diet as standards of living go up.

[6] For statements by Mr. Herter, see *ibid.*, June 24, 1963, p. 996, and Oct. 14, 1963, p. 605.

[7] For text of Proclamation 3564, see *ibid.*, Dec. 23, 1963, p. 969.

Many of the problems we see developing in agriculture trade and in the negotiations stem from the high level of grain prices the EEC is now considering. A decision to unify grain prices at substantially lower levels would make an important contribution to the Kennedy Round. I cannot stress too strongly the effect of the grain prices finally adopted by the EEC on the outcome of the whole trade negotiations.

EEC Agricultural Negotiating Plan

The second EEC proposal concerns the framework within which the agricultural negotiations in general should be carried on. This proposal has been described as one to bind the level of agricultural protection. Actually, it is proposed that all the major trading nations—food exporters and importers alike—make commitments with regard to their various present systems of agricultural subsidies and/or price supports—but there appear to be so many loopholes in this proposal that the commitments would not, in fact, be meaningful.

The concept is simple at first sight, but its implementation would be immensely complicated. I shan't discuss it in detail here, but I will summarize our reactions.

First, we cannot reconcile the Commission's proposals with decisions of GATT ministers which stated that there should be a significant liberalization of world trade and that the negotiations should cover all classes of products, including agriculture. The Community's negotiating plan for agriculture seems to establish as the objective of the negotiations the binding of increased levels of protection rather than reductions in trade barriers and expansion of trade.

Second, the plan not only fails to provide for any reductions in barriers; it would introduce new restrictions by eliminating existing tariff bindings, including zero bindings, and create the possibility of increased protection on all agricultural tariff items. It would halt any further development of trade based upon comparative advantage or changes in relative efficiency. In our view the point of departure of the negotiations must be existing concessions, and the purpose of the negotiations must be to achieve a further liberalization of trade.

Third, there would be no stability of agricultural concessions, since the whole system under the Community's proposal terminates and has to be renegotiated every 3 years. A country which is a major exporter of agricultural products would have difficulty in assessing the balance of its advantages and disadvantages at the conclusion of the negotiations and would face the need for making a reassessment at the end of 3 years.

For these and other reasons, the proposed EEC agricultural negotiating plan is neither acceptable nor workable as a general negotiating formula.

U.S. Approach to Agricultural Trade

Our approach to agricultural trade is pragmatic rather than dogmatic. Indeed, we have come to the conclusion that the spectrum of products and problems is so wide that no single formula will work.

Two weeks ago in Geneva we made certain procedural suggestions as to how we might get started on practical sector-by-sector work, to see which negotiating methods appear to offer the best prospects for success for each particular sector.

We see the possibility of grouping together certain agricultural products by the nature of the products themselves. Another useful grouping appears to be according to the nature of the protection in force. The following major groups seem to be susceptible to this pragmatic approach.

We would start with the basic principle that all the existing zero duty bindings, such as those on cotton and soy beans, will be retained. There are many other commodities, such as fresh fruit and processed fruits, for which fixed tariffs constitute the sole or major form of protection. For these commodities, we would seek to obtain as advantageous tariff cuts as possible. For items protected by a combination of measures, such as poultry and rice, we would seek arrangements to assure market access and the opportunity for growth. We would also seek the removal or reduction of nontariff barriers where they exist.

For some of the major agricultural products, the GATT ministers decided last May that negotiations should be undertaken to establish worldwide commodity arrangements. These are grains, meat, and possibly dairy products. It is for these products and these commodity arrangements that the EEC proposals for measuring and freezing levels of protection may have application—but only when combined with provisions for assuring continued access to the market equal to the levels of a recent representative period and opportunity to share in future growth. For us, the primary objective of a commodity arrangement is that set forth by the GATT ministers—the creation of acceptable conditions of access to world markets.

This is a practicable and reasonable goal. Indeed, it has been incorporated in the agreements in principle which we and other major suppliers of grain to the United Kingdom have recently concluded with the British Government. Moreover, we are willing to practice what we preach—and we have shown that we are. The recent voluntary agreements to limit beef and veal exports to the United States which we negotiated last month with Australia, New Zealand, and Ireland [8] assure them of a reasonable opportunity to compete for a share in our market and of participation in its growth. We believe that these are sound principles for negotiating worldwide grains or meat arrangements.

The negotiation of a world grains arrangement is an ambitious undertaking. While these negotiations will be lengthy, they must move along in phase with the industrial aspects of the Kennedy Round.

I have said we are pragmatic. The overall result is what counts for us. We must obtain from these negotiations arrangements that insure, broadly speaking, achievement of the objective established by the GATT ministers—"acceptable conditions of access to world markets for agricultural products in furtherance of a significant development and expansion of world trade in such products."

Its achievement would serve the interests of everyone—producers and consumers, exporting and importing countries. The benefits of increased trade, based upon relative efficiency, can be as great in agriculture as they have proven to be in industry. We cannot expect to move

[8] For texts, see *ibid.*, Mar. 9, 1964, p. 381, and Mar. 23, 1964, p. 468.

toward freer trade in industrial products if we at the same time leave agriculture stagnating in a morass of protectionism, or even sinking deeper into it. That is why I have said, often and emphatically, that the United States will enter into no ultimate agreement unless significant progress is registered toward trade liberalization in agricultural as well as in industrial products.

I said at the beginning of my talk that trade seems to dominate the international stage this year. That is partly because the danger of war has receded. And if the sounds emanating from trade negotiations sometimes remind us of the haggling at an oriental bazaar, they are nevertheless infinitely preferable to the thunder of guns. Moreover, in trade negotiations, unlike war, there need be no victors and no vanquished. As President Kennedy liked to say, a rising tide lifts all the boats.

Foreign and Domestic Implications of U.S. Immigration Laws

by Abba P. Schwartz
Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs [1]

It is most gratifying to me to have the opportunity to respond to your invitation to present to you this morning some observations on the foreign and domestic implications of our immigration laws and of our assistance to migrants and refugees abroad.

As I entered this chapel today, I was shown the window which briefly depicts the historical origin of St. Olaf College. As you, and I, and others who are privileged to attend or visit this college become absorbed in the present beauty of the campus, impressed by the structures which have been built on this hill, aware of the academic standards and the scholarly achievements of those who have studied and taught here, and familiar with the nationally known names of Rolvaag and Christiansen—as all of this confronts us, we cannot help but be overwhelmed by the significance of the contribution a small group of Norwegian immigrants has made to our American way of life. This institution is one more example—and a good example—of what is possible when a country opens its doors to immigrants.

We in the Department of State who have the responsibility for developing and applying United States policies in this area feel that the opportunities to discuss these matters with the public come all too infrequently, particularly in communities west of our eastern seaboard.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who was always mindful and proud of his Dutch heritage, reminded us on several occasions that "we are all immigrants" and that the contributions which first-generation immigrants have made to the cultural and economic life of our country is in no small measure responsible for our greatness.

Because of our heritage and the fact that the United States since the end of the Second World War has been placed in a role of critical leadership in a troubled and constantly changing world, we are concerned to see to it that our immigration laws reflect our real character and objectives and maintain for us the image of ourselves as Americans that we would like to achieve abroad. The nature of this image plays an important role in the achievement of our foreign policies generally.

Someplace in American history, Americans,

[1] Address made at St. Olaf College, Northfield, Minn., on Apr. 3 (press release 139 dated Apr. 1).

who were immigrants themselves, began to believe that the geographical and national origin of a man determined his suitability as an immigrant. Subsequently this was codified into law and became our national immigration policy. At the same time in American history, however, Americans themselves learned to judge their fellow Americans on the basis of ability, industriousness, intelligence, integrity, and all the other factors which truly determine a man's value to society. In most laws of our nation we recognize this, except in our immigration laws, where we continue to imply judgment of a man on the basis of his national and geographical origin.

It is not hard to imagine, therefore, the implication of this policy when it is interpreted to a man from a geographical area or of a national origin which is not "favored" by our present laws. Whether an individual wants to come to the United States or not, he is left with the impression that our standards of judgment are not based on the merits of the individual—as we claim to judge men—but rather on an assumption which can be interpreted as bias and prejudice.

Thus, inasmuch as our immigration laws are interpreted as the basis of how we evaluate others around the world, it is not difficult to understand the impact this has on people abroad and its effect on our foreign relations. Therefore, if for no other reason than to tell people around the world the basis on which we actually judge ourselves and others—not to speak of the contributions all immigrant cultures and traditions have made to our way of life—a revision of our immigration laws is fully justified. We have the same concern with respect to reactions to our assistance abroad since World War II to migrants, refugees, displaced persons, and uprooted persons generally.

The history of immigration to the United States is really the history of this country. The foundations of this nation were laid by people escaping oppression. The Puritans, the Huguenots, the Quakers, the Scotch-Irish, and the Spanish-Portuguese Jews were all refugees in their time.

As far back as 1644 people speaking 18 different languages were living side by side peacefully in the town of New Amsterdam on Manhattan Island. New York continued to welcome the oppressed of every nation of Europe. This union of diverse cultures and skills helped that State to attain its unique position in manufacturing, commerce, finance, and government.

A roster of pioneers in the organization of many of our industries would fill many pages. Among them:

—John Jacob Astor, a German immigrant, was the great pioneer in the fur industry;

—Andrew Carnegie, a Scottish immigrant boy, founded the American steel industry;

—Joseph Pulitzer, a Hungarian immigrant, made a great contribution to journalism;

—Michael Cudahy, Irish, was one of the most successful figures in the development of the meatpacking industry;

—Joseph Bulova, Czech—the watch industry;

—David Sarnoff, Russian—radio;

—Charles L. Fleischmann, Hungarian—the yeast industry;

—Frederick Weyerhaeuser, German—the lumber industry;

—William S. Knudsen, Dane—the automobile industry.

And behind these eminent names are hundreds of thousands of nameless men and women who brought other important industries to this country. Our clothing industry was developed by German, Austrian, Russian, and Italian immigrants and in recent years has been sustained by "migrants" from Puerto Rico and new immigrants from other parts of the world. Our watchmaking industry was developed by French and Swiss immigrants; our pottery and chinaware industry by German immigrants; and the cheese industry by Germans and Swiss.

Equally revealing are the many immigrants whose inventions formed the basis for American-born entrepreneurs to develop our great industrial base. To mention only a few: Ole Evinrude (Norwegian)—who invented the outboard motor; John Ericsson (Swedish)—the ironclad ship; David Lindquist (Swedish)—the electric elevator; Conrad Huber (Russian)—the flashlight; Michael Pupin (Serbian)—great discoveries in electricity; David Thomas (Welshman)—the hot blast furnace; Alexander

Graham Bell (Scotsman), who invented the telephone.

Many of these immigrants entered our country as children—young and unknown. They attended our schools and our laboratories. Their drive, their imagination, their desire to "prove themselves" helped to make United States industry the greatest in the world and our standard of living the highest.

Many of the refugees who fled from Hitler's tyranny, such as Albert Einstein, were persons of great distinction who contributed immeasurably to our scientific and cultural development, but others were small children, who fled with their families to this country for safety. Today they are working with other young scientists in our laboratories, helping to conquer space. The spirit that is so typically American—the welcoming of people of all backgrounds and the freedom of opportunity—has helped the immigrant and the refugee, who, in turn, have helped the United States.

History of U.S. Immigration Policy

The Federal Government at the outset of our history established a liberal immigration policy. The Constitution embodies civil rights provisions and a liberal attitude toward religious and ethnic differences. Ours was the first national state to proclaim the principle that there should be no religious test for office holding. And *only* the President of the United States must be native born. All other officerholders may be naturalized citizens.

The Federal Government utilized the principle of religious freedom to stimulate immigration. After the adoption of the Federal Constitution in 1789 Congress passed the first Federal legislation on immigration, which included a naturalization and a quarantine law.

During the 1830's there was a large influx of immigrants from famine-stricken Ireland. Between 1841 and 1850 there was substantial refugee emigration from Germany. The combined German and Irish immigration was 1,713,000 for the decade. Immigration for the next decade to 1860 increased to 2,598,000. The Scandinavians began to arrive after the Civil War and settled in the Midwest.

In the 1880's appreciable numbers of immigrants entered for the first time from Eastern and Southern Europe. They were the "new" immigrants. They came from the Balkans, Central Europe, from Russia, and from Italy. Between 1882 and 1889 large numbers of Jews fled persecution from czarist terrors in Russia and began to enter the United States. Between 1897 and 1914 our average immigration exceeded a million a year. The new immigrants numbered 10 million, as against approximately 3 million during the earlier period.

With the development of urban society and huge industries in the cities, sociological changes took place. The problems of unplanned growth were blamed on the immigrant. The "new" immigrants were represented as unwanted people in contrast with the "old," who in retrospect were glamourized as highly selected, adventurous, and specially trained. People forgot that the "old" were sometimes indentured servants, persons who had been imprisoned for debts. In reality, each new wave of immigrants had created fears in the "old." So the Irish and Germans were accused of creating economic problems.

This "fear of the stranger" played an important role in the restrictive immigration policies which developed. Labor itself, fearing for its jobs, was anti-immigration in that period. The immigrants were blamed for the industrial panics.

The restriction against Asiatics began with the barring of Chinese in 1882. It was the beginning of the use of racialism as a basis for restrictive immigration. The Japanese were next, and in 1917 the Asiatic Barred Zone was created. This act was passed despite President Wilson's veto and excluded persons from parts of China, all of India, Burma, Siam, the Malaya states, the Asian part of Russia, part of Arabia, part of Afghanistan, most of the Polynesian Islands, and the East Indian Islands. As you can see, this represents a large part of the world. It was the progenitor of the Asia-Pacific Triangle, which I shall describe later, and of the 1924 act which used the national-origins quota system as the basis for allocating visas.

Under the national-origins quota system which is embodied in our current immigration law each country outside of the Western Hemi-

sphere is allotted a specific number (a quota) of immigrants who may be admitted to the United States each year. This allocation is based on a proportion of a total equal to the proportion of the population in the United States in 1920 whose national origins, including ancestry, could be attributed to that particular country. The 1924 Immigration Act limited quota immigration to 150,000 and lessened the possibility of large-scale immigration from Eastern and Southern Europe because the basic formula resulted in disproportionate quotas to Northern European countries.

In 1952 the immigration and nationality laws were codified and revised by Congress, and that law governs our basic immigration policies today. The 1952 act retained the national-origins principle as the basis for a quota system and instead of the Asiatic Barred Zone substituted the Asia-Pacific Triangle. While many of the provisions of this law modernized procedures, and granted important powers to the Attorney General to admit persons in emergent circumstances, it retained many of the late 19th-century and early 20th-century antagonisms.

Under the current law 157,000 quota visas are authorized annually. But they are never fully utilized because of the manner of the allocation. Thousands upon thousands of persons, otherwise qualified for admission, await their turn on the quota lists.

A mother born in Ireland could join her son in the United States immediately, I am glad to say, because the Irish quota is large and never fully used. But a mother of an American citizen may not be able to join her son in this country if she was born in Greece or Turkey, which have small quotas. Under the present law a parent of an American citizen is entitled to what is known as "second preference" and the law judges the parent's admissibility to join his child upon the place where the parent was born. But if the parent has more than 50-percent Asian blood, he is chargeable to the quota assigned to the Asian area from which he originally derived his Asian origin.

Persons born in Great Britain are permitted 65,361 quota numbers, but only about 40 percent are used. The unused are not available to nationals of other countries who desire to emigrate and whose skills and talents may be highly sought by us. Greece has a quota of 308, Hungary 865, Italy 5,666, all of which are oversubscribed.

Persons born in the Western Hemisphere are admitted nonquota. This provision of the law is based on our foreign policy of hemisphere friendship and solidarity. However, it does not apply to persons born in dependent colonies in the Western Hemisphere or to the inhabitants of former colonies—now independent—of Jamaica, Trinidad, and Tobago. Whether by accident or by design, this obviously does not serve United States foreign policy interests.

Displaced Persons and Refugees

Because the quotas based on national origin severely limit admissibility of persons of certain origins, it has been necessary for Congress to enact special legislation from time to time to take care of displaced persons and refugees from various forms of man's inhumanity to man. At this point I would like to digress from a discussion of our immigration laws to present a brief summary of what the United States has done since World War II in assisting uprooted persons not only to come to the United States but to find places of resettlement in other countries. The United States took the leadership in organizing the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), which provided immediate assistance to countries devastated by the Second World War and to several million persons who had been displaced. This organization was followed by the International Refugee Organization (IRO), a specialized agency established by the General Assembly of the United Nations. The IRO moved over 1,400,000 displaced persons, principally from Europe to resettlement in countries overseas. Upon the termination of the IRO, the United States took the leadership again in organizing the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) in 1951. ICEM, with headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland, has moved in the succeeding years 1,260,000 persons, including some 556,000 refugees from Europe and from mainland China through Hong Kong. Supported by our Government and 28 other member governments of the free world, that or-

ganization continues today to move and resettle refugees and migrants to new homes overseas.

It is relevant to cite some of the dollar expenditures by the United States in these efforts. In 1945 and 1946 the United States Army provided assistance to displaced persons apart from the assistance administered through UNRRA in the amount of $200 million, while UNRRA accounted for some $29 million of United States contributions in special assistance to refugees. The United States contribution to IRO between 1948 and 1952 totaled $237 million. $93 million was spent through the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) to resettle displaced families who fled from North Korea during the Korean war. $90 million was provided for refugees from North Viet-Nam. Some $300 million to Palestine refugees has been channeled by us through the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees, approximately $10 million through the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to assist other refugees. $53 million has been spent through the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, $47 million through the United States Escapee Program, a direct unilateral effort by the United States Government to assist postwar escapees from communism. With other expenditures in assistance to refugees, including grants of our surplus foods to various areas throughout the world, the total United States contribution from the end of World War II to the present for these purposes has been conservatively estimated at over $1.3 billion. Such assistance is continuing currently at a rate of approximately $40 million annually.

All of these current and past expenditures were public funds supplied by United States citizens. They do not include funds contributed by the American public through the well-organized channels of voluntary effort. It is estimated that the American voluntary agencies themselves have contributed $1.2 billion in cash and commodities to assist refugees abroad since World War II. This is an impressive total and must be recorded in appraising the magnitude of the efforts of the United States Government and the American people in assisting those uprooted by economic and political pressures and changes. This is a creditable chapter in our history and speaks well for the sense of responsibility of all our citizens and our Government.

Of equal importance, I believe, is the fact that since World War II, in response to specific refugee situations, the United States Government has admitted under different procedures over 1 million refugees from racial, religious, and political oppression. 42,000 were admitted under President Truman's directive of 1945; 405,000 under the Displaced Persons Act of June 1948; 196,000 under the Refugee Relief Act of 1953, including 6,000 orphans; 38,000 Hungarian refugees were admitted on parole under the discretionary authority granted to the Attorney General in the 1952 immigration law, immediately following the Hungarian uprising in 1956. Some 150,000 refugees have been admitted under quota provisions of the regular immigration law, and since Castro took over Cuba we have admitted some 200,000 Cuban refugees.

In response to the sudden influx of over 100,000 Chinese refugees in Hong Kong in May 1962, the Attorney General admitted some Chinese refugees on parole. Some 10,000 have arrived, and applications are still being considered. This action promoted our foreign policy interest by demonstrating the humanitarian concern and friendship of the American people toward the Chinese people.

As a result of varied experience under these special legislative acts benefiting refugees, the Congress enacted legislation in 1960 establishing the so-called "fair share" principle, under which we accept under parole 25 percent of all the refugees accepted collectively by all countries of immigration in a preceding 6 months' period. To date some 13,025 refugees have been so accepted.

You are probably much more familiar with the hospitality which the United States has afforded in recent years to over 200,000 refugees from Cuba, most of whom arrived in Florida but are gradually being relocated throughout the country. This was the first instance in experience in which the United States became a country of first asylum for refugees.

The contributions of the United States Gov-

ernment and of the American people in receiving refugees and in providing funds and services for their relief abroad have played an important role in our foreign policies. Our generous and quick responses to refugee situations have characterized our function of leadership in a disturbed world and stimulated similar actions by other governments.

Proposals for Revision of Present Law

The foregoing telescopic treatment of the past, although admittedly incomplete in many details, lays the groundwork for our consideration of the problem at present.

We believe that American immigration policy as expressed in our laws is important both to our foreign policy and the domestic welfare of the United States. The national-origins quota system does not truly reflect the real character of the American people, but it does give a false image of our thinking to the world. Its effect is that a Greek is not as welcome as a Pole, and a Pole is not as welcome as a German. And it is based not on what you may be today but on where you were born.

The present law grants priorities (preferences) to certain family members and to persons with certain skills. But why should parents of American citizens be given only "second preference" in the quota, if their children want them? Why should there be any quota at all for a parent of a United States citizen? And why should the parent of a legally resident alien not even be given a preference?

According to present law, a person whose services are determined to be needed in the country because of education, technical training, specialized experience, or exceptional ability is entitled to "first preference." This is in the self-interest of the United States, since we benefit from all the education and experience. But even before such a preference is granted, an employer must produce a job, often to an unknown person and without any assurance that a petition for a preference will be granted. This is just one aspect of a complicated system which leaves some quotas filled and others unfilled. Does this add to our image of knowing how to do things well? We should certainly be able to devise something better.

Leaders of religious, civic, labor, and social service agencies have been calling for a change in the present system of allocating visas. They have endorsed strongly the historic step taken by the late President Kennedy in calling for the elimination of the national-origins quota system. In a special message to the Congress,[2] President Kennedy on July 23, 1963, said:

> The most urgent and fundamental reform I am recommending relates to the national origins system of selecting immigrants. Since 1924 it has been used to determine the number of quota immigrants permitted to enter the United States each year. Accordingly, although the legislation I am transmitting deals with many problems which require remedial action, it concentrates attention primarily upon revision of our quota immigration system. The enactment of this legislation will not resolve all of our important problems in the field of immigration law. It will, however, provide a sound basis upon which we can build in developing an immigration law that serves the national interest and reflects in every detail the principles of equality and human dignity to which our nation subscribes.

President Johnson in January 1964, in his remarks at the White House to representatives of organizations interested in immigration and refugee matters,[3] stated:

> We have met for the purpose of pointing up the fact that we have very serious problems in trying to get a fair immigration law. There is now before the Congress a bill that, I hope, can be supported by a majority of the Members of the Congress.
>
> This bill applies new tests and new standards which we believe are reasonable and fair and right. I refer specifically to: What is the training and qualification of the immigrant who seeks admission? What kind of a citizen would he make, if he were admitted? What is his relationship to persons in the United States? And what is the time of his application? These are rules that are full of common sense, common decency, which operate for the common good.
>
> That is why in my state of the Union message last Wednesday [4] I said that I hoped that in establishing preferences a nation that was really built by immigrants—immigrants from all lands—could ask those who seek to immigrate now: What can you do for our country? But we ought to never ask: In what country were you born?

Before I elaborate on the position of the administration on immigration policy as expressed by President Kennedy and President

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[2] For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 19, 1963, p. 298.

[3] For text, see *ibid.*, Feb. 10, 1964, p. 211.

[4] *Ibid.*, Jan. 27, 1964, p. 110.

Johnson and on their proposals for a revision of the law, I should like to comment on two other topics at issue in any reconsideration of American immigration policy.

Policy on Asian Immigration

One is the approach to Asian immigration reflected in our immigration laws, which I mentioned earlier. Concern about the effect of the large number of Chinese and Japanese immigrants in the latter part of the 19th century led eventually to the enactment of the so-called Chinese Exclusion Acts and of other laws practically closing our doors to Japanese and other Asian immigrants. A reversal of this policy was initiated by President Franklin D. Roosevelt when he urged the Congress to eliminate the Chinese Exclusion Act and to establish a quota for Chinese persons. Congress complied with the President's request in 1943 and passed a similar law on behalf of Indian immigrants in 1946. These acts, however, permitted only a token immigration of Chinese and Indian immigrants, since the entire volume of immigration from these two countries was governed by the small quotas set up for them, 105 for Chinese and 100 for Indians. In other words, no provisions were made to permit Chinese or Indian wives or children of United States citizens to join their husbands and parents without quota restrictions as in the case of non-Asian immigrants. The need for a more humane policy toward Asian immigrants became apparent when an increasing number of our servicemen during and after the Second World War married girls of various Asian ancestry. The Congress, after first responding to this situation by the passage of special legislation, placed Asian spouses and children of United States citizens on equal footing with non-Asian spouses and children when it enacted the Immigration and Nationality Act in 1952. This was a major development which in the heat of debate about the merits and demerits of our Immigration Act has frequently been overlooked.

While the 1952 law took this step forward, it continued to treat Asian immigrants differently from non-Asians. It requires that an Asian person born outside of the Asian area be charged to the quota of his ethnic origin, rather than to the quota of his place of birth. On the other hand, Asians have benefited from the special displaced persons and refugee legislation and also from the special laws passed by the Congress to remove pressures from heavily oversubscribed quotas.

Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago

Another area of concern in our immigration policy is the limitation of our good-neighbor policy to those countries of the Western Hemisphere which were independent at the time of the enactment of the Immigration and Nationality Act in 1952. Countries in the Caribbean area which have gained their independence since 1952 are treated as quota areas. They are Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago, each having an annual quota of 100. Since Congress first imposed quotas in 1921 on the volume of immigration, it has always exempted persons born in any independent country of this hemisphere. It is hoped that the Congress will adhere to this policy with respect to newly independent countries when it reconsiders our immigration policy and thus make our hemispheric policy consistent.

What is the outlook for a congressional review of immigration policy, and what is the stand the executive branch has taken on this issue?

President Kennedy submitted to the Congress in July of 1963 a request for a revision of our immigration laws, urging specifically that the Congress, over a period of 5 years, eliminate the national-origins system and that it immediately place Asians on the same footing with all other immigrants and give nonquota status to all persons born in independent countries of the Western Hemisphere. Bills reflecting the President's proposals have been introduced in the House by Representative Emanuel Celler of New York and in the Senate by Philip Hart of Michigan. Senators Hubert H. Humphrey and Eugene J. McCarthy have cosponsored the bill. Earlier this year the Senate held some hearings on the administration bill. After the Congress has taken final action on the pending civil rights bill, it is expected that it will consider President Kennedy's and President John-

son's request for a revision of the immigration laws.

When Congress deliberates the recommendations of the administration, an important factor will be the recognition that the changes proposed, which may appear far-reaching to the superficial reader of our laws, are not drastic departures from our present policies. Rather they would reconcile the letter of our general law with the immigration policy of the United States as it has developed during the last 10 years as a result of refugee and other special legislation enacted by the Congress. A recognition of this fact should be a persuasive factor in the considerations of the Congress.

No one in the brief time allotted for this presentation can do justice to the subject. I can only hope that I may have convinced you that it is important that our immigration laws reflect our national character and objectives more accurately. Surely our concern is not for the accident of place of birth but for the inherent moral worth of the individual who seeks to come to our shores.

I also hope that you will be stimulated to help our Government and voluntary groups to do more in meeting the needs of those who must seek new opportunities for dignity and self-dependence through emigration to another country.

THE CONGRESS

Communications Satellite Program and the Department of State

Statement by Abram Chayes
Legal Adviser[1]

Mr. Chairman, I am here to discuss on behalf of the Department of State some of the international aspects of the communications satellite program. It would perhaps be helpful if I identify and comment briefly on three areas of particular interest to the Department.

First: Policy statements by the President[2] and the Communications Satellite Act itself establish broad national objectives in the foreign policy field. In particular, it is the announced policy of the United States to favor the creation of a single global communications satellite system with opportunities open to all nations to participate therein, either as coowners or lessees of capacity in the system. Access to the system is to be nondiscriminatory, and care and attention are to be directed toward providing communication satellite services to economically less developed countries and areas as well as those more highly developed.

As you know, a number of preliminary talks with future foreign partners of the corporation have been held over the past year in preparation for the negotiation of international arrangements to set up the structure of the global system. In the preparation and conduct of these talks the corporation and the Department have enjoyed excellent working relations characterized by close and effective collaboration, and we continue to do so. In this way the Department has been discharging its responsibilities in the implementation of the foreign policy objectives I have already mentioned.

Second: The Department is closely involved with the preparation of United States positions and conduct of negotiations relating to the allocation of radio frequencies for the various communication services. It should be noted that section 102(b) of the Communications Satellite

[1] Made before the Military Operations Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations on Apr. 8 (press release 151).

[2] For texts, see BULLETIN of Aug. 14, 1961, p. 273; Sept. 24, 1962, p. 467; and Dec. 9, 1963, p. 904.

Act directs that care and attention be given to efficient and economical use of the electromagnetic frequency spectrum. I am pleased to confirm that a major milestone in this field was successfully passed last fall at the Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference on Space Communications of the International Telecommunication Union.[3] Satisfactory allocations of frequencies were made by the Conference, and agreement was reached on procedures for their notification and use. The Department has a continuing interest in the international aspects of frequency management generally and as it affects the communications satellite program. Lieutenant Colonel [Seymour] Stearns of the Telecommunications Division of the Department is with me today and is prepared to respond in detail to any questions you may have on this phase of the Department's activities.

Third: The Department is itself a major user of telecommunication services, and its facilities are part of the National Communications System. The Department expects to benefit as a user from the further development of that system. Mr. [John W.] Coffey, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Communications, will answer any questions in this area.

Against this background it can readily be appreciated that the Department has followed with interest the discussions between the Communications Satellite Corporation and the Secretary of Defense, as Executive Agent for the National Communications System, relating to the possibility of shared use by the United States Government of the global commercial communications satellite system to be brought into existence by the corporation and its future foreign partners.

The Department has been kept fully informed of the progress of these discussions by representatives of both the Department of Defense and the corporation and has participated in them as appropriate. To date, the discussions have not resulted in any agreed basis for shared use. We are hopeful that a shared use of the global system can be worked out without in any way jeopardizing the policy objectives set forth in the act. But we do not believe it possible to say in the abstract whether or not this can be accomplished. When the current discussions result in a basis of agreement it will have to be explained to and reviewed with the corporation's future partners.

Finally, the Department of State is satisfied that all parties to the present discussions fully recognize the necessity that any specific arrangements for governmental use of the system should not impair the successful implementation of the national objectives to which I have referred. Final decisions, therefore, will be made in the light of the results of discussion with future foreign partners of a specific program which must first be defined to the mutual satisfaction of the corporation and the Executive Agent of the National Communications System. The Department of State will, of course, actively participate in this process.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This concludes my prepared statement. I will be glad to answer any questions you and your colleagues may have.

[3] For background, see *ibid.*, Nov. 25, 1963, p. 835.

President Reports to Congress on Food for Peace Program

White House press release dated April 3

President Johnson reported to the Congress on April 3 that $1.6 billion worth of Food for Peace commodities were shipped overseas during 1963 as the United States set a new export record for farm products.

The 19th semiannual report on activities under Public Law 480[1] showed that total U.S. agricultural exports for the 1963 calendar year reached $5.6 billion, a 12-percent jump over the $5 billion volume in 1962.

In a memorandum to the President accompanying the July–December 1963 report, Richard W. Reuter, Director of Food for Peace, said that P.L. 480 "provides a ladder by which developing nations climb to full trade partnership with the United States." He added: "It is significant that while $1.6 billion worth of Food for Peace commodities were being shipped overseas during the 1963 calendar year, U.S. com-

[1] H. Doc. 294, 88th Cong., 2d sess.

mercial exports of agricultural commodities reached a record high of $4 billion."

Noting that P.L. 480 will be 10 years old next July 10, Mr. Reuter advised the President that from a modest beginning, the program has grown until, at the end of 1963, a total of $11.4 billion worth of Food for Peace commodities had been delivered overseas.

"Whereas only a few ships per month were required during those early days, today an average of five 10,000 ton ships leave American ports every day carrying Food for Peace cargoes to the hungry of the world," Mr. Reuter said. "Hundreds of millions of people a year now receive food—otherwise unavailable to them—from this sharing of the abundance of our farms."

The President's report on the overseas use of our food resources highlighted the following:

—The Alliance for Progress project "Operation Niños" is now providing supplemental food daily to 10 million children and by the end of this year should reach 12 million—one out of every three school-age children in Latin America. Cooperating alliance countries are themselves contributing $13 million in equipment, supplies, and services to this massive education-nutrition effort.

—In country after country around the world, there is a shift from family relief feeding programs to food-for-work and other "bootstrap" community development programs. Seven hundred thousand workers in 22 countries are earning food for their families—an estimated 4 million persons—in part payment for their labor on projects ranging from school and road construction to land reclamation, irrigation, and reforestation.

—Food for Peace sales programs continue to encourage other nations to shift from food purchases with their own currencies to dollar-credit and cash purchases as their economies improve. In the past 2½ years, 33 agreements for food purchases for long-term dollar credit (title IV) were entered into with 17 countries. In general, these new agreements represented a shift from purchases using only foreign currency (title I) to purchases for long-term dollar credit or a dollar credit–foreign currency combination.

—The first dollar repayments were made by foreign governments of credit extended under earlier title IV agreements, with receipts to the U.S. totaling $2.3 million.

—Foreign currencies received by the United States from title I sales were increasingly used to pay U.S. overseas expenses, preventing a dollar outflow equivalent to $253.3 million during the year.

"I am convinced that the Food for Peace program in the short run can effectively and economically meet human needs and in the long run can contribute significantly to the expansion of trade and the development of new world markets," Mr. Reuter summed up the report to the President. "Public Law 480 has proven a most effective way to help close the 'food gap' that exists between the 'have' and the 'have not' nations of the world."

The Food for Peace program is a multiagency United States effort supervised and coordinated by the Food for Peace office in the White House and administered primarily by the Department of Agriculture and the Agency for International Development of the Department of State.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on April 7 confirmed the following nominations:

Henry L. T. Koren to be Ambassador to the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville). (For biographic details, see White House press release dated March 20.)

Rutherford M. Poats to be Assistant Administrator for the Far East, Agency for International Development. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated March 3.)

Jack Hood Vaughn to be Ambassador to Panama. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 162 dated April 13.)

Mrs. Katharine Elkus White to be Ambassador to Denmark. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated March 20.)

Appointments

Mrs. Lee Walsh as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Evaluations, effective April 6. (For biographic details,

see Department of State press release 145 dated April 6.)

TREATY INFORMATION

Canada Continues Suspension of Welland Canal Tolls

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

The Department of State announced on April 9 (press release 155) an exchange of notes with the Government of Canada regarding the suspension of tolls on the Welland Canal. The tolls, which were suspended as of July 18, 1962, and were to be reimposed April 1, 1964, will continue to be suspended.

TEXT OF CANADIAN NOTE

OTTAWA, *March 31, 1964.*

No. 46

EXCELLENCY, I have the honour to refer to Note No. 198 of December 19, 1963[1] to you from the Secretary of State for External Affairs and to your reply in Note 202 of December 20, 1963[1] regarding the intention of the Government of Canada to reimpose tolls on the Welland Canal as of April 1, 1964 at the rates and under the terms existing immediately prior to the suspension of these tolls in 1962.

The Canadian Government has now re-examined this matter and has come to the conclusion that it would be preferable not to reimpose tolls on the Welland Canal at the present time.

Accordingly I have the honour to propose that this Note and your reply shall constitute an Agreement between our two Governments to continue in force beyond April 1, 1964, the Agreement recorded in the Exchange of Notes of July 3 and 13, 1962[2] in relation to the Welland Canal.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

PAUL MARTIN
Secretary of State for External Affairs

[1] For text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 13, 1964, p. 68.

[2] For text, see *ibid.*, Aug. 13, 1962, p. 255.

TEXT OF U.S. NOTE

OTTAWA, *March 31, 1964.*

No. 291

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to your note No. 46 dated March 31, 1964 in which you refer to the intergovernmental agreement by exchange of notes dated December 19 and 20, 1963, regarding the reimposition of tolls on the Welland Canal as of April 1, 1964, at the rates and under the terms in effect immediately prior to the suspension of these tolls in 1962.

You state that upon re-examination of this matter the Canadian Government has concluded that it would be preferable not to reimpose the tolls on the Welland Canal at the present time. I have been instructed by my Government to inform you that the proposal not to reimpose tolls on the Welland Canal as of April 1, 1964 is acceptable.

Accordingly, your note and this reply shall constitute an agreement between our two Governments to continue in force, beyond April 1, 1964, the agreement recorded in the exchange of notes of July 3 and 13, 1962 in relation to the Welland Canal.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

IVAN B. WHITE
Charge d'Affaires ad interim

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Automotive Traffic

Convention concerning customs facilities for touring. Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into force September 11, 1957. TIAS 3879.
Accessions deposited: Cuba (with reservation), October 23, 1963; Hungary (with reservation), October 29, 1963.

Aviation

Convention on offenses and certain other acts committed on board aircraft. Done at Tokyo September 14, 1963.[1]
Signatures: Portugal, March 11, 1964; Venezuela (*ad referendum*), March 13, 1964.

Fur Seals

Protocol amending the interim convention of February 9, 1957 (TIAS 3948), on conservation of North Pacific fur seals. Done at Washington October 8, 1963.
Ratification deposited: Japan, April 10, 1964.
Entered into force: April 10, 1964.

Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Done at Moscow August 5, 1963. Entered into force October 10, 1963. TIAS 5433.
Ratification deposited: Mauritania, April 6, 1964.

[1] Not in force.

Red Sea Lights

International agreement regarding the maintenance of certain lights in the Red Sea. Done at London February 20, 1962.[1]
Acceptance deposited: United States, April 3, 1964.

Telecommunications

Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva, 1959) (TIAS 4893), with annexes and additional protocol. Done at Geneva November 8, 1963.[1]
Ratifications deposited: United States, Territories of the United States, April 3, 1964.

Wheat

International wheat agreement, 1962. Open for signature at Washington April 19 through May 15, 1962. Entered into force July 16, 1962, for part I and parts III to VII, and August 1, 1962, for part II. TIAS 5115.
Accession deposited: Japan, April 10, 1964.

BILATERAL

Canada

Agreement to continue in force beyond April 1, 1964, the agreement of July 3 and 13, 1962 (TIAS 5117), providing for the suspension of tolls on the Welland Canal. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa March 31, 1964. Entered into force March 31, 1964.

China

Agreement amending agreement concerning trade in cotton textiles of October 19, 1963 (TIAS 5482), by revising agreed levels for categories 50 (trousers, slacks, and shorts) and 26 (cotton duck). Effected by exchange of notes at Taiwan February 3 and March 18, 1964. Entered into force March 18, 1964.

Portugal

Arrangement concerning trade in cotton textiles. Effected by exchanges of notes at Lisbon March 12, 1964. Entered into force March 12, 1964.

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of November 28, 1961, as amended (TIAS 4904, 5392). Effected by exchange of notes at Lisbon March 23 and April 3, 1964. Entered into force April 3, 1964.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Office of Media Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Boundary Waters—Saint Lawrence Seaway Reimposition of Tolls on the Welland Canal. Agreement with Canada. Exchange of notes—Signed at Ottawa December 19 and 20, 1963. Entered into force December 20, 1963. TIAS 5481. 2 pp. 5¢.

[1] Not in force.

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with China. Exchange of notes—Signed at Taipei October 19, 1963. Entered into force October 19, 1963. With exchange of letters—Signed at Taipei October 21, 1963. TIAS 5482. 13 pp. 10¢.

Telecommunication—Radio Communications Between Amateur Stations on Behalf of Third Parties. Agreement with Colombia. Exchange of notes—Signed at Bogotá November 16 and 29, 1963. Entered into force December 29, 1963. TIAS 5483. 4 pp. 5¢.

Weather Stations—Cooperative Program on Guadeloupe Island. Agreement with France, extending the agreement of March 23, 1956, as supplemented and extended. Exchange of notes—Dated at Paris August 13 and November 25, 1963. Entered into force November 25, 1963. Operative July 1, 1962. TIAS 5485. 4 pp. 5¢.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: April 6–12

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to April 6 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 138 of March 31 and 139 of April 1.

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*145	4/6	Mrs. Walsh sworn in as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Evaluations (biographic details).
*146	4/6	Rusk: death of General MacArthur.
*147	4/6	U.S. participation in international conferences.
148	4/7	Rusk: "The Atlantic Alliance."
149	4/8	Portugal credentials (rewrite).
150	4/8	Tunisia credentials (rewrite).
151	4/8	Chayes: statement on communications satellite program, Military Operations Subcommittee, House Committee on Government Operations.
152	4/8	Haiti credentials (rewrite).
153	4/8	Kenya credentials (rewrite).
154	4/8	Iraq credentials (rewrite).
155	4/9	Continued suspension of Welland Canal tolls.
156	4/9	Ball: "The Open System in North–South Relations."
157	4/9	Meeting of Joint U.S.-Canadian Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs.
*158	4/9	Cleveland: "The Strategy of Educational Development."
*159	4/9	Itinerary for visit of King of Jordan.
†160	4/10	Williams: "Diplomatic Rapport Between Africa and the United States."
*161	4/10	McIlvaine designated coordinator, FSI National Interdepartmental Seminar (biographic details).

*Not printed.
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Third Anniversary of the Alliance for Progress

This 12-page pamphlet is the text of an address by President Johnson at the Pan American Union on March 16, 1964, on the occasion of the installation of Carlos Sanz de Santamaría as Chairman of the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress.

President Johnson reaffirmed United States support of the alliance and emphasized the various areas that require the full cooperation of the 20 American states in order to assure the program's success.

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5055

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Vol. L, No. 1297

May 4, 1964

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SEATO Council of Ministers Meets at Manila

The ninth meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization was held at Manila, April 13–15. Following are texts of a statement made by Secretary Rusk at the opening session on April 13 and a communique issued at the close of the meeting on April 15.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY RUSK

It is most fitting indeed that the SEATO Council meeting should be held this year in Manila, under the distinguished chairmanship of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, for it was here, 10 years ago, that the Manila Pact,[1] which created the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, was signed by eight nations from both hemispheres who shared the determination to remain free.

I am also gladdened, Mr. Chairman, by the glorious welcome with which we have been received by your President and his stimulating words to us here today and the welcome of your Government and your people.

The situation facing us in the treaty area in 1954 was fraught with peril and with severe problems. As you will recall, in 1954 Viet-Nam had just been partitioned and the prospects for the fledgling Republic of South Viet-Nam were far from promising. Laos was an arena of guerrilla war which had spilled over from the struggle in Viet-Nam between the French and Vietnamese forces and their Communist-led adversaries. The Communist insurgency in Malaya had not then been brought under control by Malayan and British Commonwealth jungle fighters. Throughout the area, economic problems—to a great extent a legacy of the damage wrought by World War II—loomed very large.

Some of the same problems still persist. In Laos, despite the Geneva agreements of 1962, the situation remains unsettled and the pro-Communist Pathet Lao forces are continuing their military pressures against the neutralist and conservative forces. North Viet-Nam continues to maintain troops in Laos, to supply

[1] For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 20, 1954, p. 393.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. L, NO. 1297 PUBLICATION 7685 MAY 4, 1964

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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Use of funds for printing of this publication approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 19, 1961).

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military equipment to the Pathet Lao, and to infiltrate Viet Cong through Laos into South Viet-Nam in violation of the Geneva agreements of 1962.

South Viet-Nam is the target of a continuing aggression directed, supported, and supplied from Hanoi. The Communists have increased their attacks. But the Government and people of South Viet-Nam are moving with firm determination to defeat this aggression.

My country has been encouraged by the vigorous reaction of General [Nguyen] Khanh and his government to the campaign of Communist terror and subversion, as well as by the Vietnamese Government's clear recognition that this war will not be won by military action alone but that there must be economic and social progress among all elements of the Vietnamese people.

We tend to be preoccupied with our own problems in the free world. But let us not lose sight of the serious difficulties within the Communist world. These stem in part from the economic failures of communism, in part from divergent views and interests among Communist leaders and states, including historic national differences. These internal quarrels limit the grave capabilities of the Communist world. And the boast that communism was the economic shortcut to the future for developing countries has been proved clearly false.

The inefficiencies of Communist agricultural production have become increasingly conspicuous. Industrial growth, even in the Soviet Union, has slowed down sharply. Here in the Western Pacific the economic plight of Communist China and North Viet-Nam contrast dramatically with the progress of the free countries of the area, including the regional members of SEATO.

We welcomed in the United States the formation of Malaysia on September 16, 1963, and we continue to regard it as a positive and progressive development.[2] We are seriously concerned by external threats to the security and integrity of Malaysia and hope that a solution can be found to this problem which will contribute to the stability and progress of the entire treaty area.

While serious economic problems continue to confront South and Southeast Asia, encouraging progress has been made toward their solution. SEATO's skilled-labor training projects provide a good example of what is being done in the economic field.

Looking at this 10-year period in its broadest aspect, it is apparent that we are living in a period of tremendous change. In the economic, scientific, and social sphere this is indeed a revolutionary age. This being so, it is extremely important that we understand what these changes mean for us, how they are related to our interests, and how they affect the issue with which we are so deeply concerned—that is the issue of freedom in the world.

Our comprehension of these changes will enable us to move with the times, to work more effectively within the SEATO framework to achieve a better and safer community of nations and peoples.

I would like on this occasion, Mr. Chairman, to pay tribute on behalf of my country to a person whose skill and dedication in behalf of SEATO would be difficult to match. I refer, of course, to Mr. Pote Sarasin, SEATO Secretary General until his resignation last December, who had served this organization since 1957. We are fortunate to have the services of his worthy successor, Mr. Konthi Suphamongkhon. We also wish to express our deep appreciation to the outgoing Deputy Secretary General, Mr. William Worth, who has served SEATO so effectively and loyally during the past 6 years.

In the days ahead we shall be examining important questions concerning the treaty area. My delegation and I look forward to hearing the views of the other member nations and to studying with you the best means of meeting our common problems.

We have important work to do. SEATO's mission—the preservation and strengthening of peace and security in the treaty area—is as relevant today, indeed, as critical today, as it was in 1954. This is a time to rededicate ourselves to this mission, as my country now does.

[2] For a Department statement of Sept. 14, 1963, see *ibid.*, Oct. 7, 1963, p. 542.

With the "Manila spirit" to guide us, we look forward to the opportunity, Mr. Chairman, for serious and intimate discussions with our SEATO colleagues.

TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE

Press release 166 dated April 15

1. The Council of the South-East Asia Treaty Organization held its ninth meeting in Manila from April 13 to 15, 1964, under the chairmanship of the Honourable Salvador P. Lopez, Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines. The inaugural address was delivered by the Honourable Diosdado Macapagal, President of the Republic of the Philippines.

General Observations

2. The Council discussed the international situation with particular attention to the conditions existing in the treaty area at the close of SEATO's first decade. It was agreed that SEATO has had, and continues to have, a most important stabilizing influence in South-East Asia.

3. The Council noted that, while the member nations of the alliance have continued over the past year to enjoy peaceful progress and national security, the Communist threat remains. The Council studied the various manifestations of this threat in the treaty area and the means required to combat them. Despite the sharpening of the Sino-Soviet dispute, world domination remains the aim of communism and thus vigilance must not be relaxed. In addition to measures to deter overt aggression and active insurgency, there should continue to be emphasis on the development of economic and social conditions which strengthen national resistance to subversion.

4. Re-affirming that the determination of national policy rests with individual governments, the Council declared that material support and encouragement should be given to those nations which, in defending themselves, need and request such support.

Republic of Vietnam

5. The Council (see paragraph 10 regarding the position of France) surveyed with special attention the situation in Vietnam. It noted the efforts made there to check increasing subversive and aggressive activities and expressed its continuing deep interest and sympathy for the Government and people of Vietnam in their struggle.

6. The Council expressed grave concern about the continuing Communist aggression against the Republic of Vietnam, a protocol state under the terms of the Manila Pact. Documentary and material evidence continues to show that this organized campaign is directed, supplied and supported by the Communist regime in North Vietnam, in flagrant violation of the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962.

7. The Government and people of the Republic of Vietnam have given eloquent testimony to their determination to fight for their country. The Council affirmed its confidence that the program of political and administrative reform, military action, pacification, and economic and social development recently instituted by the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, together with the support it is receiving from member nations of SEATO and from other nations in the free world, will greatly enhance the ability of the Vietnamese people to defeat the Communist campaign and will at the same time improve their prospects for a better life.

8. The Council agreed that the members of SEATO should remain prepared, if necessary, to take further concrete steps within their respective capabilities in fulfillment of their obligations under the treaty.

9. The Council agreed that the defeat of the Communist campaign is essential not only to the security of the Republic of Vietnam, but to that of South-East Asia. It will also be convincing proof that Communist expansion by such tactics will not be permitted.

10. The French Council member, while expressing the sympathy and friendship of France for the Vietnamese people, who for such a long time have been undergoing such severe trials and who aspire towards real independence, stated that under the present serious circumstances it was wise to abstain from any declaration.

Laos

11. The Council expressed concern that the achievement of a neutral and independent government of national union in Laos is being jeopardized by repeated violations of the Geneva Agreement of 1962, particularly by North Vietnamese military assistance and intervention and by repeated Pathet Lao attacks. It is urged that the International Control Commission be accorded the necessary facilities to fulfill its duty, under the provisions of that agreement, of investigating violations in all parts of the kingdom. It is agreed to keep the situation under close scrutiny.

Counter-Subversion

12. The Council noted that regional members of the alliance continue to be prime targets for Communist subversion, but that effective counter-measures are being taken by the respective governments to prevent the exploitation of vulnerable areas. SEATO has assisted in the co-ordination of material and other aid provided at the request of member countries.

Interests of Member States

13. The Council noted the anxiety expressed by certain member countries for due consideration of their individual problems in the context of the region as a whole, keeping in view the provisions of the Manila Pact. In this connection, the Council noted the observation of the President of the Philippines that the interests of member states should not be placed at a

disadvantage in relation to those of non-member states.

14. The Council heard full reports from its various members about problems of interest to members involving their relations with non-member states.

Economic, Medical and Cultural Co-operation

15. The Council reviewed the progress made by existing SEATO civil projects, and agreed that other proposals should be examined through which SEATO might make similar contributions to the welfare of the region.

16. The SEATO General Medical Research Laboratory in Bangkok, the SEATO Clinical Research Centre in Bangkok, and the SEATO Cholera Research Laboratory in Dacca are investigating and publishing the causes, treatment and control of diseases.

17. The SEATO Regional Community Development Technical Assistance Centre in Ubol, Thailand, is developing techniques and disseminating information on economic self-help and local development.

18. The SEATO Graduate School of Engineering in Bangkok plays an important part in the development of trained personnel needed in the region. The Council directed that a study should be made of the financing of the school so as to ensure its future as a regional institution of higher learning.

19. The skilled labour projects in the Asian member countries are helping to provide skilled manpower for the developing industrial plants of the Asian member nations.

20. The Council also reviewed the program for cultural co-operation and agreed that the established practice of awarding research fellowships, post-graduate and undergraduate scholarships and professorships is contributing to the advancement of knowledge and to international cultural relations.

Military Planning and Exercises

21. The Council recorded its conviction that adequate defences, individual and collective, are essential to the maintenance of security. The experience gained from regular and systematic military planning among the eight member nations and from the conduct of military exercises, of which 25 have been held to date, is one of the most important and valuable assets of the Alliance.

22. The Council commended the conduct of the military defence exercises held during the past year, including the civic action programs which were of direct benefit to the local population.

23. The Council approved the report of the military advisers, and noted with satisfaction that the Military Planning Office had revised and refined defence plans in the light of changing or anticipated situations.

Staff Changes

24. The Council expressed its deep appreciation to His Excellency Mr. Pote Sarasin, who served as Secretary-General from the creation of that position in 1957 until his resignation in December 1963 upon his appointment as a member of the Cabinet of Thailand. The Council took especial recognition of his skill and untiring efforts in improving and strengthening the organization and of the eminent contribution he made to the cause of collective security.

25. The Council conveyed its gratitude to Mr. William Worth, whose tenure of office as Deputy Secretary-General and Chairman of the Permanent Working Group ends shortly after the conclusion of the Council meeting. It commended him for his outstanding and dedicated service during the seven years he has held those positions.

26. The Council welcomed the incumbent Secretary-General, His Excellency Mr. Konthi Suphamongkhon, who was appointed in February of this year. It also welcomed Mr. David A. Wraight, who has been appointed to succeed Mr. Worth.

Secretariat-General

27. The Council expressed its warm appreciation to the staff of the organization for their valuable services.

Next Meeting

28. The Council accepted with pleasure the invitation of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to hold its next meeting in London in 1965.

Expression of Gratitude

29. The Council expressed its gratitude to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines for its hospitality and the excellent arrangements made for the conference. The meeting voted warm thanks to the Chairman, the Honourable Mr. Salvador P. Lopez.

Leaders of National Delegations

30. The leaders of the national delegations to the Council meeting were:

The Honourable Sir Garfield Barwick, Minister for External Affairs of Australia

His Excellency Mr. Maurice Couve de Murville, Minister of Foreign Affairs of France

The Right Honourable Keith Holyoake, Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs of New Zealand

His Excellency Dr. A. M. Malik, Ambassador of Pakistan to the Philippines

The Honourable Salvador P. Lopez, Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines

His Excellency Mr. Thanat Khoman, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand

The Right Honourable Lord Carrington, Minister Without Portfolio, United Kingdom

The Honourable Dean Rusk, Secretary of State of the United States

U.S. Reaffirms Commitments to Taiwan and Viet-Nam

At the conclusion of the meeting of the SEATO Council of Ministers at Manila,[1] Secretary Rusk flew to Taiwan for a visit with Chiang Kai-shek, President of the Republic of China, and then to the Republic of Viet-Nam. Following are texts of statements made by Mr. Rusk on his arrival at Taipei April 16 and at Saigon April 17, together with a statement made at the White House upon his return to Washington April 20.

ARRIVAL AT TAIPEI, APRIL 16

I greatly welcome this opportunity to visit Taiwan. I bring you warmest greetings from the President of the United States, Lyndon B. Johnson, and the American people.

The United States Government and the American people are associated with you in a Treaty of Mutual Defense. I wish to reaffirm our dedication to the commitments in this treaty, our support of the Republic of China as the Government of China, and our opposition to any proposal to deprive the Republic of China of its rightful place in the United Nations and to seat the Chinese Communists in its place.

The Communist regime on the mainland of China calls itself revolutionary and boasts of progress, despite the fact that its policies have inflicted terrible setbacks on the people of the mainland. It is the Government and people of the Republic of China who have been carrying out successfully progressive programs which reflect the true revolutionary inheritance of the Three People's Principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. These forward-looking programs continue to improve the well-being of the people of the Republic of China.

I salute the resolute will and positive achievement of the Republic of China under the leadership of President Chiang Kai-shek. The American people have always regarded the Chinese people with admiration. We value you as stalwart comrades in the struggle to secure a more prosperous, just, and satisfying life for all free men everywhere, and a peace safe from the threats of aggression. I look forward to discussions with your leaders on the major problems facing free men today. May the friendship and close understanding between our two peoples, as your own phrase puts it, live 10,000 years!

ARRIVAL AT SAIGON, APRIL 17

I bring the greetings of President Johnson and the American people to the valiant government and valiant people of the Republic of Viet-Nam. Your independence, security, and well-being are at the center of our deep commitment to you in your present struggle. I am very pleased to have this chance to get acquainted personally with General [Nguyen] Khanh and his colleagues and to learn firsthand about your action to defeat aggression from the north and to improve the living conditions of the people of Viet-Nam.

Earlier this week in Manila, I attended the meeting of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. You can take heart from the degree of solidarity achieved there among both your close neighbors and your strong friends. We were fully aware of the eloquent testimony which your Government and people have given to your determination to fight for your country.

We agreed that the defeat of the Communist campaign is essential not only to the security of the Republic of Viet-Nam but to that of Southeast Asia.

We agreed that the members of SEATO should remain prepared, if necessary, to take further concrete steps within their respective capabilities to fulfill their obligations under the treaty.

You will have peace here in this beautiful country when Hanoi and Peiping have been taught to leave their neighbors alone. You and those of us who are at your side must defeat their effort to impose their own misery upon you. That this will be done I have not the slightest doubt, and I am here to make clear once again that we shall help you do it.

[1] See p. 690.

RETURN TO WASHINGTON, APRIL 20

President Johnson

Secretary Rusk has just made a very interesting and informative report on his meeting with SEATO and with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and with Ambassador [Henry Cabot] Lodge in Saigon. Secretary [of Defense Robert S.] McNamara and Mr. [George W.] Ball and Mr. [McGeorge] Bundy and myself heard with great interest some recommendations the Secretary made, together with his observations and conclusions in connection with the effort of South Viet-Nam. The Secretary will be glad to make a statement to you at this time.

Secretary Rusk

Thank you, Mr. President.

I do feel that this trip to the Philippines and to the Republic of China and to Saigon was very important for me and was very helpful to our common effort. At the SEATO meeting it was quite apparent that those members of the free world do look upon the security of South Viet-Nam as utterly vital to the security of Southeast Asia and that the security of Southeast Asia in turn is vital to the entire free world. There was no one at the SEATO meeting who did not hope that this effort succeeds, and all of them but one made it very clear in our public declaration that this was so and that they were putting their full effort behind it. We talked about further measures that could be taken to support the present Government of South Viet-Nam with a good deal of unity and solidarity of purpose, and I came away from that meeting very much encouraged by the attitude of those who are in the area and those who are making a major effort in the area.

Over in Taiwan I had some very interesting discussions with President Chiang Kai-shek. The people on Taiwan have done a remarkable job in building up a thriving economy and improving the social standards of that island. They are now sending technical assistance personnel to the other countries who are in a developing process and who need to borrow from the Republic of China some of the experience of success which has occurred on that island, and that is one of the very important developments of the last year or two.

I had a chance to go over with President Chiang Kai-shek the full security situation in the Pacific Ocean area. I reported to him on the SEATO meeting and assured him of our continued support for the international position of the Republic of China in the United States and elsewhere.

In Saigon I was much interested to get a detailed report on a province-by-province basis of the course of the struggle in that country. I was encouraged to discover that there were a considerable number of provinces where pacification is moving ahead, and in those provinces where there is peace, good progress is being made on the economic and social development of the country.

I must say the overwhelming impression I got in South Viet-Nam was that that country could be a gleaming country if only it had peace; that is the missing element. It has resources, it has a lively and intelligent population, it has some trained leadership of very considerable capacity, an important geographic position; it is favored by nature. If it could continue now, as we think it will, to finish up its pacification program, there is a country that can play an important, strong, active role among the free nations of Southeast Asia.

There are provinces there where the situation is still critical, and the plans that have been laid down by General Khanh and his colleagues and by our own Ambassador and General [Paul D.] Harkins seem to be well devised to deal with the situation in those critical provinces; but it will take some further time, some further effort by the South Vietnamese and by us. Also, I think that South Viet-Nam will be calling for more assistance of a political sort, an economic sort, and perhaps in other respects from other free-world countries who have demonstrated their interest in that country. We know that there are those who are prepared to provide personnel and to provide economic resources and whatever assistance might be needed to get on with this job.

General Khanh himself is an impressive man. He shows great vigor and understanding. He is trying now to invigorate the administration of the country following the political uncertainties

since last November. He is on the right track, and he is making good progress. We believe that the prospect there is that there can be steady improvement in those critical provinces and that we can go ahead now and exploit and profit from the peace which has been established in others.

So I came back encouraged from my trip, without any misunderstanding about the difficulty of the job still ahead and without any lack of resolve about the necessity for getting on with it, because that country deserves peace and the security of the free world requires that Southeast Asia and South Viet-Nam be secure.

Thank you very much.

Question-and-Answer Period

Q. The President said that he had heard with great interest recommendations that you had brought back. Would you be at liberty, sir, to tell us what some of these recommendations are?

A. Well, I would not want to go into detail about a number of recommendations that I have brought back to add to those which Secretary McNamara brought back on his recent trip.[2] Mine, as you would expect, lie more largely in the political field. I do think that South Viet-Nam, for example, has perhaps during the political difficulties of the last 3 or 4 months allowed its international diplomatic effort to drop off somewhat and that they should go ahead now and move with considerable vigor and activity in explaining their case to the rest of the world and enlisting the political support of the free world in their struggle, and I am sure they will be doing that now that they have settled down and are getting on with the job.

I think also that it has been indicated that there are other countries who are prepared to be helpful in resources in South Viet-Nam, and we must now move to pull that together and see that all those who wish to contribute have a chance to do so and that the total is coordinated into a consistent effort to win this struggle at the earliest possible moment.

Q. What countries are these?

A. I think some of the SEATO countries, for example, and there are some non-SEATO countries that have indicated a willingness to help. One thing, for example, that I can mention is that there is at the moment a critical fertilizer shortage in South Viet-Nam just at the beginning of the planting season. It has been a little difficult to find sources nearby to get there in time. Both the Philippines and the Republic of China have offered fertilizer to meet this situation. These are very substantial quantities, and we are pleased that they have come forward. This may seem to be a rather small thing, but a combination of small things make up large things; so we are going to be trying to pull these together.

Q. You mentioned peace, Mr. Rusk. Do you have any impression among the leadership of South Viet-Nam at the present time that they would be willing now or in the near future to negotiate with North Viet-Nam?

A. Oh, no. I think that that is not in their minds at all because there is no known question, at least no question that I know about, on which negotiations would appear to be successful. The answer there is a very simple one: If those in the North in Hanoi and Peiping would leave their neighbors to the South alone, there would be peace and there would be no need for an American military presence in that area. We have never asked for bases in South Viet-Nam. Our 15,000 or 16,000 men are there as a direct result of these pressures from the North and the infiltration of cadres and weapons and political control into the Viet Cong insurrection in the South. So I do not see the basis for a negotiation.

We have got two agreements affecting that part of the world which were negotiated, which represent solemn commitments on the part of Peiping and Hanoi. Those are the Geneva agreements of 1954 and 1962. They have treated those agreements with contempt. There is no occasion as far as I can see that peace is going to come about by an agreement which would simply represent a piece of paper on the other side while they go ahead with their mischievous activities in the South. Now, we need peace through action, peace through demonstration by the North that they are leaving their

[2] For a White House statement dated Mar. 17, see BULLETIN of Apr. 6, 1964, p. 522.

neighbors alone, and that could come about by decision in Hanoi and Peiping. If they make that decision, then peace could be restored very quickly out there.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said that other nations had offered help and that one of the things was to get all this help together.

A. Yes.

Q. Did that help involve anything in a military—?

A. Well, there are a few military personnel already in South Viet-Nam from other countries. I think there may be some technical people and some specialists. I do not myself envision organized combat units at the present moment from other countries. Thank you.

Q. Military advisers from other countries?

A. There are some there now, and I think there might well be a good use for some more. Thank you.

Q. Thank you.

President Calls for Review of Tariffs on Glass Products

White House press release dated April 15

President Johnson has requested the Tariff Commission to begin an investigation for the purpose of advising him on the probable economic effects of reducing or terminating the special temporary tariff protection on cylinder, crown, and sheet glass.

Increased tariffs on these glass products were imposed on March 19, 1962,[1] after an escape-clause investigation established the need for such temporary protection. The situation in the industry must, under the law, be reviewed each year by the Commission. The first annual review was completed last autumn under the provisions of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. That act also provides, in section 351(d)(2), that the President may call for a full-scale review of the case by the Tariff Commission in order to advise him of the probable economic effect of modifying the special escape-clause restrictions.

The annual Tariff Commission report on this case was reviewed by the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, Christian A. Herter, and the interagency committees responsible to Governor Herter's office.

[1] For background, see BULLETIN of Apr. 16, 1962, p. 649.

President Johnson Holds Talks With King Hussein of Jordan

His Majesty Hussein I, King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, visited the United States April 13–24 at the invitation of President Johnson. His Majesty arrived at Philadelphia April 13 and was in Washington April 14–16, where he met with President Johnson and other Government officials. King Hussein and his party left Washington on the afternoon of April 16 for New York City and on the following day departed for visits to Cape Kennedy and West Palm Beach, Fla., April 18–19, and Houston, Tex., April 20–21, returning to New York City April 22, where the official portion of the visit was completed April 24. Thereafter, His Majesty visited San Francisco, Calif., Denver and Colorado Springs, Colo., and Chicago, Ill., and departed the United States April 29. Following is the text of a joint communique released at Washington April 15 at the conclusion of discussions held by President Johnson and King Hussein April 14 and 15.

White House press release dated April 15

King Hussein of Jordan and President Johnson have completed two days of discussions on matters of mutual interest and concern. Both welcomed the opportunity presented by the King's visit at the invitation of the President for a full exchange of views.

The President presented the views of the United States on various world problems, including those of the Middle East. He emphasized the strong desire of the United States for friendly relations with all Arab states, and its devotion to peace in the area. King Hussein put forward the views of Jordan and the other Arab states on various Middle East problems and their impact on relations between the two

nations. Cordiality, good will and candor marked the discussions. A common concern for preserving and strengthening a just peace in the area was evident throughout the talks.

The two leaders declared their firm determination to make every effort to increase the broad area of understanding which already exists between Jordan and the United States and agreed that His Majesty's visit advanced this objective.

The President expressed the intention of the Government of the United States to continue to support Jordanian efforts to attain a viable and self-sustaining economy.

His Majesty and his party will spend a few days travelling in the United States before returning home.

Diplomatic Rapport Between Africa and the United States

by G. Mennen Williams
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs [1]

In 1792 a newly emerging, underdeveloped country called the United States of America struggled to convert a vast wilderness into a viable nation. Although our population in those days was a sparse 4 million people, such cities as Philadelphia, with its nearly 43,000 people, faced difficulties with urban expansion.

In addition to such domestic problems, we also were concerned with survival in a world in which we had few friends. Having lost the protection of the British Fleet when we came to independence, one of the earliest diplomatic tasks of the infant United States was to minimize the harsh treatment American ships were receiving at the hands of the older, more established nations of North Africa. Consequently we set up the first American consulate in Africa at Algiers on June 7, 1792. Before the end of the 18th century, we also had established posts at Tripoli (1795), Tunis (1795), and Tangier (1797) in North Africa, and at Cape Town (1799) in Africa's southernmost nation.

North Africa's political climate in those early days of relations between the governments of that area and the fledgling United States was not conducive to the development of diplomatic rapport, however. American shipping was fair game and a new source of revenue for the Africans, and we were forced to make substantial tribute payments to the four North African powers. Nor was this all. In 1798 the American frigate *George Washington*, after delivering 26 barrels of silver dollars in tribute to the Dey of Algiers, was forced at gunpoint to transport an Algerian mission to Constantinople. Perhaps even more humiliating was the fact that, upon arrival, the Turkish port officer informed the ship's crew that his Government had never heard of a country called the United States.

Obviously, good diplomatic rapport was not a characteristic of early relations between Africa and the United States.

Throughout the 19th and into the early 20th century, we had relatively few diplomatic contacts with Africa, although this was a great period of missionary activity on the continent. In that century and a half, however, we did increase the number of U.S. posts concerned with trade and consular matters throughout Africa. Thus it was we entered Portugal's African territories (1853), Liberia (1863), the Congo (1884), Ethiopia (1903), Nigeria (1916), and Kenya (1918) and increased the

[1] Address made before the American Academy of Political and Social Science at Philadelphia, Pa., on Apr. 10 (press release 160).

number of American posts in Morocco and South Africa. We also had a consulate on Zanzibar from 1837 to 1915 to serve American traders and whaling ships that used the port for supplies.

World War II and After

With the coming of World War II, Africa took on new importance. In 1940 we opened a post at Dakar, Senegal, then the capital of French West Africa and the African port of entry for much of our wartime transatlantic shipping and air transport. During the war years, the emphasis our posts had given to trade and consular affairs was replaced by a new concern with political and economic reporting—the former because the United States in this period had a number of important military facilities in Africa, and many significant military operations were conducted in African territories; and the latter because Africa's extensive natural resources included many strategic materials needed for the Allied war effort.

Africa's rise to prominence during the war years also led to the ultimate development of a Bureau of African Affairs as a separate Department of State entity to deal with African matters. Although responsibility for much of Africa was transferred from what was then the Division of European Affairs to the Near Eastern Division in 1937, practically all substantive decisions concerning Africa continued to be made in the Division of European Affairs. The bulk of the African Continent was controlled at that time by European colonial powers. Egypt was then, as it is today, the responsibility of Near Eastern Affairs. It was not until 1943 that a small African Section was set up within the Near Eastern Division.

A trend toward a more unified approach to Africa began to take place in the postwar years. In 1956 responsibility for South Africa and Madagascar was transferred from the Bureau of European Affairs to the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.

In that same year, 1956, the importance of Africa was further recognized by a reorganization in the Near Eastern Bureau which led to the creation of the post of Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs and two Offices—one for Northern Africa and one for Southern Africa. In view of the rapid progress of most of the continent toward independence in the late 1950's, the next logical step—the creation of a separate Bureau of African Affairs for all of Africa except Egypt—was taken in 1958. My predecessor, Joseph Satterthwaite, now our Ambassador to South Africa, was the first Assistant Secretary for African Affairs.

It is interesting also to note the changes that have taken place in our operations in Africa during the last quarter century. In 1939, on the eve of World War II, we had no embassies in Africa but we did have 4 legations, 3 consulates general, 8 consulates, and 1 consular agency—a total of 16 posts. Today we have nearly four times that many posts. There are now 58, exclusive of Egypt, of which 34 are embassies, 7 are consulates general, 14 are consulates, 1 is a consular agency, and 2 are embassy branch offices. Perhaps these figures dramatize better than any other measure the rapid increase in Africa's importance to the United States.

Recognition of Africa's Potential

Although the swiftness with which most of Africa achieved independent status was not anticipated by many people, the Department was fortunate enough to have had a nucleus of Foreign Service officers with a particular interest in Africa. From about 1940 on, this group, which recognized Africa's great potential, began to give the U.S. Government a better understanding of the likely course of Africa's postwar development. This small band of men laid the foundations for the high degree of diplomatic rapport that exists between Africa and the United States today, and several of them, I am happy to say, still serve their Government in high posts in Washington and Africa.

The principal contribution of these early African specialists was a recognition that it was in the interests of the United States to stand forthrightly on the side of self-determination in Africa and to express our support of the legitimate aspirations of Africa's dependent people. To establish an American presence in Africa and to demonstrate what the people of Africa were capable of achieving,

a pilot assistance program was set up in Liberia (1942–43)—one of the two independent countries under the African Division's jurisdiction at that time. This program, I might point out, was implemented even before President Truman's Point 4 program was announced in 1949. Looking ahead to commercial use, lend-lease authority was used to build Liberia's Free Port at Monrovia and to improve the facilities at that country's major airport, Robertsfield. From the remnants of the World War II Office of War Information's program, faint beginnings were made toward establishing a U.S. information program in Africa.

All of this was done by about 1950, and the men and women of the African Division who did it had very little support for their efforts. You will recall that this was the period when we were concentrating on Europe's reconstruction, and the principal problem areas in foreign affairs were in the Middle and Far East. Consequently, Africa had a lower priority and received a relatively small amount of attention until the true nature of the continent's rebirth in independence became broadly known in the latter part of the 1950's.

When it was clearly seen that forces at work on the African Continent were moving at a vastly accelerated rate, it became possible for the African Bureau to move toward meeting the many diplomatic challenges the new situation presented. For example, we adopted a policy of recognizing newly independent governments at once. In many cases the United States has been the first foreign country to extend diplomatic recognition to the new African nations. The promptness with which we have welcomed new nations to the world community has had a great deal to do with the development of diplomatic rapport between ourselves and Africans.

Examples of Diplomatic Rapport

There are many interesting stories that can be told about the outstanding efforts Foreign Service officers have made to be prompt in establishing diplomatic relations with new African governments. The establishment in 1960 of our first consulate at Bamako, Mali, is a case in point. Mali, as you know, came to independence with Senegal in the Mali Federation. As our principal post in the Federation was at Dakar, opening the consulate at Bamako was not at that time an urgent matter. The officer who was assigned to open the consulate at Bamako, John Dean, previously had established our first post at Lomé, Togo, in 1959 and was taking a brief leave in Switzerland with his family before reporting to his new position at Bamako. However, when he heard a radio statement that Mali and Senegal had dissolved the Federation, he knew this meant that independent Mali would be without U.S. representation and he immediately took a train to Geneva and cabled Washington for instructions. Within 24 hours Dean was instructed to proceed to Bamako at once and open a U.S. consulate. Two hours after receiving his instructions, he had packed his bags and was on his way. He stopped at the U.S. Embassy in Paris and picked up two American flags, a typewriter, Government stationery, and code equipment and was on a plane to Bamako the same evening.

On August 26, 1960, at 7 a.m., Dean landed at Bamako. He went straight to a hotel, got two rooms to use as an office, a flagpole for the American flag, and a car for transportation. By noon he had rented a post office box and established a telegraphic address for the American consulate—but only after he had convinced the local postmaster that the U.S. Government should be billed monthly rather than each time he sent a cable. He next sent his first message to Washington—the traditional "Assumed charge." In the afternoon he visited the Mali Chief of Protocol to tell him the American consulate was open, and he met with American missionaries and businessmen representing American interests to obtain bilingual office help. By sundown the consulate was in business. That night, and for 2 months thereafter, Dean took his code equipment to bed with him to safeguard it. In one day the United States had opened its post in Mali, and Malians have not forgotten that the first foreign representative in their country was an American named John Dean. This is the type of swift response to a fast-breaking situation that has helped build diplomatic rapport between Africa and the United States.

The development of rapport is also a question of doing what has to be done with whatever is available to do the job. In this respect, a young Foreign Service officer, Roger Provencher, arrived at Ouagadougou, Upper Volta, on Thanksgiving Day, 1960, to establish our diplomatic mission there. He could find no hotel room in that city of 14,000 suddenly turned into a national capital; so he made do with an unused cot and a mosquito net in the local customs office. After 3 nights there, he persuaded the Central Hotel to give him a room—but he got it only on the condition that he vacate it on Sundays for occupants who had reserved the room on an annual basis. On Sundays, however, the hotel gave Provencher space in a former chickenhouse on the hotel grounds which had been redecorated in pink and green.

Such difficulties abroad, while inconvenient at the time, can always be looked upon in retrospect with good humor. But African diplomats encounter difficulties in this country, too, and many of these difficulties are not of the laughing variety. Particularly, I am thinking about the series of incidents in which African diplomats have been barred from restaurants and other public establishments in this country. Needless to say, these incidents have strained the diplomatic rapport between Africa and the United States, and it is largely because of the understanding and restraint of our African guests that much of our rapport has not been dissipated.

Rapport between Africans and Americans also has developed through extracurricular activities of American diplomats and their families in Africa. There are, for example, the activities of Ambassador Mercer Cook, the former Howard University professor and authority on African literature who represents us in Niger, and his wife. Mrs. Cook, who was a social worker, organized the sending of $30,000 worth of medicines to the people of Niger and is very active with women's organizations throughout the country.

Another type of American who has done much to develop African-American rapport is the technical specialist, of whom a good example is Frank Pinder, a graduate of Florida A. & M. College, who recently was promoted to Deputy Director of the U.S. AID Mission to Ghana. Now a legend in many parts of West Africa, Pinder has, over the last 16 years, introduced fundamental changes into the agricultural systems of Liberia and Ghana. He is as welcome in the homes of farmers in some of the most remote areas of those two countries as he is in their capitals. His work has been praised by President [William V. S.] Tubman of Liberia and by Foreign Minister [Kojo] Botsio of Ghana, and, when he left Liberia for Ghana in 1958, he was offered but had to decline a decoration from the Government of Liberia.

And, of course, the outstanding performances of U.S. ambassadors in Africa have been the foundation on which rapport between Africa and the United States has been built. To name just a few, there is Edmund Gullion, who has just left the Congo and whose consummate skill and patience contributed much to the reunification of that country; William Attwood, whose work in Guinea despite sizable obstacles helped markedly to develop a strong bond of friendship between the United States and that country; Joseph Palmer, who served with great distinction in Nigeria and developed a knowledge of the country that few people can match through his visits by car and riverboat to Nigerians in every one of that country's 31 provinces; and William Porter, who headed our mission in Algeria in a time of extreme unrest and personal danger—subsequent to which he became Ambassador—and who was able to maintain effectively the interests of the United States through satisfactory relations with both the French authorities and the emerging Algerian authorities. This was a remarkable demonstration of effective diplomacy in a difficult and chaotic transition period.

Let me also mention a remarkable American who was a tower of strength in East Africa—William "Red" Duggan, our consul general in Dar-es-Salaam from 1958 to 1961, who served in Tanganyika during the period in which that country moved toward independence. Duggan's devotion to duty cost him his sight, but it won him the friendship of the people of Tanganyika and their President, Julius Nyerere, who invited Duggan to be his personal guest at Tanganyika's independence ceremonies.

Impact of U.S. Presidents

It is impossible to describe diplomatic rapport between Africa and the United States without mentioning the impact of three of our Presidents with great interest in that continent.

Franklin D. Roosevelt is well known throughout North Africa for the impact he made in 1943 in Casablanca upon Morocco's Sultan, who, at independence, became King Mohammed V.

John F. Kennedy established rapport with freedom-loving Africans everywhere with his 1957 Senate speech analyzing the Algerian situation and prescribing independence as the only answer. During his Presidency, he so linked United States and African aspirations that Kennedy is a truly respected name throughout Africa.

Senegalese remember President Lyndon B. Johnson's attendance at their country's first anniversary of independence in 1961. His warm, informal diplomacy convinced Africans of the sincerity of American efforts to establish meaningful friendship with the new nation, and the cordiality with which he was received was demonstrable evidence that genuine rapport was established by his visit.

Foundations of Diplomatic Rapport

Individual rapport between Africans and Americans, official or private, has generally benefited from important common personal characteristics. By and large, Africans and Americans both admire and respond to frankness and openness in personal and official dealings and share a well-developed sense of humor and enjoyment of life.

Africans and Americans enjoy such a substantial individual rapport not simply because of shared common and sympathetic characteristics but basically because we—as people and as nations—cherish common objectives and beliefs.

Africans and Americans want freedom and independence and the right to control their own destinies. These goals inspired the Declaration of Independence of our young Republic, and they have brought 31 new nations to freedom in Africa in the last dozen years.

Africans and Americans today insist on personal and national dignity for themselves and for all men. American history, like modern African history, provides demonstrable evidence of our belief in this principle.

Africans and Americans have a common interest in improving their daily living conditions. We share a desire to reduce the burdens created by poverty, disease, malnutrition, and illiteracy as quickly as possible.

This mutuality of aspirations has won us many friends on that continent. The combined efforts of both public and private organizations and individuals to speed the attainment of those objectives have assured many Africans that the United States is indeed interested in the future of Africa, and this broad-based interest has made the development of diplomatic rapport easier.

The American people traditionally have had a deep and sincere interest in the progress of other peoples and a genuine concern with assisting those less favored materially than ourselves. This humanitarian interest is expressed in Africa in the work of U.S. missionary groups, in the African activities of private foundations, in the African programs of labor organizations, colleges, and universities. It is reflected also in the work of the Peace Corps, of our AID missions, our information offices, and our Foreign Service.

Our presence in Africa also is motivated by national self-interest. We have learned that peace is indivisible. We know that our peace and security is best assured in a world where nations are genuinely free and and progressing toward greater economic and social well-being. We know that there can be no real security and peace for us or for our children in any part of the world that is troubled by instability or disorder. We have a strong self-interest, therefore, in helping Africa to find a place in a world in which all of us—the people of Africa and the people of the United States—can live in greater security and abundance.

A century ago, Abraham Lincoln asked: "What constitutes the bulwark of our own liberty and independence?" And he answered: "It is not our frowning battlements, our bristling sea coasts, the guns of our war steamers, or the strength of our gallant and disciplined army. These are not our reliance against a re-

sumption of tyranny in our fair land. All of them may be turned against our liberties, without making us stronger or weaker for the struggle. Our reliance is in the love of liberty which God has planted in our bosoms. Our defense is in the preservation of the spirit which prizes liberty as the heritage of all men, in all lands, every where."

These words—and the actions we take in support of them—are the true basis of diplomatic rapport between Africa and the United States. If we continue to chart our course by the fundamental principles on which this nation was founded, I am confident that the rapport which today exists between Africa and the United States will characterize our relations throughout the foreseeable future.

U.S. Reaffirms Support of Royal Lao Government

Department Statement [1]

We are maintaining a close watch on developments in Laos and are in touch with our Embassy there. The U.S. Government has fully supported, and we continue fully to support, the Geneva agreements of 1962 and the Royal Government of National Union.

We are therefore categorically opposed to any seizure of power and are urging immediate release of the neutralists as a first step toward restoring the situation.

Ignacio Lozano Named Adviser on Cultural Exchange Program

The Department of State announced on April 17 (press release 168) that Ignacio E. Lozano, Jr., a Los Angeles industrialist and publisher of *La Opinion*, a Spanish-language daily newspaper, had on that day been sworn in as a consultant to Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs. Mr. Lozano will assist the cultural exchange program as an adviser on Latin American activities.

United States and United Kingdom Conclude Grains Agreement

Following is a statement released at Washington on April 16 by Christian A. Herter, the President's Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, regarding a grains agreement concluded at London on April 15 by an exchange of notes between U.S. Ambassador David K. E. Bruce and the Earl of Dundee, British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs.

The United States and the United Kingdom have entered into an agreement on grains imports into Britain which has major implications for the Kennedy Round of international trade negotiations in the field of agricultural products.[1] Through this agreement, American grain farmers will have the opportunity to maintain at least their present level of grains exports to the U.K. and will have the additional opportunity to sell more grains as that market grows. The products covered by the agreement include wheat, wheat flour, and major feed grains.

The U.K. is introducing important changes in her domestic grains policies to insure that a fair and reasonable balance is maintained between domestic grains production on the one hand and grains imports into the U.K. on the other, broadly based on present supplies to the U.K. market and providing that both domestic producers and overseas suppliers shall have the opportunity to share in any future growth in the U.K. market on a fair and reasonable basis.

A significant provision of the agreement is that the U.K. Government will take effective corrective action at the earliest practicable time if total grains imports fall appreciably below

[1] Read to news correspondents on Apr. 19 by Richard I. Phillips, Director of the Office of News, in response to information from Vientiane that a group of Laotian military leaders had attempted to overthrow the Royal Government of National Union.

[1] For an address by Mr. Herter on "The Role of Agriculture in Trade Expansion," see BULLETIN of Apr. 27, 1964, p. 671.

the average level of the last 3 years. Further, the U.K. has agreed to review annually with its major overseas suppliers the operation of its domestic grains policies in light of the objective of sharing its market between domestic producers and overseas suppliers in a fair and reasonable way.

A similar agreement has been concluded between the U.K. and each of her other major cereals suppliers, Australia and Canada.

Under the agreements, the U.K.'s overseas suppliers will cooperate in helping the U.K. assure that grain prices in that market do not fall below prescribed minimum prices. Today world grains prices are above those prescribed as minimum in the agreement. If they should fall below the minimum, the exporter may take steps to insure that grains sell in the U.K. at the prescribed price or the U.K. may enforce a levy to raise the imported price to the agreed minimum.

For a number of years, the U.K. has provided her producers with guaranteed returns on grains production at levels substantially above world prices. This has been achieved by making grains available to British consumers at world price levels and using direct payments to British farmers equal to the difference between actual market price levels and the guaranteed price. The effect has been to make overseas producers residual suppliers in the U.K. market, since British farmers were assured the guaranteed return on all the grains they produced. British grains production has expanded sharply under this program, and the proportion of total consumption supplied by imports has declined substantially over the years.

Under the new system, British farmers will be paid a guaranteed return based on "standard quantity." The "standard quantity" will be based on present levels of production. The introduction of a "standard quantity" provides for a lower per unit return to farmers if production exceeds this "standard quantity." For example, if it developed that the "standard quantity" were 90 percent of production, then the per unit deficiency payment would be 10 percent less than that which would have been paid if the "standard quantity" had not been employed.

The U.S. considers this arrangement an important precedent for the negotiation of acceptable conditions of access to world markets for major agricultural products in the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations, which is just getting under way. Discussions have already begun on a world grains arrangement as a part of the Kennedy Round. The U.K. is one of the world's major grains importers and the commitment she has undertaken to take effective corrective action if imports show an appreciable decline below the average volume during the 3 years preceding July 1, 1964, is an important contribution to the successful outcome of a world grains arrangement. The present bilateral agreements between the U.K. and its principal overseas grains suppliers may be replaced by a world grains arrangement when present negotiations are successfully concluded.

United States and France Discuss Air Cargo Operations

Department Announcement

Press release 167 dated April 17

Representatives of the United States and France will meet in Washington beginning on April 20 for an exchange of views concerning air cargo operations between the United States and France. The consultations will take place at the request of the French Government. Consideration will be given to questions relating to the routing and capacity of air cargo service.

The chairman of the French delegation will be Mr. Augustin Jordan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The chairman of the U.S. delegation will be Mr. Henry T. Snowdon, Chief of the Aviation Negotiations Division, Department of State.

The Military Assistance Program for 1965

Statement by Robert S. McNamara
Secretary of Defense [1]

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: I greatly welcome this opportunity to appear before you in support of the fiscal year 1965 military assistance program. In my considered judgment, this program, and the foreign aid program generally, has now become the most critical element of our overall national security effort.

It has long been recognized that the Communist threat to our security and the security of the entire free world is not only military but involves every area of human endeavor—it is political, it is ideological, it is economic, it is scientific, and it extends even into the cultural spheres. In such a struggle, great strategic nuclear power alone is not enough. Indeed, even great strategic nuclear power complemented by great conventional power alone is not enough. As Chairman Khrushchev warned us more than 3 years ago, the Communists, while rejecting global nuclear wars and even local wars, fully support the so-called "wars of national liberation" which we know from bitter experience as guerrilla wars and insurrections. The Chinese Communists are even more militant in their support of armed aggression as an instrument of foreign policy. Indeed, one of the major differences in outlook between these two Communist powers is the degree of risk which each believes should be taken in pressing their expansionist policies.

We believe that the actions we have taken to strengthen, protect, and make more ready our strategic nuclear forces have convinced at least the Soviet Union that a nuclear attack against us or our allies could not end in other than disaster for them. We believe the measures we have taken to expand, modernize, and supply more adequately our limited-war forces have discouraged at least the Soviet Union from risking even a conventional war against the U.S. and its allies. But if we are to meet the avowed Communist threat across the entire spectrum of conflict, then we must also be ready to take whatever measures are necessary to counter their efforts to promote guerrilla wars and insurrections. And much of this task can be accomplished only by the assistance, both military and economic, we give our less prosperous allies.

Moreover, our global military strategy since the end of World War II, particularly in the limited-war area, has always assumed the availability of allied forces. In other words, our strategy has long been based on the concept of the *collective* defense of the free world. And this means that our own security requires that we have strong allies around the world. We do in fact have strong allies, particularly in Western Europe. Indeed, the great and growing strength of our NATO allies in that region stands as a monument to the success of our

[1] Made before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on Mar. 25.

foreign aid programs in the post-World War II period.

But many of our friends and allies in other areas of the free world have not yet succeeded in building up their economic strength to the point where they can make their full contribution to the collective defense. These nations still need our help, in some cases not only in the form of military assistance but economic assistance as well. The development of their economic and military strength in the context of the collective defense of the free world is obviously in our own national interests. Who can deny that the military strength of Greece and Turkey, the southern bastion of NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], is important to our own security? Who can say that the military strength of South Korea, the Republic of China, and South Vietnam is not essential to our position in the far Pacific? Who can deny that the survival of these nations as independent states on the very periphery of Communist power is vital to our own national security objective of preventing the further spread of communism, whether by overt or covert aggression? If these nations were to succumb to Communist aggression, would not the security of the entire free world be weakened, including our own?

In my opinion, it makes no sense whatsoever to spend $50 billion a year on our own military forces and refuse to spend a mere 2 percent of that amount to provide that critical margin of assistance required to insure the military effectiveness of the forces of our allies who stand beside us in the collective defense of the free world. It is surely ironic that at the very time the Communists are increasing their efforts in this new arena of the struggle—guerrilla warfare, insurrection, and covert aggression—we should want to diminish our efforts in this same arena. Certainly, it must be clear to all Americans that if we fail to support those free nations which need and want our help in maintaining their independence, we will have to use our own forces if we are to prevent the expansion of communism through overt or covert armed aggression. As President Johnson recently stated,[2] the foreign aid program is the best weapon we have to insure that our own men in uniform need not go into combat.

We are well aware that the Congress, and perhaps the people of this country, are growing weary of the continued burden of the foreign aid program. President Johnson stated frankly that ". . . it is going to be very tough to get a good foreign aid measure through the Congress this year," but, he added, ". . . we are not going to pad our request . . . we will ask only what we need, and we hope we get what we ask. . . ."[3] This is the approach the Department of Defense has taken in formulating the military assistance program we are presenting here today. We are asking for a total of $1 billion in new obligational authority, the same amount appropriated for this purpose last year. We are asking the reappropriation of $25 million, the amount of presently available funds which we estimate will remain unobligated at the end of the current fiscal year. In addition, we believe we can recoup, in FY 1965, $135 million of prior year funds which have been reserved but not expended as a result of price changes, cancellations, and slippages in prior year programs. These three sources together would provide a total military assistance program of $1,160 million for FY 1965 compared with a program of $1,200 million in FY 1964 and about $1,600 million in FY 1963, as shown on the third from the last line of the table attached to this statement.

Last year when I appeared before this committee I stated that we hoped to reduce the military assistance program to about $1 billion a year by 1968. But neither I nor the Clay Committee (The President's Committee To Strengthen the Security of the Free World) believed that our security could be properly protected by such a low level of appropriation in fiscal years 1964 and 1965. We are presenting a request of only $1 billion for FY 1965 solely because the Congress has made it crystal clear to the executive branch that it is unwilling to appropriate a larger amount.

There should be no illusions that the difference between what we consider the optimum program and the program we are requesting can be made up by increased recoupments, by living

[2] For text of President Johnson's message to Congress on foreign aid, see BULLETIN of Apr. 6, 1964, p. 518.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 523.

off the pipeline, or by a greater use of excess materiel.

With regard to recoupments, the $135 million already reflected in our 1965 estimate is all we can expect to generate in the next fiscal year. In FY 1964 we estimated recoupments of $125 million, and it now appears that the actual amount "recouped" will be within 3 percent of our estimate. In fiscal years 1962 and 1963, as a result of an intensive effort to "shake out" the program, we "recouped" a total of $490 million. I am satisfied that we have "shaken out" about all we can.

With regard to financing future year programs by drawing down the so-called "pipeline," I can assure you that such a course would simply result in "robbing Peter to pay Paul." These unexpended balances, popularly called the "pipeline," represent funds which have been obligated for goods and services which have not yet been delivered. Funds must be available to pay for these goods and services when they are delivered. Moreover, this unexpended balance for military assistance is shrinking. At the end of FY 1962, the unexpended balance, for grant aid and credit assistance combined, was $2,784 million. At the end of FY 1963, the balance had been reduced to $2,422 million. By the end of the current fiscal year we expect the balance to decline to $2,087 million. In FY 1965, assuming the budget request of $1 billion in new obligational authority is appropriated and assuming our estimates of collections and expenditures for that year are realized, the unexpended balance will decline to about $1.9 billion—a total reduction of almost $900 million since the end of FY 1962.

Finally, with regard to the use of excess stocks, let me assure you that little relief can be expected from that source. We had originally anticipated using about $48 million of excess stocks for the current fiscal year program; it now appears that only $28 million of such stocks will be available. The remainder of the requirement will have to be met from new procurement or not met at all.

Thus, the future strength and combat effectiveness of the forces of our allies, forces upon which we depend to fight alongside our own in the event of war, will be determined by the actions of this committee and this Congress on our 1965 military assistance budget request.

Now, what will our 1965 military assistance program provide and why is it needed? We have tried during the last year to develop a more meaningful format for the presentation of the military assistance program to the Congress and the Nation—a format which shows more directly the relationship between the individual country programs and our own national security objectives. Accordingly, we have divided the country programs into six major categories: Forward Defense; Alliance for Progress Security; Military Base Rights; Grant Aid Phaseout; Free-World Orientation; and U.S. Force Support and Military Assistance Program Administration.

The first category, "Forward Defense," comprises the grant aid military assistance programs for 11 nations stretching along the southern and eastern perimeters of the Communist bloc—from Greece and Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean to Korea in the Western Pacific. These 11 countries—Greece, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, India, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, the Philippines, the Republic of China, and Korea—maintain more than 3½ million men under arms and account for $745 million, or two-thirds of the total FY 1965 military assistance program. These nations, plus NATO in Western Europe, and Japan in the Western Pacific, are truly the free world's and our own nation's frontline of defense against Soviet and Chinese Communist expansion through military aggression.

The next grouping, "Alliance for Progress Security," consisting in FY 1965 of 15 Latin American nations, accounts for $66.2 million, less than 6 percent of the total 1965 military assistance program. Our primary objective here is, of course, to insure the security of the Western Hemisphere against Communist penetration.

The third category, "Military Base Rights," for which $24.4 million is proposed, includes 4 countries in each of which we have important base rights.

The fourth category, "Grant Aid Phaseout," includes, in the FY 1965 program, only 3 countries—Denmark, Japan, and Norway—com-

pared with 12 countries in FY 1963. These 3 country programs will be phased out when our present commitments are completed. This category accounts for $53 million of the FY 1965 military assistance program, or less than 5 percent.

The fifth category, "Free-World Orientation," includes, in FY 1965, 7 countries whose continued independence and stability we believe is of great value to our own national interests. Altogether they account for only $15.2 million, or a little more than 1 percent of the total 1965 military assistance program.

The final category, "U.S. Force Support and MAP Administration," is essentially the "all other" category and accounts for $256.2 million, or 22 percent, of the total 1965 military assistance program. However, about $76 million of this amount, for "Infrastructure" and "International Military Headquarters," actually represent costs of U.S. military forces which by long-established custom have been funded in the military assistance program. Also included in this category is $50 million for credit assistance which we expect will eventually be paid back to the United States. No contingency fund has been included in the 1965 military assistance budget request.

Other Defense witnesses who are scheduled to appear before this committee are prepared to discuss the military assistance program at whatever level of detail you desire. What I would like to do at this time is to highlight, in terms of the six categories I have described, some of the major problems we face.

Forward Defense Programs

This, as I pointed out, is the most important category and accounts for about two-thirds of the total FY 1965 military assistance program. The 3½ million men under arms supported by the 11 countries in this category represent an increment of defensive strength which is essential to the success of our overall military strategy. These forces relieve us of the tremendous burden, in dollars and in manpower, which we would otherwise have to assume, either by deploying additional U.S. forces overseas or by holding additional forces in a central reserve in the United States and providing for the necessary airlift, sealift, and prepositioning of equipment.

In all of our contingency planning involving the areas of the world where these countries are located, we take into full account the availability of these indigenous forces. Moreover, the existence of reasonably adequate military forces in these nations on the periphery of Communist power, by eliminating the hope of a quick, easy, and cheap victory, reduces the likelihood of Communist attack. Perhaps even more important, the ability of the indigenous forces to respond promptly to local aggression greatly reduces the risk of subsequent direct U.S. involvement in fulfillment of its mutual defense commitments and thereby the risk of escalation into larger wars. These commitments are embodied in a series of treaties with many of the countries which form the free-world defensive perimeter against aggression from the Communists. Of the 11 countries included in this category, Greece and Turkey are members of NATO. Turkey is also a member of CENTO [Central Treaty Organization] together with Iran and Pakistan and is thus the link between NATO and CENTO. Pakistan is also a member of SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization] together with Thailand and the Philippines and is thus the link between CENTO and SEATO.

The U.S. also has bilateral defense agreements with the Philippines, Korea, and the Republic of China, and we are presently engaged in assisting the people of South Vietnam in combating the covert Communist aggression in that country. We are also supporting the Government of Laos where the Pathet Lao are taking every opportunity to sabotage the coalition government. Finally, we are assisting the Government of India in strengthening its military forces against the threat of Chinese Communist attack from the north.

The $745 million we have proposed in the FY 1965 military assistance program for these 11 countries is far short of what would be required if we were to attempt to raise the modernization of these forces to the levels called for by JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] planning. A recent study by the Department of Defense of 7 of these countries on the Communist periphery indicates that the total requirement for major

equipment alone would call for $700 million more through 1969 than what would be available under a continuing $1 billion a year program. Operating costs alone are estimated to be on the order of $300 million per year for these 7 countries. Since a $1 billion military assistance program will permit the allocation of only about $500 million to these 7 countries, only about $200 million will be available for force modernization, including major equipment, compared with the computed requirement of almost $400 million per year for major equipment alone.

The impact of this problem can best be understood in terms of individual country programs.

Greece and Turkey

As I indicated earlier, Greek and Turkish military forces form the southern bastion of NATO, complemented by the United States 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean. NATO depends heavily on these two nations to hold the southern flank. Greece is faced by relatively well-armed Bulgarian forces and Turkey by both Bulgarian and Soviet forces.

Both Turkey and Greece face serious problems in maintaining their current levels of defense expenditures. Both will continue to need financial assistance from other members of NATO, and, in this connection, Secretary Rusk at the NATO ministerial meeting last December strongly urged our NATO allies, who have made a small start in providing financial assistance to Greece and Turkey, to expand their effort greatly. But the United States will continue to have to make up the critical margin of support if these two NATO countries are to be expected to carry out their roles under present NATO military planning.

As shown on the attached table we have again been forced to reduce military assistance to the "Forward Defense" nations, including both Greece and Turkey. We hope that the other NATO allies will help to offset part of this cut, but I would be less than candid if I did not tell you that the situation on the southern flank of NATO is serious.

Last year I received from General [Lyman L.] Lemnitzer, the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, a cable in which he expressed his serious concern with the deterioration of the military capabilities of the Greek and Turkish forces in the face of improving Communist capabilities across their borders. General Lemnitzer pointed out that the problem was not in the fighting caliber of the forces of either of these two countries but rather in equipment deficiencies which the countries themselves could clearly not afford to correct.

Recently I received another communication from General Lemnitzer, which I would like to discuss with this committee in executive session. In this communication, he again expresses his concern with the situation on the southern flank with regard to equipment deficiencies which have been caused by reductions in military assistance funds. All I can tell General Lemnitzer is what I am telling you, namely, that we are allocating to Greece and Turkey all that is feasible within a military assistance program budget of a billion dollars in new obligational authority. Of the amount which we have included for Greece in the 1965 program, only about one-third will be available for investment and practically all of that will be used for the Air Force. Accordingly, significant modernization of the ground forces must be deferred.

The Turkish armed forces are in the same straits. More than 60 percent of the 1965 program for Turkey will be required for operating costs, leaving less than 40 percent of a reduced amount for investment. In order to provide minimum army force improvements in the FY 1965 program, it will be necessary to defer some spare parts, training ammunition, and attrition replacement. As in the case of Greece, much of the equipment in the Turkish ground forces is of World War II vintage, repair parts are no longer available, and maintenance costs have been prohibitive.

The present difficulties between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus should not be permitted to obscure the fact that both of these countries are loyal and dedicated members of NATO and the continued military strength of both is essential to the execution of NATO military strategy.

Iran, Pakistan, and India

Iran, Pakistan, and India are on the frontline of the free world's defense against Communist encroachment in the Near East and South Asia. The Chinese Communists' attack on the northern provinces of India in October of 1962 pro-

vided a classic example of the danger of military weakness in the nations bordering Communist China. Here, again, was clear proof that military weakness tempts Communist aggression and that neither neutrality nor attempts at political accommodation insures security against the Communist threat.

This attack brought home to the Government of India the importance of maintaining strong military forces along their northern borders. The United States and the British Commonwealth nations responded to India's urgent request for assistance with a program of $120 million, of which the U.S. provided half. In FY 1964 we programed another increment, as you know, and we have included an additional amount in the FY 1965 program. We are also providing in the 1964 program some excess stocks, including some radar and communications equipment. We plan to continue the modernization of a number of mountain divisions and to provide certain other assistance. We believe that the U.K. and the Commonwealth countries will also continue their support of the Indian armed forces.

Our military assistance to India has deeply troubled Pakistan, as you are well aware. Nevertheless, it is important to the entire free world, including Pakistan, that India be able to defend itself against Chinese Communist aggression. The United States has taken great pains to assure the Government of Pakistan that our aid to India will not be at the expense of Pakistan's security, to which we are committed under our mutual defense agreements. General [Maxwell D.] Taylor, in his recent visit, again endeavored to reassure Pakistan of our continued interest in, and support of, its national integrity. An additional increment of equipment and training is provided for Pakistan in the FY 1965 military assistance program. While much has been done to improve the capabilities of the Pakistan army, equipment deficiencies still exist. To meet some of these deficiencies, the FY 1965 program emphasizes ground-force improvements.

With respect to Iran, our objective has been to help build up its military forces to the point where they can insure internal security and provide at least an initial defense against an overt Soviet attack. Although the Iranian military forces, with our aid, have improved significantly during the last decade, they are still not, and never can be, a match for Soviet forces presently deployed along the Iranian borders, even though the terrain favors the defense.

Despite its strategic vulnerability, it seems quite unlikely that the Soviet Union would, in view of our mutual cooperation agreement with Iran, deliberately undertake a major aggression against that country in the near future. The more likely contingency is a covert or ambiguous aggression using dissident elements in Iran or neighboring nations to pave the way for ultimate Communist takeover. In Iran, as elsewhere in the world, the best defense against the spread of communism is a steady improvement in economic and social conditions, which is the primary aim of our economic assistance efforts. In this connection, the assurance of a continued substantial level of military assistance support has enabled the Shah to concentrate on reforms leading to economic and social progress throughout the country.

The FY 1965 military assistance program provides funds to continue improvement of Iran's air defense capabilities and to support the reorganization of the Iranian ground forces which is now underway. This reorganization is designed to provide a smaller but more mobile and better trained army.

Southeast Asia

Included in the Forward Defense category are three Southeast Asian countries—Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos. The continued independence of Vietnam is essential to the defense of Southeast Asia. There is a serious question in my mind as to whether the amount provided for Vietnam in the 1965 program will be sufficient. Since we have not included a contingency fund in our 1965 military assistance budget request, any increase in the Vietnam program—and I am reasonably sure an increase will be required—will have to be made at the expense of other country programs, or will have to be provided by transfer from economic aid. This is the case in the current year's program for which we are anticipating a $50 million transfer of economic aid funds under section 610 of the law.

Last week a statement was issued by the

White House,[4] summarizing General Taylor's and my report to the President and the National Security Council on the situation in Vietnam. But I want to emphasize again that we intend to provide whatever amounts of economic aid, military training, and logistics support are required to maintain the independence of the Republic of Vietnam. In all of the millions of words that have been written and spoken in recent months on the subject of Vietnam, one issue stands out above all others, and that is—can a nation maintain its independence in the face of Communist-supported armed insurgency? Can a free government supported by other free-world nations succeed in suppressing such armed insurgency supported by its neighbors? This is the crucial question, not only in Vietnam, but in all of the newly emerging and weaker nations of the world. This is the issue which must be resolved in South Vietnam by the people of South Vietnam, with our economic, training, and logistics support.

We must demonstrate to both friend and foe alike that an independent people, given the will to remain independent and given the will to fight and struggle and sacrifice for their independence, can, with the economic, technical, training, and logistics support from other free-world countries, sustain their independence and suppress armed insurgency, even if supported from the outside. As I stated at the outset, Chairman Khrushchev put us on notice 3 years ago that the kind of struggle now taking place in Vietnam is precisely the kind of war the Communists favor and will strongly support in the future. Either we confront this problem in Vietnam and prove to the Communists that this type of armed aggression will also fail, or we will have to face the same problem increasingly in other areas. And it cannot be avoided so long as the Communists continue to view this kind of aggression as the key to their policy of expansion.

Our military assistance objectives with respect to Thailand are closely related to those for South Vietnam. The loss of either country to the Chinese Communists would endanger the independence of neighboring nations and seriously jeopardize U.S. security interests. The 1965 program is designed to help sustain the armed forces of that country.

The U.S. is continuing to provide military assistance to the Royal Lao Government at that Government's request and thus in full accord with the Geneva agreements. This military assistance is designed to maintain neutralist and conservative forces loyal to Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma at the minimum level necessary to prevent the Pathet Lao/North Vietnamese forces from advancing into non-Communist territory. The 1965 program has been designed to provide minimum operating essentials for the neutralist and conservative forces.

The Philippines

Both the strategic location of the Philippines and our long history of close cooperation and mutual good will make that nation a key ally associated with us in the common defense, not only bilaterally but also as a member of SEATO. The objective of our 1965 military assistance program for the Philippines is to enhance the capabilities of its military and paramilitary forces to prevent or defeat Communist insurgencies and to help develop forces deployable within the SEATO area for mutual defense tasks. Attainment of these objectives and continuing close association between the U.S. and the Philippines in collective security undertakings are very much in our national interest.

Republic of Korea and the Republic of China

Two other key countries on the Communist periphery which complete the arc of free-world forward defense—Republic of Korea and the Republic of China—are directly exposed to the threat of Communist aggression. Although Red forces in the Far East do not yet have the full range of capabilities of the Soviet military machine, their very number and expendability represent massive power subject to the will of an avowedly belligerent adversary. To deter the exercise of that power against our security interests and those of our allies in the area, we count heavily upon the combat effectiveness of the sizable forces maintained by the Republics of China and Korea.

Adequate military assistance to the armed forces of South Korea and the Republic of China not only helps to protect our security

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 522.

interests in the Far East, but far more important, it substantially reduces the risk of an emergency requirement for direct intervention by the United States. In this connection, it is pertinent to note that our FY 1965 program for Korea is less than 1 percent of the direct military costs we incurred in the Korean conflict in 1950–53. The cost in terms of American casualties suffered in that conflict cannot, of course, be reduced to dollars and cents. The 1965 program for the Republic of China is also quite modest considering the forces that nation is maintaining. It would be highly imprudent of us not to insure that the troops on the free-world side of the 38th parallel and the Taiwan Straits have conventional weapons at least as effective as those of their opponents.

As members of this committee are aware, the Chinese Communists have never given up their goal to add Taiwan to their empire. They can be prevented from achieving this goal only by a combination of the strength of United States and Republic of China forces defending the Taiwan Straits—a course of action to which the U.S. is committed by treaty with the Republic of China. Military assistance to the Republic of China has already greatly strengthened those forces, but additional military assistance expenditures are required if this capability is to be maintained. Nearly two-thirds of the value of the FY 1965 program will be required to maintain these forces, leaving only a small amount for equipment and training.

Alliance for Progress Security Program

This important category accounts for less than 6 percent of the total 1965 military assistance program—$66.2 million divided among 15 countries, compared with $65.4 million divided among 20 countries in FY 1963. Of the $66.2 million, 52 percent is for internal security programs, 24 percent for naval defense, 15 percent for civic action, and the remaining 9 percent for general training and programs which have not yet been developed in detail.

The military assistance program for Latin America is an integral part of the entire Alliance for Progress effort. As the recent experience of Venezuela so clearly demonstrates, internal security is essential to the development of democratic government in Latin America. In the light of the avowed objectives of Communist policy, we can expect that the attempts made in Venezuela to overthrow the legitimate government by subversion and armed insurrection will be repeated elsewhere in Latin America. While military assistance alone is certainly not the whole solution to the problem of stable government and economic development in Latin America, it does make a very important contribution toward that goal.

Military Base Program

This category includes only 4 countries, in all of which we have facilities used by our own forces. The total amount of money involved is relatively quite small, $24.4 million, or about 2 percent of the total 1965 program. In Spain we have valuable naval and air bases including the new Polaris base at Rota. In the case of Portugal, we have the air facilities in the Azores which are important to our transatlantic airlift operations. In Libya we have the Wheelus Air Base, which is used both for air transport and for the training of certain of our forces in Europe. The formal agreement permitting the United States to use the facility in the Azores has expired, but we continue to operate there on an informal basis, pending renegotiation of the agreement with Portugal.

Grant Aid Phaseout Program

In consonance with our policy to phase out of the military assistance grant aid program all of those recipient countries which have achieved adequate levels of economic strength, the number of countries in this category has been reduced from 12 as late as FY 1963 to only 3 in the program now before you. Military assistance to these 3 remaining countries is limited to the fulfillment of prior-year commitments and to training associated therewith. These commitments take the form of United States participation in cost-sharing undertakings which generate increases in the recipient nations' defense budgets and thus contribute to the strengthening of the common defense as well as increases in purchases from the United States. The total amount proposed for FY 1965 to fulfill these commitments is $53 million,

or about 5 percent of the total program. No new commitments will be made to these countries, and they have been so informed.

Free-World Orientation Program

Slightly more than 1 percent of the total proposed military assistance program is designed to preclude or minimize Communist bloc influence in 7 countries. These programs provide modest amounts of military assistance to underdeveloped and emerging nations where it is important to the security interests of the United States and the common defense of the free world to preserve and encourage resistance to the extension of Communist influence. In some cases, programs are designed to establish or maintain a friendly United States relationship with the military forces—often a potentially important factor in the local situation. In other cases, the amount of United States military assistance furnished to uncommitted nations is considerably smaller than that provided by the Soviet Union. These programs represent, in many cases, a calculated risk in that they may not succeed in their main objective. But the amounts are so small and the potential for gains to the cause of freedom is so large that the risk seems well worth taking.

United States Force Support and Military Assistance Program Administration

As I have indicated earlier we have continued to include in the military assistance program the costs for the NATO Infrastructure and International Military Headquarters which, although they could more properly be considered costs of the U.S. forces, have traditionally been funded in this program. Accordingly, had there not been a military assistance program, these costs would have had to be borne in the regular defense budget.

Another item included here, for want of a better place to put it, is the $50 million for credit assistance which we anticipate will eventually be repaid to the United States Treasury. Other Defense witnesses will discuss with you supply operations and regional costs for which we have included in the 1965 program $84.7 million and $22.1 million, respectively; but I would like to discuss very briefly the $23.5 million included for program administration. You will notice on the attached table that we have reduced program administration costs from $24.9 million in FY 1963 to $24 million in FY 1964. Now we are reducing it another one-half million dollars, notwithstanding the fact that salary scales have increased. In part, the reduction in program administration costs over the FY 1963–65 period reflects our effort to reduce civilian employment in the Department of Defense, which, as you may know, will be brought below the 1 million level for the first time since 1950. The number of military personnel assigned to military assistance activities is also being reduced, with resultant savings to this program in travel costs, etc.

Supporting Assistance

Although supporting assistance is not properly a part of the military assistance program and is included in the economic assistance request, I would like to emphasize that the $335 million included for this purpose in the President's 1965 budget is of great importance to the success of the military assistance program. Of the total program, $240 million is being requested for Vietnam, Korea, and Laos alone. This assistance is essential to the maintenance of the military forces and also provides some of the economic support required to underpin the military effort in those countries. Vietnam alone will consume over one-third of the total supporting assistance requested in the 1965 budget, and I can personally testify that at least that amount of funds is absolutely essential to our effort in that country.

Legislative Changes

Before I conclude my statement, there are a number of legislative changes I would like to touch on.

Section 507 – Military Sales

As presently written, this section requires governments making purchases from the U.S. under dependable undertakings to make payment no later than the time the United States is required to pay its contractors. This requirement has caused considerable difficulty for countries whose laws prohibit payment until the items purchased are actually delivered. The

proposed amendment would authorize the purchaser to make payment under dependable undertakings within 120 days of delivery of the Defense articles or the performance of Defense services, when the President determines that such an arrangement is in the national interest. The Department of Defense would use available appropriations to meet its payments to U.S. suppliers under the terms of the contract. These appropriations would be reimbursed in full from payments made by the purchasing government. We are confident that the authority provided by this amendment would considerably enhance our ability to compete for military sales throughout the world, without any risk of loss to the United States Government.

The sale of military equipment, supplies, and services to other countries is of considerable importance to the United States at this time. First, it contributes to our economic well-being by providing jobs in this country; second, the receipts from these sales help to reduce our adverse balance of payments; and third, the use of common equipment, supplies, and services helps to promote the continuing cooperation of U.S. and allied forces.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
(*$ Millions*)

	Fiscal Year		
	1963 Actual	1964 Estimate	1965 Proposed
Forward Defense	973. 1	806. 3	745. 0
Alliance for Progress	65. 4	65. 9	66. 2
Military Base	35. 6	51. 9	24. 4
Grant Aid Phaseout	90. 0	70. 7	53. 0
Free-World Orientation	55. 3	15. 4	15. 2
U.S. Force Support and MAP Administration Infrastructure	50. 0	50. 0	60. 0
International Military Headquarters	13. 7	14. 0	15. 9
Supply Operations	137. 2	116. 6	84. 7
Regional Costs	103. 7	−14. 8	[a] 22. 1
Program Administration	24. 9	24. 0	23. 5
Credit Assistance	50. 3	--------	50. 0
Subtotal	379. 8	189. 8	256. 2
Total Obligational Authority	1, 599. 2	1, 200. 0	1, 160. 0
Less: Recoupments and Reappropriations	274. 2	[b] 200. 0	160. 0
New Obligational Authority	1, 325. 0	1, 000. 0	1, 000. 0

[a] Includes Operation and Maintenance of the MAP Installations and Storage and Maintenance of MAP Stockpiles which are shown as Supply Operations costs in FY 1963 and FY 1964.

[b] Anticipates $50 million transfer from economic aid funds.

Section 503 – General Authority

We are also requesting an amendment to section 503 which would permit the more extensive participation of private credit agencies in the financing of military sales. We estimate that in the current fiscal year a total of $213 million of military sales will be financed through private institutions and the Export-Import Bank. I think we can all agree that this is a highly desirable way to finance such sales. However, the political situation in certain countries which may be potential purchasers of U.S. military equipment has made private lenders reluctant to extend credit at the going rates under the existing law. Accordingly, we are proposing an amendment to section 503 which would provide for military sales a guaranty similar to that provided in the investment guaranty program. Under the proposed provision, a fractional reserve of 25 percent of the amount guaranteed would be required.

Section 620(m) – "Church Amendment"

The training proviso to section 620(m) expires at the end of FY 1964 and in our judgment should be extended. This is the provision which authorizes the Department of Defense to furnish military training assistance to economically developed nations. We believe that the furnishing of this type of training to such nations is a fruitful source of potential sales of U.S. military equipment, since it exposes military personnel of other countries to U.S. doctrine and equipment. We propose, however, that the limitation on the amount of training which may be furnished to any one country be reduced from $1 million to $500,000 per year.

Section 510 – Draw-Down Authority

This section, which gives the President authority to draw down Defense stocks for military assistance when he finds such action vital to the security of the United States, also expires on June 30, 1964. Although we have not made use of this authority because we believe it should be invoked only as a last resort, we strongly urge that it be renewed. As I have

already stated, the fiscal year 1965 military assistance program is so tight that little or no flexibility exists to meet unanticipated emergencies. Accordingly, this special authority may be of vital importance to us during the next fiscal year. The military departments whose stocks are drawn down must, of course, be reimbursed from subsequent military assistance appropriations.

Continuing Authorization

We believe the present practice of requiring an annual authorization for the military assistance program is not conducive to sound, long-term planning, either by ourselves or by the recipient nations. Military assistance is clearly one of the essential tools of U.S. foreign policy, and we should be willing to acknowledge that fact by providing a continuing authorization for that essential program. The Defense Department, of course, would continue to appear before the authorizing committees each year, as we have in the past, to report on our problems and progress and to present the program proposed for the forthcoming fiscal year, and the bill proposed by the President expressly requires such presentations.

Conclusion

Chairman [Thomas E.] Morgan and members of the committee, I believe that with this FY 1965 military assistance program we have come to a critical decision point. Unless we are assured of at least a billion dollars a year for military assistance over the next several years, the military strength we have helped to build up around the periphery of the Communist bloc will quickly melt away. Even with a billion dollars a year we will have to consider carefully the advisability of proposing a reduction in the size of the forces and military personnel strengths supported by the military assistance program. This may well be necessary in order to achieve a better balance between the size of the forces and the quality of their equipment. Combat effectiveness as you well know is not only a function of numbers of men but of their equipping and training as well.

Anything less than $1 billion a year in new military assistance funds will inevitably require a reassessment of our entire policy of depending on indigenous forces in preparing our own contingency war plans and, accordingly, of the size and character of our own military forces. I believe it is obvious to all of us that any attempt to offset the loss of combat effectiveness in those allied forces supported by the military assistance program by increases in our own forces is bound to cost far more for the same amount of combat capability. Yet if we are to provide adequately for our national security and the collective defense of the free world, we will have to make these additional expenditures.

Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I appeal to you and to your colleagues on this committee to give our FY 1965 military assistance program your full and unequivocal support, not only in the committee but on the floor of the House. The security of our nation demands it.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

88th Congress, 2d Session

Winning the Cold War: The U.S. Ideological Offensive. Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Part VII (appendixes to part VI): A. The Cold War Since 1960, B. Research Studies of U.S. Information Agency, January 1964, 123 pp.; part VIII, U.S. Government Agencies and Programs (Agency for International Development, Department of Defense), January 15–16, 1964, 145 pp.

Recent Developments in the Soviet Bloc. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Europe of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Part II: Economic Developments, Political Trends and Party Factionalism, Distribution of American Publications, Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy, State Department Views. February 18–March 10, 1964. 116 pp.

International Development Association Act Amendment. Hearings before the House Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 2214. March 23–24, 1964. 104 pp.

Authorizing the President To Appoint a Commission To Study the Feasibility of, and Most Suitable Site for, the Second Interoceanic Canal Connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Report to accompany S. 2701. S. Rept. 968. March 26, 1964. 11 pp.

Small Business and Foreign Trade. A report of the House Select Committee on Small Business pursuant to H. Res. 13. H. Rept. 1303. April 6, 1964. 46 pp.

Amendment to International Development Association Act. Report to accompany S. 2214. H. Rept. 1312. April 9, 1964. 16 pp.

Temporary Suspension of Duty on Certain Shoe Lathes. Report to accompany H.R. 10468. H. Rept. 1325. April 15, 1964. 2 pp.

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings[1]

Scheduled May Through July 1964

ILO Building, Civil Engineering, and Public Works Committee: 7th Session.	Geneva	May 4–
6th Round of GATT Tariff Negotiations	Geneva	May 4–
ICEM Executive Committee: 23d Session	Geneva	May 4–
IMCO Working Group on Watertight Subdivision and Damage Stability of Passenger and Cargo Ships: 3d Session.	London	May 4–
IMCO Working Group on Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Sea	London	May 4–
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs: 19th Session	Geneva	May 4–
UNESCO Executive Board: 67th Session	Paris	May 4–
FAO/WHO Code of Principles Committee for Milk and Milk Products.	Rome	May 4–
FAO Consultative Subcommittee on the Economic Aspects of Rice: 8th Session.	Rome	May 4–
OECD Maritime Transport Committee	Paris	May 5–
IMCO Working Group on Intact Stability of Ships: 3d Session	London	May 11–
U.N. ECE Working Group on Input-Output Statistics	Geneva	May 11–
ICEM Council: 21st Session	Geneva	May 11–
NATO Ministerial Council	The Hague	May 12–
Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission	The Hague	May 12–
OECD Energy Committee: Special Committee for Oil	Paris	May 12–
OECD Working Party III (Balance of Payments)	Paris	May 14–
OECD Energy Committee	Paris	May 14–
OECD Ministerial Meeting on Science: Interim Committee	Paris	May 14–
FAO Group on Grains: 9th Session	Rome	May 14–
International Rubber Study Group: 17th Meeting	Tokyo	May 18–
Executive Committee of the U.N. High Commissioner's Program for Refugees: 11th Session.	Geneva	May 18–
U.N. Trusteeship Council: 31st Session	New York	May 20–
BIRPI Working Group on Administrative Agreement	Geneva	May 20–
U.N. Trusteeship Council: 31st Session	New York	May 20–
U.N. Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: Technical Subcommittee.	Geneva	May 22–
IMCO Council: 11th Session	London	May 25–
ITU CCITT: 3d Plenary Assembly (including meetings of study groups).	Geneva	May 25–
OECD Industry Committee	Paris	May 26–
OECD Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices	Paris	May 27–
Universal Postal Union: 15th Congress	Vienna	May 29–
WHO Executive Board: 34th Session	Geneva	May
NATO Civil Defense Committee	Paris	May
1st International Short Film Festival	Cracow, Poland	June 1–
3d Consultative Meeting Under Article IX of the Antarctic Treaty	Brussels	June 1–
U.N. ECE Committee on Housing, Building, and Planning: 25th Session.	Washington	June 2–
FAO International Meeting on Dairy Education	Paris	June 2–
OECD Pulp and Paper Committee	Paris	June 9–
UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: 3d Session.	Paris	June 10–

[1] Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Apr. 14, 1964. Following is a list of abbreviations: ANZUS, Australia, New Zealand, and United States Security Treaty; BIRPI, United International Bureaus for the Protection of Industrial and Intellectual Property; CCITT, Comité consultatif international télégraphique et téléphonique; ECA, Economic Commission for Africa; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IA–ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund; WHO, World Health Organization.

U.N. ECOSOC Technical Assistance Committee	Vienna	June 15–
U.N. Special Fund Governing Council: 12th Session	The Hague	June 15–
U.N. Special Committee on Friendly Relations	México, D.F.	June 15–
International Labor Conference: 48th Session	Geneva	June 17–
U.N. ECE Coal Trade Subcommittee	Geneva	June 22
U.N. ECE Working Group on Productivity Statistics	Geneva	June 22–
International Wheat Council: 39th Session	London	June 23–
14th International Film Festival	Berlin	June 26–
FAO Desert Locust Control Committee: 9th Session	Rome	June 29–
U.N. ECA Seminar on Industrial Estates	Addis Ababa	June 29–
ICAO Airworthiness Committee: 6th Session	Paris	June
International Sugar Council: 17th Session	London	June
UNICEF Executive Board and Program Committee	NewYork	June
U.N. ECAFE Working Party on Customs Administration: 4th Session.	Bangkok	July 1–
14th International Film Festival	Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia	July 4–
FAO Intergovernmental Committee for the World Food Program	Geneva	July 6–
27th International Conference on Public Education	Geneva	July 6–
ANZUS Council	Washington	July 13–
IMCO Panel on Stability of Fishing Vessels: 1st Session	London	July 13–
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 37th Session	Geneva	July 13–
IMCO Subcommittee on the International Code of Signals: 6th Session.	London	July 20–
IA–ECOSOC Committee of Governmental Experts in Aviation: 2d Meeting.	Santiago	July
South Pacific Commission: Final Meeting on Revision of Commission.	Wellington	July

Achievements of the Inter-American Development Bank

Statement by Douglas Dillon
Secretary of the Treasury [1]

It is particularly fitting that we are holding our fifth annual meeting of the Bank's Governors today, which is being observed in my country as Pan American Day. There could be no more fitting place for today's meeting than this honored and historic city, which Bolivar chose for the first Inter-American Conference, the Congress of Panama.

This is the 140th year since Bolivar prophesied proudly and boldly that "a hundred centuries hence, posterity, searching for the origin of our public law and recalling the compacts that solidified its destiny, will touch with respect the protocols of the Isthmus. In them will be found the plan of our first alliances that will have marked the beginning of our relation with the universe."

The Bank, then, could not be more "at home" than here in Panama, where inter-American meetings first were launched, for the Bank in the best inter-American tradition is a strong and progressive force in the social and economic development of the hemisphere.

In 1963 the Inter-American Development Bank completed its third full year of operations and once again compiled an impressive record of achievement.

To support the economic and social development of its Latin American members, the Bank last year authorized 56 new loans, for a total of $259 million. Its lifetime loan approvals at the end of the year had reached the impressive figure of $875 million, and activity under these loans is proceeding at a sharply accelerated

[1] Made before the annual meeting of the Governors of the Inter-American Development Bank at Panamá on Apr. 14. Mr. Dillon is U.S. Governor of the Bank.

pace. Total disbursements at the end of 1963 were $206 million—more than three times larger than disbursements at the end of 1962.

Impressive as they are, these statistics can give us only a limited appreciation of the truly remarkable work which the Bank's dedicated management and staff have accomplished in the past 3 years. Each loan, for example, reflects weeks and months of careful scrutiny and planning. Behind each loan, moreover, lie several additional applications for projects found wanting or not yet ready for execution but which nonetheless required—and merited—time and effort to review.

The Bank has also continued its efforts to mobilize private capital for Latin American development in the highly industrialized free countries. Last year the Bank was able to sell a total of $7.4 million in additional participation—without any guaranty—in the United States, Canada, and Western Europe. As you know, the Bank has just floated its third successful bond issue—the second in the United States—in the amount of $50 million. In addition, the Bank is actively negotiating for further flotations in various Western European countries. I am confident that these efforts will soon bear fruit. Additional external capital has also been mobilized by the Bank through arrangements for the joint financing of projects. As stated in the annual report, five of the Bank's ordinary capital loans last year were made in association with other external sources of capital.

Equally important—although perhaps less immediately evident in our usual review of the Bank's activities—is the fact that the Bank's lending policies have stimulated the mobilization of very large amounts of domestic capital in its member countries. The total cost of projects financed by the $875 million of the Bank's loans amounts to nearly $2.5 billion. Most of the additional cost—some $1.5 billion of it—represents the direct participation of local interests—governments, firms, and individuals—and their provision of the domestic capital required.

In directing the Bank's lending policies, President [Felipe] Herrera has increasingly emphasized the encouragement of regional integration. It seems to me all to the good that the Bank should give priority to loans having a "regional integration component," for regional integration is essential if an adequate rate of economic growth is to be achieved in Latin America. I note that in the pursuit of these policies the Bank has extended a $6 million line of credit to the Central American Bank for Economic Integration and has made a $3 million loan to the national universities of the five Central American countries in order to insure technical progress within the framework of that area's vigorous movement toward regional integration.

During the past year the Bank moved to implement the export credits program which the Governors approved in Caracas. The Bank has given specific form to the general directive laid down by the Governors and has completed the detailed regulations to govern this new activity. The $30 million of ordinary capital resources allocated to this program has now been put to work by the grant of lines of credit to several member countries. I am sure we will all watch with great interest and expectation the important role this export financing program can play in the development of capital goods production, export diversification, reduced trade barriers, and regional integration.

Increase in Lendable Resources

The pace of the Bank's activities required some time ago that the Governors consider an increase in the Bank's lendable resources. The process begun 2 years ago in Buenos Aires has now been completed and the authorized ordinary capital of the Bank now stands at the equivalent of an imposing $2.15 billion, of which $475 million is the authorized paid-in capital stock and $1,675 million is callable capital. Our Congress in January authorized United States participation in this increase to the extent of $411.8 million in callable capital, which will be subscribed in two installments—this year and next—along with the subscription of the Bank's other members. With the Bank's demonstrated success in raising funds in private capital markets, the increased authorized capital provides ample assurance of adequate resources for projects on standard "bankable" terms for several years to come.

We have at the moment no such assurance on the availability of Bank funds for so-called "soft" loans—loans designed to supplement those made on ordinary banking terms. Agreement was reached earlier this year on an increase of $73.2 million in the Fund for Special Operations, of which $50 million will be paid in by my Government on April 28. This will bring the total capital of the Fund for Special Operations to the equivalent of $219.5 million, of which $150 million will have been paid in by the United States. In addition, our Congress last year appropriated an additional $131 million to increase the Social Progress Trust Fund administered by the Bank. These additional funds for loans on easy repayment terms will suffice for less than 1 year of lending operations at an adequate rate. It is urgent, therefore, that the Governors address themselves once again to the future of the Bank's lending activities on soft terms and begin action to obtain the requisite funds.

Proposal To Enlarge Special Operations Fund

At our last meeting in Caracas, and again in the report on this matter which is now before you, my Government has expressed its view that the Bank would be strengthened if at this point in its life—and at this juncture of the Alliance for Progress—the lending windows to which the United States and other member countries provide funds were reduced from the existing three to two. We have, therefore, proposed that there be no further replenishment of the Social Progress Trust Fund and that, instead, there be a substantial enlargement of the Fund for Special Operations.

The Social Progress Trust Fund, as you know, grew directly from the Act of Bogotá and the emphasis which at that time we all agreed to place on social development in Latin America. It was unfortunately all too true that social progress in the hemisphere had been sadly neglected, and therefore it was both essential and proper that the Act of Bogotá call attention to the priority needs of the social sector.

The Act of Bogotá, as we all know, was soon succeeded by the great milestone of hemispheric dedication and cooperation, the Charter of Punta del Este. That charter gave formal recognition to the fact that social and economic progress are mutually reinforcing objectives. It also called for comprehensive planning of the path to progress—planning that would make it necessary to reduce or remove any sharp distinction between economic and social projects. The mark of well-prepared plans—which, happily, are now well advanced in a number of countries—is the rational allocation of available resources between the economic and social sectors, taking full account of their interdependence. We can expect, therefore, that the Bank, in deciding upon particular projects for financing, will increasingly take into account both economic and social considerations and not just one or the other. With this approach, only two sources of financing, one hard, one soft, seem necessary—the choice between them to be determined not necessarily just by the nature of the project but also by the situation of the borrower or other special circumstances.

In the context of these considerations, I hope that we can agree at this meeting to seek the commitment of our governments to a 3-year program to enlarge the Fund for Special Operations by an amount equal to $300 million per annum, of which the United States would contribute $250 million, and the other members of the Bank, $50 million, all in our own national currencies.

This enlargement, which would enable the Fund to make loans on special terms for the purposes currently being financed by both the Fund and the Social Progress Trust Fund, can be accomplished without any change in the agreement establishing the Inter-American Development Bank. This would simplify the legislative problems of the member governments. This is particularly desirable as far as the United States is concerned. In view of our forthcoming national election, the United States Congress can be expected to adjourn somewhat earlier in the year than has recently been the case. Delay in reaching agreement on this matter or the introduction of complexities involving basic changes in the Bank's charter would greatly increase our difficulty in obtaining congressional approval this year—as can be attested by the Members of the United States Congress who have come here from Washing-

ton to attend this meeting as members of our delegation.

The Alliance for Progress

We look for the Bank to continue and expand its role as the "Bank of the Alliance." During the past year the Bank has assumed new duties as financial agent in the mobilization of external resources for national development programs, in filling a special advisory role with various entities concerned with the provision of external development financing, and, finally, as technical adviser to the newly established Inter-American Alliance for Progress Committee (known as CIAP). In connection especially with the latter body, it seems appropriate for the Bank to assume a more active role in the programing of development assistance and in directing its activities toward the support of well-designed national and regional programs.

Turning to the Alliance for Progress, in which the Bank plays such an important role, I think we must, in honesty, acknowledge that the present moment is one characterized by skepticism and doubt, both in Latin America and in the United States. Unquestionably, we still have a long way to go before we achieve the objectives envisioned in the Charter of Punta del Este. But while we face that fact, let it not obscure the equally important fact that, by every realistic measure, we have come a long way.

First, in the recent creation of the Inter-American Alliance for Progress Committee, CIAP, we have established a sound mechanism for hemispheric coordination and guidance within the framework of the alliance. Our appointment of Ambassador Teodoro Moscoso as United States representative has made clear that the United States wishes to play an active role in this Committee, to which President Johnson has pledged "our full support." [2]

Second, we should not lose sight of the fact that 11 of the 19 Latin American member countries have been achieving the minimum 2½ percent per capita growth target set at Punta del Este. Equally important, perhaps, is the fact that throughout the hemisphere we have witnessed in the past 2 years the creation of new institutions vital to the pace of future growth. The Bank itself has participated in the establishment or reform of a variety of intermediate credit institutions—development banks, agricultural credit banks, savings and loan and housing finance institutions—all critical in the process of domestic resource mobilization. Intense efforts are being devoted to the reform of tax structures, improved tax collection, a more equitable and productive distribution of land, and improved facilities in the fields of health and education.

These are the very sinews of growth, and the attention and activity focused in these areas in the past 2 years has far surpassed anything ever before witnessed in the hemisphere. The fruits of endeavors such as these will not miraculously ripen overnight; on the contrary, progress will be difficult and even hazardous. But without these efforts, progress simply will not occur. We therefore have a clear choice before us:

—Shall we hold timorously back, afraid to move because we might stir up waters that could become troubled?

—Or shall we venture forth on new paths—but always within a framework of free and democratic institutions—that will offer all of our peoples a fair share in the gradually ripening fruit of our mutual endeavors?

On behalf of my country, I urge that we move without timidity and with confidence.

So far as external funds are concerned, taking into full acount the self-help measures of the various countries of Latin America in connection with their commitments under the Charter of Punta del Este, the United States continues to be prepared to provide public assistance in the order of magnitude suggested by the charter. As our AID [Agency for International Development] Administrator, Mr. David Bell, emphasized in his address to the Governors last year, the pace at which aid can be provided must depend upon a series of preparatory and correlated actions. Careful advance planning and sound project implementation takes time, and there will be inevitable lags between commit-

[2] For text of an address made by President Johnson at the Pan American Union on Mar. 16, see BULLETIN of Apr. 6, 1964, p. 535.

ment and disbursement of funds. I have pointed out the close attention the Bank has given to the problem of project execution and loan disbursements during the past year and wish to assure you that our own financing institutions have also made every effort—consistent with the overriding requirements of sound project implementation—to expedite disbursement.

Among the disappointments of the past 2 years, I might note that the commitment of external funds from Europe has thus far been less than had been hoped. Recently there has been new evidence of European interest in Latin America symbolized by the recent visits of President de Gaulle and President Luebke. The United States wholeheartedly welcomes these renewed signs of European interest and hopes that the interest will be clearly manifested in an increase in the kinds of low-interest, long-term development loans so badly needed by Latin America. In addition to liberal terms, we would hope that European assistance to Latin America would be carefully related to the overall planning effort and to the system of priorities established within the context of the Alliance for Progress. The proposal of the Governor for Argentina raises interesting possibilities in this respect, and I can state that my delegation is in full accord with the objectives underlying his proposal.

I should like once again to emphasize in the strongest terms the need for the Latin American countries themselves to be on guard against terms of assistance from any source which would create an unacceptable burden for the future. The indiscriminate and unrestrained acceptance of short- and medium-term suppliers credits, in cases where longer term development loans are the real need, all too often simply creates an unwieldy and unmanageable problem which can very quickly assume crisis proportions leading to a slowdown in the pace of development.

Mobilizing Private Investment

The field of private investment is another area where flows of external capital have proved disappointing. In this connection, we must constantly bear in mind the fact that the foreign investor always has alternative possibilities for investment of his capital. Given the high levels of current economic activity in the United States and Europe, the opportunities for profitable investment at home in both areas are relatively great. In order to attract private funds from the United States or Europe, or to induce the investment of local private capital, a country—whether already industrialized or developing—must maintain an investment climate which offers a reasonable prospect that a sound project will yield a return commensurate with the risk involved. The choice is for each country to make. The results will depend, to a very great extent, upon that choice.

In the United States over the past 3 years we have adopted a series of tax measures to increase the relative attractiveness of investment at home as compared with investment in other free, industrialized countries. Countries that deliberately hamper the investment of private capital, or fail to provide a hospitable climate, should be aware of the fact that they are forgoing sources of financing and technical knowledge of great importance to their future growth and to the strength of their international position—sources which cannot possibly be replaced by public funds.

An important corollary of a favorable "investment climate" is a country's ability to raise capital abroad. In this connection the recent experience of Mexico comes to mind: Mexico has been able to float two highly successful bond issues in the capital markets of the United States—one last year and a second just 2 weeks ago—for a total of $65 million. It goes without saying that these Mexican issues were very welcome, and we hope that other Latin American countries will be able to follow this example in mobilizing private external funds for their development. I should mention here that the interest equalization tax on foreign securities which has been proposed to the United States Congress by my Government [3] is not designed to apply to the securities of the Latin American countries.

Finally, I cannot let this occasion pass without mention of the world trade and development conference now under way in Geneva.[4] I

[3] For background, see *ibid.*, Mar. 23, 1964, p. 464.

[4] For background, see *ibid.*, Apr. 20, 1964, p. 634.

am aware of the intense interest which your Governments have in this conference and in its purpose of helping to ease the problem facing the developing world. That endeavor is, of course, one in which the United States has long taken the lead, and I would simply like to emphasize my country's determination to continue its efforts, in every feasible way, to serve that purpose.

Mr. Chairman, the tangible evidence of the Bank's progress placed before us at this meeting symbolizes the activity, movement, and forward progress being accomplished throughout Latin America under the guidance of the Charter of Punta del Este. I am confident that at our meeting next year, and in the years ahead, we will find ourselves increasingly able to meet the needs of Latin America and of Western Hemisphere solidarity.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Automotive Traffic

Customs convention on the temporary importation of private road vehicles. Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into force December 15, 1957. TIAS 3943.
Ratification deposited: Cuba (with reservation), November 20, 1963.

Aviation

International air services transit agreement. Done at Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force for the United States February 8, 1945. 59 Stat. 1693.
Acceptance deposited: Algeria, April 16, 1964.

Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961.[1]
Ratification deposited: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (with reservation and declaration), March 25, 1964.

[1] Not in force.

Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund. Opened for signature at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1501.
Notification of withdrawal: Cuba, April 2, 1964.

Northwest Atlantic Fisheries

Protocol to the international convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries of February 8, 1949 (TIAS 2089), relating to harp and hood seals. Done at Washington July 15, 1963.[1]
Ratification deposited: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, April 13, 1964.

Telecommunications

Radio regulations, with appendixes, annexed to the international telecommunication convention, 1959 (TIAS 4892). Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force May 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4893.
Notification of approval: Mexico, March 7, 1964.

BILATERAL

Bolivia

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1701–1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at La Paz March 25, 1964. Entered into force March 25, 1964.

Tanganyika

Agreement for the continued application to Tanganyika of the provisions of the agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom for technical cooperation (TIAS 2281). Effected by exchange of notes at Dar-es-Salaam, December 9, 1963. Entered into force December 9, 1963.

Yugoslavia

Agreement for the abolition of all nonimmigrant visa fees. Effected by exchange of notes at Belgrade, December 30, 1963, and March 27 and April 4, 1964. Entered into force April 15, 1964.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Designations

Robinson McIlvaine as Coordinator of the National Interdepartmental Seminar, Foreign Service Institute, effective April 13. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 161 dated April 10.)

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American Republics

Achievements of the Inter-American Development Bank (Dillon) 717

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Asia. SEATO Council of Ministers Meets at Manila (Rusk, text of communique) . . . 690

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Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Release issued prior to April 13 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 160 of April 10.

No.	Date	Subject
*162	4/13	Vaughn sworn in as Ambassador to Panama (biographic details).
*163	4/13	Dr. Ferebee sworn in as consultant to Medical Division (biographic details).
*164	4/13	U.S. participation in international conferences.
*165	4/14	Itinerary for visit of King of Jordan.
166	4/15	SEATO communique.
167	4/17	Talks with France on air cargo operations.
168	4/17	Lozano named consultant to Assistant Secretary Battle (rewrite).
*169	4/17	Barnett: "China and the Chinese."
†170	4/17	Williams: "African Issues at the United Nations."

*Not printed.
†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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America as a Great Power

Address by President Johnson[1]

The world has changed many times since General Washington counseled his new and weak country to "observe good faith and justice toward all nations." Great empires have risen and dissolved. Great heroes have made their entrances and have left the stage. And America has slowly, often reluctantly, grown to be a great power and a leading member of world society.

So we seek today, as we did in Washington's time, to protect the life of our nation, to preserve the liberty of our citizens, and to pursue the happiness of our people. This is the touchstone of our world policy.

Thus we seek to add no territory to our dominion, no satellites to our orbit, no slavish followers to our policies. The most impressive witness to this restraint is that for a century our own frontiers have stood quiet and stood unarmed. But we have also learned in this century, and we have learned it at painful and bloody cost, that our own freedom depends on the freedom of others, that our own protection requires that we help protect others, that we draw increased strength from the strength of others.

Thus, to allies we are the most dependable and enduring of friends, for our own safety depends upon the strength of that friendship. To enemies we are the most steadfast and determined of foes, for we know that surrender anywhere threatens defeat everywhere. For a generation, without regard to party or region or class, our country has been united in a basic foreign policy that grows from this inescapable teaching.

Tested Principles of Foreign Policy

The principles of this foreign policy have been shaped in battle, have been tested in danger, have been sustained in achievement. They have endured under four Presidents of the United States, because they reflect the realities of our world and they reflect the aims of our country.

[1] Made before the Associated Press at New York, N.Y., on Apr. 20 (White House press release; as-delivered text).

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. L, NO. 1298 PUBLICATION 7687 MAY 11, 1964

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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Particular actions must change as events change conditions. We must be alert to shifting realities, to emerging opportunities, and always alert to any fresh dangers. But we must not mistake day-to-day changes for fundamental movements in the course of history. It often requires greater courage and resolution to maintain a policy which time has tested than to change it in the face of the moment's pressures. Our foreign policy rests on very tested principles.

First, since Korea, we have labored to build a military strength of unmatched might. We have succeeded. If the threat of war has lessened, it is largely because our opponents realize attack would bring destruction. This effort has been costly. But the costs of weakness are far greater than the costs of strength, and the payment far more painful. That is why, in the last 3 years, your Government has strengthened the whole range of America's defenses.

We have increased defense spending in these 3 years by approximately $6 billion over the last year of the Eisenhower administration, and this year we are spending approximately $8 billion more on defense than we were during that last year.

Second, we have strongly resisted Communist efforts to extend their dominion and expand their power. We have taken the risks and we have used the power which this principle demanded. We have avoided purposeless provocation and needless adventure. The Berlin airlift, the Korean war, the defense of Formosa, the Cuba crisis, the struggle in Viet-Nam, prove our determination to resist aggression and prove our ability to adapt particular response to particular challenge.

Third, we have worked for the revival of strength among our allies, initially, to oppose Communist encroachment on war-weakened nations; in the long run, because our own future rests on the vitality and the unity of the Western society to which we belong.

Fourth, we have encouraged the independence and the progress of developing countries. We are safer and we are more comfortable in a world where all people can govern themselves in their own way, and where all nations have the inner strength to resist external domination.

Fifth, we have pursued every hope of a lasting peace. From the Baruch Plan, named after that noble resident of this city, to the test ban treaty, we have sought and welcomed agreements which decrease danger without decreasing security. In that pursuit, for 20 years we have been the leading power in the support of the United Nations. In that pursuit, this year as in every year, we will work to reach agreement on measures to reduce armament and lessen the chance of war.

Today we apply these same principles in a world that is much changed since 1945. Europe seeks a new role for strength rather than contenting itself with protection for weakness. The unity of communism is being eroded by the insistent forces of nationalism and diverging interest. A whole new group of societies is painfully struggling toward the modern world.

Our basic principles are adequate to this shifting world.

But foreign policy is more than just a set of general principles. It is the changing application of those principles to specific dangers and to specific opportunities. It involves knowledge of strengths and awareness of limitations in each new situation.

The presence of offensive missiles in Cuba was a fact. The presence of fallout in the atmosphere has been a fact. The presence of guerrillas in Viet-Nam, at this hour, is a fact.

Such facts cannot be dealt with simply by historical judgments or general precepts. They require concrete acts of courage, and wisdom, and often restraint. These qualities of endurance and innovation, these qualities of continuity and change are at work in at least six major areas of continuing concern to you.

Relations With the Soviet Union

First is our relationship with the Soviet Union, the center of our concern for peace. Communists, using force and intrigue, seek to bring about a Communist-dominated world. Our convictions, our interests, our life as a nation, demand that we resolutely oppose, with all of our might, that effort to dominate the world. This activity, and this alone, is the cause of the cold war between us.

For the United States has nothing to fear from peaceful competition. We welcome it, and we will win it. It is our system which

flourishes and grows stronger in a world free from the threat of war. And in such a competition all people, everywhere, will be the gainers. Today there are new pressures, new realities, which make it permissible to hope that the pursuit of peace is in the interests of the Soviet Union as it is in ours.

And our own restraint may be convincing the Soviet leaders of the reality that we, in America, seek neither war nor the destruction of the Soviet Union. Thus I am very hopeful that we can take important steps toward the day when in the words of the Old Testament, "nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more."

We must remember that peace will not come suddenly. It will not emerge dramatically from a single agreement or a single meeting. It will be advanced by concrete and limited accommodations, by the gradual growth of common interests, by the increased awareness of shifting dangers and alinements, and by the development of trust in a good faith based on a reasoned view of the world.

Our own position is clear. We will discuss any problem, we will listen to any proposal, we will pursue any agreement, we will take any action which might lessen the chance of war without sacrificing the interests of our allies or our own ability to defend the alliance against attack. In other words, our guard is up but our hand is out.

I am taking two actions today which reflect both our desire to reduce tensions and our unwillingness to risk weakness. I have ordered a further substantial reduction in our production of enriched uranium, to be carried out over a 4-year period. When added to previous reductions, this will mean an overall decrease in the production of plutonium by 20 percent, and of enriched uranium by 40 percent. By bringing production in line with need—and the chart shows now that our production is here [*gesturing*], and our need is here, and our reduction today will bring it here—we think we will reduce tension while we maintain all the necessary power.

We must not operate a WPA nuclear project, just to provide employment, when our needs have been met. And in reaching these decisions, I have been in close consultation with Prime Minister Douglas-Home. Simultaneously with my announcement now, Chairman Khrushchev is releasing a statement in Moscow, at 2 o'clock our time, in which he makes definite commitments to steps toward a more peaceful world. He agrees to discontinue the construction of two big new atomic reactors for the production of plutonium over the next several years, to reduce substantially the production of U–235 for nuclear weapons, and to allocate more fissionable material for peaceful uses.

This is not disarmament. This is not a declaration of peace. But it is a hopeful sign, and it is a step forward which we welcome and which we can take in hope that the world may yet, one day, live without the fear of war. At the same time, I have reaffirmed all the safeguards against weakening our nuclear strength which we adopted at the time of the test ban treaty.

The Atlantic Partnership

The second area of continuing effort is the development of Atlantic partnership with a stronger and more unified Europe. Having begun this policy when peril was great, we will not now abandon it as success moves closer. We worked for a stronger and more prosperous Europe, and Europe is strong and prosperous today because of our work and beyond our expectation.

We have supported a close partnership with a more unified Europe, and in the past 15 years more peaceful steps have been taken in this direction than have been taken at any time in our history. The pursuit of this goal, like the pursuit of any large and worthy cause, will not be easy or untroubled. But the realities of the modern world teach that increased greatness and prosperity demand increased unity and partnership. The underlying forces of European life are eroding old barriers, and they are dissolving old suspicions. Common institutions are expanding common interest.

National boundaries continue to fade under the impact of travel and commerce and communication. A new generation is coming of age, unscarred by old hostilities or old ambi-

tions, thinking of themselves as Europeans, their values shaped by a common Western culture. These forces, and the steadfast effort of all who share common goals, will shape the future. And unity based on hope will ultimately prove stronger than unity based on fear.

We realize that sharing the burden of leadership requires us to share the responsibilities of power. As a step in this direction we support the establishment of a multilateral nuclear force composed of those nations which desire to participate. We also welcome agreed new mechanisms for political consultation on mutual interests throughout the world with whatever changes in organization are necessary to make such consultation rapid and effective.

The experience of two world wars has taught us that the fundamental security interests of the United States and of Europe are the same. What we learned in time of war, we must not now forget in time of peace. For more than a decade we have sought to enlarge the independence and ease the rigors of the people of Eastern Europe. We have used the tools of peaceful exchange in goods, in persons, and in ideas, to open up communication with these restless nations that Mr. Khrushchev refers to sometimes as "children who are grown up too big to spank." We have used limited direct assistance where the needs of our security have allowed us to follow the demands of our compassion.

In that spirit within the last month I have exercised the power granted the President by the Congress and I have reaffirmed the right of open trade with Poland and Yugoslavia.[2]

Latin America

In the third area of continuing concern, Latin America, we have renewed our commitment to the Alliance for Progress, we have sought peaceful settlement of disputes among the American nations, and we have supported the OAS effort to isolate Communist-controlled Cuba. The Alliance for Progress is the central task today of this hemisphere. That task is going ahead successfully.

But that alliance means more than economic assistance or investment. It requires us to encourage and to support those democratic political forces which seek essential change within the framework of constitutional government. It means preference for rapid evolution as the only real alternative to violent revolution. To struggle to stand still in Latin America is just to "throw the sand against the wind."

We must, of course, always be on guard against Communist subversion. But anticommunism alone will never suffice to insure our liberty or fulfill our dreams. That is going to take leadership, leadership that is dedicated to economic progress without uneconomic privilege, to social change which enhances social justice, to political reform which widens human freedom.

The resumption of relations with Panama[3] proves once again the unmatched ability of our inter-American system to resolve these disputes among our good neighbors. At the outset of that dispute with Panama, the first morning I stated to the President of Panama by telephone our willingness to seek a solution to all problems without conditions of any kind. And I told him that our negotiators would meet theirs anywhere, anytime, to discuss anything, and we would do what was fair, just, and right. We never departed from that willingness. And on that basis, the dispute was settled.

We now move toward solution with the generosity of friends who realize, as Woodrow Wilson once said, "You cannot be friends on any other terms than upon the terms of equality."

The use of Cuba as a base for subversion and terror is an obstacle to our hopes for the Western Hemisphere. Our first task must be, as it has been, to isolate Cuba from the inter-American system, to frustrate its efforts to destroy free governments, and to expose the weakness of communism so that all can see. That policy is in effect, and that policy is working. The problems of this hemisphere would be far more serious if Castro today sat at the councils of the Organization of American States disrupting debates and blocking decision, if Castro had open channels of trade and communication along which subversion and terror could flow, if his economy had been a successful model

[2] BULLETIN of Apr. 20, 1964, p. 626.

[3] *Ibid.*, Apr. 27, 1964, p. 655.

rather than a dismal warning to all of his neighbors.

The effectiveness of our policy is more than a matter of trade statistics. It has increased awareness of difference and danger, it has revealed the brutal nature of the Cuban regime, it has lessened opportunities for subversion, it has reduced the number of Castro's followers, and it has drained the resources of our adversaries, who are spending more than $1 million a day. We will continue this policy with every peaceful means at our command.

The Far East

A fourth area of continuity and change is the battle for freedom in the Far East. In the last 20 years, in two wars, millions of Americans have fought to prevent the armed conquest of free Asia. Having invested so heavily in the past, we will not weaken in the present. The first American diplomatic mission to the Far East was instructed to inform all countries that "we will never make conquests, or ask any nation to let us establish ourselves in their countries."

That was our policy in 1832. That is our policy in 1964. Our conquering forces left Asia after World War II with less territory under our flag than ever before. But if we have desired no conquest for ourselves, we have also steadfastly opposed it for others. The independence of Asian nations is a link in our own freedom.

In Korea we proved the futility of direct aggression. In Viet-Nam the Communists today try the more insidious, but equally dangerous, methods of subversion, terror, and guerrilla warfare. They conduct a campaign organized, directed, supplied, and supported from Hanoi. This, too, we will prove futile. Armed Communist attack on Viet-Nam is a reality. The fighting spirit of South Viet-Nam is a reality, as Secretary Rusk told us from there yesterday. The request of a friend for our help in this terrible moment is a reality.

The statement of the SEATO allies that Communist defeat is "essential" is a reality.[4] To fail to respond to these realities would reflect on our honor as a nation, would undermine worldwide confidence in our courage, would convince every nation in South Asia that it must now bow to Communist terms to survive.

The situation in Viet-Nam is difficult. But there is an old American saying that "when the going gets tough, the tough get going." So let no one doubt that we are in this battle as long as South Viet-Nam wants our support and needs our assistance to protect its freedom.

I have already ordered measures to step up the fighting capacity of the South Vietnamese forces, to help improve the welfare and the morale of their civilian population, to keep our forces at whatever level continued independence and freedom require. No negotiated settlement in Viet-Nam is possible, as long as the Communists hope to achieve victory by force.

Once war seems hopeless, then peace may be possible. The door is always open to any settlement which assures the independence of South Viet-Nam and its freedom to seek help for its protection.

In Laos we continue to support the Geneva agreements which offer what we think is the best hope of peace and independence for that strife-torn land. At my instruction yesterday Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy went to Laos, and he has already arrived there for a firsthand examination of the developments, developments that have come in the last 48 hours. At the moment we are encouraged by reports of progress toward the reestablishment of orderly, legal government.

As for China itself, so long as the Communist Chinese pursue conflict and preach violence, there can be and will be no easing of relationships. There are some who prophesy that these policies will change. But America must base its acts on present realities and not on future hopes. It is not we who must reexamine our view of China. It is the Chinese Communists who must reexamine their view of the world.

Nor can anyone doubt our unalterable commitment to the defense and liberty of free China. Meanwhile, we will say to our historic friends, the talented and courageous Chinese people on the mainland, that just as we opposed aggression against them, we must oppose aggression by their rulers and for the same reasons.

[4] For text of communique of Apr. 15, see *ibid.*, May 4, 1964, p. 692.

The New Nations of Africa and Asia

Fifth is our concern with the new nations of Africa and Asia. We welcome their emergence, for their goals flow from hopes like our own. We began the revolt from colonial rule which is now reshaping continents and which is now creating new nations. Our mastery of technology has helped men to learn that poverty is not inevitable, that disease and hunger are not laws of nature. Having helped create hopes, we must now help satisfy them, or we will witness a rising discontent which may ultimately menace our own welfare.

What we desire for the developing nations is what we desire for ourselves—economic progress which will permit them to shape their own institutions, and the independence which will allow them to take a dignified place in the world community.

Let there be no mistake about our intention to win the war against poverty at home, and let there be no mistake about our intention to fight that war around the world. This battle will not be easy and it will not be swift. It takes time to educate young minds and shape the structure of a modern economy. But the world must not be divided into rich nations and poor nations, or white nations and colored nations. In such division, I know you must realize, are the seeds of terrible discord and danger in decades to come. For the wall between rich and poor is a wall of glass through which all can see.

We recognize the need for more stable prices for raw materials, for broader opportunity for trade among nations. We are ready to help meet these claims, as we have already done, for example, with the negotiation of the international coffee agreement, and as we will do in the weeks ahead in the Kennedy Round. We will continue with the direct economic assistance which has been a vital part of our policy for 20 years.

Foreign Aid

Last year the Congress reduced foreign aid from $4.9 billion—later modified by General Clay's committee to $4.5 billion—and Congress reduced that to a total of $3.4 billion that they appropriated to me to deal with the problems of 120 nations. This year I ordered that our request be cut to the absolute minimum consistent with our commitments and our security, allowing for no cushions or no padding, and that was done.

Every dollar cut from that request for $3.4 billion will directly diminish the security of the United States. And if, in spite of this clear need and this clear warning, substantial cuts are made again this year in either military or economic funds, I want to sound a warning that it will be my solemn duty as President to submit supplemental requests for additional amounts until the necessary funds of $3.4 billion are appropriated.

In these areas, and in other areas of concern, we remain faithful to tested principle and deep conviction while shaping our actions to shifting dangers and to fresh opportunity. This year is an election year in the United States. And in this year let neither friend nor enemy abroad mistake growing discussion for growing dissension, conflict over programs for conflict over principles, or political division for political paralysis. This mistake in judgment has been made twice in our lifetime, to the sorrow of our adversaries.

Now let those at home, who share in the great democratic struggle, remember that the world is their audience and that attack and opposition to old policies must not be just for opposition's sake, that it requires responsible presentation of new choices, that in the protection of our security—the protection of American security—partisan politics must always yield to national need.

I recognize that those who seek to discuss great public issues in this election year must be informed on those issues. Therefore I have today instructed the Departments of State and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency to be prepared and to provide all major candidates for the office of President with all possible information helpful to their discussion of American policy. I hope candidates will accept this offer in the spirit in which it is made, the encouragement of the responsible discussion which is the touchstone of the democratic process.

In the past 20 years we have gradually become aware that America is forever bound up in the affairs of the whole world. Our own future is linked to the future of all. In great capitals and in tiny villages, in the councils of great powers and in the rooms of unknown planners, events are being set in motion which will continually call upon our attention and our resources.

Prophecy is always unsure. But if anything is certain, it is that this nation can never again retreat from world responsibility. You must know, and we must realize, that we will be involved in the world for the rest of our history. We must accustom ourselves to working for liberty in the community of nations as we have pursued it in our community of States.

The struggle is not merely long. The struggle is unending. For it is part of man's ancient effort to master the passions of his mind, the demands of his spirit, the cruelties of nature. Yes, we have entered a new arena. The door has closed behind us, and the old stage has passed into history.

Dangers will replace dangers, challenges will take the place of challenges, new hopes will come as old hopes fade. There is no turning from a course which will require wisdom and much endurance so long as the name of America still sounds in this land and around the world.

The Situation in the Western Pacific

Address by Secretary Rusk [1]

It is a great pleasure for me to be once more in Indiana and to be here at Valparaiso University in company with my friend from across the aisle, Congressman Charles Halleck. One who has been deeply concerned for many years with foreign policy must pay respect to the indelible imprint which he made upon the history of our times while serving his country as majority leader in the 80th Congress at a time when we were picking up once more, on a bipartisan basis, our heavy responsibilities for the maintenance of peace through such measures as aid to Greece and Turkey, the Marshall Plan, and the beginnings of NATO. It was a special pleasure for me to respond to your kind invitation because it was so strongly endorsed by this distinguished public servant.

Please accept my warmest congratulations and best wishes as you dedicate this Law School, an occasion made celebrated by the presence of one of the greatest of our legal statesmen, the Chief Justice of the United States. It was my own personal aspiration to become a lawyer, but a world war intervened. I have continued to marvel at the role of law in enlarging the freedom of those who are within its compass. I have long felt that the nature of our legal order has been much too much neglected in the education of the ordinary citizen. One can only express some measure of astonishment, for example, that the most pervasive and compelling aspect of our social environment is given so little attention in undergraduate or liberal arts education.

In our relations with the rest of the world, the building of a decent world order is our principal preoccupation—the subject of most of our effort, the content of most of our cables, the commitment of all of our representatives abroad. Little by little that decent world order is coming into being, and law is being given its chance to

[1] Made at the dedication of a new building for the School of Law at Valparaiso University, Valparaiso, Ind., on Apr. 25 (press release 186).

lay a healing hand upon disputes and to enlarge the area of freedom by allowing more confident prediction about what others will do. Therefore it is a very special pleasure for me to be a part of this dedication event.

U.S. Security Interests in the Western Pacific

There are many aspects of our foreign policy which I might discuss with you. But I shall make my talk tonight primarily a report on a 10-day trip across the Pacific, from which I returned Monday evening.[2]

The security of the United States—and of the free world as a whole—is deeply involved in the Western Pacific. The vital contribution to freedom being made by Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Republic of China is, I believe, generally recognized in the United States. We have a defensive alliance with each of those nations. All three were ratified overwhelmingly by the United States Senate. Only two Senators voted against the mutual security pact with Japan and only six against the security pacts with the Republics of Korea and China.

Southeast Asia also is vital to our security. Including the island countries off its shores, it has more than 200 million people. It contains rich agricultural lands and valuable mineral resources. Parts of it are relatively lightly populated. Standing at the crossroads between two oceans and two continents, it is a region of great strategic importance, not only to all the people who live in the great arc from Karachi to Tokyo but to the free world as a whole.

Our interest in the defense of that region is recognized through three defensive alliances: our direct mutual security pact with the Republic of the Philippines, ANZUS (our defensive alliance with Australia and New Zealand), and SEATO, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. All three of these treaties were ratified overwhelmingly by the Senate.

The Communists are eager to take over Southeast Asia. They are trying hard to do so by means short of the overt type of aggression they attempted in Korea 14 years ago. They are attempting to win by subversion—and, in South Viet-Nam, by acts of terror and guerrilla warfare.

This assault on the Republic of Viet-Nam was organized and is directed, supported, and supplied by the North Vietnamese Communist regime in Hanoi. Hanoi also directed and continues to support the Communist threat to Laos, where there is presently an uncertain "peace."

The North Vietnamese spearheads of aggression are supported by the Communist regime in Peiping, which rules some 700 million people. And the assault on Viet-Nam is supported at least verbally by Moscow. For, in the upside-down jargon of the Communists, this is a so-called "war of national liberation"—and a form of aggression which has the blessing of the Soviet as well as the Chinese Communists.

Fourteen years ago the Communists launched an open aggression against the Republic of Korea. Had that aggression been allowed to succeed, Japan would have come under a more direct threat and the psychological effects of an unchallenged Communist aggression would have been felt all over the world. Probably most of the free countries on the periphery of the Communist world in Asia would have felt it necessary to submit to Communist domination.

Since the Korea war, no Communist state has again ventured an all-out direct aggression. But they have not abandoned the technique of aggression through guerrilla warfare, sustained by infiltrating trained men and arms across national frontiers. That is the technique they are using in Southeast Asia.

If the Communists were to succeed in their assault on South Viet-Nam, the consequences to us, and to the free world as a whole, would be very serious. The rest of Southeast Asia would be in jeopardy, and saving it would be more costly, in blood and treasure, than defeating the aggression in South Viet-Nam. And the loss of Southeast Asia as a whole to the Communists would bring about a major shift in the balance of power. The South Asian subcontinent would be flanked, and Australia would be directly threatened. Such an immense victory for the Communists might well undermine the will of

[2] For statements made by Secretary Rusk at Taipei and Saigon Apr. 16 and 17 and on his return to Washington Apr. 20, see BULLETIN of May 4, 1964, p. 694.

free peoples on other continents to defend themselves.

These, very briefly, are the reasons why President Eisenhower decided to assist the Republic of South Viet-Nam; why, when the Communists stepped up their assault, President Kennedy decided to increase our assistance; and why President Johnson has increased it further and has promised that we will continue to help the Republic of Viet-Nam until this aggression against it is defeated.

The SEATO Council Meeting

The threat to Southeast Asia was, of course, the principal subject before the meeting of the SEATO Council of Ministers, which I attended in Manila last week.[3] This defensive alliance was signed in Manila nearly 10 years ago, following the Geneva accords, which brought to a close the war in Indochina in which France had been engaged. The purpose of the Manila Pact was to curb further Communist aggression in Southeast Asia, and by a protocol the protection of SEATO was extended to the three non-Communist states of former Indochina, should they request it. Cambodia and Laos have renounced that option. South Viet-Nam has not requested assistance from SEATO but is receiving help not only from the United States but, on a small scale, from other individual SEATO members.

At the meeting in Manila last week, the eight SEATO members considered all aspects of the attack on South Viet-Nam. None suggested that the free nations should turn their back and walk—or run—away from this aggression. France was already committed to what it calls a "political solution"—that is, to some form of so-called "neutralization." But it did not submit any specific proposal along that line. The consensus of the other members was that so-called "neutralization" of South Viet-Nam would be only a device for turning it over to the Communists.

Indeed, seven of the eight members of SEATO had little difficulty in arriving at some clear-cut pronouncements concerning the assault on the Republic of Viet-Nam.

They agreed that it is an "aggression" and that it is "directed, supplied and supported by the Communist regime in North Vietnam, in flagrant violation of the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962."

They agreed that "the defeat of the Communist campaign is essential not only to the security of the Republic of Vietnam, but to that of South-East Asia" and that "it will also be convincing proof that Communist expansion by such tactics will not be permitted."

They also agreed that "the members of SEATO should remain prepared, if necessary, to take further concrete steps within their respective capabilities of fulfillment of their obligations under the treaty."

It should be noted that the seven members who agreed on these and related declarations are the regional members—Thailand, the Philippines, Pakistan, Australia, and New Zealand—and the two others which maintain military forces in the area: Great Britain and the United States.

The communique adopted at Manila was by far the strongest ever issued by a SEATO Council. It demonstrated that SEATO is far from moribund. It is a warning which Hanoi and Peiping would do well to heed.

The Philippines

While in the Philippines I had the opportunity to talk at length with President [Diosdado] Macapagal and his colleagues in the Philippine Government.

The Republic of the Philippines is a vigorous, thriving democracy, committed to constitutional procedures, combining political stability with economic and social progress. Under President Macapagal's strong leadership, it is shouldering increasing responsibilities for preserving peace in Southeast Asia.

The Philippine people have not forgotten Bataan and Corregidor, and General MacArthur's return to the Philippines. They remember that Filipinos and Americans fought side by side. They know that freedom does not come cheap but is for the strong in spirit.

[3] For text of a statement made by Secretary Rusk at the SEATO meeting on Apr. 13 and a communique released on Apr. 15, see *ibid.*, p. 690.

We Americans are rightfully proud of our association with the Government and people of the Philippines, who share so fully with us a dedication to democracy and human rights.

The Republic of China

At Taipei I had the opportunity to discuss with President Chiang Kai-shek and the members of his government a wide range of matters of common interest. The Republic of China is a rampart of freedom in the Western Pacific. We support it as the Government of China, and we remain firmly opposed to any proposal to deprive it of its rightful place in the United Nations and to seat the Chinese Communists in its place.

The Republic of China continues to make remarkable economic and social progress. Its land reform and programs for rural development have been among the most successful in the world. Its citizens have achieved levels of well-being which contrast dramatically with the misery of their kinsmen on the mainland.

Many developing countries could profit from study of the programs of economic and social improvement which have been applied successfully on Taiwan. Also, the Republic of China is educating and training increasing numbers of men and women in various professions and skills which are in short supply in most parts of the world. These provide an expanding reservoir of technical advice and assistance on which other free nations are increasingly drawing.

In the people of the Republic of China, we have talented, vigorous, and resolute allies dedicated to freedom.

U.S. Role in Viet-Nam

In Viet-Nam, I talked at length with General [Nguyen] Khanh and his colleagues, as well as with Ambassador [Henry Cabot] Lodge, General [Paul D.] Harkins, and other members of our American team. These talks reinforced my confidence in the will and the ability of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam to lead the people of that country to victory and a better life.

Our policy is to assist the Government and people of South Viet-Nam in achieving those objectives. As President Johnson said in New York Monday:[4]

> The statement of the SEATO allies that Communist defeat is "essential" is a reality. To fail to respond . . . would reflect on our honor as a nation, would undermine worldwide confidence in our courage, would convince every nation in South Asia that it must now bow to Communist terms to survive.
>
> . . . So let no one doubt that we are in this battle as long as South Viet-Nam wants our support and needs our assistance to protect its freedom.

Our appraisal of the morale and capabilities of the Government and people of South Viet-Nam is not exclusively American. Seven members of SEATO—all of whom have representatives in South Viet-Nam—joined in saying:

> The Government and people of the Republic of Vietnam have given eloquent testimony to their determination to fight for their country.

The SEATO Council also expressed its confidence in the "program of political and administrative reform, military action, pacification, and economic and social development recently instituted by the Government of the Republic of Vietnam. . . ." That favorable judgment was further reinforced in my own mind by what I saw and heard in Viet-Nam. General Khanh has both vigor and breadth of view. He believes that defeating the Communists requires a combination of military, political, economic, and social programs. His objective is not only to root out the Communists but to improve the living standards of the Vietnamese people.

Actually, between the end of the Indochinese war in 1954 and 1959, South Viet-Nam made great economic and social progress. Its achievements left the vaunted Communist paradise in North Viet-Nam far behind. Almost certainly that is why Hanoi reactivated the assault on South Viet-Nam in 1959.

The Communist campaign has, of course, held back South Viet-Nam's overall economic development. But I saw at firsthand that progress continues even in the midst of war. I visited a modern synthetic textile plant and a modern papermaking plant near Saigon. About 200

[4] See p. 726.

miles northeast of Saigon I visited a "New Life" hamlet. This is in a relatively secure province—and one which General Khanh described as a "pilot province," an example of what can and will be done elsewhere as the Communists are rooted out. I visited also a large dam and hydroelectric installation built by the Japanese as part of their reparations agreement. This installation will also provide water for irrigation.

I believe that economic and social development should be accelerated in the relatively secure areas of the country. I discussed with General Khanh and his colleagues various ways in which our aid program might be improved and in which other free nations might provide useful assistance, both military and civilian. There is need for more people of several professions and vocations—not least, for more physicians. I believe that several free nations are prepared to send more help, both in people and in critical materiel.

The Viet Cong have scored some gains in the last few months. They took advantage of two successive coups and the resultant turnovers in South Vietnamese administrative personnel to increase their efforts. They recaptured some of the more exposed strategic hamlets. They have managed to launch a few rather large-scale attacks, although they continue to rely chiefly on assassinations and small assaults.

General Khanh's objective is not only to "clear" but to "hold." With American assistance, he is moving ahead with training and equipping of local self-defense forces for villages and hamlets in the less exposed areas, thus releasing regular troops for offensive actions against the Viet Cong. He is increasing his security forces by some 50,000 men. I believe that his efforts are beginning to show results.

We can all take deep pride in the performance of the American military men who are training and supporting the South Vietnamese. We should take pride also in our civilian officials and their families, who work amid danger.

The Vietnamese people are energetic, intelligent, and quick to learn. They have a great economic potential. When they have won the peace and security which they are fighting for, and so fully deserve, they can become, I believe, one of the most prosperous people in that part of the world.

Communist Activities in Laos

In Laos, we support the Geneva agreements of 1962 calling for a neutral, independent country. We continue to support a Government of National Union with Prince Souvanna Phouma as Premier. However, we recognize that the Communist Pathet Lao and their North Vietnamese allies have not honored the Geneva agreements. There are still North Vietnamese military personnel in Laos in violation of those agreements; and they assist the Pathet Lao in attacks on Government forces. The Communists exclude the National Government from the areas which they control and refuse to allow the International Control Commission to perform its peace supervision functions in those areas. The Communists also are actively at work trying to subvert areas under non-Communist control. And they still move men, weapons, and other supplies from North Viet-Nam to South Viet-Nam over the "Ho Chi Minh trail" through Laos, in violation of the Geneva agreements.

There could be peace in Laos and throughout Southeast Asia if Hanoi and Peiping would comply with existing agreements to which they solemnly subscribed. The issue of peace is just that simple.

Economic Failures of Communism

Everywhere that I went on this trip to Southeast Asia, my heart was warmed by the manifestations of friendship for the United States. And I have had the same experience during the two visits I have paid to Japan and Korea as Secretary of State.

Also I have found in the Western Pacific countries widespread recognition of the economic failures of communism. The notion that communism is a shortcut to the future for developing countries has been shattered by experience. Communism in China and North Viet-Nam is not only brutal but an abysmal economic failure. The Soviets have done better, but their growth rate has dropped below that of Western Europe and the United States, not to mention Japan. And they have developed serious

difficulties in feeding themselves. Indeed, Communist methods are a sure-fire means of reducing farm production.

While Communist China and North Viet-Nam are bogged down in a morass of misery, most of the nations of the Western Pacific continue to advance economically and socially. Japan, which had a large industrial base before the Second World War, keeps on forging ahead in production and living standards and is making increasingly significant contributions to the technical and economic advancement of other free Asian countries. Australia and New Zealand enjoy high living standards, of course, and are contributing positively to both the security and the well-being of countries to their "Far North." The Philippines, Thailand, the Republic of China, and Malaysia have made noteworthy economic progress and, as they continue to surge forward, are able to increase their assistance to other countries.

Despite their economic failures—indeed, perhaps all the more because of these failures—the Asian Communists remain dangerous. Desperation might lead them to deeds which rational men would shun.

The dispute between Moscow and Peiping is partly about the means of promoting the Communist world revolution. The free world must take care not to let any Communists anywhere suppose that they can profit from aggression or militancy.

Most of the leaders and peoples of free Asia know that the free nations are far stronger than the Communist nations. In particular, they realize the power of the United States. What they are not always certain about is the resolve of the free world, including the United States, to deter or defeat aggression. They know that the foremost Communist objective is to get the Yankees to go home. They sometimes fear that we may, in fact, go home.

Our armed forces west of Alaska and Hawaii number in the range of 200,000 men. We have them there for the same reason that we have military forces in Western Europe and elsewhere: to protect the security of the United States, which is inseparable from that of the free world as a whole.

Our programs of military and economic assistance to the free nations of Asia serve the same end. We must take care that they are strong enough, well enough financed, to do the job.

On the trip from which I just returned, I gave renewed assurances that the United States has no intention of accommodating the Communists—of assisting their campaigns for world domination—by bringing the Yanks home. I said that we are in the Western Pacific to stay until that part of the world is safe for freedom.

U.S. and Japan To Exchange Data on Use of Natural Resources

Press release 183 dated April 24

Secretary Rusk announced on April 24 that Under Secretary of the Interior James K. Carr will visit Japan next month to inaugurate an exchange of information on applied science and engineering as it relates to improved use of natural resources.

The joint Cabinet meeting held at Tokyo last January [1] determined that such an exchange, proposed for the United States by Under Secretary Carr, would have definite mutual advantages.

Under Secretary Carr will meet with Vice Minister Taro Hisada of the Japanese Science and Technology Agency on May 12–13 at Tokyo. Among the topics to be discussed in this initial exchange are: (1) blending of coal for the steel industry; (2) diversified sources of energy, including liquefied petroleum gas from Alaska, and solar energy; and (3) air and water pollution.

Under Secretary Carr will be accompanied by assistants from the Department of State, the Department of Commerce, and the Department of Agriculture.

[1] For text of a joint communique of the third meeting of the Joint United States-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs, see BULLETIN of Feb. 17, 1964, p. 235.

Principles of Our Policy Toward Cuba

by Under Secretary Ball [1]

Foreign policies are rarely born full-armed like Minerva. More often they evolve in response to events and circumstances.

In such cases there is a danger that the assumptions on which policies are founded may become obscured.

This has, I think, happened to some extent with regard to our policy toward the present government of Cuba. Some of the public discussion that has surrounded that policy has involved misapprehensions on a number of fronts—misapprehensions as to the nature of the danger posed by the present and potential activities of the Castro government, misapprehensions as to the range of policies available to counter that danger, and misapprehensions as to the objectives that we can expect to accomplish by the policies employed.

In my observations to you this evening, I shall try to answer some of the questions that have arisen with regard to our Cuba policy and shall try to clarify some of the confusion that has been apparent in the public debate.

The Nature of the Threat

First, what is the nature of the threat imposed by existence of a Communist regime in Cuba?

It is not, in our judgment, a *military* threat to the United States. We shall never permit it to menace our own strategic power, as our actions in October 1962 demonstrated. We are taking constant and effective measures to insure that such a threat does not occur again—and we shall continue to take those measures.

Nor do we regard Cuba as a direct *military* threat to Latin America. The Cuban armed forces are large and equipped with modern weaponry. They are by all odds the most powerful military establishment in Latin America. But Cuba does not possess air- and sealift sufficient to permit it to take offensive action against its neighbors, and, in any event, we maintain overwhelming military forces in the area to prevent Cuba from attacking other American Republics.

The menace of Castro communism to Latin America is of a different and—perhaps I might say—a more modern kind. It is the menace of *subversion*, the undermining of existing governments, the arming of organized Communist minorities, and the mounting of campaigns of sabotage and terror.

Latin America, Tempting Target for Communism

Some areas of Latin America are peculiarly vulnerable to such tactics. Vulnerability is greatest where social injustice is widely prevalent, where anachronistic societies remain dominated by small elites—tight little oligarchies that control the bulk of the productive wealth. In some places these oligarchies have only recently—and reluctantly—begun to make concessions to the insistent demands of the millions of economically submerged peoples for a measure of social justice and a decent standard of living.

For Latin America, as has been frequently remarked, is in the throes of a great transformation from a continent of backward societies to a continent of new, modern nations. During this period of change and tension, it offers a

[1] Address made before a convention of the Omicron Delta Kappa Society at Roanoke, Va., on Apr. 23 (press release 180).

tempting target for the Communists. They are at least as conscious as we of the importance and weakness of the area. They are at least as determined as we to see that the brew produced by the Latin American ferment is to their liking. They have, therefore, regarded the establishment of a Communist government in Cuba—a Communist Latin American state at the very doorstep of the United States—as a major asset for communism.

Cuba, a Base for Subversion

In their determination to establish a center of subversion for Latin America in Cuba, the Communists have found a natural lieutenant in Fidel Castro. Castro regards himself as the "liberator" of all Latin America. A born revolutionary, driven by a hunger for power and prestige, he looks upon the southern half of the American Continent as a proper field for the fulfillment of his ambitions. He seeks a revolutionary millennium in which the example of Cuba will have swept the continent, and his position of liberator and leader—not of the small island of Cuba, but of all Latin America—will have been assured.

This vision springs from his psychological and political needs. It is necessary to the man and equally to his followers, whose revolutionary enthusiasm must be constantly fed on the prospect of further advance beyond the confines of the island—an island which they look upon as the base from which the continent-wide revolution will be propagated by word and deed.

That Castro intends to extend Communist power, and that he is actively seeking to do so, have been clearly shown. The most recent and dramatic evidence is the three tons of arms sent from Cuba to Venezuelan Castroist insurgents. As you know, an investigating committee of the Organization of American States (OAS) was appointed to study all aspects of this case. It found that the evidence clearly substantiated the Venezuelan Government's charges of Cuban intervention and aggression. The committee's report provides the basis for further collective OAS action against Cuba, and the members are consulting now among themselves to determine the collective measures which should be taken.

Two Principal Lines of U.S. Strategy

The United States, as the strongest nation in the Western Hemisphere, is faced with a difficult but practical problem. With the existence of a Communist center in Latin America, how do we and our Latin American allies prevent that center from being used as an active center for Communist infection?

The most obvious and direct way to eliminate the Castro regime in Cuba would be by direct military action designed to replace the present government by a non-Communist government friendly to the West. Less direct action might take the form of an enforced blockade—which would still be an act of war.

At the other end of the spectrum from military action is a policy of trying to negotiate with Castro. Taking account of the decisions reached within the American system, notably at Punta del Este in January 1962 [2] and later in October 1962,[3] we have consistently maintained that two elements in the Cuban situation are not negotiable. First, Castro's political, economic, and military dependence upon the Soviets; and, second, the continuance of Castro's subversive activities in Latin America.

We see no present evidence that Castro is prepared to eliminate these two conditions—and, in fact, the evidence thus far is all the other way.

The limits in which we must erect a Cuban policy are, therefore, well defined and narrow. If, on the one hand, we do not wish to adopt policies that involve an act of war—and even the most vigorous critics of our Cuban policy have rejected this course of action—and, on the other, there seems little sign of a possibility of serious negotiation with the present regime, we are left with two principal lines of strategy for dealing with the menace of Castro's Cuba to Latin America.

First, we must take all possible measures to strengthen the Latin American nations so that they may, through individual and collective means, resist Communist subversion.

Second, we must employ all available instru-

[2] For background, see BULLETIN of Feb. 19, 1962, p. 270.

[3] For background, see *ibid.*, Nov. 12, 1962, p. 720.

ments of power less than acts of war to limit or reduce the ability of the Cuban government to advance the Communist cause in Latin America through propaganda, sabotage, and subversion.

Cooperative Actions of American States

To the greatest extent possible, we are pursuing both these lines of strategy within the framework of the inter-American system. We have sought to make clear to our Latin American friends that the problem of protecting the continent against the menace of Castro communism must be tackled by the American states as a collective undertaking. The Organization of American States is the principal instrumentality for this purpose, but we are also employing other multilateral groupings within the inter-American family.

In January 1962, the foreign ministers of the OAS formally found the Castro regime to be incompatible with the inter-American system and excluded it from further participation in that system. The foreign ministers also approved the immediate suspension of trade with Cuba in arms and war material.

In early October 1962, the foreign ministers of the OAS informally met to consider the problems arising from growing Sino-Soviet intervention in Cuba, particularly the attempt to convert the island into an armed base for Communist subversive penetration of the hemisphere. In their conclusions, the foreign ministers pointed out:

1. The need for the American Republics and all other independent countries to review their policies on trade with Cuba, including the use of their ships in the Cuban trade;
2. The importance of intensifying measures against Communist subversion;
3. The desirability of keeping a careful check on the delivery of arms to Cuba; and
4. The need for special studies of the transfer of funds for subversive purposes, the flow of subversive propaganda, and the utilization of Cuba as a base for training in subversive techniques.

The Council of the OAS subsequently directed the preparation of a special study on measures for controlling funds, propaganda, and training for subversive purposes. The Council sent the report, incorporating specific and general recommendations in these three fields, to member governments in July 1963 urging that the recommended measures be carried out promptly.

Meanwhile, in April 1963, the five Central American Republics, together with Panama and the United States, undertook a cooperative effort to safeguard the Caribbean area against Cuban subversive activities.[4] At that meeting, and at a subsequent second meeting in January 1964, the cooperating countries agreed on a series of measures to increase the security of the countries of the area. The program includes the control of subversive travel, funds, and propaganda, the strengthening of security organizations, and the improvement of communications between national security agencies.

Following its own investigation of the recently discovered Venezuelan arms cache, the OAS is now studying additional measures for dealing with Cuba as a base of subversion and for policing Cuban-supported activities in Latin America.

These cooperative actions by the American states have shown considerable success. In order to control movement to and from Cuba for subversive purposes, many Latin American governments have instituted procedures for restricting travel by their nationals to Cuba. As a result of these measures only 50 percent as many Latin Americans were able to travel to Cuba during 1963 as during the preceding year.

We continue to work with individual governments to help them improve the ability of their police and armed forces to deal with terrorism and insurgency. The United States and Latin American governments are also cooperating with increasing effectiveness in exchanging intelligence on Castroist subversion activities and in improving communications between their security services.

In the long run, however, Latin America will be rendered immune to Communist infection only by an amelioration of the conditions—political, economic, and social—in which sub-

[4] *Ibid.*, May 6, 1963, p. 719.

version flourishes. The United States and the free nations of Latin America have, therefore, through the Alliance for Progress, undertaken a major collective effort. It is directed at the ambitious target of transforming the structure and productive capacity of the Latin American nations so as to bring about not merely an increase but a more equitable distribution of resources. Given the magnitude of this undertaking, it will be years before major results can be achieved. But until such a transformation is accomplished, Latin America will remain a fertile seedbed for Communist subversion.

Program of Economic Denial

By strengthening the Latin American nations through collective political, economic, and military measures we are increasing their ability to resist subversion. But at the same time we must actively pursue measures against Cuba to limit its ability to subvert.

In this effort we are exploiting the propaganda potential to the fullest. But an information program must be regarded primarily as a supplement to substantive policies. Given the present limits of action, we must rely, as our major instrument, on a systematic program of economic denial.

This is the only policy—short of the use of force—that gives promise of having a significant impact on Cuba and its continuance as a Communist base in the Western Hemisphere. Such a program, in our judgment, can and does work effectively to achieve objectives that are in the manifest interest not only of the United States and Latin America but of other free-world nations.

Objectives of Economic Denial Program

In discussing the effectiveness of this program, let me make one point quite clear. We have never contended that a program of economic denial—short of an act of war such as a military blockade that would cut off bloc as well as free-world trade—is likely *by itself* to bring down the present Cuban regime. The objectives which this program can accomplish are more limited. They are four in number:

First, to reduce the will and ability of the present Cuban regime to export subversion and violence to the other American states;

Second, to make plain to the people of Cuba and to elements of the power structure of the regime that the present regime cannot serve their interests;

Third, to demonstrate to the peoples of the American Republics that communism has no future in the Western Hemisphere; and

Fourth, to increase the cost to the Soviet Union of maintaining a Communist outpost in the Western Hemisphere.

Those are the objectives which we seek to achieve by a program of economic denial against Cuba. That program reflects the purpose of the Organization of American States. In our opinion, it is realistically designed to accomplish the limited but nonetheless important objectives toward which it is directed.

Cuba Vulnerable to Economic Pressure

Economic denial is a weapon that must be used with great selectivity. It can never be more effective than the economic circumstances of the target country. A program of general economic denial against the Soviet Union, for example, would in the long run make little sense, since the Soviet Union imports from the free world only about one-half of 1 percent of its gross national product. But Cuba presents a wholly different situation. It is a small island with meager natural resources and a low level of industrial development. Prior to the Castro regime, its imports from the free world—principally the United States—represented more than 30 percent of its gross national product.

Those imports were the vital elements of its economic prosperity. They consisted principally of industrial goods and equipment, fuel, raw materials, and foodstuffs.

Cuba's industrial installations, its power plants, its sugar mills, its transportation equipment are all of Western origin. After 5 years Cuba's industrial plant is obsolete and rapidly deteriorating. With no continuing supply of spare parts, it has resorted to cannibalizing its existing equipment.

In addition, Cuba has become far more exposed and vulnerable to economic pressure because Castro's internal policies have driven into exile several hundred thousand Cubans—the managerial and professional elite. There is now a great shortage of skills, and much of the equipment in the industrial plant is mishandled. This situation has been further aggravated by management decisions taken on ideological, rather than economic, grounds.

Cuba is, therefore, vulnerable to a policy of economic denial. The proof of its vulnerability is well illustrated by what has happened to the Cuban economy since trade with the West was first restricted. Today the Cuban standard of living is some 20 percent below pre-Castro levels. Such statistics, of course, do not tell the complete story because many essential items are rationed and many imported items, such as fresh fruits and canned goods, have almost disappeared. The Cuban people are allowed, for example, two bars of soap per person per month, three pounds of meat per person per month, and six ounces of coffee per person per month—when they can get them.

Industrial output, which accounts for less than 25 percent of the gross national product, has remained stagnant. Quality has frequently been sacrificed to maintain the volume of production. In many industries output is shoddy, centralized operations inefficient, and labor productivity extremely low, in large part because of lack of morale and incentive. Plants and machinery are often idle owing to a lack of spare parts or raw materials, and breakdowns in water, power, and transport exacerbate the general disorganization.

Cuban sugar production—the basis of the entire economy—has fallen drastically. Last year's production of 3.8 million tons was the lowest since the early 1940's, and the crop for this year will probably be near the same figure.

With the curtailment of free-world trade, exports have fallen drastically—from more than $800 million in 1958 to less than $500 million in 1963. The lines of trade have been completely redrawn. In 1958, substantially all imports came from free-world sources; last year, 85 percent came from the bloc. It is perhaps pertinent to point out that Cuban exports to Latin America fell from $24 million in 1953 to an estimated $8 million in 1962, while Latin American exports to Cuba fell from $78 million in 1958 to an estimated $6.7 million in 1962.

Restrictions on Shipping and on Vital Goods

In order to exploit Cuba's economic vulnerability we have developed programs of common action on two levels:

First, to restrict the availability of free-world shipping to Cuba;

Second, to limit the categories of goods that may be available to Cuba.

In order to make these policies effective, we have sought the cooperation of the other major industrialized countries of the free world, and particularly our NATO allies. We have obtained considerable, although not complete, cooperation.

For example, the number of calls by free-world vessels at Cuban ports dropped 60 percent in 1963 as compared to 1962, and there are reasonable prospects that, over 1964 as a whole, there will be a further drop.

Realistically, we must recognize that the restriction of free-world shipping, while useful, is of only limited utility. Shipping under the control of the bloc could transport the goods that Cuba requires, although at the cost of a considerable reorganization and disruption of schedules and charters.

Much more important is the denial of those categories of goods that are most vital to the operation of the Cuban economy. This includes industrial goods, transport equipment, and critical materials. Not only is Cuba wholly dependent on a large and continuing import of consumer goods if it is to maintain more than a subsistence economy, but its limited industrial plant, including the sugar industry, is based on Western equipment that is rapidly becoming worn out and obsolete and on Western transport equipment that is rapidly falling apart. It is important, therefore, that the West should not bolster the economy by providing spare parts and replacements.

This was the reason, for example, that the administration took such a strong position against the recent sale of 450 buses to the Castro government—400 of which are to be used in Habana. Those 400 additional buses will al-

most double available public transport in the city that dominates Cuba's economic life. Without those buses the efficiency of the Cuban economy and the level of Cuban morale would be further impaired.

The sale of Western locomotives to Cuba, for instance, would have an even greater impact. Movement of sugar to Cuban ports is almost entirely by rail, and the motive power of the Cuban railroad system is presently in a critical state of disrepair. In a late 1963 description of the "desperate state" of the railroad system, a Cuban official organ estimated that only one-quarter as many locomotives were then in operating condition as in 1959. To replace even a part of this equipment would be a very big boon to the Cuban economy.

The position of our Government in seeking to prevent the sale of such heavy equipment to the Cuban regime has, unfortunately, not always been fully understood either in the United States or by some of our friends abroad. The question has frequently been confused by the curious contention that the sale of United States wheat to the Soviet Union somehow justifies the sale of critical supplies to Cuba. Such an argument betrays a misunderstanding of the nature and objectives of the program of economic denial which I have attempted to describe this evening.

As I mentioned earlier, the continent-wide economy of the Soviet Union, which in many ways approaches self-sufficiency, is far less vulnerable to economic denial than that of Cuba. There would be no point in trying to influence Soviet strength or Soviet policy by a *general* effort to deny exports to that country. All that has ever been attempted is a *selective* program of denying access primarily to strategic goods.

The United States has long had a modest trade in agricultural products with the Soviet Union. The special aspect of the wheat sale was its unusual size and character. The Soviet Union has been traditionally an exporter of wheat, and before approaching the United States it had already contracted the bulk of its wheat import requirements from Canada and Australia. Purchases from United States were, from the Soviet point of view, marginal. Even the 2½ million tons originally discussed would have totaled only about 3½ percent of normal Soviet bread grain production.

Under these circumstances it is quite clear that the sale of wheat to the Soviet Union involved considerations quite unrelated to those involved in the denial of economic goods and other capital equipment to Cuba. Thus any sale of wheat to the Soviet Union was not of great importance to the Soviet economy and of slight importance to the food stocks of the Soviet people. But our denial of industrial and transport equipment and spare parts to Cuba can mean a serious impairment in the state of the Cuban economy.

Oddly enough, these two quite distinct questions have been confused—sometimes, I fear, deliberately—by people holding quite disparate views—by those in Europe who would like to find an excuse to sell heavy equipment to Cuba and by those in America who would like to find a basis for attacking the wheat sale. An objective comparison of these two situations reveals the emptiness of the argument.

Cuban Economic Failure

In the course of my observations this evening, I have tried to spell out for you the bases for our policy toward Cuba and to explain particularly the reasons why we are seeking—and shall continue to seek—to limit the supply of critical goods to the Cuban economy.

This program is directed at the present Cuban government. It will be continued so long as that government persists in its efforts to subvert and undermine the free societies of Latin America.

Within recent weeks it has become more than ever apparent that our program is succeeding. Cuba under communism is providing a spectacle of economic failure for all to see. Far from offering a better life for the Cuban people, communism is bringing only depression and want.

Today the Cuban economy is in a mess—a mess produced by incompetent management, ideological interference, and the refusal of the United States and many other Western societies to deal with a government that is seeking to undermine its neighbors.

The magnitude of the Cuban economic failure is clearly apparent in the constant complaints of the present Cuban leaders.

But if our program of economic denial is helping to accentuate the failures of the Cuban economy, let me make it quite clear that it is not aimed at the Cuban people. The United States has no quarrel with the people of Cuba. It feels no animosity, only sympathy and sorrow. We have shown our good will by exempting food and medicines from the restrictions imposed on our trade with Cuba. We have never sought in any way to starve the Cuban people.

For we are confident that the people of Cuba will not always be compelled to suffer under Communist tyranny.

Given freedom and democracy, Cuba could develop its high potential for economic and social progress. The Cuban people should not be forced to serve as a vehicle for the intrusion into this hemisphere of an alien way of life that can bring them neither progress nor liberty. Let one final point be clear. We oppose the present Cuban regime not just because its ambitions menace our hemispheric neighbors. We oppose it, above all, because its standards of conduct and its tyrannical practices condemn the people of Cuba to misery and fear.

The people of Cuba deserve better than that.

U.S. Policy on Flights Over Cuba Remains Unchanged

Following is a statement made by Richard I. Phillips, Director of the Office of News, on April 20 in response to a query from a news correspondent regarding surveillance flights over Cuba, together with a statement made by President Johnson on the following day during a question-and-answer period at a meeting at the White House with a group of editors and broadcasters.[1]

Statement by Mr. Phillips, April 20

First, I would recall that the overflights are a substitute for the on-site inspection agreed to by the Soviets in October 1962, but which Fidel Castro refused to permit.

Second, I would point out that the surveillance flights are thoroughly based on the resolution approved by the OAS [Organization of American States] on October 23, 1962.[2]

Third, I would remind you of the various statements made by the late President Kennedy and by Secretary Rusk during the past 15 months on this subject, making it unmistakably clear that we regard the overflights as a necessity to avoid the deception which was practiced against us in 1962.

Fourth, I would recall that Secretary Rusk said, in March a year ago: "If there were any interruption with our surveillance . . . that could create a very dangerous situation."[3]

Our publicly expressed position on this question remains unchanged.

Statement by President Johnson, April 21

I do think that it is essential that we maintain surveillance and know whether any missiles are being shipped into Cuba. We will have to maintain our reconnaissance and our overflights. Any action on their part to stop that would be a very serious action. We have so informed them and informed their friends.

Defense, AEC Report to President on Test Ban Treaty Safeguards

White House press release dated April 20

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT

The White House today [April 20] released the text of a letter from Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, reporting their conclusions following a joint review conducted by the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission of the status of progress during the past 8 months on the implementation of the limited test ban treaty safeguards recommended by the Joint

[1] For an excerpt from remarks made by the President to the editors and broadcasters on Apr. 21, see p. 746.

[2] For text, see BULLETIN of Nov. 12, 1962, p. 722.

[3] *Ibid.*, Apr. 1, 1963, p. 467.

Chiefs of Staff, and approved by the late President Kennedy.

In releasing this letter, the President reemphasized the statement he made today in a speech before the Associated Press [1] that his administration is committed to the policy first expressed in the four points in President Kennedy's letter to Senators [Mike] Mansfield and [Everett M.] Dirksen on September 11, 1963.[2] These four points were restated in the McNamara-Seaborg letter released today.

The President also pointed out that while an adequate underground testing program is, under present circumstances, essential to our national security, the United States continues to be alert to possibilities for the relaxation of tensions and the building of a permanent peace. Although we are testing nuclear weapons as now permitted by the limited test ban treaty, we still support a complete cessation of all testing of nuclear weapons accompanied by an adequate system of inspection to insure both sides against violations. The United States Government is ready at any time to negotiate a treaty providing for such a comprehensive test ban.

TEXT OF DEFENSE-AEC LETTER

APRIL 16, 1964

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission have reviewed the status of our joint progress on the implementation of the limited test ban treaty safeguards recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by President Kennedy.

The status of implementation of the safeguards is as follows:

Safeguard 1

"The conduct of comprehensive, aggressive, and continuing underground nuclear test programs designed to add to our knowledge and improve our weapons in all areas of significance to our military posture for the future."

In the eight months since the signing of the limited test ban treaty, the United States has announced a total of 20 underground detonations. The test program has in fact been more extensive than this since it has been and will continue to be the policy that the AEC will not announce all detonations at the Nevada Test Site.

Important information has been obtained on new weapons designs and weapons effects. The highest yield nuclear device ever detonated in the continental United States was fired underground at the Nevada Test Site. Weapons effects tests have been carried out underground and others are being planned and prepared.

Safeguard 2

"The maintenance of modern nuclear laboratory facilities and programs in theoretical and exploratory nuclear technology which will attract, retain and insure the continued application of our human scientific resources to these programs on which continued progress in nuclear technology depends."

During Fiscal Year 1964, the AEC and DoD will spend about $350 million on weapons development and effects laboratory research. During this period, over $25 million will be expended on improvements of AEC nuclear laboratory facilities. Technical programs are being maintained at a high level to meet military requirements and increased effort is being placed on research and development programs to gain more fundamental knowledge in nuclear weapons technology.

Program adjustments are underway in the Department of Defense weapons effects laboratories. These adjustments are designed to emphasize development of improved laboratory simulation and analytical approaches to weapons effects problems, as well as full exploitation of underground testing.

Safeguard 3

"The maintenance of the facilities and resources necessary to institute promptly nuclear tests in the atmosphere should they be deemed essential to our national security or should the treaty or any of its terms be abrogated by the Soviet Union."

The DoD and AEC are proceeding, on schedule, with the development of a capability "to institute promptly nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere" on minimum reaction times. As of January 1, 1965, the United States will have the capability to proceed with: (a) tests to verify designs of stockpile weapons within two months; (b) tests of entire nuclear weapons systems, including delivery vehicles, missile and nuclear warhead proof tests within two months; (c) tests of experimental devices designed to explore new concepts of nuclear weapons technology within three months; and (d) tests relating to military effects of nuclear detonations within a period of six to nine months.

Safeguard 4

"The improvement of our capability, within feasible and practical limits, to monitor the terms of the treaty, to detect violations, and to maintain our knowledge of Sino-Soviet nuclear activity, capabilities, and achievements."

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[1] See p. 726.

[2] For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 30, 1963, p. 496.

The Atomic Energy Detection System is being augmented to improve our capability to monitor atmospheric tests by other countries and to improve our identification ability at higher altitudes. Studies are continuing in ways and means to improve detection techniques and systems for both underground and space shots. The detonations at the Nevada Test Site are providing valuable information to improve techniques for detection of underground nuclear shots. A nuclear experiment designed specifically to provide data for improvement of underground detection systems was executed on October 26, 1963, near Fallon, Nevada. Construction is proceeding for other experiments designed to investigate the phenomenology of underground detonations. In mid-October 1963 an Atlas Agena rocket successfully placed into orbit two instrumented satellites designed for the detection of nuclear explosions in deep space. Work is continuing on ground based detectors of nuclear explosions in space.

We will be pleased to discuss any aspects of these programs at your convenience.

Respectfully yours,

ROBERT S. MCNAMARA, *Secretary of Defense*
GLENN T. SEABORG, *Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission*

The Local Community and World Affairs

Remarks by President Johnson [1]

I would like to talk to you about one area in which we can see with some certainty the shape of things to come. That is the fight against poverty around the world. We are waging an all-out war against poverty here at home. We are committed to pursue that war to final victory. But we are also engaged in that same battle on 100 different fronts around the world, in 100 or more nations.

We do this for two reasons: First, for the first time in history, man has the real power to overcome poverty. We have proved that by the wise application of modern technology. The determined labor of skilled men and women can ultimately produce enough food and clothing and shelter for all mankind. The possession of new abilities gives us new responsibilities, and we want to live up to those responsibilities. That is our Christian duty.

Second, we now know that the progress which others make in satisfying their own desire for a better life will ultimately affect our own future and our own prospects, for we are now a part of a single world community and you no longer can confine your activities or your influence to your local county seat. Names such as Saigon, Rio, and the Congo once stirred only thoughts of romantic adventure and great, mysterious distance, but today, as we meet here, we follow the events of those capitals with a close concern based on the knowledge that what happens there today will surely affect our action and our hopes here tomorrow.

That is why you and I have a special responsibility to explain the problems of the developing world abroad to the American people at home. We must do better than we have done in explaining why our children's welfare and the welfare of our country may well depend on the wisdom and the foresight that we show in working with the people of other lands. To do this, we must first understand clearly how most of the people of the world live.

I discussed in New York yesterday [2]—and it took me 41 minutes to complete it—just a brief

[1] Excerpt from remarks made by the President on Apr. 21 in the flower garden at the White House before a group of editors and broadcasters attending a 2-day foreign policy conference at the Department of State. For complete text, see White House press release dated Apr. 21.

[2] See p. 726.

description of the problems that exist in certain areas of the world. Only by doing so can we truly understand the marvel of our own good fortune in this country.

On three continents, in dozens of countries, hundreds of millions of people struggle to exist on incomes of little more than a dollar a week. In the 112 or more nations, only 6 of them have an income of as much as $80 a month: Sweden and Switzerland, Australia and New Zealand, Canada and the United States. Here we ought to get down on our knees every night and thank the good Lord for our blessings, that our income can be more than $200 a month, when more than two-thirds of the people of the world have less than $8 a month. These people have less to spend each day on food and on shelter and on clothing, on medicine, on all of their needs, than the average American spends at his corner drugstore for a package of cigarettes. They live in rundown country shacks of tar paper. They live in city slums. They live without heat, water, or sanitation of any kind.

Their children have no schools to go to. They have no doctors or hospitals to attend. Their life expectancy is somewhere between 35 and 40 years of age. Worst of all, many of them live without any hope at all. They see no escape from the ancient cycle of misery and despair.

These are not new conditions. Poverty, hunger, and disease are afflictions as old as man himself. But in our time and in this age there has been a change. The change is not so much in the realities of life but in the hopes and the expectations of the future. If a peaceful revolution in these areas is impossible, a violent revolution is inevitable.

We who stand here in peace and security and prosperity must realize that we are greatly outnumbered in this world, more than 17 to 1 in population, in area, in race, in religion, in color. You take any criteria and measure yourself by that standard, and you will find that we are in a very small minority.

I sat here the other day and talked to a most prosperous American. He came to tell me of the successes in this country where he owns more than a million acres of land, to discuss the 100,000-acre ranch that he once owned in Cuba—that he once owned in Cuba. So today, as we meet here, we must realize that these young, teeming masses are determined to have some of the better things of life. I stood in an African hut on another continent not many months ago, and I saw a mother with a baby on her breast, one in her stomach, and one on her back, and eight on the floor, in this adobe hut. I thought of my own mother and the trials that she had raising her family. As I looked into this African mother's eyes, I saw the same look in that mother's eyes that I saw in my own mother's eyes when she was determined that her children would have food, clothes, and an education.

You hear me when I tell you that in the world we are outnumbered 17 to 1, but these numbers, these masses of humanity, are either going to make a peaceful revolution possible or they are going to make a violent revolution inevitable. All you have to do is turn on the television and see the young student riots in nation after nation. So the television and the radio sets, the wonders of communication, to us are delightful instruments of pleasure, and to some of us they are important aids to business. But they have become the instruments of revolution in the rest of the world.

The shrinking of distances, the ready access to information about other countries and other people, have made these folks aware that a better life may be within their grasp, and a better life is possible. They now know that the conditions that their fathers accepted with weary resignation are no longer inevitable. They know now that depression and despair are not the ordained lot of man.

This knowledge has helped create the worldwide boom of vast portent which we know as the revolution of rising expectations. The meaning of this revolution is very simple: It means that people in the rest of the world want for themselves the same things that you and I want for our loved ones, for our friends, and for our children, and that most of us already have. They intend that their families shall live a decent life and that they have a job that gives them survival and dignity. They intend that their children shall be taught to read and to write. They intend that the hungry shall be

fed and the sick shall be treated. They intend to take their place in the great movement of modern society, to take their share in the benefits of that society.

These just desires, once unleashed, can never again be stifled. The people of the developing world are on the march, and we want to be beside them on that march.

I can think of nothing that would give me more satisfaction than the knowledge that I could believe that you wielders of the pen and you molders of opinion, you leaders in public life, could take your stand this morning on the side of preserving humanity and uplifting it throughout the world.

Our gross national product in this, the richest of all nations, this quarter, is running at the rate of $608.5 billion—$608 billion. We are asking to distribute in the form of help, aid, and military assistance to all the nations who want to have freedom less than one-half of 1 percent of that amount—$3.4 billion. But because of what we call it, and because of how it has been administered, and because it is far away, we don't realize that this investment is not only one of the most Christian acts that this great, powerful, rich country could do but it is an act of necessity if we are to preserve our image in the world and our leadership in the world and, most of all, our society.

Oh, how I would like to feel that we could, here in this rose garden today, launch a new movement to develop a greater society, a better society in all the world, not only by driving poverty from our midst here at home—it was one-third of the ill-fed, ill-clad, and ill-housed when Mr. Roosevelt was here, and today we have it down to one-fifth—but that we could drive that one-fifth into the basements and pull a better cover over the land, and we could also make some steps to developing taxpayers instead of just tax eaters, and helping others help themselves, following the Golden Rule not only at home but abroad, saying to these 112 nations, "We are going to do unto you as we would have you do unto us if our positions were reversed."

We must help developing countries because our own welfare demands it. It takes no great gift of foresight to realize that unless there is progress and unless there is growing satisfaction of just desires, there will be discontent and there will be restlessness. The developing world would soon become a cauldron of violence, hatred, and revolution without some assistance. How would you feel if you were a member of a family whose total income was less than $80 per year? Yet a majority of the people of the world have incomes of less than $80 a year. Under such conditions, communism, with its false and easy promises of a magic formula, might well be able to transform these popular desires into an instrument of revolution. That is why every American who is concerned about the future of his country must also be concerned about the future of Africa, Asia, and our old friends in Latin America.

No President who looks beyond the immediate problems which crowd his desk can fail to extend the hand and the heart of this country to those who are struggling elsewhere. We help these countries in many ways, through trade and raw materials and manufactures, with the Peace Corps now working in more than 40 of them, through programs of economic assistance, through the exchange of scholars and students and ideas.

We know that we have much to gain from them. We know that we can learn from their cultures, from their arts, from their traditions, for many of them are as rich in spiritual treasure as they are poor in material goods. These are government programs, but it is also important for cities and towns, for private organizations and private individuals, to become interested and involved in the affairs of the world.

So I hope you will make this one of your first orders of business when you return to your homes. You can do this in many ways. Your communities can establish direct contact with communities in other countries. You can arrange for exchange of visits. You can arrange for help to schools and hospitals in a similar community, in a sister country, in a developing land. You can try and establish scholarships to bring deserving students to your local college or to your local high school for education. You can arrange programs of study and discussion about the problems of these other countries that a good many of your folks have not read

about or studied about. You can conduct exhibits or performances of the arts and music, folklore, of others.

These are just a few examples of the multitude of possibilities which are open to those who are willing to assume a personal responsibility for America's interest in the rest of the world. We must never forget that concern and sympathy are often as important as material assistance. This must not be a patronizing concern, but it must be the concern of equal for equal, the concern of brother for brother.

As you all know from our own experience, people everywhere are as hungry for respect as they are hungry for bread. I hope you will explain this to your people, and, as leaders of local opinion, I hope you can begin to shape in your local communities a fruitful collaboration between your people and the peoples of the lands. You are a part of the world. You are going to live in it. There are societies in other lands that are now venturing to take the same step that your colonial forefathers took, your revolutionary forefathers took, when they brought into existence this, the most powerful of all nations.

America's great strength in world affairs is not in Washington. It rests on dedicated labor of the private institutions. It rests on organizations and local governments. It rests on the leaders and molders of public opinion, of which you are a substantial part. If we can summon that strength to our relations with the developing world, then we will have a weapon which our adversaries cannot ever hope to match. Then, and only then, will all Americans be proudly joined in a great adventure which unites the highest of our national ideals and the most important of our national needs.

If I can leave one hope and one wish with you, it would be as a result of your visit here and of your study and application of what you have learned in your discussions, that upon your return home you could put the spotlight of your own community on the spotlight of other communities in the world, and somewhere out yonder you could lend a helping hand to lift up and to lead a people who are not as fortunate as we are. I believe that that would give you and your community a satisfaction that will never come from a paycheck.

I think that, if you can provide that leadership, America will not only continue to be the leader of the world but we will be justified in being the leader of the world. But if we sit here just enjoying our material resources, if we are content to become fat and flabby at 50, and let the rest of the world go by, the time will not be far away when we will be hearing a knock on our door in the middle of the night and we will be hearing voices clamoring for freedom, independence, food, and shelter, just as our revolutionary forefathers clamored for it.

President Greets Public Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations

Remarks by President Johnson [1]

Governor Herter, ladies and gentlemen: When Governor Herter explained this meeting to me and asked that we schedule it, he kept assuring me that his party would be small, and I was tempted to tell the Governor that, next to seeing him personally, few things would make me happier than to be sure that his party really was small—his Republican Party.

I am sure that all of you appreciate, as I do, that you are privileged to work with one of the most able and respected public men of our time, in the person of Christian Herter.[2] He is setting an inspiring example of unselfish devotion to duty in his present labors, as he has ever since I have known him, and that has been a good many years.

The country is no less in the debt of each of you for your own public-spirited participation in this undertaking which is so much in our national interest and which I think is so much in the interest of the free world. As a legislator long before I became a public executive, I am always mindful of the wisdom of a great Englishman's observation, and that observation was

[1] Made in the flower garden at the White House on Apr. 21 (White House press release); for an Executive order establishing the Committee, see BULLETIN of Mar. 30, 1964, p. 506; for names of the Committee members, see White House press release dated Mar. 2.

[2] Mr. Herter is the President's Special Representative for Trade Negotiations.

that free trade, one of the greatest blessings which a government can confer upon a people, is in almost every country unpopular.

I know, and I think you know, how far we in the United States have come toward a mature and toward a rational understanding of the opportunities which trade presents for the building of the kind of a world that men want. The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 will endure as one of the greatest monuments to President Kennedy's leadership—and how difficult it was to pass that act, and how long and faithfully he worked on it! But it will also stand as a milestone to the progress of popular understanding among business, labor, and agriculture.

I hope that our friends in other lands will neither underestimate nor undervalue the strength of American support for success of the trade negotiations that we have entered. That act 2 years ago was made possible by the kind of unselfish and nonpartisan public support that you are providing again now. We are going to greatly need your advice and your counsel and, most of all, your real help. The negotiations will be lengthy, and, of course, they will be complex. They will be difficult at all times. But as we believe the cause is worthy, we know that the gains can be great.

I look forward with a certain amount of prudent optimism to the round of negotiations which the 1962 act by our Congress has made possible. Of course, we will need to be patient and persistent. We will need at all times, of course, to be firm. We are willing to offer our free-world friends access to American markets, but we expect and we must have access to their markets also. That applies to our agricultural as well as our industrial exports.

The United States will enter into no ultimate agreement unless progress is registered toward trade liberalization on the products of our farms as well as our factories. These negotiations are not the kind in which some nations need lose because others gain. Their success will be to the advantage of all. The opportunity, therefore, is here to build a partnership for progress among the free-world industrial nations and then between them and the developing nations. We mean to fully explore that opportunity, and we mean to fully pursue it.

At home we are moving to eliminate the causes of poverty among all Americans. In the world we believe that a long step can be taken toward a victory over that poverty everywhere if free nations will only work together for a victory over the obstacles to free trade.

This morning it is somewhat dampened by the atmosphere, but let me say to each of you, and to Governor Herter in particular, that I express the gratitude of the American people to you for lending your hand to the laying of this most important cornerstone for what we all hope in the days to come will be a much better world, a world where peace endures and where prosperity is present.

I am sorry that we have inclement weather. I would like to visit with you longer. But I do want you to know from the bottom of my heart that we feel deeply in your debt for the contribution you have made. We look forward with great anticipation to the fruits of your efforts.

Thank you.

Private Committee To Help Find Embassy Sites in Washington

The Department of State announced on April 20 (press release 175) that the Department and the D.C. Board of Commissioners have asked Garfield I. Kass, a Washington builder and developer, to form a committee [1] to assist in finding sites in the Nation's Capital where foreign government chanceries and other foreign government offices may be established in the future without legal impediments or public controversy. The Department will maintain liaison with the private committee through Pedro A. Sanjuan, Director of Special Representational Services.

[1] For names of the members of the committee, see Department of State press release 185 dated Apr. 24.

African Issues at the United Nations

by G. Mennen Williams
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs [1]

Almost exactly 1 year ago, I spoke to the Collegiate Council for the United Nations at the University of Maryland. In that talk, I listed six principal African aspirations:

1. freedom and independence from colonial rule;
2. personal and national dignity on the same basis as other peoples of the world;
3. improved standards of living;
4. African unity;
5. nonalinement in the confrontation of great powers; and
6. an increasingly important African role in the United Nations.

These remain the chief African aspirations. Much still remains to be done before they can be satisfactorily realized. But in even so short a period as a year, significant progress has been made toward their attainment.

During the past year two more African nations, Kenya and Zanzibar, achieved independence and became members of the United Nations, raising the total African membership to 35. Two other nations, Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia (to be known as Malawi and Zambia), are scheduled to become independent later this year. Thus there has been and continues to be progress toward the overriding African goal of independence for all African peoples. There remain, however, several territories, mainly in southern Africa, where the path to self-determination for the majority of the population is strewn with difficulties, where race relations are increasingly embittered, and where the future is obscure.

It is harder to measure progress toward the second African goal of personal and national dignity. However, the increasingly active role African leaders are playing in the councils of the world suggests that there may have been more progress in this field than we generally realize. This new African prominence in world affairs is focusing on areas of resistance to progress in human relations. Thus, for the Africans, any sense of progress on the world stage is marred by the ever harsher application of the doctrine of *apartheid* to their brothers in South Africa. In fact, the shadow of this problem falls on those who believe in human dignity everywhere.

The improvement of living standards is a long-term process and involves ever-rising expectations. While we do not have adequate figures yet for 1963, there has been a generally rising trend in the indications of economic progress in Africa for the past few years. African exports, for example, rose by 42 percent between 1952 and 1961. Between 1957 and 1961 the gross national product of Liberia rose annually by 5.3 percent, of Ethiopia by 4.8 percent, of Sudan by 4.5 percent, and of Nigeria by 3.8 percent. Technical assistance and economic aid projects that are contributing or will contribute to better living for many Africans could be cited in practically every African country. But the gap between living standards in the developed and less developed countries remains enormous.

[1] Address made before the fourth annual leadership institute of the Collegiate Council for the United Nations at Chicago, Ill., on Apr. 18 (press release 170 dated Apr. 17).

Both we and the Africans must do all we can to reduce this gap. Moreover, such U.N. instrumentalities as the World Health Organization, the Economic Commission for Africa, the Special Fund, and the U.N. Technical Assistance Program have a continuing significant contribution to make.

Organization of African Unity

Africans are keenly aware that their needs are great and their individual resources are small. They know that only by combining their efforts and working together will they achieve the best possible rate of progress and security. Visible progress toward this desirable goal of African unity clearly was made during the past year. This is not to say it is around the corner. But there have been some truly remarkable accomplishments recently in the field of inter-African cooperation. The continent-wide Organization of African Unity, formed only last May, has successfully weathered its first serious tests. OAU has played a prominent role in settling disputes between Algeria and Morocco and between Ethiopia and Somalia, although the latter is not yet fully resolved. The important point, however, is that these disputes have been dealt with by Africans themselves through their own organization. They have developed political machinery which has helped to dampen down threatening international conflicts and which provides hope for negotiated solutions without extracontinental intervention.

Progress toward the African goal of nonalinement is somewhat more difficult to evaluate, particularly for an American. But in the sense of remaining free from outside domination, this aspiration generally has been achieved in Africa. There are threats—occasionally serious threats—to the preservation of this kind of freedom in some African areas. Overall, however, there is a growing awareness of such threats and a general determination to safeguard new-found freedoms from foreign ideologies.

The sixth goal I listed last year was Africa's desire to play an increasingly active role in a strong and efficacious United Nations. Here, too, there has been progress in the past 12 months. Anyone who has observed recent sessions of the U.N. General Assembly in action has no doubt about the important part being played by Africans. For example, they played a key role in obtaining a 6-month extension of U.N. forces in the Congo on a satisfactory basis. In addition, the majority of African states opposed the Soviets' troika proposals for reorganizing and weakening the U.N. Secretariat. A majority also voted against replacing the representatives of the Republic of China with those of the Chinese Communist regime in the United Nations.

Their prominence is not merely a question of numbers, although African states now comprise almost one-third of U.N. membership—35 of 113 members. Nor is it simply a question of their being active and vocal, although they are frequently both. Rather, it is a question of their faith in the United Nations as an effective instrument for peaceful change. They are convinced that the United Nations is important to world progress, and they seek to make maximum use of the U.N. to achieve their aspirations. It is, in fact, a measure of their responsibility that they place major emphasis on petitioning the world organization to bring about changes they feel deeply about. This is one of the many reasons why the United States is one of the strongest supporters of the United Nations.

Southern Rhodesia; Portuguese Territories

At the same time, I would not suggest that we always see eye to eye with Africans in the U.N. On the basic goals of self-determination and human dignity, we are in agreement. On matters of method and timing, we sometimes differ. The global range of our interests and responsibilities makes the formulation of our policy on any matter a complex process—a process in which we must find the best possible accommodation among our differing and even conflicting national interests, the interests of our friends, and those of our opponents.

Take the Southern Rhodesia question, for example. The African nations are gravely concerned about the situation there and its potential for severe trouble. Britain, too, is greatly disturbed by the trouble inherent in the Southern Rhodesia problem. And so is the United States.

The possibility of another independent country in southern Africa controlled by a relatively small white minority, in which the overwhelming African majority is without adequate representation, legitimately arouses the apprehensions of everyone concerned with the peaceful and harmonious development of that part of the world.

But the Southern Rhodesian question is clearly the kind of problem that is best solved by the principals themselves. There is a need for agreement to be reached among the various elements of the Southern Rhodesian population through consultation, negotiation, and agreement.

But what can and should the U.N. do about it? Should the U.N. call for an immediate constitutional conference in Southern Rhodesia to arrange for majority rule based on universal adult suffrage and fix an early date for independence? Or might such a categorical blueprint actually prevent European and African leaders from getting together to talk about their political future? As U.S. Ambassador Sidney Yates said recently in the U.N.'s colonialism committee:[2] "We are all in favor of constitutional changes; the question is how best to get them." Ambassador Yates went on to suggest "exploratory conversations" between the parties as a practical step forward. The committee majority, however, preferred to press for an immediate constitutional conference, and the United States had to abstain on the committee's resolution. Clearly, this approach does not attempt to reconcile the conflicting interests that should work together to give the people of Southern Rhodesia the kind of government to which they are entitled.

The Portuguese territories in southern Africa, where there is both potential and actual trouble, are another difficult problem. Africans in those areas feel increasingly frustrated in their efforts to achieve political expression. The United Nations says these people should have the right to self-determination. The United States fully agrees. And, in its own particular way, so does Portugal. Then what is the problem?

In those territories the problem is a little more complex than differences on method and timing. It is also a question of an agreed definition of the goal. In principle, of course, self-determination is simply a people's free choice of political institutions. The African nations recognize this principle but cannot conceive of any choice by the people of the Portuguese territories other than complete independence. It may be that this is what the people will choose. The Portuguese, however, while recognizing the principle of self-determination, believe that there are options which the people may choose other than independence.

Last year there was a briefly encouraging development toward a solution to the Portuguese-African problem, when discussions between Portugal's Foreign Minister and the representatives of several African countries were held under the auspices of the U.N. Secretary-General. Unfortunately these talks were discontinued owing to inability to agree on a definition of self-determination. The Secretary-General has been asked to continue his efforts, however.

Now, where can the United Nations go from here? What kind of U.N. efforts should the United States support? We sincerely hope that both the Portuguese and the Africans will agree to start talking again.

Problems of South Africa and South-West Africa

The most intractable problems in southern Africa are the race relations of South Africa and South Africa's administration of the former German colony of South-West Africa. Since the United Nations' inception, some 27 resolutions regarding South Africa's racial policies have been passed by the U.N. General Assembly and the Security Council. In that same period the General Assembly has passed over 70 resolutions about South-West Africa alone! The International Court of Justice has rendered advisory opinions regarding South-West Africa three times. In recent months South African and South-West African issues have been before various U.N. bodies and have caused controversy in several associated agencies. In

[2] For text of a statement made by Mr. Yates on Mar. 12, 1964, before the Special Committee on the Situation With Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, see U.S./U.N. press release 4372.

the next few weeks and months U.N. committees and other U.N. bodies will be further considering these and associated issues.

As you know, South Africa's mandate over South-West Africa, which was assigned by the League of Nations after World War I, is currently the subject of a contentious case before the International Court of Justice. Two African countries that were members of the League of Nations—Ethiopia and Liberia—have asked the Court to judge whether the Mandatory has lived up to its obligations. The mandate agreement stipulates that the Mandatory should develop "to the utmost" the "material and moral well-being and social progress of the inhabitants." The Court's judgment is not expected until next year. The previous applications to the Court on South-West African issues have been for advisory opinions, which the parties were free to accept or disregard. In the current litigation, however, the parties are obligated to respect the Court's judgment.

The South African Government's Commission of Inquiry into development plans for South-West Africa, the Odendaal Commission, has proposed that the Territory be divided into a white section and 10 nonwhite "homelands." Each homeland would have its own "citizenship" and legislature and, the Commission recommends, become increasingly independent of the others. The Commission also advocates large-scale incorporation of the Territory's administrative structure into the Republic's governmental departments. Spokesmen of the South African Government have endorsed broad principles of the Odendaal Commission's report, including proposals for large expenditures on roads, water resources, a large hydroelectric project, and other development; but the Government has not yet committed itself formally to any specific implementation. If it implemented the controversial proposals of the Commission before the judgment of the Court was rendered, the ICJ might be petitioned for an interim order to halt such action, which could precipitate an early crisis in the United Nations.

We believe it would be in the best interest of everyone that no action be taken by South Africa that would complicate the ICJ case on South-West Africa. At the same time, we hope that other African governments will not press for action by the United Nations before the ICJ decision is reached. It is our view that action with respect to this international territory, whether by the Mandatory or by international bodies, should proceed and could proceed more effectively on a sound legal basis. No one should act in a way prejudicial to the Court's consideration of the problem. Court procedures may be slow compared with the swift pace of modern Africa. However, the United States believes not only that there is no other responsible course but also that proceeding under Court authority is likely to be the only effective way of dealing with this matter.

The most difficult problem of all is to reach definite conclusions about what the United Nations can effectively do about *apartheid* in the Republic of South Africa itself. This is a tragic problem involving both whites and nonwhites whose families have lived in the area for centuries, building up one of the highest standards of living in Africa. Both sides have equities, but *apartheid* is intolerable for black Africans.

Here are some examples. A black African:

1. cannot vote in national and provincial elections;
2. cannot serve in Parliament;
3. cannot attend the university of his choice;
4. cannot remain in any urban area over 72 hours unless he satisfies certain long-term residence or employment standards (and, under a bill passed a few days ago by the South African House of Assembly, even these rights are to be taken away);
5. cannot strike or bargain collectively;
6. cannot fill positions in industry or commerce reserved for whites by Government regulations;
7. cannot serve on a jury;
8. cannot, when detained under certain laws, seek legal advice or have recourse to the courts; and
9. cannot demonstrate against existing laws.

There is a growing body of security laws. Under the 1950 Suppression of Communism Act, as extended, a Communist can include one who advocates such objects as bringing about

political, industrial, social, or economic change by picketing or similar peaceful action. As a result, a number of non-Communists, and, indeed, anti-Communists, have been convicted or restricted under this act.

Under a 1963 law, a police officer may without warrant arrest and detain for successive 90-day periods persons who might have information about or who might intend to commit specific types of political offenses, as well as persons actually suspected of committing such offenses. Such arrest and confinement is instantly renewable, and without notification to lawyer or family. Persons serving sentences of imprisonment under several national security laws may be kept indefinitely in prison after completion of their sentences if the Minister of Justice believes the individual, on release, might further the achievement of any of the statutory objects of communism. Thus, Robert Sobukwe, anti-Communist President of the Pan-Africanist Congress, was jailed in May 1963, immediately on completion of his 3-year term for incitement, and is still imprisoned on Robben Island in Table Bay near Cape Town.

This year and next, the several major issues regarding South Africa and the Territory of South-West Africa appear to be heading toward a climax. The litigation concerning the mandate before the Court, the report of the Committee of Experts on South Africa, consideration by U.N. bodies of the issues of political trials and other repression of dissent, pressures for sanctions—all appear to be converging in an accelerated way.

In and outside the United Nations, men of good will must be determined and imaginative to find peaceful solutions to the heavy problems that confront Africa.

U.S. and Japan To Cooperate on Aid Programs for Ryukyus

Press release 184 dated April 24

In ceremonies held at Tokyo at 10:30 a.m., April 25, 1964 (Tokyo time), the United States and Japan concluded an agreement to establish a Consultative Committee and a Technical Committee to facilitate cooperation between the two Governments in programs of economic and technical assistance in the Ryukyu Islands. The new agreement was concluded in accordance with the policy announced by the late President Kennedy on March 19, 1962, calling for a cooperative relationship between the United States and Japan in programs of assistance to the Ryukyuan people.

The first meeting of the Consultative Committee was held immediately after the signing of the exchange of notes [1] between the two Governments. It is expected that the Technical Committee, with a representative of the U.S. High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands serving as chairman and with participation by representatives of the Governments of Japan and the Ryukyu Islands, will commence its functions in connection with carrying out the agreement in the near future.

U.S. and China Agree To Extend Educational Exchange Program

Press release 182 dated April 24

The Governments of the Republic of China and the United States on April 23 signed at Taipei a revised agreement extending the program of educational exchanges between the two countries begun in 1947.

The current agreement is the latest in a series renewed in various participating countries under the broader authority of the Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961. It was signed by Foreign Minister Shen Chang-huan and American Ambassador Jerauld Wright.

The new agreement will enable the U.S. Educational Foundation in the Republic of China to carry out a wider range of educational and cultural programs, including facilitation of private exchange programs between the two countries. It also permits funding of the foundation's activities in U.S. and other currencies as well as in Chinese currency. Another provision authorizes the foundation to accept contributions for its programs from other sources.

[1] Not printed here.

U.S. Discusses "Freeze" Proposal in Disarmament Committee

Statement by Adrian S. Fisher [1]

During the past few years this Conference has been living within the lengthening shadow of an arms race. Our task has been to shed the light which will wipe out this shadow.

During that time this Conference has been working in the face of a paradox—the paradox of increasing armaments on both sides, paid for in spiraling costs, resulting in increased danger to both sides rather than increased security.

The President of the United States, in his message to the Conference of 21 January of this year,[2] offered a program to stop what would otherwise become an inexorable buildup of more and more weapons of greater and greater destructive power. In putting this program forward the President emphasized:

> . . . we must first endeavor to halt further increases in strategic armaments now.

Because it could halt further increases in strategic armaments now, the most significant and potentially far-reaching measure which the President of the United States put before this Conference is that dealing with a verified freeze of the number and characteristics of strategic offensive and defensive nuclear vehicles. It is this measure which the United States would like to explore further in this Committee.

We have all heard the awesome figures dealing with the number of nuclear delivery vehicles now planned to be built during the next few years. Chairman Khrushchev has stated the intentions of the Soviet Union graphically. He has talked of rockets being produced like sausages.

The United States has recently indicated that its force now contains more than 750 operational long-range ballistic missiles. The United States has announced that that number will rise, under present plans, to more than 1,700 during the next few years.

During the period when this Conference has been going on—while we have been discussing at this table the means of reducing arms—strategic armaments have been increasing at a rapid rate. The figures that I will give are applicable to the United States, but it is clear that, in the absence of an agreement, the forces of the Soviet Union will also increase rapidly.

This Conference began in 1962. In 1963 the inventory of operational vehicles in the United States increased by approximately 200 percent over the 1962 level. In 1964 it is increasing by 550 percent. By 1965 it will have grown to an aggregate increase of 750 percent over the 1962 level. As I indicated a moment ago, we must assume that the Soviet Union is increasing its missiles at a similar rate.

I do not set forth those figures in order to engage in hindsight. It is useless for us to speculate upon what results this Conference might have achieved had we concentrated first on measures to hold constant the numbers of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. It is useless to speculate whether we could have avoided a situation in which both sides substantially increased their strategic nuclear vehicles while arguing how best to reduce them.

It is of no utility for this Conference to consider what might have been the effects of some-

[1] Made before the Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva on Apr. 16. Mr. Fisher is Deputy Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. For statements made before the Conference by William C. Foster on Jan. 1 and Feb. 6, see BULLETIN of Mar. 2, 1964, p. 350, and Mar. 9, 1964, p. 376; for statements made by Mr. Fisher on Mar. 5 and 19, see *ibid.*, Apr. 20, 1964, p. 641.

[2] For text, see *ibid.*, Feb. 10, 1964, p. 224.

thing we did not do 2 years ago upon our situation today. It is, however, of the greatest utility for this Conference to consider the effect of what we can do today upon our situation 2, 3, and many more years from today. The freeze of the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles will have a decisive impact on the program to build more of these armaments—programs which will go forward if no agreement of this type is reached. If this measure were agreed upon and implemented, it would accomplish more practical results during the next several years—in terms of actual inventories of weapons of mass destruction—than any collateral measure put before this Conference.

The freeze would keep many hundreds of the deadliest weapons ever devised by man out of the arsenals of the future and would halt all progress on even more deadly ones now being developed. Moreover, as President Johnson has stated, the measure we are now discussing, by preventing the further expansion of the deadly and costly arms race, can open the path to reductions in all types of forces from present levels.

The freeze of strategic nuclear vehicles, particularly in conjunction with the cutoff of production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons, would have a stabilizing effect on the military environment. It would, as I have just pointed out, curb the nuclear arms race. Moreover, it would facilitate progress toward general disarmament, although it is, of course, not linked with the conclusion of a treaty on general disarmament. It is our belief, therefore, that the freeze and the cutoff could usefully be explored in parallel as companion measures.

Description of Vehicles To Be Frozen

On the instructions of President Johnson, I would now like to present further details concerning the elements of the strategic nuclear vehicle freeze. These details should answer a number of the questions which have been asked in the Committee about this measure. We also hope that they will serve as a stimulus for further exploration of the freeze on strategic nuclear vehicles by the Conference.

Under the agreement which the United States proposes to explore, the numbers and characteristics of the following strategic nuclear vehicles would be frozen:

First, ground-based surface-to-surface missiles having a range of 5,000 kilometers or greater, together with their associated launching facilities; and sea-based surface-to-surface missiles having a range of 100 kilometers or greater, together with their associated launchers;

Second, strategic bombers having an empty weight of 40,000 kilograms or greater, together with any associated air-to-surface missiles having a range of 100 kilometers or greater;

Third, ground-based surface-to-surface missiles having a range of between 1,000 kilometers and 5,000 kilometers, together with their associated launching facilities;

Fourth, strategic bombers having an empty weight of between 25,000 kilograms and 40,000 kilograms, together with any associated air-to-surface missiles having a range of 100 kilometers or greater;

Fifth, strategic anti-missile-missile systems, together with their associated launching facilities. In connection with this type of armament, further technical discussions will be required in order to formulate a workable and acceptable definition of "anti-missile-missile systems."

Limitations on Production and Testing

Let me turn now to the limitations on production and testing.

The production of new types of armaments that fall within the listing I have outlined would be prohibited. The production of all existing types of armaments within this listing, and of specified major subassemblies of these armaments, would be halted, except for production required to cover the maintenance of the vehicles, their accidental loss, and the expenditure of missiles within agreed annual quotas for confidence and training firings.

Replacement would be on a one-for-one basis of the same type. Production for authorized replacements would not be permitted to exceed agreed annual numbers which would, in effect, amount to a small percentage of the inventories of armaments existing in the hands of the respective sides at the effective date of the freeze agreement. Verification of inventories would

not be involved. The agreed replacement numbers would be subject to periodic review.

With respect to replacement of armaments no longer in production, the parties would seek to agree upon acceptable substitutes from among weapons in production. In the absence of such an agreement on items out of production the party concerned could reopen production lines for one-for-one replacement.

Control over the number of missile launchers is an essential element of the program. Limitations would also be imposed on the construction and improvement of launchers and launching facilities, commensurate with the spirit of the production limitations.

Production of boosters for use in space programs would be permitted even though such vehicles are equivalent to the boosters used for armaments, but would be limited to the quantity needed to meet the announced use of the boosters for such space programs.

Limitations on testing would be applied under the program. Certain types of tests and firings would, however, be permitted. Confidence and training firings of existing affected missiles would be limited to an agreed annual number for each type of missile, subject to periodic review, as I indicated earlier. Tests of new missiles and aircraft systems would be permitted to continue, subject to verification, as far as required for allowed space and civil air programs and for development of nonstrategic types of weapons not affected by the freeze. Limitation on research and development testing would be the subject of technical discussions.

Verification

How would the freeze be verified? As a point of departure, the parties to the agreement would have to make a complete declaration of all production and testing facilities relevant to the agreement. Declarations would be made after the conclusion but before the implementation of the agreement. Included would be facilities producing—or which were recently utilized in producing—completed armaments and specified major subassemblies of armaments affected by the freeze. Facilities producing, or recently involved in the production of, vehicles for space or aeronautical programs and their major subassemblies—these vehicles being equivalent to the boosters used for affected armaments—would also be included. All installations used for space launchings and sites to be used for all allowed missile firings would also be declared. Declarations would have to be kept up to date if new facilities were used.

The verification arrangements which we have in mind for the freeze would concentrate on monitoring critical production steps, replacements, and launchings. A verification system sufficient to provide adequate assurance of compliance would of course be required. Such a system could include the following:

(1) continuing inspection of declared facilities;

(2) a specified number of inspections per year to check undeclared locations for possible prohibited activities such as armament production or launching-site construction;

(3) the stationing of observers to verify all space launchings and all allowed missile firings in order that stated requirements for replacement missiles could be verified and the launching of prohibited types of missiles detected;

(4) observation of the destruction of—or, in the case of accidents, other confirmation of—vehicles and launchers being replaced.

Further details of the verification system required will be developed on the basis of further study. It is clear, however, that the verification system for the measure which we are now exploring would be less extensive than that required for general and complete disarmament. It would not involve verification of the levels or the deployment of existing armaments.

To formalize an agreement on the freeze, we would propose embodying it in a treaty which would enter into force within an agreed interval after signature and ratification by the United States, the Soviet Union, and such other states as might be agreed. We believe that such a treaty should contain a withdrawal clause similar to that contained in the partial test ban treaty,[3] with which I know the chairman is familiar. The freeze agreement should also contain a provision that a conference would be held, periodically or at the call of any party, to consider whether the treaty should be con-

[3] For text, see *ibid.*, Aug. 12, 1963, p. 239.

tinued or modified. It should be further provided that after such a conference any party could consider whether to exercise its right under the withdrawal clause on the basis of the results of the conference.

Significance of Freeze Proposal

I have described the essential elements of the United States proposal to explore a verified freeze of nuclear delivery vehicles. We have put forward this concept for serious exploration by the Soviet Union, the United States, and their respective allies. As a result of such continuing exploration, the United States may wish, therefore, to review the outline of the elements of the freeze concept which I have just presented.

The freeze provides a practical means to halt the most costly and potentially destructive segment of the arms race. The suggestion for a freeze deals with the areas of the arms race which are of the greatest danger and with the arms which are most easily controlled. This suggestion is designed to affect those armaments which are the most significant in halting the arms race and which are, at the same time, the simplest to verify in regard to limitations on production and testing.

Agreement on this measure, especially if coupled with its companion measure—the cutoff of production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons—would provide an excellent point of departure for major arms reductions to follow. It would slow down what is now an ever-mounting spiral of armaments and by so doing greatly facilitate progress toward disarmament.

We ask all members of this Conference to examine with care the measure we have set forth here this morning. We particularly ask the Soviet Union, as one of the states primarily affected by this measure, to give the details careful attention. This is a measure dealing with a complex problem. We hope and expect that governments will look at this measure carefully and thoughtfully before indicating their reaction.

We ask that this Committee explore the freeze in the spirit in which it is proposed. We hope that that will lead to a fruitful exploration of this important measure. With agreement on this measure, we shall have stopped on a plateau from which we could begin the descent from danger.

U.S. Proposes Town-Centered Planning for Asia

The 20th session of the U. N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East was held at Tehran, Iran, March 2–17. Following is a statement made before the Commission on March 4 by Kenneth T. Young, U.S. representative.

Mr. Chairman [Ali Naghi Alikhani of Iran]: I join my colleagues in warmly welcoming your election as chairman of ECAFE's 20th session and the election of His Excellency Dr. [Abdul Hakim] Tabibi of Afghanistan as our first vice chairman and The Honorable Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. [J. R.] Marshall, of New Zealand as our second vice chairman. Under your guidance, sir, our meeting has already been productive and efficient. It should mark another milestone in the constructive record of ECAFE.

Mr. Chairman, I have listened with great interest to the statements of our distinguished Executive Secretary [U Nyun] and previous speakers. They form a significant and, I think, remarkable analysis of this region's complexities. Yet, Mr. Chairman, I have the impression that a single and simple theme underlies this meeting: action for progress in bettering the conditions of Asia's people. May I direct a few observations to this worthy theme.

First, continued economic improvement permitted the United States to increase its foreign purchases in 1963 in the ECAFE region as elsewhere. Of the $17 billion of goods bought by the United States in 1963, some $3 billion came from this region. This was an increase of $280 million over 1962. With the U.S. economy continuing to expand and with an anticipated gross national product of almost $625 billion in 1964, U.S. demand for products of the ECAFE countries should continue to rise, particularly if current efforts to reduce obstacles to international trade are successful.

Secondly, President Johnson will present a message to the Congress on assistance for economic progress and political stability.[1] One of the interesting and encouraging developments in the ECAFE region is the expanding exchange of assistance among the countries represented here.

Thirdly, discussion and actions of various kinds are needed to expand markets. The movement in the ECAFE region toward enlargement of markets through regional arrangements offers promise for diversification of industry and eventually the expansion of both intraregional and extraregional trade. Consideration of export potential in national development plans is a constructive trend, supplementing continuing efforts toward import substitution. We are interested in useful measures for regional cooperation in the ECAFE area, as described in the survey.

Fourthly, the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations under the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade], scheduled to begin in late spring of this year,[2] can result in major reductions in tariffs and other trade barriers. This can open markets for the goods of the developing countries. The GATT Contracting Parties have agreed that full reciprocity in tariff reductions will not be expected from the developing countries. The very form of the negotiations—across-the-board cuts instead of the former method of item-by-item bargaining—will itself be advantageous to the developing countries. We intend to use our negotiating authority under the Trade Expansion Act to the fullest possible extent to secure tariff reductions on products of chief interest to the developing countries. These negotiations offer our best immediate opportunity for widespread reduction of trade barriers which may otherwise frustrate the export potential of the developing countries.

Fifthly, the forthcoming United Nations Conference on Trade and Development will appropriately consider a wide range of proposals.[3] At a press conference held on February 29, President Johnson expressed his attitude toward development of world trade as follows:

> We are very interested in that conference. We are going to participate in it and make every contribution we can. We think it is essential in the interest of the peoples of the world that trade barriers be pulled down. We are going to contribute everything we can to that end.

Sixthly, the secretariat's very able Economic Survey for 1963 has highlighted the principal problem for action, namely, that lagging development of agriculture threatens the general economic progress of the area. We too are particularly concerned over the fact that population growth continues to outpace increases in national production. More people means more young people in every country. The growing youth majority deserves more attention and higher priority in action for development. Food production must be increased considerably to meet the needs of increasing populations and to assure healthy economic growth for people in the ECAFE area. For the well-being of Asian peoples, the United States delegation joins in the view that more attention and action should now be directed to rural improvement and agricultural progress in Asia.

Accordingly, Mr. Chairman, in my final observation, may I suggest that perhaps we should be searching for some new technique to stimulate rural productivity, create more public services and better markets, and synthesize a modern but satisfactory rural way of life.

I wonder if we might not look for a breakthrough to quicker rural progress in a concept of town-centered planning of all phases of development. This concept could be described as a technologically progressive, politically integrated, but geographically decentralized society organized along town-centered lines. This would mean a new emphasis to meet the needs of rapidly expanding rural populations which are experiencing low standards of living, underemployment, underconsumption, and migration of increasing numbers of people unprepared to live and find work in already sprawling cities.

[1] For text of President Johnson's message on foreign aid, transmitted to the Congress on Mar. 19, see BULLETIN of Apr. 6, 1964, p. 518.

[2] For an address on "The Role of Agriculture in Trade Expansion" by Christian A. Herter, see *ibid.*, Apr. 27, 1964, p. 671.

[3] For a statement made before the U.N. Conference on Mar. 25 by Under Secretary Ball, see *ibid.*, Apr. 20, 1964, p. 634.

Between the extremes of urban bigness and village smallness, a town-building program could interject a combination of public services, a market environment, and the dispersal of industry. Better than the small village, the town could provide centralized training institutions, public works, agricultural extension services, medical care, specialized trade production, and credit facilities and adequate markets. Better than the huge metropolis, the new town would be able to provide an acceptable way of life for underemployed farm families. It could do this by fostering new opportunities for training and employment, particularly in light industries, and by affording its residents with adequate social services. Town building would center development in a cluster of villages close to rural people. It is as important to avoid the uprooting disintegration of their way of life as it is to prevent the rootless combustion of superurbanization.

The service-market environment of rural towns could provide incentives for the cultivators and family heads, who are the decisive individuals in rural areas. In such towns they would have markets for selling their crops and stores for buying their family needs. There are many who are now convinced that a market environment in rural areas is crucial to national development and industrialization in particular.

So I wonder if perhaps the most important task now for developing nations is not to find new ways to expand domestic markets. What is needed is the local manufacture both of inexpensive agricultural equipment and the kinds of consumer goods which will create incentives for rural people to adopt modern methods of raising agricultural productivity.

Town-centered planning would require integrated programs of the many social, economic, and political factors involved, as well as the purely technical design and layout of new or modernized communities. The establishment of such communities cannot be successful unless all of these market factors plus the social and human factors are put together in regional planning.

In particular, application of the latest technological knowledge in town-centered planning can make really hopeful changes for individuals and families, especially young people. For example, our current research indicates that low-cost plastic roofing may be the solution to the most costly feature of tropical housing for millions of Asian peoples—the roof over their heads.

Some precedents and experience are available already in Asian countries along the lines of area development. If regional formulation of a general concept for town-centered planning has any merit, Mr. Chairman, my delegation would be glad to join with others in further discussions of its feasibility. There are several specific aspects of this approach which we would like to explore with our colleagues here.

Mr. Chairman, the U.S. delegation makes these observations, mindful of His Imperial Majesty's farsighted mandate to us for social justice and reform and mindful of President Kennedy's active interest in this Decade of Development and a pattern of partnership between countries, as in ECAFE.

President Johnson continues this determination to win mankind's battle against poverty, disease, and ignorance. At the recent session of the United Nations General Assembly he stated:[4]

"Every nation must do its share. All United Nations members can do better. We can act more often together. We can build together a much better world."

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Convention on international civil aviation. Done at Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force April 4, 1947. TIAS 1591.
Adherence deposited: Yemen Arab Republic, April 17, 1964.

[4] *Ibid.*, Jan. 6, 1964, p. 2.

Trade

Declaration on the provisional accession of Argentina to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 18, 1960. Entered into force October 14, 1962. TIAS 5184.
Acceptance deposited: Senegal, March 16, 1964.

Declaration giving effect to provisions of article XVI (4) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 19, 1960. Entered into force November 14, 1962. TIAS 5227.
Signature: Japan, March 31, 1964.

Procès-verbal extending and amending declaration of provisional accession of Swiss Confederation to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of November 8, 1961. Done at Geneva December 8, 1961. Entered into force for the United States January 9, 1962. TIAS 4957.
Acceptances deposited: Niger, February 17, 1964; Senegal, March 16, 1964.

Protocol for accession of Israel to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 6, 1962. Entered into force July 5, 1962. TIAS 5249.
Signature: Malaysia, March 17, 1964.

Procès-verbal extending period of validity of declaration on provisional accession of Argentina to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of November 18, 1960 (TIAS 5184). Done at Geneva November 7, 1962. Entered into force January 1, 1963. TIAS 5266.
Signatures: Federal Republic of Germany (subject to ratification), March 31, 1964; Niger, February 17, 1964; Pakistan, March 7, 1964; Senegal, March 16, 1964.

Declaration on provisional accession of the United Arab Republic to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 13, 1962. Entered into force for the United States May 3, 1963. TIAS 5309.
Signatures: Denmark, March 11, 1964; Malaysia, March 17, 1964; Niger, February 17, 1964; Senegal, March 16, 1964.

Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade embodying results of 1960–61 tariff conference. Done at Geneva July 16, 1962. Entered into force for the United States December 31, 1962. TIAS 5253.
Signatures: Chile (subject to ratification), February 25, 1964; South Africa, March 23, 1964.

Procès-verbal extending declaration on provisional accession of Tunisia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of November 12, 1959 (TIAS 4498). Done at Geneva December 12, 1963.[1]
Signatures: India, February 28, 1964; Japan, January 31, 1964; Kenya, February 17, 1964; Madagascar, January 20, 1964; Niger and Pakistan, February 17, 1964; Senegal, March 16, 1964; United Kingdom, February 10, 1964.

BILATERAL

Belgium and Luxembourg

Agreement amending the agreement of October 8, 1948, as amended (TIAS 1860, 3940), between the United States, Belgium, and Luxembourg, for the financing of a cultural and educational program. Effected by exchange of notes at Brussels and Luxembourg, March 12 and April 2, 1964. Entered into force April 2, 1964.

Japan

Protocol amending the agreement of June 16, 1958, as amended (TIAS 4133, 4172), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington August 7, 1963.
Entered into force: April 21, 1964.

Tunisia

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1701–1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at Tunis April 7, 1964. Entered into force April 7, 1964.

Viet-Nam

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of January 9, 1964 (TIAS 5514). Effected by exchange of notes at Saigon April 14, 1964. Entered into force April 14, 1964.

[1] Not in force.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: April 20–26

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Release issued prior to April 20 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 170 of April 17.

No.	Date	Subject
†171	4/20	Air talks with Canada (rewrite).
†172	4/20	Meeker: "Can the United Nations Keep World Peace in the 1960's?"
*173	4/20	U.S. participation in international conferences.
*174	4/20	Itinerary for visit of Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago.
175	4/20	Private committee to help find embassy sites in Washington (rewrite).
*176	4/22	Koren sworn in as Ambassador to Congo (Brazzaville) (biographic details).
*177	4/21	Battle: 400th anniversary of St. Augustine, Fla.
†178	4/22	Smith: "The Nuclear Defense of NATO."
†179	4/23	Manning: "The Citizen's Role in Foreign Policy Legislation."
180	4/23	Ball: "Principles of Our Policy Toward Cuba."
*181	4/24	Harriman: American Society of International Law (excerpts).
182	4/24	Educational exchange agreement with China.
183	4/24	Exchange of scientific and technical information with Japan.
184	4/24	Aid agreement with Japan for Ryukyu Islands.
*185	4/24	Members named for committee to help find embassy sites.
186	4/25	Rusk: "The Situation in the Western Pacific."
†187	4/25	Tyler: "The Atlantic Alliance: Constant Objectives in a Context of Change."
†188	4/25	Ball: "Interdependence—The Basis of U.S.-Canada Relations."

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REC'D MAY 1964

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May 18, 1964

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Central Treaty Organization Meets at Washington

The 12th session of the Ministerial Council of the Central Treaty Organization was held at Washington April 28 and 29. Following are texts of the opening address made by Secretary Rusk on April 28 and a final communique issued at the close of the meeting.

ADDRESS BY SECRETARY RUSK

Press release 190 dated April 28

Mr. Secretary General, esteemed colleagues, Your Excellencies, and distinguished guests: It is with a sense of deep personal satisfaction and pleasure that I welcome the Ministerial Council of the Central Treaty Organization to Washington. The Council last met here in 1959. Since that time, my predecessors and I have experienced the warmth of your hospitality as guests in your several capitals. It is indeed a privilege for me to act as your host for this session and thus to make a token return of that hospitality.

President Johnson has charged me with the pleasant duty of extending on behalf of the American people, the United States Government, and in his own name, a most sincere and heartfelt welcome to our country. The President looks forward to extending his personal greetings to my colleagues, the distinguished heads of delegation, at the White House tomorrow morning.

You come to us not as strangers to a strange land but as proven friends and close allies. Although the United States is not a member of CENTO, we are bound to each of you by other defense agreements and are intimately involved in the work of CENTO itself. We are glad you are here and hope that you will feel truly at home during your stay.

CENTO is now in its 10th year of existence. This would seem, therefore, to be an appropriate time for us to reexamine the reasons for its formation, the course it has taken, and the purposes it serves.

Some 10 years ago the nations here represented recognized that the threat of Communist aggression in the region of the Middle East was real, pervasive, and continuing. They further recognized the mutuality of their interests, as free peoples, in preserving their freedom and independence. Moreover, they recognized that freedom and independence can best be maintained through collective action.

And so the CENTO countries determined to declare their recognition of these basic principles, to make clear their intention to friend and

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The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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foe alike. The Pact of Mutual Cooperation which they signed in 1955 proclaims the essence of that intent in its first article:

> Consistent with article 51 of the United Nations Charter the High Contracting Parties will co-operate for their security and defence.

By that declaration a shield was raised against the threat of aggression. Because the United States recognized the vital importance of that shield, it has taken part in the work of the principal committees of CENTO and, by your invitation, attends these Council meetings.

So long as the Communist threat of aggression persists, there will be need for the CENTO shield. And, my friends, that threat has not been removed.

The Council of SEATO, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, met this month in Manila.[1] SEATO is currently confronted with the brutal fact of continuing Communist aggression. Just a few days ago I visited South Viet-Nam, where warfare still rages because Communist aggressors persist in their attempt to impose their will on a free people. The fact that we have not experienced such conflict in the CENTO region is, at least in part, attributable to the existence of this defensive shield.

But a shield is not an offensive weapon—and thus no nation which wants peace need fear its existence. As President Johnson said last week:[2]

> We will discuss any problem, we will listen to any proposal, we will pursue any agreement, we will take any action which might lessen the chance of war without sacrificing the interests of our allies or our own ability to defend the alliance against attack. In other words, our guard is up but our hand is out.

Constructing Machinery for Cooperation

As we have worked together to strengthen CENTO, we have found that it has become both a symbol and a vehicle for our common aspirations and objectives.

During these first 10 years we have been engaged in constructing machinery for cooperation. We found that the first essential is communication. Together, we first established the various forums of CENTO for this purpose—the Council, the committees, and the specialized working groups. An impressive volume of communication and interchange has already taken place through these channels. Not only diplomats but educators, scientists, experts, and professionals in many fields have met together, exchanged ideas and skills, and have developed valuable habits of cooperation. The benefits of their endeavors are already evident throughout the region and, I am confident, will continue to increase in the future.

We also found a need for physical communications facilities for effective cooperation in defense and economic development. The tangible evidences of CENTO's achievements in this field are a source of great satisfaction to all of us:

—New and modern systems of telecommunications link the treaty area. The CENTO microwave system linking the three capital cities will be the longest in the world upon its completion in the near future;

—Great ports have been modernized and improved; CENTO highways now traverse friendly frontiers;

—The CENTO railway project to join the Turkish and Iranian railway systems is now on its way to completion. CENTO has long recognized the significant contribution which this project will make to both the security and the economic needs of the region. The United States is pleased to have been able to assist in the completion of this worthy project.

Thus these first years of CENTO may fairly be characterized as a period of solid and worthwhile beginnings.

What, then, of the future? I think that we can face it with an increasing degree of confidence. Across the face of our National Archives Building on Pennsylvania Avenue are emblazoned these words from Shakespeare, "What is past is prologue." Our past in CENTO is a constructive decade of learning, organizing, and building. We have created the institutions and facilities which make our cooperation fruitful, and our peoples are already benefiting therefrom. Within the CENTO partnership, there is today a growing consciousness of the mutuality of our goals and a growing sense of community.

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[1] For a statement by Secretary Rusk and the text of a communique, see BULLETIN of May 4, 1964, p. 690.

[2] *Ibid.*, May 11, 1964, p. 726.

There has been clear evidence of this in the accomplishments of the highly successful economic meeting in Ankara last month and of the Military Committee meeting which has just concluded here in Washington.

It is not for me to predict the decisions of this Council session. But I would hope that as a result of this meeting and of subsequent meetings of our colleagues and deputies CENTO would:

—strengthen its institutional structure;

—complete the extensive capital projects which provide the communication network for the area;

—improve and expand cooperative association in developmental and technical assistance activities; and

—maintain the defensive shield by effective military cooperation.

Building a Decent World Order

In a larger sense, also, I believe we have reason for confidence. We in the free world have our problems. But when we look across the Iron and Bamboo Curtains, we see that the Communist world has far-reaching problems to which solutions have not yet been found.

Let us not forget that the leaders of both the principal Communist nations proclaim world domination as the ultimate Communist goal. And we must take particular care not to let any Communists anywhere think that they can gain from a policy of militancy.

The notion that communism is a shortcut to the future for developing nations has been shattered by actual Communist performance. In terms of economic strength, the free world continues to widen its advantage over the Communist world, both relatively and absolutely.

And, despite opposition or lack of cooperation from the Communists, we are moving ahead with the great task of building a decent world order—the kind of world outlined in the preamble and articles 1 and 2 of the Charter of the United Nations.

The members of CENTO, like other free nations, have a common interest in working toward these goals:

—a world free of aggression—aggression by whatever means;

—a world of independent nations, each with the institutions of its own choice but cooperating with one another to their mutual advantage;

—a world of economic and social advance for all peoples;

—a world which provides sure and equitable means for the peaceful settlement of disputes and which moves steadily toward a rule of law;

—a world in which the powers of the state over the individual are limited by law and custom, in which the personal freedoms essential to the dignity of man are secure.

If we persevere, we shall eventually reach that goal: a world in which freedom is secure for all mankind.

We of the United States delegation once again extend to you a warm welcome and pledge to you our unstinted cooperation as we work together toward our mutual objectives.

FINAL COMMUNIQUE

The Twelfth Session of the Ministerial Council of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) was held in Washington on April 28 and April 29, 1964. The delegates from the five countries participating in this meeting were led by:

H. E. Mr. Abbas Aram	Foreign Minister of Iran
H. E. Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto	Foreign Minister of Pakistan
H. E. Mr. Feridun Camal Erkin	Foreign Minister of Turkey
The Rt. Honourable R. A. Butler	Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, United Kingdom
The Honorable Dean Rusk	Secretary of State, United States of America

The Secretary of State of the United States, as host, was in the chair. In his opening address, Secretary Rusk welcomed the delegations on behalf of President Lyndon B. Johnson.

The Council of Ministers expressed deep regret at the tragic death of John F. Kennedy, the late President of the United States, and paid warm tribute to his outstanding qualities as a statesman and to his wise and valiant contributions to the cause of world peace.

The Council welcomed Mr. Butler to his first CENTO Ministerial Meeting since becoming Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom.

In the traditional frank atmosphere of CENTO, the Council reviewed international developments since it last met in Karachi.[3] The Ministers particularly ex-

[3] *Ibid.*, May 27, 1963, p. 841.

changed views on recent developments in the general area of the Middle East and discussed the implications of these events for the CENTO alliance.

The Council expressed its deep concern over the violence which has occurred in Cyprus since December 1963 and in particular over the recent deterioration which has created a dangerous situation with grave implications for peace and security in the whole area. The Council declared its earnest desire that the violence should be brought to an immediate end in accordance with the letter and spirit of the United Nations Security Council resolutions.

While welcoming the reduction in world tension which had occurred, the Foreign Ministers recognized that serious dangers to the peace and security of the Free World continue to exist. Specifically, they noted that the danger from subversive activities remains acute.

The Ministers reaffirmed their objective of seeking peace and security through world disarmament under adequate safeguards, while maintaining a posture of constant vigilance. They noted with satisfaction that the Test Ban Treaty constituted a valuable first step on the road to disarmament.

The Ministers observed the distinctive contribution of CENTO as a deterrent to aggression in the treaty area. They noted with satisfaction that, behind the defensive shield of the Organization, the regional countries were making noteworthy social, economic and political progress.

The Council expressed pleasure at the continuing progress of CENTO in the economic sphere, noting the extensive activities of the Organization in wide-ranging technical fields and the beneficial developments that are occurring on the CENTO communication projects. The microwave and high frequency telecommunication projects linking the region will be in operation by the end of 1964. In addition, work is forging ahead on the Turkey-Iran and Iran-Pakistan highway projects; development work has been completed on the port of Trabzon and has begun on the port of Iskenderun; and the current pace of activity on the CENTO Airway will bring this valuable project to completion in 1965. The Council noted with particular pleasure the United States decision to help finance through long-term loans the CENTO railway project which will link the existing railway systems in Iran and Turkey, and the intention of the United Kingdom to increase their financial contribution to the economic activities of the Organization.

The Council agreed that the contributions of the CENTO technical cooperation programmes and of the CENTO cultural relations programme are of value to the process of economic and social development in the region and have led to closer relations and improved understanding among the peoples of the member countries.

The Council reviewed the report of the CENTO Military Committee and discussed suggestions for further cooperation in the military sphere designed to strengthen the defence potential of the alliance. They also reviewed reports on CENTO military exercises, particularly the recent CENTO-sponsored air, land and sea operation "DELAWAR" in Iran, and the earlier "MIDLINK" naval and "SHAHBAZ" air defence exercises.

The Foreign Ministers found their discussions of great value in achieving common understanding on world and regional problems and in planning the continuing work of the alliance.

The Council expressed warm appreciation of the work of Dr. Abbas Ali Khalatbary during his current term of office as Secretary General. His appointment was extended for an additional three years.

It was decided that the next meeting of the Ministerial Council will be held in Tehran in the Spring of 1965.

Mr. Anderson, Mr. Newbegin Named To Represent U.S. in Panama Talks

The White House announced on April 25 that President Johnson has appointed Robert B. Anderson as the representative of the United States, with the rank of Special Ambassador, to carry out the objectives of the joint declaration by the United States and Panama which was signed at Washington on April 3.[1]

The President has also appointed Robert Newbegin as alternate representative of the United States, with the personal rank of Ambassador, to accompany Mr. Anderson.

[1] For a statement by President Johnson and text of the joint declaration, see BULLETIN of Apr. 27, 1964, p. 655.

Interdependence—The Basis of U.S.-Canada Relations

by Under Secretary Ball[1]

During the past 4 days you have undertaken a difficult exercise in analysis. You have sought to probe, identify, examine, and dissect the interests and attitudes of the peoples and the Governments of Canada and the United States as they affect relations between these two great countries. You have sought also to determine how those interests and attitudes came into being and how they are likely to develop.

Relations between governments and peoples are never simple. They are even more complicated when two nations live side by side. Then there is an impingement of interests at every level of activity. And, in the case of Canada and America, disparity in size is a highly important added element. One can never lose sight of the fact that the population of the United States is 10 times that of Canada or that its gross national product is 14 times as large.

Relations might be easier to sort out if each country had a simple and completely homogeneous society. But today Canada is preoccupied with the problems and pressures of a bilingual society in which the minority is anxious to preserve its identity. We, on the other hand, are preoccupied with the tensions of a multiracial society in which an important minority is trying to establish its equality.

Each of our two nations is young in years. Yet each is greatly influenced by its own short history. Each has a well-defined body of tradition and principle to which it must be faithful if it is to maintain its own soul. And each has its own fixations and powerful memories from the past, its special sensitivities not always well communicated or understood abroad, its own areas of irrationality, its own neuroses.

Each nation is governed by a democratic government. Here again, however, the appearance of similarity is greater than the reality, for the framers of Canadian confederation designed it to avoid what they, rightly or wrongly, saw as the flaws in the architecture of our own constitutional system. Yet the very fact that each is a democracy means that each Government must follow lines of policy that reflect a synthesis of the views of its people. This is a significant element in the relations between our two Governments; it at once both simplifies and complicates the compromise of differences.

Your effort here has been primarily one of diagnosis—to try to find out why Canadians and Americans think and act as they do with regard to one another's affairs. What is even more difficult is to translate the answers into national policies—policies that can facilitate harmonious coexistence on a single continent and that can enable our two nations to combine their energies in pursuit of common objectives in the world at large.

This translation of principles into policy needs to be carefully approached; otherwise the relations between our countries will be marred by a constant succession of petty quarrels.

Such petty quarrels as arise must be resolved by agreement, for we are denied the ultimate arbitrament of force. Obviously we are never going to make war on one another. But better yet, such quarrels should be avoided; problems should be solved before they become trouble-

[1] Address made before the 25th American Assembly, Arden House, Harriman, N.Y., on Apr. 25 (press release 188).

some, and this can be done only if we each design policies that take into account the other's attitudes and interests.

This is easier to achieve in some areas of policy than in others. Tonight I wish to indicate some of our mutual interests and problems with regard to defense, to cultural affairs, and particularly to economic relations—and then to suggest possible means for reconciling difficulties in United States-Canadian relations in the future.

Joint Defense Programs

There should be no serious differences between United States and Canadian defense policies. Neither country can afford differences in this field, for in a modern nuclear age defense is indivisible. Certainly the defense of North America is indivisible, and Canada lies directly athwart the shortest route between the principal center of Communist power and the United States.

The United States and Canada cooperated closely during the war, and in 1947 we decided to continue our joint arrangements. The Permanent Joint Board on Defense, which President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Mackenzie King established in 1940, is still an effective instrument in defense coordination.

In the same spirit, early in the 1950's, the two countries agreed to set up a joint North American air defense system. Together we have developed a continent-wide radar warning network. As a further step, in 1958 we agreed to integrate our air defense systems under one command, the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) with headquarters at Colorado Springs.[2]

Cooperation on military matters today is excellent and virtually constant among the services of the two countries. To insure close liaison between the two defense forces, a Canadian Joint Staff is maintained in Washington and the United States Air Force has a Coordination Staff in Ottawa.

United States-Canadian joint defense programs have provided a variety of modern weapons for Canada. They insure Canadian industry an opportunity to participate in the production of up-to-date military equipment.

We were happy to reach agreement last year to provide nuclear weapons for Canadian forces.[3] While the United States retains physical custody of these weapons, the agreements provide for joint United States-Canadian control over their use. With these arrangements, we are in greater harmony in our joint defense efforts than we have been for a number of years.

Cultural Relations

But if we can cooperate in our common defense, neither should we have any insoluble difficulties between us so far as cultural relations are concerned.

I am aware of the apprehensions in some circles that Canada risks being culturally overwhelmed by the United States. We Americans are a vocal—sometimes a rather noisy—people, and the development of radio and television has extended exposure to American cultural influence beyond the written to the spoken word.

The concern in some sectors of Canadian opinion, as I understand it, is that the very volume and high decibel count of American expression tends to challenge the lower key expressions of Canadian life. But the Canadians, like ourselves, are freedom-loving people who do not censure books or jam broadcasts. In open societies such as those of our two nations, there can be no private dialogs, and we and our Canadian friends live in adjoining houses with wide-open windows between us.

Anxiety to preserve intact the special values of Canadian culture has led to proposals for governmental action, notably in the protection of Canadian periodicals. The specific measures in question have been directed at discouraging the support of American magazines by Canadian advertisers.

We Americans can understand the desire to protect journals of fact and opinion that provide expression for Canadian ideas and for the discussion of Canadian problems. But publications fall in an area of special sensitivity involving the most fundamental aspects of our common cultural tradition. I cannot believe that

[2] For an exchange of notes, see BULLETIN of June 9, 1958, p. 979.

[3] For background, see *ibid.*, Feb. 18, 1963, p. 243.

the unique values of Canada's culture will be advanced or encouraged by any measures that may impede competition in the field of ideas. I would hope that, however the Canadian Government may ultimately resolve this question, it will not act in such a manner as to inhibit the free flow of thought across our borders.

Commercial and Economic Policies

The areas of greatest complexity and difficulty between our two nations lie in the range of our commercial and economic policies. It is one of the cliches of American-Canadian relations that we are each other's most important trading partners. Last year Canada accounted for 20 percent of our total exports and the same percentage of our total imports, while America accounted for 68 percent of Canadian imports and 62 percent of Canadian exports. The United States draws heavily upon Canadian raw materials for her industrial requirements, while we have poured over $20 billion of our capital into the development of the Canadian economy.

To a considerable extent—without any conscious decision to do so—we have regarded the North American Continent as an economic whole and have allowed free movement of certain of the key factors of production. Capital has moved almost without restriction and in both directions. As might be expected, the net capital flow has been overwhelmingly toward Canada. But what is often forgotten is that on a per capita basis Canadians have invested almost twice as much in the United States as Americans have in Canada.

Labor also has moved with relative freedom. Indeed, until 1930, the movement of labor was practically unimpeded by any governmental restrictions. Today both countries follow liberal immigration policies toward one another. The free flow of people who live on each side of the border makes an accepted contribution to the seasonal or local employment needs in each country.

The freedom that exists with regard to capital and labor does not apply to the movement of goods. Here substantial barriers have been erected. Today we treat Canada as we treat our other trading partners—on a most-favored-nation basis. The Canadians extend us most-favored-nation treatment but qualified for the preferences it accords, within the framework of the Ottawa agreements of 1932, to the United Kingdom and other members of the Commonwealth.

Over the years, the barriers between us have been gradually reduced by a succession of trade agreements. In fact, the first trade agreement we negotiated under our reciprocal trade agreements legislation of 1934 was with Canada.

From the point of view of economic principles, there is no doubt that Canada and the United States could employ the resources of North America most efficiently by developing the continent as a single great market. The tastes of the Canadian and American people are sufficiently similar to permit that standardization and specialization of production that form the basis for the economies of scale. And the European experience in recent years has fully demonstrated that, when national markets are combined into a common market, opportunities are created for the rationalization of industry that can result in a greatly heightened productivity for all concerned.

But no modern peoples are likely to permit their destinies to be shaped purely by economic facts. While both Canada and America have been moving toward commercial liberalization during the last 30 years—and hopefully will move even farther in that direction with the forthcoming Kennedy Round of trade negotiations—both have drawn back, for political reasons, from the ultimate logic of the single market.

Quite obviously, the Canadians have had the greater stake in this decision since the intimate linking of the economies of the two nations would make a proportionately bigger impact on their lives than on ours. Yet it must be acknowledged that, while we Americans have never had to face this question in the same terms, such a development would cause problems for us as well.

Canadian policy is firmly committed to the preservation of an independent and separate national economy. So far as the United States is concerned, this is a decision of the Canadian Government and of the Canadian people. It is a decision we respect.

One can expect to find some element of economic nationalism in the policies of almost every government, including our own, involving varying degrees of economic cost to the nation immediately concerned and to other nations. If such policies are pursued with moderation and with due regard for the interests of others, there is no reason why they should not be susceptible of mutual adjustment in the relations between nations.

But difficulties necessarily arise when the anxiety to avoid economic interdependence leads to policies that are discriminatory and inequitable. This is particularly the case with close neighbors, such as the United States and Canada, where the degree of intertwining of economic affairs is so great and the volume of trade so large that any change in existing ground rules can have immediate and substantial repercussions. Measures by governments designed to induce a change in the character of investment from equity to debt, for example, or to refuse national treatment to capital that had earlier been welcomed, or to bring about the transfer of production from one country to another can be seriously disruptive.

The obligation to be sensitive to the existing high state of interdependence rests on both Governments. America gave recognition to the fact that our economies are closely tied when it immediately concurred in Canada's request for an exemption from the interest equalization tax.[4] Canada, on its part, has been willing to maintain a high proportion of dollars in its monetary reserves in acknowledgment of its participation in a closely interlinked monetary system.

Trend Toward Economic Interdependence

The desire of our Canadian friends to safeguard the identity of their national market apparently stems from the belief that the nation and people may lose something of their national political independence if their economy is too closely meshed with that of other nations, and particularly the United States.

The maintenance of political independence, however, depends more on the state of the national will than on economic relationships. Certainly, neither Canada nor the United States is interested in yielding or compromising its own freedom of political decision. In fact, on both sides of the border there is a fierce desire to resist any steps in that direction. I do not believe, therefore, that as between Canada and the United States there is any basis for assuming an automatic and parallel relation between increased economic interdependence and a loss of independence in political life.

This point is a relevant one, for it seems likely that, for better or worse, natural trends will lead in the direction of greater economic interdependence. With more complex tools both of production and of management, the optimum standards for efficiency are increasing. The requirements of scale in industrial output are expressed in larger and larger figures. Capital needs are more demanding. Corporate units are growing in size. Left to natural market forces, these trends should lead toward a progressively higher degree of economic involvement between our two countries and the rest of the world. Canada will become increasingly important to the United States and the United States to Canada.

I offer this thesis tonight not as an expression of United States Government policy but as a prediction of the natural evolution of economic forces in a time of vaulting technological advance. I do not doubt that either the United States or Canada has the ability, by political means, to interpose measures of economic nationalism that can check or interrupt those forces. But the cost to both countries of measures toward that end is almost certain to rise to prohibitive levels as the pressures for realizing the benefits of scale are intensified by economic progress throughout the world.

Need To Avoid Divergent Economic Policies

I suggest, therefore, that the effort of our two countries be focused not on measures of economic nationalism but on appropriate steps that may be taken to permit the normal and healthy development of our economies toward an increasing economic interdependence that is viewed not so much in bilateral terms as in terms of its relation to an expanding world economy.

To achieve this will require, of course, a con-

[4] For text of a joint statement issued on July 21, 1963, see *ibid.*, Aug. 12, 1963, p. 256.

siderable measure of agreement between the Canadian and American Governments on a basic philosophical approach to the purposes that should govern our relations. The opportunity for the formulation of such an agreement has been provided by a decision taken last January between President Johnson and Prime Minister Pearson during their meeting in Washington.

In the language of the communique which followed that meeting,[5]

> The Prime Minister and the President discussed at some length the practicability and desirability of working out acceptable principles which would make it easier to avoid divergencies in economic and other policies of interest to each other. They appreciated that any such principles would have to take full account of the interests of other countries and of existing international arrangements.

In order to examine the possibility for developing such a set of principles, it was agreed by these two leaders that a working group would be established at a senior level to study this problem. For this purpose the two Governments have appointed distinguished diplomats of long experience in Canadian-American relations—Ambassador Livingston Merchant for the United States and Ambassador Arnold Heeney for Canada. These two gentlemen are now engaged in the preliminary work required of their task and will submit a report for study by our Governments before many months.

Intergovernmental Consultations

Once our two Governments agree upon a common set of principles to govern our relations, the smooth evolution of those relations will require constant intergovernmental consultation within the framework of those principles.

There are already a number of institutional arrangements for the conduct of those consultations, such as the joint working group on energy, the joint working group on the balance of payments, facilities for quarterly grains consultations, the Cabinet committee on defense, the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, the International Joint Commission, and the U.S.-Canadian interparliamentary committee.

Finally, in the economic field, there is the Joint United States-Canadian Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs. This Committee, established in 1953 at the Cabinet level, normally meets once a year. The last meeting was in September 1963 in Washington.[6] The Committee will meet again next week in Ottawa. Its discussions cover a wide range of current problems.

Consistent with the habits of two nations that share a common tradition of pragmatism, we have not sought to carry institutional arrangements for consultation beyond their present informal character. Given the desire on both sides to preserve freedom of political decision, neither nation is pressing for any experiments in supranationality. Instead the relations between our Governments rest on a mutual respect for each other's sovereignty.

But as separate sovereign powers with a will to live harmoniously in a spacious continent, there is no reason why we cannot work out progressively more effective mechanisms for settling our mutual affairs. This will involve, of course, not merely the conventional recognition of our national similarities but also a grownup awareness of our differences.

Yet, in the final analysis there is one point on which I think we can agree without question—that there is in each nation a deep reservoir of good will for the other. And granted that good will, there is no reason why we cannot face such problems as may come and find solutions compatible with our individual needs and our common requirements.

[5] For text, see *ibid.*, Feb. 10, 1964, p. 199.

U.S.-Canada Economic Committee Concludes Ninth Meeting

The ninth meeting of the Joint United States–Canadian Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs was held at Ottawa April 29 and 30. Following is a joint communique released at the conclusion of the meeting.

The Ninth Meeting of the Joint United States–Canadian Committee on Trade and Eco-

[6] For text of a joint communique, see *ibid.*, Oct. 7, 1963, p. 548.

nomic Affairs was held in Ottawa April 29–30, 1964. The Committee noted with satisfaction the progress which had been made in matters of interest to both countries and the general improvement in relations between them.

The Committee received from Mr. Arnold Heeney, on behalf of himself and Mr. Livingston T. Merchant, their interim report of progress on their joint study of United States–Canadian relations. They were appointed by President Johnson and Prime Minister [Lester B.] Pearson to examine the desirability and practicability of developing acceptable principles which would facilitate cooperation in economic and other policies.[1] Their report noted agreement on method of procedure and states that preliminary investigations have been initiated.

The Committee noted that economic activity in Canada and the United States had continued to expand and that another favorable year was anticipated for 1964. They agreed that the two countries should continue to follow policies designed to stimulate economic growth and employment in the context of economic stability. They noted that trade between the United States and Canada was running at record levels. The Committee discussed policies which each country was following to improve its balance of payments. The United States members expressed agreement with Canada's desire to improve its current account through an expansion of exports, and stressed the importance of adhering to the principles of non-discrimination in achieving this objective. The Committee also noted the recent improvement in the United States balance of payments position and expressed the expectation that this improvement would continue.

The members of the Committee looked forward to the opening of the GATT tariff and trade negotiations in Geneva, in which both countries would be participating actively, for the reduction of trade barriers and the expansion of trade in both industrial and agricultural products between the two countries and with the rest of the world. They took note also of the progress at the current United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and agreed on the importance of continuing international cooperative efforts to assist the less developed countries to expand their trading opportunities and facilitate their economic development.

The Committee discussed the trade in automobiles and automobile parts between Canada and the United States. United States members stressed their concern over the possible adverse effects of the Canadian automotive programme on certain United States parts producers. Canadian members emphasized that the programme is designed to promote increased specialization and lower production costs in the Canadian automotive industry.

The Committee examined problems affecting trade between the two countries. Canadian Ministers expressed concern about increases in levels of certain United States tariffs arising from the recent reclassification of the U.S. tariff, including rates on parts and components. They urged that the U.S. Government take action to correct this situation. They requested that action should be taken to remove long standing U.S. restrictions on imports from Canada of lead and zinc, and cheese. The United States members expressed their concern over possible Canadian measures which might adversely affect certain U.S. publications. A number of other matters were discussed including Great Lakes water levels, tourist customs privileges, and the trade in softwood lumber and coal.

The Committee discussed the energy resources and energy problems of both countries and their relationship to economic efficiency. There was general agreement that U.S.-Canadian cooperation should be encouraged in areas where such cooperation serves the long-term mutual advantage of both nations. They established a joint working group to prepare a programme of studies relating to trade in all kinds of energy between the United States and Canada.

The meeting concluded with a general review of the international situation by Mr. Rusk and Mr. Martin.

The Canadian Delegation included Mr. Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs; Mr. Walter Gordon, Minister of Finance;

[1] For background, see BULLETIN of Mar. 23, 1964, p. 448.

Mr. Mitchell Sharp, Minister of Trade and Commerce; Mr. Harry Hays, Minister of Agriculture; Mr. C. M. Drury, Minister of Industry; the Governor of the Bank of Canada, Mr. L. Rasminsky; Mr. Norman Robertson, the Chief Canadian Trade Negotiator; the Canadian Ambassador to the United States, Mr. C. S. A. Ritchie; and other advisers.

The United States Delegation included Mr. Dean Rusk, Secretary of State; Mr. Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the Treasury; Mr. Stuart Udall, Secretary of the Interior; Mr. Luther H. Hodges, Secretary of Commerce; Mr. Orville L. Freeman, Secretary of Agriculture; Mr. George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State; Mr. Walter W. Heller, Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers; Mr. William M. Roth, Deputy Special Trade Representative; the United States Ambassador to Canada, Mr. W. W. Butterworth; and other advisers.

The Atlantic Alliance: Constant Objectives in a Context of Change

by William R. Tyler
Assistant Secretary for European Affairs [1]

I am very appreciative of your invitation to speak to you and welcome this opportunity to discuss with you some of the broad aspects of the Atlantic partnership. You will recall that Secretary Rusk spoke about the alliance to the Overseas Press Club in New York on April 7.[2] He pointed out that the central task of maintaining the security of the free world has been performed, and NATO remains essential for this; and the time is now ripe for wider tasks—in sharing responsibility for nuclear power, in concerting policies toward Communist nations and the settlement of disputes in the free world, and in cooperating more closely on the problems of aid, trade, and economic policy.

I should like today chiefly to discuss some of these wider tasks. The accomplishments of the Atlantic alliance thus far are substantial; the opportunities before it may be greater still. We live in a revolutionary and fast-moving period of history. And the United States and its Canadian and European partners have joined their effort to maintain the security and advance the well-being of the free world. These objectives remain constant. I believe that we shall move forward toward them.

President Kennedy once said that although the processes of history are fitful, halting, and aggravating, if we look beyond passing excitements and at the profound tendencies that shape the future, we can then discern something in the nature of a grand design, from which we can derive both encouragement and a sense of purpose. I believe we should view the Atlantic alliance in this spirit.

The nature of relations between the United States and Western Europe is changing. Some of the assumptions and priorities of the postwar era have already been discarded; others are being questioned. Neither we nor the Europeans can afford to ignore our changing relations or the dynamic forces inducing them. It is the task of leaders on both sides of the Atlantic to assess the quality and scale of the changes and

[1] Address made before the Economic Club of Detroit at Detroit, Mich., on Apr. 27 (press release 187 dated Apr. 25).

[2] For text, see BULLETIN of Apr. 27, 1964, p. 650.

to relate them to the lasting objectives of our partnership. We need to distinguish between the transitory and the permanent.

European Economic Recovery

In the immediate postwar period transatlantic relations were characterized primarily by Western European dependence on the United States.

In the wake of war, millions of Europeans lay dead. Of those who survived, many were weary and dispirited. Administrative machinery was disorganized. Means of production and distribution were disrupted. Financial resources had been consumed. The European economy had collapsed, and the European capability for defense was nonexistent.

Many Americans fell in battle also. But the United States emerged from the war with prodigious economic and military strength. The United States had a monopoly of nuclear weapons. The American economy produced goods enough to satisfy demand in the United States and to provide enormous material assistance to Europe.

Europe was utterly dependent on the United States for its economic welfare and defense. The influence of the United States upon Europe was immense.

This abnormal state of affairs could not and did not last. With astonishing resilience, and with massive assistance from America, the Europeans threw their talent and energy into the task of reconstruction. They rebuilt their economy and restored defense capabilities in an amazingly short time. In a little more than 10 years after the beginning of the Marshall Plan, European production had greatly exceeded the prewar level, restrictions on the movement of goods and services had been markedly reduced, financial reserves had been increased many times, and a high rate of economic expansion had been achieved. The Europeans now have greater wealth at their disposal than at any time in their history. The European capability for defense is now large, and European forces stand side by side with Americans in the common defense of Western Europe and North America.

Movement Toward Political Unification

European resurgence is everywhere evident—in the plants, in the fields, in the body politic. A quickening sense of energy, power, and purpose permeates European life; it is evoked by a high level of economic activity long sustained, a growth of military capability, and, above all, a new political purpose.

The development of the European Economic Community and progress toward political unification are expanding European economic horizons and creating new political goals.

The European Economic Community has as its economic objective the creation of a single economic area where the people of the six member countries can buy goods and services unrestrained by artificial restrictions, freely invest savings anywhere in the Common Market, and choose their places of work without regard to national boundaries. In the 7 years since the signature of the Treaty of Rome, considerable progress has been made toward the dismantling of national obstacles and the establishment of common external economic policies. Europeans are confident that their goal of complete customs union will be reached by 1970—in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Rome.

The impact of this developing area on economic activity has been and will continue to be great. The ultimate political consequences are likely to be even more profound.

The movement toward political unification has attracted the interest and excited the imagination of many Europeans. They see in a uniting Europe the hope of eliminating the national rivalries that within the last 50 years resulted in two catastrophic wars. They feel the powerful pull of participation in a great constructive task. They are caught up in a broader sense of identity. The prospect and process of unification absorb their energies and attract their loyalties.

The attitudes of other Europeans, less actively involved in tasks of unification, undoubtedly will be affected deeply by the creation of a single economic entity. When a Frenchman sells in Belgium, buys from the Netherlands, hires workers from Italy, invests in Germany, and travels in Luxembourg as freely and as

easily as he would in France, his perspective is likely to be broadened, his sense of identity and loyalty enlarged.

A vital economy, greater military strength, and an absorbing new political purpose have given the Europeans a revived feeling of power and a renewed sense of destiny.

Transatlantic Partnership

European resurgence also has caused a fundamental change in relations between Western Europe and the United States. Western Europe is no longer dependent on the United States; and the United States is not immune to the effects of Western European policies. A better balance has been reached. Today transatlantic relations are characterized primarily by interdependence.

The forces pushing us toward interdependence have been at work for some time. Naturally, however, the renewed sense of European power and destiny has set up new strains in the partnership between Europeans and ourselves, and national policies and attitudes have so far responded only partially to the tasks of partnership. This is true on our side of the Atlantic as well as theirs; there is need for reassessment on both sides.

We Americans sometimes tend to expect of our allies that they should implement policy objectives we have unilaterally formulated, or accept uncritically solutions we have devised. On occasion we forget that the cohesiveness and strength of the alliance depends primarily on the extent to which members agree on policy objectives. We have not always been willing to devote the time and patience required to build a true consensus. We need to remember that our allies will make greater efforts in common tasks in proportion as they are fully satisfied that these efforts are in pursuit of objectives they have formulated in concert with us and which they accept as valid, in terms of their own interests.

On the other side of the Atlantic, our European partners—frequently with our encouragement or acquiescence—have sought for many years to solve some of their problems mainly within a European framework. Now that the European economy is restored and vibrant, European defense capabilities have increased, and progress toward a full economic union has passed the point of no return, the opportunity exists for Europeans once more to raise their vision and view their problems in the context of both the European integration movement and of the Atlantic partnership. Harmonious development of policies around the Atlantic basin will benefit alike Western Europe, North America, and the rest of the world.

Much depends on whether Americans and Europeans have really come to understand the fundamental reality of interdependence and whether we can muster the courage to act on the basis of that reality. Progress for each of us in Western Europe and North America has come to depend more than ever on our ability to learn to think and act in terms of the common welfare and not just in terms of the benefits that can accrue to any one nation. We can promote the common welfare and meet our worldwide responsibilities to the extent that we regard our problems as indivisible and seek joint solutions.

Underlying Forces of Interdependence

In this developing partnership, what are the governing principles that remain constant? In what areas of our national activities are we fundamentally dependent on each other?

There are three basic spheres where the well-being of each member of the alliance is intimately interrelated with the well-being of the other members: (1) defense against external attack, (2) relationships with the Communist countries and with the rest of the world, and (3) improvement of our standard of life. Fundamentally involved in our own well-being, moreover, is the assistance which we extend to poorer countries. The success of our efforts in these spheres depends in large measure upon the extent to which members of the Atlantic alliance work together.

Let us look at the meaning of interdependence in each of these areas of activity.

Defense of the Atlantic Area

The indivisibility of the defense of the Atlantic area is based on the common assessment that neither Western Europe nor North Amer-

ica could for long maintain its way of life if the other were defeated by a hostile power. It also emanates from the continuation of a powerful external threat, the nature of defense requirements, and the enormous amount of resources required for adequate defense.

The fundamental commitment that the members of the alliance have made to each other arises from the conviction that armed aggression against any one member of the alliance would place all the others in mortal danger. In article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty all the members of the alliance have pledged themselves to consider an armed attack against one or more of them as an attack against them all.

This solemn obligation has no terminal date. Contrary to views that have occasionally been expressed recently, the treaty neither lapses nor comes up for renewal in 1969. It will, however, be possible after that time for any signatory to give notice that it intends to withdraw from NATO 1 year after its notice of denunciation.

However, as long as the danger of armed aggression exists, it is highly improbable that any member of the alliance will choose to exercise this option. Those who would oppose us should make no mistake about the meaning of debate within the alliance. Differences of emphasis on secondary issues should not be interpreted as weakening our determination to stand together in our common defense.

A number of factors suggest that the threat of premeditated Soviet armed aggression against Western Europe is less immediate today than previously. The Soviet Union is deeply involved in a fundamental struggle with Communist China for the leadership of international communism. The countries of Eastern Europe are beginning to follow, in varying degrees and extent, independent policies. Within the Soviet Union itself there are some signs of loosening of totalitarian control. However, the strength of the Western armed forces committed to NATO and the overwhelming power of the American thermonuclear deterrent—and the institution of NATO itself—are by far the most important reasons why the danger of armed attack is less imminent.

However, we should not allow the success of our common defense to deceive us into thinking that the danger of attack has disappeared. The Soviet military capability is great and is constantly being modernized. Powerful Soviet armed forces and many hundreds of Soviet missiles are still arrayed against the Atlantic nations.

To permit our combined power to dwindle would increase the probability of miscalculation about our basic resolve to defend ourselves and, thus, increase the danger of armed aggression and nuclear war. There is no escape from the need to maintain and enhance the military strength of the Atlantic alliance for defensive purposes.

The defense of North America and Western Europe requires the maintenance of strong nuclear and conventional forces.

To deter major aggression, the United States maintains nuclear capability of enormous power. To increase and further disperse the nuclear forces for the defense of the alliance, we are now working on the establishment of a multilateral nuclear force.[3] This is a serious effort to strengthen our common defense and to meet the legitimate interests of the members of the alliance in nuclear defense without further proliferating national nuclear forces.

In addition, we need strong and flexible capability to keep the strategic options open. The members of NATO have deployed powerful conventional forces to counter limited attacks effectively and to avoid the necessity of instantaneous choice between retreat or nuclear retaliation.

Effective defense consumes a stupendous amount of resources. No one country—even one as wealthy as the United States—can provide the equipment and manpower required for the defense of North America and Western Europe without great sacrifice. The magnitude of the task, as well as fundamental principles of policy, requires that the members of the alliance regard their defense as indivisible. Since common defense benefits all in accordance with the nature and degree of the total effort, it is essential that all members bear an equitable share of the burden.

The United States has consistently devoted a much larger percentage of gross national

[3] See p. 783.

product to defense than have the other NATO members. We think that the other members of the alliance could and should contribute more to the joint defense effort. Our common defense requires interdependence in effort as well as in benefit.

Coordinating National Policies

In matters of overall national policies the members of the alliance are similarly dependent upon the actions of each other and need similarly to concert together. NATO is not a federal structure, and there is no "Government of NATO." The sovereign members act together by common consent. Yet the common interest which binds them together is real and recognized. The process of concerting policies, and the results, may not always be so spectacular, or at least self-evident, as in the more strictly military or economic fields. A common consensus is often inherently more difficult to achieve. But the partners do consult together, patiently and continuously, and common or coordinated policies have been achieved—as, for example, in bringing Germany, pending the reunification of the German people in peace and freedom, as a responsible and respected member into the community of free nations; or in efforts to bring the arms race under control; or in dealing with the Soviet Union and other Communist countries. Disputes among partners have been settled peaceably—as, let us hope, will be done in the present dispute over Cyprus. Obviously, this process must be extended and strengthened; we must constantly work to make the interdependence of members a realistic force for the common good.

Improving the Standard of Life

As the industrialized nations seek to improve their standard of life, they are finding it increasingly necessary to formulate their national policies with full regard to the interdependence of their economies. This is especially true now that governments seek to maintain high levels of economic activity by following countercyclical policies and by efforts to avoid adverse effects on their economies of inflationary or deflationary trends abroad. Powerful forces are at work making national economic boundaries less and less relevant. The innovations of scientists and industry and the vision of statesmen have made economic interdependence a reality.

We now accept as ordinary instantaneous communication between North America and Europe. We no longer marvel at transatlantic flights just below the speed of sound. We take for granted the availability of a broad range of European goods in America and American goods in Europe. Technological advance and the universal desire for increased economic well-being are exerting inexorable pressures in the direction of further interdependence.

With interdependence comes increased interaction among national economies. Events in one economy rapidly transmit shock waves—for better or worse—to other economies. This presents policymakers with new challenges and responsibilities. Policy formulation must take into account the international impact of domestic decision.

Out of this need has evolved an Atlantic consultative process which is less well known than it deserves to be. Since 1961, senior officials from the capitals of 20 Western European and North American countries have come together regularly and frequently in Paris for meetings in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). They will soon be joined by representatives from Japan. Their purpose is to consult about their national economic policies so that they may develop in harmony with each other.

In the past 3 years we have witnessed the development of increasingly frank consultation and close collaboration on matters of economic growth, fiscal and monetary policy, and balance of payments. The consultative process has made it possible to compare alternative approaches to common problems and to explore the interaction of programs and expectations in different countries. It has yielded sharpened awareness of the international impact of domestic policy and of means for insulating others from possible adverse effects of change in policy. It is making possible more timely and more symmetrical adjustments to changes in the balance of payments, with surplus countries sharing the burden of adjustment.

The experience thus far with consultation in

the OECD indicates quite clearly that the most fruitful results are obtained when consultation is frequent and is directed toward alternative approaches to policy still in the making.

Cooperation in the OECD is not usually aimed at the development of uniform national policies. The consultative process leaves ample room for differences in policies stemming from varying emphasis of national objectives and multiplicity of national circumstances. The primary aim of policy coordination in the OECD is to insure that national policies develop in step with each other.

The increasing interdependence of the economies of the industrialized countries makes it imperative that North America, Western Europe, and Japan act on the basis of their common interests and avoid the damage that can follow from unrestrained pursuit of narrow national objectives. Economic growth and financial stability of the OECD countries depend in no small measure on the understanding of and confidence in each other's policies.

Shortly after the OECD came into being, the members set a common economic growth target. All OECD governments agreed to follow deliberate policies to increase the aggregate gross national product by 50 percent before the end of 1970. To reach this goal without creating financial instability or balance-of-payments disequilibrium, national policymakers are finding it necessary to coordinate monetary and fiscal policies. In the consultative process in the OECD, senior policy officials from capitals examine together actions that each might take to stimulate or—if inflationary pressures are high—to restrain demand by means that will minimize international repercussions.

One example of how we used this consultative process may be of interest. While considering its tax cut proposals, the administration discussed and jointly examined the American economic situation and prospects with our partners in the OECD. Prior to these discussions there had been widespread belief that foreign businessmen and private and central bankers would be frightened by expansionary fiscal policies and budget deficits in the United States. Fears of inflation, it was said, might lead to a flight from the dollar. As a result of extensive discussions, however, the OECD recommended that the United States take vigorous fiscal action to stimulate its economic growth and reduce unemployment and idle resources. The administration was then able to proceed with its program in the knowledge that it was understood and endorsed by our OECD partners.

The rapid movement of the European Economic Community members toward full economic union at a time when the economic interdependence of all the OECD countries is expanding and deepening creates special problems and imposes new policy requirements. The constancy of American support for the European integration movement needs no reaffirmation. The record speaks for itself. The steadfastness of our backing for the European Economic Community permits us to point to problems that concern us without fear of misunderstanding.

As the EEC forges integrated policies, it is essential for the common welfare that the EEC and the other OECD countries develop their policies in harmony. The process of policy integration of the EEC countries involves problems of greater intensity and magnitude than the process of policy coordination among the OECD countries. But this important difference should not obscure the need for the development of consonant economic policies among all the industrialized countries. Otherwise the divergence of policies between the EEC and the other major industrialized countries will create harmful tensions. To minimize the damage that can be done and to further the common welfare, all of the OECD countries—including the United States—should make deliberate efforts to consider the repercussions of their actions on the interests of others. The development of harmonious policies in the OECD will benefit both European integration and Atlantic partnership, which are compatible, not conflicting, goals.

The Kennedy Round of tariff negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade affords a major occasion to move cooperatively ahead in an international forum in which more than 60 countries around the world participate. In the GATT negotiations, we will have an opportunity to bring about the largest mutual reduction of trade barriers in history. The benefits from such a lowering of obstacles

to the movement of goods among nations would be enormous. Greater economic specialization and more efficient utilization of resources would permit more and higher quality products to be made available to more people at lower prices. We all stand to gain. It is the task of statesmen and leaders throughout the industrialized countries to keep our common objectives rather than our separate problems foremost in our minds during the negotiations.

Common Responsibilities to Developing Nations

In working together to improve our security and economic welfare, we—the rich and powerful nations—cannot afford to ignore the nature of the world we live in or to slight our common responsibilities toward the less developed countries. Our well-being will be profoundly affected by how we exercise our responsibilities toward them.

Many of these countries are in the middle of political revolution as they attempt to establish themselves as viable political entities free from the former colonial dependencies. More are in the process of social revolution as they try to create modern societies. Virtually all of them are undergoing economic revolution as they realize for the first time that poverty is not preordained and unalterable. Some are enmeshed in all three revolutions at the same time. Change—frequent, sudden, and far-reaching change—pervades the less developed countries. Social customs, political institutions, economic activity, and personal values are being transformed abruptly. The frequency of violence and warfare is high.

The primary causes are political and social and must be dealt with by the developing countries themselves. Only they can create the social structures and political institutions capable of transforming revolutionary change into evolutionary, stabilizing development. However, we can help them if we attune ourselves to their political and social efforts and if we help them expand their economies. And it is in our own interest to do so. Unless they do begin to achieve their objectives, the cost of their failures will surely be shared by us.

This is a herculean task, one requiring the combined strength of the Atlantic partnership. We need to act together to open further our markets to the exports of the less developed countries and to increase the flow of development assistance to those countries.

A large reduction of trade barriers, as a result of success in the GATT trade negotiations, would be of immense value to the developing countries. In this connection, I should point out that the United States is prepared to reduce its tariffs in these negotiations without requiring reciprocity from the developing countries. We should regard the participation of the developing countries in the trade negotiations as a means to contribute to their development needs rather than in terms of exchanges of concessions.

In the last 5 years, the aid extended each year to the less developed countries by the members of the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD has increased from a little over $4 billion to about $6 billion. The average duration of development loans has lengthened measurably, and the average yearly cost of these loans has dropped considerably. Technical assistance has increased markedly.

However, we should not allow such progress as has been made to blind us to the great unfulfilled needs of the less developed countries. The gap between the development requirements of these countries and the amount of resources available remains huge. There is a large and continuing need for goods and skills that can be provided only by the rich countries.

All the members of the Development Assistance Committee—including the United States—need to shoulder additional burdens. In appraising our aid effort, we Americans too often overlook the amount of assistance being extended to the less developed countries by the other industrialized countries. Aid of the other DAC countries, averaged over the 3 years from 1960 to 1962, amounted to about .62 percent of gross national product. Over the same period, American aid came to approximately .63 percent of gross national product. Thus, what we are now doing and what we need to do falls with relative equality on the United States and the other major industrialized countries.

In all of these areas, the Atlantic nations are being propelled toward partnership. The underlying forces of interdependence are more powerful and lasting than the forces that would

divide us. If we ignore the reality of our interdependence and approach our problems in terms of parochial interests, surely none of us will prosper. If, however, we can perceive our problems in the broader perspective of the common welfare, the benefits to all will be many and great.

There may be times when we seem to hesitate or falter. We may not always succeed in achieving full participation in common programs by all the partners. The alliance may even on the surface appear to be in "disarray." But the interests of its members in increasingly closer ties between Europe and North America far outdistance any disruptive tendencies. The United States will cooperate with all those who wish to move forward. As we face the challenges before us, let it not be recorded that our vision was so limited that we failed to act together for the common good.

The Nuclear Defense of NATO

by Gerard C. Smith
Special Adviser to the Secretary of State [1]

Admiral Minter, distinguished guests, delegates, faculty, midshipmen: I am honored to be here to join with you in opening the fourth Naval Academy Foreign Affairs Conference, attended by outstanding young men and women from all over the United States.

This year's conference considers "Problems of United States Foreign Policy in the European Community."

I would like to discuss with you tonight a project which is designed to meet one of the most pressing of these problems: How can the United States share strategic deterrent responsibilities with its NATO allies without promoting independent national nuclear forces?

The solution we propose to this problem has much to do with the sea; naval officers have contributed greatly to it. I speak of the MLF—the multilateral force—the proposed missile fleet for NATO.

[1] Address made before the U.S. Naval Academy Foreign Affairs Conference at Annapolis, Md., on Apr. 22 (press release 178).

The Setting

First, let us look briefly at the problem to which this MLF project is addressed.

Since the war, we have been trying to create a working partnership between a uniting Western Europe and North America. That partnership, though not yet fully realized, has been more successful than we once dared to hope.

The reconstruction of Europe under the Marshall Plan, the development of NATO, the creation of three European Communities—the Coal and Steel Community, the Common Market, and Euratom—have all contributed to this success. They have helped European countries to draw closer—to each other and to North America—and to progress further toward higher levels of economic and social well-being, more stable and promising relations with the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and a somewhat more durable peace.

Obstacles to continuing progress, of course, exist. The road ahead—the continuing move-

ment toward European integration and Atlantic partnership—will not be smooth. The long-term prospect is favorable, but the inevitable only comes to pass, as Justice Holmes wisely observed, through human effort.

I am told that a British Army manual used to advise that the best way to avoid mortar fire is by going forward. By the same token, the way for Europeans and Americans to avoid being sidetracked or blocked by the obstacles to European integration and Atlantic partnership is by going forward in new joint programs:

—For Europeans: in programs which follow the classic pattern of European integration, affording every interested country an opportunity to join on a basis of equality, without any suggestion of first- or second-class membership.

—For Europeans and Americans: in programs which follow the classic pattern of Atlantic partnership—close association with the U.S. while leaving open the opportunity for an ever-larger European role as Europe moves toward political unity.

Such new joint ventures are needed just as much in defense as in other fields. Neither European integration nor Atlantic partnership will rest on a solid basis if they extend only to the economic area.

A relapse into nationalism would be particularly disruptive in the field of nuclear weapons. If each industrially qualified ally should build its own nuclear weapons, a harvest of division and allied friction would result, weakening the Atlantic alliance, seriously prejudicing the efficiency of the alliance nuclear deterrent, and adding complications in the field of arms control. Alternatively, if the European Community were to be divided into first- and second-class citizens, with some countries claiming special status by reason of national nuclear programs which other countries lack, this would not be conducive to a cohesive community.

The Problem

Against this background, we now face the question of how best to respond to European nuclear concerns.

Over the past 7 years the Soviet Union has been deploying hundreds of rockets aimed at Western Europe. This array is still growing. Although programed U.S. forces would be adequate to meet the threat, there is a good case for replacing some of these programed forces with medium-range missiles. On military grounds, two successive NATO Supreme Commanders, Generals [Lauris] Norstad and [Lyman L.] Lemnitzer, have urged deployment of such missiles to help cover Soviet forces directly threatening Europe.

Broader political and psychological considerations are also involved. The Soviet leaders have not hesitated to put their rockets to political use. They have reminded European countries from time to time how easily the U.S.S.R. could destroy the Acropolis or the orange groves of Italy or, for that matter, all of England or France. Nuclear blackmail addressed to Europe lay at the heart of Moscow's pressure on Berlin over the period 1958–62.

It is not surprising, therefore, that Europeans living so near this Soviet nuclear power have been anxious to have a larger role in long-range strategic deterrence, to complement their existing manning, ownership, and share in control of shorter range missiles.

Criteria Governing an Effective Response

For years leaders of the alliance have been seeking to devise an effective response to this European concern. There is a good measure of agreement on the criteria which any response should meet:

First: It should achieve its immediate political purpose. It should respond to the concerns of our European friends.

Second: It should achieve its military purpose. It should be a credible and substantial component of the alliance nuclear deterrent.

Third: It should be a stable and responsible form of deployment. It should not add to the complex disarmament problem or make it more difficult to bring the arms race under international safeguarded restraints.

Fourth: It should be financially manageable. It should not retard needed economic growth, social reform, or buildup of conventional military forces.

Fifth: It should strengthen the prospects for European unity and transatlantic partnership.

Alternative Responses

Three possible responses to the European nuclear/MRBM problem have been considered:

1. Strategic nuclear weapons needed to cover the direct threat to NATO Europe could be provided by U.S. forces, with the Europeans having a larger consultative role about their use.

2. The U.S. could supply medium-range missiles to allied forces for *national* manning and ownership.

3. The U.S. and interested allies could jointly own, man, and control medium-range missiles deployed to the European theater.

The first course—virtually exclusive U.S. coverage of the threat—does not seem likely to respond fully to European concerns. It would not provide medium-range missiles close at hand to offset Soviet rockets, unless such missiles were deployed to U.S. forces only. We would be hard put, in this case, to explain to our allies why we proposed to deny them any role in ownership, manning, and control of such missiles. This kind of discrimination could not fail to be politically divisive.

Some people believe that increased consultation between the U.S. and its allies about the use of U.S. strategic power would constitute an adequate response to this problem. Discussion and exchange of information about strategic forces is, indeed, now taking place within the NATO framework. This process has increased in pace within the last year, and we favor continuing efforts to extend such consultation. Improved arrangements for doing so were agreed upon at the Ottawa NATO meeting only last year.[2]

If consultation about alliance strategic forces remains imperfect, it is not for lack of good will or machinery. Rather it is because the consultation is one-sided. So long as consultation means other countries advising the U.S. about what to do with American strategic power, to which they have made little contribution, I have the feeling that it will, while useful, remain limited in effect. The effectiveness of consultation is apt to be in direct proportion to the degree of participation by the consulting nations in the operation they are consulting about.

Moreover, participation in nuclear matters within Europe is unequal. Some countries already have national nuclear weapons programs. The nonnuclear powers in Europe may not be prepared to accept indefinitely this inequality in participation. Improved nuclear consultation will not cure that inequality.

For all these reasons, European leaders are likely to find nuclear consultation with the United States an inadequate substitute for a role of active participation in operation of strategic weapons.

I turn now to the second course of action: deployment of medium-range missiles to allied national forces.

We followed this course in deploying first-generation IRBM's to the maritime flank areas of NATO Europe: U.K., Italy, and Turkey. Under this system the missile was nationally owned and manned by the allied country in question. Any wartime decision to fire the missile would have required the agreement of the U.S. and the owning country, under the so-called "two key" system. These first-generation missiles were highly vulnerable to attack and therefore have been phased out as obsolescent.

In deploying new medium-range missiles it has seemed to us, as well as to some of our European partners, that this pattern of national deployment should not be extended to new strategic weapons. New *nationally* owned and manned strategic missile forces could be divisive within the alliance and unsettling in terms of East-West relations. We ought rather to be moving toward forms of ever-closer integration in the ownership, manning, and control of such weapons.

If the answer lies neither in a near monopoly of U.S. responsibility in the strategic field, even with improved consultation, nor in U.S. bilateral sharing with other national forces of the alliance, what is left?

[2] For text of a communique, see BULLETIN of June 10, 1963, p. 895.

The creative answer that has emerged, and is beginning to assume concrete form, is the MLF.

MLF: The Preferred Response

Here is our present concept of the MLF. It is, of course, subject to refinement in the process of arriving at an international agreement. It would be a fleet of surface warships, armed with Polaris missiles, owned, controlled, and manned jointly by a number of NATO nations.

The force would be under the military command of an allied officer and under the general policy direction of a board of high officials of the participating nations. The force would be open to any NATO member willing to assume a fair share of the costs and responsibilities. No nation's share could exceed 40 percent.

The force would be manned by a mix of officers and crews from participating nations. Each ship would be manned by nationals of at least three countries, with no nation providing more than 40 percent of the personnel in any ship.

Major participants—that is, those countries underwriting a significant percentage of the costs—would undoubtedly enjoy a position of special influence, not only on control but on such other matters as budgets, size, and future developments of the force.

Firing of the missiles in wartime would be by decision of an agreed number of participants, including the United States.

In the longer term, as President Johnson said at Brussels last November,[3] "Evolution . . . toward European control, as Europe marches toward unity, is by no means excluded." Any change in the control formula would, of course, require the approval of all the participants. It would hinge not only on European unity but also on sufficiently wide European participation so that no single country could play a dominant role. All this would not come about quickly. In the case of the United States, participation in the force as well as any change in the control formula would require congressional consent.

The concept of a multilateral force was first suggested by then Secretary of State Herter, with the approval of President Eisenhower, at the NATO Council meeting in December 1960.[4] It was reaffirmed by President Kennedy in a speech at Ottawa the following year.[5] Since then it has generated increasing interest.

A working group representing the U.S., Italy, Germany, the U.K., Belgium, Holland, Greece, and Turkey has been meeting in Paris since October 1963. Its aim is to reach general understanding of what the MLF would involve and of its technical and political feasibility. Encouraging progress is being made. There seem to be no insuperable difficulties.

A naval demonstration of mixed manning is about to start on a United States guided missile destroyer, U.S.S. *Biddle*. Personnel from the United States, Germany, Italy, the U.K., the Netherlands, Greece, and Turkey will take part. In about a month's time European officers and men will start to take over about half the ship's billets. It is good to be able to report that the officers and men of the *Biddle* are deeply interested and confident of success in working out this promising possible prototype of future allied cooperation.

It long has been standard practice to have crews of many nationalities on merchant ships. Crews of a number of European allied nations manned some British ships in World War II. And mixed manning has been successfully carried out for prolonged periods in the turnover of U.S. naval vessels to foreign navies. Our Navy and all allied naval experts who have examined the problem have concluded that, with skillful training and good motivation, efficient and happy ships can be jointly manned by crews made up of men from allied navies.

European Interests

Let us now look at the MLF against the criteria which, as I mentioned earlier, must govern any response to the European missile problem.

To take the political criterion first: Would the MLF respond to European concerns?

We believe that it would do so in several ways:

[3] *Ibid.*, Dec. 2, 1963, p. 852.

[4] For background and text of a communique, see *ibid.*, Jan. 9, 1961, p. 39.

[5] For text, see *ibid.*, June 5, 1961, p. 839.

First: It would deploy medium-range missiles to the European area. European countries which agree with General Lemnitzer, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, in favoring such deployment would be encouraged. They would expect these missiles' presence to help not only to deter aggression but also to frustrate attempts at ballistic blackmail.

Second: It would, as a high European defense official said recently, be "a clamp holding the U.S. and Europe together. . . ." Because the force would be jointly owned, it should further strengthen the profound U.S. commitment to the common defense of Europe symbolized and given substance by the presence of our forces in Berlin, in Germany, and elsewhere in Europe.

Third: It would narrow the present gap between nuclear and nonnuclear powers in Europe. All members of the MLF would share in ownership, managing, and manning of the force.

Fourth: It would increase the effectiveness of consultation about use of alliance nuclear forces. MLF would afford its members the knowledge, sense of responsibility, and participation needed to make nuclear consultation effective. The mere existence of MLF and the need for decisions about its targeting, deployment, and future evolution are bound to improve the depth and significance of such consultation. Far from being an alternative to improved allied nuclear consultation, MLF may well be an essential component to a more meaningful form of consultation.

Fifth: It would be a nuclear defense program in which Europe's role and influence could grow as Europe moved toward unity. The eventual possibility of such a larger European role is an important element in making the MLF a viable alternative to national nuclear weapons programs.

Obviously, MLF does not offer what national nuclear programs purport to do: *national* nuclear status. It is intended to move in exactly the opposite direction. It offers a collective approach to the nuclear weapons problem.

While the present appeal of MLF is thus largely to major nonnuclear European powers, we can hope that in the long run countries now having programs of their own may also come to see the merits of the MLF.

Military Questions

I turn now to the second criterion against which any proposed response to the European missile problem must be tested: What about the military utility of MLF?

The U.S. Navy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense, after close study, have concluded that MLF would be militarily effective and a useful element of NATO's strategic deterrent forces. General Lemnitzer has stated he would welcome MLF because it would help to meet his military requirement.

As presently planned, the MLF would have Polaris A–3 missiles of great penetration capacity. These missiles would be usable for all the purposes of deterrence and defense of Europe for which the weapons of U.S. Polaris submarines are capable. They would be effective against many missile sites, airfields, and other targets threatening European nations of the NATO alliance. These missiles would be assigned to NATO and placed under the operational control of SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander Europe]. They would be targeted by SACEUR and be included in NATO strategic plans.

The U.S. Navy has studied the survivability of the MLF from the standpoint of possible surveillance and attack on MLF warships by submarines, surface vessels, aircraft, and missiles. It conducted this study under contingencies of cold war, limited war, and general war. It concluded that MLF's survivability would be high—more than sufficient to insure its effectiveness as a deterrent, an operating force, and a reliable second-strike retaliatory system.

MLF warships would be almost indistinguishable from thousands of other ships in the same area; they would, in peacetime, be lost in 3 to 4 million square miles of Atlantic and Mediterranean waters surrounding NATO territory; they would be able to outrun most trailing vessels and able to "scrape off" shadowing submarines in friendly coastal waters too shallow for submarine operation; they would operate behind the shield of the NATO landmass over which attacking planes could not fly unopposed; they would benefit from protection by NATO air and surface forces during hostilities; and

they could exploit the blanketing effect of islands and restricted passages for protection from radar detection and tracking.

The fact that the United States is prepared to devote resources and manpower to MLF is the best evidence of our confidence in its invulnerability and military effectiveness.

A question may arise as to the relation of the MLF to the level of existing and programed U.S. forces.

Certainly, the United States now has strategic forces of immense power. But future increases in U.S. missile strength are being programed for two reasons:

First: Present U.S. strategic delivery systems rely to a large degree on manned bombers. As some of these bombers become obsolescent, they must be replaced.

Second: The Soviet rocket inventory is not static—it continues to grow. If effective deterrence is to be maintained, NATO forces must keep pace until safeguarded international arms control arrangements are achieved.

As I indicated earlier, the increased Western missile strength that is needed could be made up either of wholly U.S. forces or a mix of U.S. and allied forces. If the latter course is followed, the MLF could substitute for some of the presently programed U.S. forces. At the December meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Secretary McNamara said:

> If the members of the alliance should wish, we are prepared to join other interested Allies in substituting sea-based, medium-range missiles for some of the longer range systems now included in our program. In that event, we believe that this force should take the form of the multilateral surface ship force now under discussion. . . .

The MLF could thus not be a net addition to, but a substitution for, some of the increased strength the U.S. now plans to build.

Would the MLF be a credible part of NATO's deterrent to war?

As a strategic weapon system with a high degree of survivability, the MLF is likely to be fired by the participating governments, which would have to act at the highest level, only in one of two circumstances:

First: In response to Soviet nonnuclear attack so strong that it could not be contained by nonnuclear forces. The NATO governments have already agreed on guidelines for such circumstances.

Second: Under second-strike conditions, after a Soviet nuclear attack. In this event, the prior fact of Soviet nuclear attack should, in effect, make the decision. Nuclear war would already have begun.

Their decision would be facilitated by experience in working together in the MLF. The process of continuous consultation and planning which will be required for peacetime operation of the MLF should widen the area of agreement among MLF members about strategic matters. It would thus permit them to decide more readily on the wartime conditions under which these missiles would be fired.

There is thus little doubt that Moscow will regard the MLF as a credible component of Western nuclear armament.

Effect on East-West Relations

I turn now to the third criterion: A strategic missile deployment to the European theater should not have a damaging effect on the chances for disarmament and for improving relations with the Soviet bloc.

A central and persisting security problem of the alliance is how to build and maintain an effective defense posture in such a way as to reinforce, rather than weaken, efforts to bring military power under safeguarded international control.

While prosecuting our defense programs, we must stay alert to any opportunities for realistic arms control arrangements. Especially when dealing with nuclear weapons systems of unimaginable destructive potential, we must resist the natural mental callousness that tends to accumulate in those who have to deal for long periods with awful but necessary things.

I can assure you that these considerations weigh heavily on the planners who are putting together the program to carry out the MLF concept.

It is fair to say that the MLF would constitute the first weapons system in history especially designed with arms control considerations in mind. It is especially designed not to result

in the national proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Recently Secretary Rusk pointed out that,[6]

> The detailed arrangements for the MLF will include mutually agreed strong and enduring safeguards against any one nation's securing control of any of the MLF weapons. We believe that when the Soviet Government understands this, it will recognize that the MLF does not constitute a proliferation of national nuclear systems but, on the contrary, is an alternative to it.

Let me be more specific:

The missiles in the MLF will be manned, owned, and controlled multilaterally, rather than nationally as was the case with earlier model strategic missiles deployed in Europe. The MLF will thus not involve nuclear missiles in the hands of any individual state.

Any wartime decision to fire the missiles would be by multilateral agreement, rather than by bilateral agreement as in the case of these earlier strategic missiles. The MLF will thus increase the number of states with a finger on the safety catch, rather than on the nuclear trigger.

There would be no increase of risk of compromise of weapons design data under MLF. Multilateral custodial procedures would assure that individual countries had no greater access to information about how to design and manufacture weapons than at present under the NATO atomic stockpile. Stringent protection against espionage and sabotage will also be provided.

All of this is not to say that MLF will be welcomed by the U.S.S.R. It will do its best by propaganda and diplomacy to forestall MLF. This must be expected because MLF would not only constitute an offset to Soviet rockets opposing Europe, but would also evidence a new degree of Atlantic unity, which Soviet policy has long sought to prevent.

Nevertheless, it is clear that it is in the interest of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. not to pursue a policy of proliferation, whatever may or may not be recorded in formal agreements on this subject. And the MLF, by offering a viable alternative to national nuclear weapons programs, should improve the chances for limitation of national weapons-producing centers.

[6] *Ibid.*, Apr. 27, 1964, p. 650.

Even though the MLF would not result in proliferation of nuclear weapons, a question is sometimes put as to whether it is sensible to continue with a major new weapons system while negotiating about disarmament. The answer is simple: The U.S.S.R. continues to strengthen its missile arsenal targeted on Western Europe. So long as these hundreds of Soviet rockets are arrayed against Europe, effective European participation in strategic deterrence should not be precluded.

This participation need not, moreover, increase the presently planned level of Western missile strength. For, as I have already indicated, the MLF could substitute for some of the now programed U.S. weapons. This is one reason the U.S. Government has said publicly that the MLF would be consistent with a missile freeze.

This European participation could, moreover, be helpful in efforts to bring nuclear armaments under international control. For the MLF would not only give its members, as coowners of significant nuclear power, a good claim to participate in disarmament negotiations; it would also give them the strategic understanding required to play an effective role in such negotiations.

And now a special word about the relation of the MLF to recently announced fissionable material cutbacks.[7] These cutbacks are welcome steps. But, as President Johnson and Premier Khrushchev have said, this is not disarmament. The U.S. cutback is designed to bring production in line with need and to reduce tension while maintaining necessary power. President Johnson has reaffirmed all the safeguards against weakening our nuclear strength which we adopted at the time of the test ban treaty.[8] The cutbacks do not ease the specific problem MLF is designed to meet.

Cost

Another important criterion is that the costs of a missile force should be economically manageable. It should not retard economic and

[7] For an address by President Johnson before the Associated Press on Apr. 20, see *ibid.*, May 11, 1964, p. 726.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 744.

social progress or the development of needed conventional forces.

During the first 5 years of construction of the force we estimate that the average annual costs to European nations becoming major participants in the MLF would be between 1 percent and 4 percent of their average annual defense expenditures. The cost to the smaller countries would be an even smaller percentage of their defense budgets. In later years the annual cost would be very much less for all these countries.

These are costs well below those of other major military programs being carried out by these NATO countries. They seem well within the margin of adjustment in the defense budgets and the national economies involved.

European Unity and Atlantic Partnership

The last of the criteria that I mentioned is that any approach to the European missile problem should contribute to our political goals: Atlantic partnership and European unity.

Political and military cooperation in NATO has been a good start toward the Atlantic partnership. Economic cooperation in OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] and increased trade opportunities now being sought in the Kennedy Round will, we trust, constitute a second functional base. MLF offers the nucleus of a transatlantic nuclear defense association which could be an additional political-military underpinning for a concrete Atlantic partnership.

The MLF would also contribute to European integration. It would do so in three major ways:

1. It should reduce the attraction and apparent rewards of national nuclear programs, thus diminishing the likelihood that such politically divisive programs will spread.

2. It would narrow the present gap between nuclear and nonnuclear powers in Europe, a gap which cannot fail to impede the European Community's progress toward unity.

3. It would require joint European work and create a venture in which European countries would find it advantageous to concert common positions.

European unity will thus be furthered by the need for the European nations to come together in order to achieve specific purposes. The common control of nuclear energy for deterrence, sought under the shadow of a threat peculiarly addressed to Europe, is such a purpose.

If MLF can reduce the obstacles to European integration and Atlantic partnership that nuclear weapons nationalism is causing, it would be well worth its costs many times over.

We must go forward toward European and Atlantic unity on a broad front if we are to achieve our goals. The MLF can be one part of this broad movement.

Moving Into Changing Times

These are the important reasons why President Johnson said in his speech at the Associated Press luncheon on April 20:

> We realize that sharing the burden of leadership requires us to share the responsibillties of power. As a step in this direction we support the establishment of a multilateral nuclear force composed of those nations which desire to participate.

The MLF is a new concept. It is designed to meet a new need: closer integration within the alliance in the strategic nuclear field, accomplished in a way that will not hinder progress toward arms control.

Because it is a new concept, a wrench to accustomed ways of thinking will be needed to bring it about. But we are moving into changing times. Bold innovation is needed in these times. We must seize the opportunities open to us with vigor and courage.

The Citizen's Role in Foreign Policy Legislation

by Robert J. Manning
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs [1]

We are living in a turbulent world. The history of our era relentlessly marches on, and week by week—sometimes day by day—it confronts us with new events, new problems, new challenges, and new opportunities. In such a period as this it takes the best efforts of all Americans to think through the implications and the ramifications of the role which history has thrust upon our country in the field of world affairs.

It is for this reason that I am exceptionally glad today to meet with this very active Foreign Policy Legislation Clearing House of the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia. We are concerned in foreign affairs today with the perpetuation and development of the freedoms for which our forefathers fought. In the preamble of that great document which was drafted here in Philadelphia in 1787, our Founding Fathers said that they were concerned to "secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity." The basis of the foreign policy of the United States has never been expressed more eloquently.

I would like to come back to this concept later. First, I want to take a few minutes to tell you that I have been most impressed with what I have learned about the work of this Clearing House. I understand that its purpose is to keep your membership closely and accurately informed on the status of foreign affairs legislation under consideration in the Congress —that great lawmaking body in which you Philadelphians have a special reason to be interested, for it was here that it had its beginnings. I have read the March issue of your Clearing House Newsletter with admiration. I note that you not only seek to inform your members but that you encourage them to write to their representatives in Congress and to express their views. I am sure that you will do this freely and frankly, soberly and responsibly. It is an admirable program, and I wish you great success with it.

Foreign policy is everyone's business because it affects everyone. All too often, the pressures that are brought on the Congress for or against legislation are based on individual self-interest. But in the case of this Clearing House, and your concern with foreign affairs legislation, I am sure that individual self-interest is the last thing by which you would be motivated. In this organization you come together because of your deep sense of public responsibility. You inform yourselves, you discuss the issues, you make up your minds about what is required by the public good, and you take action to insure that your views are made known where it counts. That is responsible citizenship.

It is my understanding that you wish me today to report to you on some of the legislation which is now before the Congress in which the Department of State has a deep interest. This I shall be glad to do, but not in detail. As I am sure you are aware, it is not I who represents the Department in its relations with Congress and who is particularly concerned with our legislative program in foreign affairs. That

[1] Address made before the Foreign Policy Legislation Clearing House of the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia at Philadelphia, Pa., on Apr. 23 (press release 179).

person is my colleague Frederick G. Dutton, who addressed you last year. I want to put my emphasis today not on legislation, despite your very specific and fully justified interest in it, but on the broader field of the citizen's role in foreign affairs.

Pending Legislation

So let me report to you briefly on some of the legislation now before Congress and some of the fields in which the Department very urgently needs the understanding and support of the Congress.

In making a brief report I hope I shall not be too brief for your taste. I am reminded here of an old newspaper story about the cub reporter who went to work on a New York morning newspaper. His first night on the job, the city editor sent him out to cover an immigrant wedding on New York's then turbulent East Side, the idea being to give the youngster a chance to try his hand at writing a mild color story.

At midnight the young reporter rushed into the newsroom, his eyes glittering with excitement, flung himself at his typewriter, and clattered away on the keys. Presently the night city editor, puffing on his pipe, looked up and took in what was going on. He strolled over to the youngster, put a fatherly hand on his shoulder, and said, "Ease up, son. There's no space tonight. Hold it down to two paragraphs."

"Two paragraphs?" the youngster cried out in anguish.

"Yes, two paragraphs. And make them short."

"Well, okay, if that's the way you want it," grumbled the reporter. And here is what he wrote:

"There was a colorful wedding last night in East Side New York. Fourteen bodies have been taken to the City Morgue. The dead are as follows. . . ."

I do not want to take all the color out of my story. But let me give you a capsule report. Some of the bills in which the Department is especially interested at this session of the Congress are as follows:

1. Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act

What we are trying to do in this field is to change the basis for the selection of immigrants to be admitted into the United States. The legislation now before Congress, which was proposed last year by President Kennedy [2] and has the full support of President Johnson, would abolish the national-origins system which has been in effect since 1924.[3] Over a 5-year period, the new amendments would provide that our present national quotas would be phased out, 20 percent each year. The national quotas would be incorporated into a single worldwide quota, which could be used more rationally and flexibly than is possible under present laws. Our selection of immigrants would no longer be based on ethnic and nationality considerations. Instead, preferences would be given to applicants who have valuable skills to offer the American economy, or who have close relatives in the United States and want to be rejoined with their families.

This legislation represents less of a change of practice than you might think, since we have been admitting large numbers of persons under special refugee legislation. But it does represent a restatement of our immigration philosophy, and it would enable us to eliminate many of the discriminatory features of our present laws, especially as they relate to Asians and Africans and to southern Europeans.

As President Johnson said in January,[4] this nation which was built by immigrants should ask those who seek to immigrate here not where were they born but what kind of citizens they would make and what they are prepared to do for this country. I am sure that you realize that our present immigration laws do very much complicate our effort to maintain good relations with the less developed nations of the world, and they cloud our image overseas. It is time for a policy more in accord with the true spirit of this Republic.

The status of the present amendments, by the way, is that bills have been introduced into both Houses of Congress and the Senate has held

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[2] BULLETIN of Aug. 19, 1963, p. 298.

[3] For an address on "Foreign and Domestic Implications of U.S. Immigration Laws" by Abba P. Schwartz, see *ibid.*, Apr. 27, 1964, p. 675.

[4] For an excerpt from President Johnson's state of the Union message, see *ibid.*, Jan. 27, 1964, p. 110.

some hearings. It is hoped that the Congress can consider them after it has taken final action on the civil rights bill.

2. The National Academy of Foreign Affairs

I mention this important bill because I understand you requested a report. Mr. Dutton talked to you about it last year; so I do not need to go into detail at this time. The proposal is to establish a high-level, interdepartmental institution to be known as the National Academy of Foreign Affairs.[5] It would serve all Federal departments and agencies, providing advanced instruction to government personnel in the fields of foreign languages, foreign cultures, and foreign affairs. It would also house facilities for important research. Outstanding authorities from all over the country would be drawn into the Academy's programs, and the academic resources of the Nation would be linked more directly to government operations and responsibilities.

At present the legislation is in committee in both Houses of Congress, but only the Senate has held hearings. A number of top officials of the Department have testified in favor of this proposal, which grew out of the recommendations of the Herter committee in 1962. We attach great importance to the proposed National Academy, which we feel would have a profound effect in heightening the skills and capabilities of our personnel. In the meantime, we are already carrying on a rich program of instruction with our present facilities, doing as much as we can do under existing legislation.

3. Foreign Aid

We need first authorizing legislation and then an actual appropriation. The foreign aid legislation now before Congress would provide for sufficient new authority to cover the administration's appropriation requests for $3.4 billion. Of this total, $2.4 billion has been requested for economic assistance and $1 billion for military assistance.

The President's foreign aid request this year is an extremely tight and realistic one.[6] He is asking for the same amount which the Congress recently voted for the 1964 fiscal year. There is no leeway at all in this request; it represents the bare minimum of aid funds which this administration feels that it must have in order adequately to protect and promote the security of the United States. In the interest of the authorizing legislation and the appropriations requested, Secretary Rusk has already made two appearances at hearings in the House, and David Bell, Administrator of AID [Agency for International Development], and Secretary of Defense [Robert S.] McNamara[7] are backing him up with more detailed testimony. They are being followed by a series of other witnesses who will support the details of the requests.

There has already been talk on the Hill of slashing the aid appropriations far below the level of the President's request. Ladies and gentlemen, the United States cannot risk this folly. We need this program. It is vital. We cannot hope to swing our proper weight in the world and carry out our national purposes without spending money. Without an adequate foreign aid program we could not support our effort in Viet-Nam, we could not hold the bloody ground we fought to defend in Korea, we could not save India and Pakistan from the pressures on their northern borders, we could not protect the investment in security we have made in Greece and Turkey, and we could not implement the Alliance for Progress. I ask you, with all the urgency I can muster, are we to slide into indifference and impotence all over the world for lack of willingness to spend a sum amounting to only 3.5 percent of our annual budget and only six-tenths of 1 percent of our annual gross national product?

There are a lot of misunderstandings of our foreign aid program. One is that it constitutes a major drain on our balance of payments. This is just not true. The latest analyses of how our aid money is spent show that 84 percent of it is spent right here in the United States, on American goods, American machinery, American equipment, American technical skills. I have no doubt that a considerable amount is spent right here in greater Philadel-

[5] For background, see *ibid.*, Mar. 25, 1963, p. 427.

[6] For text, see *ibid.*, Apr. 6, 1964, p. 518.

[7] For statements made before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs by Secretary Rusk on Mar. 23 and by Secretary McNamara on Mar. 25, see *ibid.*, Apr. 13, 1964, p. 595, and May 4, 1964, p. 705.

phia, that it is providing jobs and corporate earnings and corporate profits to the people of this important industrial center. And don't forget that when American equipment goes overseas, it is the forerunner of future exports to nations which come to have familiarity with our products and desire to keep importing them in years to come.

Another misunderstanding is that we provide the overwhelming proportion of the foreign assistance which goes to the developing countries and that other advanced nations are contributing far less than their share. Certainly this was once true, but the situation is improving. Other advanced countries of the free world are increasing their aid to the developing countries more rapidly than we are. Of the 12 countries which make up the DAC, which is to say the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the other 11 combined are now providing a higher percentage of their per capita income than we are—71 cents per capita against our 66 cents. These countries in 1961 provided $2.5 billion in development funds, and the amount is increasing annually.

Still another misunderstanding is that the United States is scattering its aid too widely and not concentrating it where it will do the most good. The fact is that two-thirds of development aid is now going to 7 countries—Chile, Colombia, Nigeria, Turkey, Pakistan, India, and Tunisia. Two-thirds of military assistance is going to 11 countries along the Sino-Soviet periphery. And four-fifths of supporting assistance funds—aid which is used to back up military assistance—is going to 4 countries, Korea, Viet-Nam, Laos, and Jordan.

A great many people speak of foreign aid as if it were money sent down a rathole, without results, which is making client countries permanent economic dependencies of the United States. This also is not true. In 17 countries which once were receiving aid from us, economic development has proceeded to the point where they no longer need grants and soft loans from us. Our aid program in those countries has been terminated. In 14 additional countries, making 31 in all, economic assistance is now being phased out, and the transition is being made to a status where they will be able to obtain their capital needs from hard loans and from private investment.

Still another misconception is that the foreign aid program is unacceptable to the American people. A 1963 Gallup Poll showed that 58 percent of the sample polled were in favor of continuing foreign aid, while 30 percent were opposed and 12 percent had no opinion. The Research Corporation of America polled 1,500 business leaders in all parts of the United States on this same subject and reported that 75 percent of those asked said, "Don't discontinue foreign aid," while only 15 percent thought it should be stopped and 10 percent had no opinion. In other words, five out of six business leaders who had opinions on foreign aid thought it should be continued.

I think we are justified in concluding, on the basis of these figures, that the American people genuinely desire to continue the foreign aid program. Naturally they want to have the money properly expended and the program efficiently administered. Certainly there were mistakes during the early, experimental years, when our aid personnel were learning what could and what could not be done effectively. And any program of the magnitude and difficulty of ours is bound to include a certain amount of waste and human error. But today, as Secretary Rusk told the House Foreign Affairs Committee last month, the program, under the able leadership of David E. Bell, is the best run, best administered, we have had since the days of the Marshall Plan.

Before I leave foreign aid, I want to mention a legislative proposal which the President has sent to Congress.[8] It would encourage U.S. private investment in the less developed countries by providing a tax credit to American individuals or corporations investing in them. This tax credit would amount to 30 percent of the investment made, subject to certain restrictions to protect our balance-of-payments position. It would have the effect of greatly increasing the rate of yield on investment and

[8] For a draft of a bill "To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to allow a credit against tax for certain investment in less developed countries, and for other purposes," see H. Doc. 250, 88th Cong., 2d sess.

thus acting as an incentive. It has the full support of the State Department and merits your careful study and consideration.

So much for the legislation pending. I just want to say what I am sure all of you have gathered by now, that we in the Department of State are most urgently concerned over the authorizing legislation and the appropriations for the various parts of our pending foreign aid program—our mutual defense and development programs, to give you the official nomenclature. We have come a long way in foreign aid in the last two decades. We have every right to be proud of what has already been accomplished. We should all be deeply concerned as to what we can accomplish in the future.

Defining American Foreign Policy

Let us turn for a moment to my other subject—the citizen's role in foreign affairs. We in the Department of State are, after all, working for you. We are your representatives in the urgently important field of American relations with the rest of the world. We owe you an accounting of what we are doing and what we are trying to do. And you, as citizens, as taxpayers, as voters, as leaders in public opinion, should consider whether we are on the right track and are entitled to your support.

Let me first try to give you a definition of American foreign policy. I spoke a while ago of the phrase from the Founding Fathers, that what we are after is to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity. But let me put this another way. The basic purpose of American foreign policy is to assure the continuation of the American people's experiment with democracy. That is to say, we want to survive as a people in a threatening world; but we also want to survive on our own terms, as a nation with certain ideals, certain beliefs, certain values, a certain philosophy of human relationships and individual fulfillment that has come down to us from our forefathers. And we want to preserve the way of life that we have developed and enjoy the privileges that it has brought us.

But if we are to survive as a people and to realize our national aspirations, we must take into consideration the international environment. We cannot control that environment, for there are 120 other recognized sovereignties on this planet and some of them have aspirations and policies and programs which are seriously in conflict with our own. Nevertheless, we can profoundly influence our world environment. We can reduce the threats from powers hostile to us; we can tighten the bonds of cooperation with the powers friendly to us; and we can develop the capabilities of those uncertain and wavering countries who are neither hostile nor friendly but desperately need help and will go where they think they can find it.

Our program for influencing our world environment, to make it less threatening and more benevolent, is our foreign policy. There was a period, a few years back, when the threat of world communism was so immediate, so overwhelming, so all-pervading, that all of American foreign policy seemed to be swallowed up in the one great objective of turning back that threat. The threat is still with us, and very critically so in some world areas, but unless we read the signs wrongly, it has diminished. The bipolarized world of two superpowers which existed a decade ago is gradually modifying its character. We seem to be heading into a new period of multinational pluralism, in which alliances are becoming more flexible and many countries are operating more independently. Where a few years ago a public official might have thought twice about defying the dogmatic emotions of the cold war by quoting Palmerston, he today may find himself pointing out that, like the England Palmerston described, the United States has no eternal enemies or perpetual allies but only perpetual interests which its leaders are bound to defend.

In the altered world situation the tasks of our diplomacy are clear in outline but difficult in detail. In the interest of our own security and the security of those nations whose freedom and well-being are vital to us, we must maintain sufficient military strength and readiness to deter or defeat aggression at any level. This is what we call the "security through strength" goal of American policy.

Secondly, we seek to tighten our bonds of friendship and cooperation with the other advanced nations of the free world by a variety of constructive arrangements—political, economic,

cultural—which will be as indispensable to them as to us. This is "progress through partnership."

Thirdly, we must help the less developed areas of the world carry through their revolution of modernization without sacrificing their independence or their pursuit of democracy. We refer to this policy goal as the "revolution of freedom."

Fourthly, we must assist in the gradual emergence of a genuine world community, based on cooperation and law, through the establishment and development of such organs as the United Nations, the World Court, the World Bank and Monetary Fund, and other global and regional organizations. This is the goal of "community under law."

And fifthly, we must seek tirelessly to modify the arms race and reduce the risk of war, to narrow the areas of conflict with the Communist countries, and to continue to spin the infinity of threads that bind nations peacefully together. We call this policy goal "peace through perseverance."

As I have said, these tasks are clear in outline but difficult to realize in concrete detail.

Nevertheless, we have certain assets on our side. Most of the other 120 countries want the same kind of world that we do. We believe that the interests of the United States will be best served by having as many nations as possible truly free and independent; most other nations want this for themselves. We want to see other countries of the world with governments based on the consent of the governed; most other nations want this too, and no doubt all would if their populations could be freely consulted. We want other nations to be economically developed and prosperous, with higher standards of living; there is no nation which does not want this.

In carrying out our policies we have in general three categories of means. We can employ military strength, which is the use of military means. We can employ our economic wealth, which is the use of economic means. And we can employ our ideals, our values, our intellectual capacities, our ability to persuade; that is the use of psychological means—or persuasion.

We have these three classes of means. I cannot think of others which do not fall into one of these three categories. When people think of the Department of State, they usually do not think of us as using military means, and they are reluctant to have us use our economic means. But persuasion by itself, without the use of strength and wealth, is a rather insubstantial sort of tool. Diplomacy is the use of persuasion to gain one's ends, but effective diplomacy has to be the use of persuasion backed with strength and wealth.

Effectiveness of Organized Citizen Groups

Where the citizen can be effective in this process is in informing himself as completely as possible and then making his influence felt. It is not enough for the citizen to understand the problems facing our country in foreign affairs, although that is an important portion of his responsibility. What is additionally necessary is for him to understand the resources and methods available to his national policymakers and conductors of foreign relations.

The citizen can study the issues and make up his mind what should be done. Then he can say that his government should do this and this and that in the field of foreign affairs. My point here is that he must also understand that bricks cannot be made without straw. We cannot have a strong defense policy unless the people of the United States are willing to support an effective Military Establishment and to serve in it personally when called upon to do so. And we cannot have a strong diplomacy unless the people are similarly willing to provide the Department of State with the resources it needs and to give it their thoughtful support.

The role of the citizen in our democracy should never be a passive one with relation to foreign affairs. Foreign policy is everyone's immediate concern, and the responsible citizen should not only support and not only criticize; he should also take the initiative on occasion and become an activist. In foreign policy, as in most issues of public policy, it is the organized groups who are heard most clearly, and most insistently, by the Congress and by the executive branch.

There are some Congressmen who don't like

to hear executive branch officials telling the public to support given policies or legislative programs, but if the official lets this displeasure scare him, he neglects one important part of his responsibility. If he is accountable to the public for explaining policies and clarifying government actions, then the government official is responsible, too, for pressing for the approval of legislation and funds for those projects he thinks are vital to the conduct of his work.

I hope, therefore, that this Foreign Policy Legislation Clearing House will study with great care the foreign affairs legislation pending before the Congress, and that you will communicate your views not only to the Department of State but also to your representatives in the Capitol. I hope even more that you will study the appropriations requests which the President has made and which the Department is bending its energies to support. For if you want us to be fully effective, you must be willing for us to spend some realistic portion of your tax dollar on the tasks of diplomacy.

But most of all I encourage you to continue to carry out your responsibilities as a superior and thoughtful organization, to play a leading role in the formation of public opinion on foreign affairs. It is difficult for the unorganized public to develop views or to make those views heard. But you are in a far more favorable, and therefore a far more responsible, position. I am sure that you recognize the importance of the role you are playing, and I wish you great success, with all my heart, in carrying out the tasks in foreign policy formulation which you have undertaken.

Can the United Nations Keep World Peace in the 1960's?

by Leonard C. Meeker
Deputy Legal Adviser [1]

When we ask this question, we obviously should not be thinking of the United Nations as a separate and independent power in the world, with its own resources, its own military units, its own will, its own faculties of decision and action. Despite the fears of some, and to the disappointment of others, the United Nations is not a sovereign; it is not a superstate or world government.

The United Nations is, among other things, a continuing diplomatic conference. In its various bodies and meetings the delegates are representatives of the governments of United Nations members. What the delegates say and what they do is on instruction from their respective governments. What a United Nations body does, therefore, is what the member governments are desirous or willing that it shall do.

The operation and the effectiveness of the United Nations quite evidently reflect, and are governed by, the state of relations among the nations of the world. The original conception, held by the founders of the United Nations, that unanimity among the great powers would assure the Security Council's ability to keep world peace was from the beginning nullified by the absence of agreement and by the outbreak of cold war. The world organization had to adapt to these facts, and it did. When the Soviet boycott of the Security Council ended in August 1950 and the Soviet veto paralyzed the Council from further action on Korea, the General As-

[1] Address made before the Dade County Bar Association at Miami, Fla., on Apr. 20 (press release 172).

sembly took over, pursuant to residual charter powers belonging to the Assembly.

During the 8 years while Dag Hammarskjold was Secretary-General, large responsibilities were carried by him. He engaged in worldwide peacemaking diplomacy, often under the broad authority given to the Secretary-General by the United Nations Charter. He also directed major peacekeeping operations—involving sizable military forces—in the Middle East and in the Congo. This enlarged role of the Secretary-General filled the vacuum which had been created by the relative ineffectiveness of the Security Council and which the General Assembly had been unable fully to supply because of the Assembly's unwieldy size.

Hammarskjold's tragic death in September 1961 was the end of another era in the life of the United Nations. One immediate result was a constitutional crisis over the choice of his successor as Secretary-General. A year earlier, Premier Khrushchev had proposed to the General Assembly that the Secretary-General be replaced by a triumvirate, or troika, composed of Western, Communist, and nonalined figures. His proposal followed a bitter attack on Hammarskjold for his conduct of the Congo operation. During 1960 and 1961 Communist efforts to infiltrate and take over the Congo had been thwarted, and the young Republic was being guided by the United Nations on a course of independence and national unity. Now the Soviets had a practical opportunity to press their troika proposal, and they had a veto in the Security Council to block the election of *any* successor to Hammarskjold.

Many weeks of hard discussions followed. Not only the United States and countries of the West stood firm against the Soviet plan. The uncommitted countries also were unwilling to see the office of Secretary-General paralyzed and nullified by introduction of the veto principle. Under the Soviet plan, all three members of the troika would have to agree before any decision could be made or action taken.

In the course of discussion the U.S.S.R. began to modify its proposal and next asked that a new Secretary-General have a troika of three under secretaries to advise him. Finally the Soviets dropped their insistence on the troika scheme and acquiesced in the election of a distinguished diplomat of Burma—U Thant—to the office of Secretary-General.

Those events occurred 2½ years ago. They came in the aftermath of the U–2 incident of 1960, Khrushchev's torpedoing of the Paris summit meeting, his angry and tempestuous appearance for a month at the General Assembly, and the Berlin crisis of 1961 which culminated in the erection of the wall. As we ponder the United Nations and its prospects today, we are aware of the changes that have taken place in the world during these 2½ years. The changes, of course, have a heavy bearing on the future of international organization and efforts to keep the peace.

Since 1961 U.S. defenses have been greatly strengthened in the United States and through the deployment of Polaris submarines on the oceans. Our national effort in space programs has been stepped up, and very substantial successes have been scored. In 1962 came the Cuban missile crisis, and with it perhaps one of the watersheds of history was crossed. Months later, when the Soviet leadership had digested the results of the crisis, they accepted last summer the earlier American and British proposal for a limited nuclear test ban treaty. This was followed in October 1963 by agreement on a General Assembly resolution designed to keep nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction from being stationed in outer space. At the end of the year, there was unanimous agreement in the United Nations on a declaration of legal principles governing the activities of states in the exploration and use of outer space.

Rift Between Moscow and Peiping

During the same period the rift between Moscow and Peiping widened and deepened. Some of the sharpest Soviet thrusts came to be reserved for Communist China, while the views of Western leaders on the large questions of war and peace began to be characterized as "reasonable." Two weeks ago Chairman Khrushchev said in Hungary:

> The Chinese leaders tell us: If there is war—so what? Suppose one-half of mankind will be destroyed. The other half will remain. Time will pass, women

will again bear children and mankind will be the same number as before.

In my opinion it is not from an excess of brains but from an absence of them that people say such things.

During the same trip in Hungary Khrushchev gave this statement on Soviet aims in a Communist society:

Some say that when the economy is growing, when the riches of the people are increasing, a kind of petty-bourgeois transformation sets in. If so, we are proud of it.

We made the revolution for the transformation of the people—to make people well provided for and to assure them both their material and spiritual needs.

The Chinese Communists, for their part, now regard Khrushchev as such a renegade that they accused him last winter of Bible reading and psalm singing, of prayers and incense burning.

These developments in the Communist world would have been startling a few years ago. They deserve our close attention today. The course of the Sino-Soviet conflict may be largely beyond the power of the United States to influence. It behooves us nevertheless to watch with care the unfolding of this conflict. The nations of the West and of all the free world, as well as the Communist countries, have a strong interest, and indeed a stake, in the outcome.

The fact that this great split has occurred in the Communist world has by no means brought a solution of the problems faced by the United States in its relations with the Soviet Union. This year's session of the Disarmament Conference in Geneva has produced no agreements—not even agreement on an agenda of subjects to be discussed. Wide East-West differences remain over Germany and Berlin, and there is the ever-present possibility of dangerous incidents between the armed forces that face each other in Germany. Within the U.S.S.R. narrowly restrictive measures continue to be taken regarding the movement of foreigners, including official representatives.

It is probably reasonable to guess that the Soviet Government is sensitive to the pressure of Chinese Communist propaganda and feels that it must in some respects tailor Soviet actions with the Chinese position in mind. The appeal of the hard line of Peiping to some Communists in other countries has to be taken into account by Moscow.

Events within the United Nations clearly reflect the reality that large problems between East and West remain. They have not been solved or banished by conflict within the Communist world. The capacity of the world organization to do its job in keeping the peace is clearly affected by political issues dividing the principal powers.

Peacekeeping Operation in Cyprus

The recent Cyprus case illustrates very well some of the main problems of peacekeeping that confront the United Nations. On that troubled island in the eastern Mediterranean, two communities were engaged in progressively widening hostilities. The toll of dead, injured, and suffering mounted from day to day. The effect of communal violence on the island's economy was ruinous. An adequate military force was urgently needed to restore peace and order and to allow efforts to be undertaken toward a negotiated settlement. The United Nations Security Council took up the case. Days and weeks were consumed in negotiations leading up to the creation of a United Nations force in Cyprus. There was the problem of where the forces would come from. There was the problem of how the whole operation would be paid for.

Following adoption of the Council's resolution on March 4,[2] it took 3 weeks to organize the force and land the first United Nations contingents on Cyprus. Had it not been for the presence of British troops dispatched earlier at the request of the Cypriot Government, the situation might have gone beyond repair and ended in armed conflict between two members of NATO—Greece and Turkey. Secretary-General U Thant secured the agreement of Canada, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden to furnish troops, in addition to the British forces. Commitments to contribute funds were secured from Britain, the United States,[3] and 15 other

[2] For background and text of resolution, see BULLETIN of Mar. 23, 1964, p. 465.

[3] For a Department statement regarding the U.S. offer, see *ibid.*, Mar. 30, 1964, p. 484.

countries—the Security Council having recommended voluntary financing. Finally, in accordance with another recommendation of the Council, the Secretary-General designated a mediator to promote an agreed peaceful settlement on Cyprus.

In this precarious situation remedies had to be improvised. They were slow in being organized and brought to bear. The problem of financing was a serious one, and the expedient finally resorted to was one that would scarcely serve in a large peacekeeping operation. Why were such difficulties encountered? Why was it not possible for the United Nations to proceed as expeditiously as in the Suez crisis of 1956 or the Congo breakdown of 1960?

It took time to get countries to agree to commit their forces. The financial crisis which confronts the United Nations was also a significant factor. Members of the organization now owe it $125 million in assessments that are overdue. $92 million of this amount is owed by members which do not allege *inability* to pay but instead assert they have no *obligation* to pay. This is more than a financial crisis; it is a political and constitutional crisis.

Significance of U.N. Financial Crisis

The crisis arises from two of the most important peacekeeping operations undertaken by the United Nations in its nearly 20-year history. The United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East and, to an even larger extent, the United Nations Operation in the Congo have been financially costly enterprises, especially when judged by United Nations budgetary standards. To date, the United Nations has appropriated just over $500 million for these two peacekeeping operations.

The Communist bloc in the United Nations, led by the U.S.S.R., has maintained that there is no legal obligation to pay assessments attributable to the two operations, on the ground that the financing of them was not approved by the Security Council. In other words, the Soviet Union has wanted to introduce the veto into United Nations financing, although the charter, in article 17, plainly gives the financial authority of the organization to the General Assembly acting by a vote of two-thirds. France is another principal United Nations member which denies an obligation to pay peacekeeping assessments.

When the issue became clear in 1961 and it was evident that serious financial problems loomed before the organization, one of the steps which the General Assembly took was to ask the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion whether the peacekeeping assessments for the Middle East and Congo forces were legally binding. Twenty countries, including the Soviet Union and the United States, filed briefs. Nine countries, including the United States and, for the first time in history, the Soviet Union, presented oral argument.[4]

In July 1962 the Court ruled that the expenditures authorized by the General Assembly for Middle East and Congo peacekeeping were "expenses of the Organization" within the meaning of article 17 of the charter and that the corresponding assessments were binding on member states. Thereafter, the General Assembly voted, by a very large margin, to accept the Court's opinion. No valid argument is now left that the Assembly's assessments for peacekeeping are other than binding.

Since the Court gave its opinion, 34 countries which had paid nothing on their Middle East and Congo assessments have made payments totaling $7.6 million on their arrears. Apart from the moral suasion of international law as declared by the Court and accepted by the General Assembly, what sanction is available to induce payment? The charter itself contains a sanction in article 19, which provides that a member "shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two full years."

In the interval since the Court's opinion, 13 member nations temporarily went over this 2-year limit. But in each case—including two Communist states, Cuba and Hungary—the 13 made sufficient payments to forestall the application of article 19 at the next succeeding General Assembly session. In one instance the de-

[4] For text of a U.S. statement, see *ibid.*, July 2, 1962, p. 30.

linquent member had not made its payment before the session and absented itself from meetings pending payment. The President of the General Assembly said that he would have announced the member in question had lost its vote if any vote had taken place and a representative of the member had been present.

At present, in the calendar year 1964, 17 United Nations members, including the U.S.S.R., are in arrears by an amount more than 2 years' contributions. If, by the time the Assembly next meets, they have not made payments so as to reduce their arrears below the critical level, they will have no vote in the General Assembly. As Ambassador Stevenson said on this matter at Princeton University a month ago,[5] "the charter must be applied in accordance with its terms and without fear or favor." It is the hope of the United States that members now in arrears will make payments before this year's session of the Assembly. We will continue to bend all our efforts to this end.

Only last week, the United Arab Republic, whose views and actions often carry considerable weight with the nonalined countries, paid nearly all of its overdue Congo assessments. The new action by the Government in Cairo has increased the isolation of the group of United Nations members declining to pay their peacekeeping assessments. Yugoslavia had earlier moved to pay part of its Congo assessments. Today it is principally the Soviet bloc and France that deny an obligation to pay these peacekeeping costs.

Steps To Improve U.N. Peacekeeping Processes

The impact of the United Nations financial crisis on the peacekeeping activities of the organization is not theoretical or to be spoken of in the future tense. It has become actual. I have already noted that Cyprus was a close call. On two other occasions in the last 2 years the United Nations has launched peacekeeping operations in which the costs were to be defrayed otherwise than through compulsory assessment of the membership. In the instances of West New Guinea and Yemen the countries most immediately concerned agreed to pay the costs.

Recent experience thus points up the need for getting the United Nations better organized to deal with brush fires in the modern world. There are several steps that are worth taking.

First, on the question of peacekeeping forces, we need to provide a means of supplying quickly the military units frequently needed, in larger or smaller numbers, for keeping the peace. Very likely the United Nations does not want and should not incur the expense of a standing army sizable enough to be useful in all the kinds of contingencies that may be foreseen. But there is great merit in the plan under which United Nations members earmark national military units, equipment, and logistic support for peacekeeping service.

Canada, the Nordic countries, and the Netherlands have already proceeded to do some earmarking in their national military establishments. It is to be hoped that other United Nations members will do likewise. Specialized training for the units would be in order, for the tasks of keeping the peace are different from usual military assignments. The members of peacekeeping forces are soldiers without enemies. They need often to exercise diplomacy in carrying out their mission.

Earmarking of military forces by national governments should be accompanied by the development of a permanent military staff in the United Nations. This staff could consult with governments on organization and training, advise the Secretary-General, and prepare plans and procedures for a variety of possible peacekeeping operations.

Second, there is the question of financing future peacekeeping. Improvisation in an emergency is not the best we can do when there is time to plan ahead. A dependable system of financing is required, particularly for operations of any substantial size. Later this year a working group of 21 countries will meet at United Nations headquarters to discuss the problem of financing. As one means of dealing with the problem, the group will consider a special scale of assessment for peacekeeping costs.

[5] For text, see U.S./U.N. press release 4374 dated Mar. 23.

Third, and perhaps most basically, there is the question of how a United Nations peacekeeping operation is to be authorized and how political control over it is to be exercised. We have seen from the earlier history of the United Nations that the organization cannot work if such decisions are placed exclusively in the Security Council, where the veto can frustrate all action. After Korea, the alternative of General Assembly debate and recommendation was developed.

In the intervening years the United Nations has undergone a great expansion. A 1945 membership of 51 has grown to 113 members today, with the prospect of a total of 125 to 130 during the next decade. This may require some adaptation of procedures if the United Nations is to remain relevant to the real world and effective in it. Theoretically, a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly could now be formed by nations with only 10 percent of the world's population, or which contribute, altogether, 5 percent of the assessed budget. In practice, this does not happen, and it would be unduly alarmist to fear that the Assembly will be taken over by "swirling majorities."

Nevertheless, even the theoretical possibility that a two-thirds majority, made up primarily of smaller states, could recommend a course of action for which other nations would bear the primary responsibility and burden requires our careful attention. As Secretary of State Rusk said in his Hammarskjold Memorial Lecture in New York last January 10:[6]

> The plain fact of the matter is that the United Nations simply cannot take significant action without the support of the members who supply it with resources and have the capacity to act.

It is unlikely that any scheme of weighted voting will provide an answer. Among many such schemes that have been devised and even tested with computers, not one has been found which would have been better from the viewpoint of the United States. Moreover, the principle of "sovereign equality" and its derivative—"one state, one vote"—are probably so firmly embedded in the United Nations Charter and in the thinking of the international community that any formal departure from them may not be feasible.

Other methods are available for rationalizing the decisionmaking processes of the United Nations in regard to peacekeeping. Two measures now under discussion could be instituted without requiring charter amendment. One of these would provide that the General Assembly would initiate a peacekeeping operation only after the operation had been discussed in the Security Council and the Council had been unable to take action on it. The other would require that the financing of peacekeeping operations be first recommended to the General Assembly—before the Assembly adopts budgetary action—by an Assembly committee that includes adequate representation of United Nations members that are large financial contributors.

Adapting to a New Environment

I have sought to sketch out this afternoon some of the problems that confront the United Nations today in its role of peacemaker and peacekeeper for the world. Over the years the efforts of the United Nations have taken new shapes and have been pursued along new paths as changes of circumstance required. In looking back over the history since World War II, we are impressed by the flux of events and by the fluid and plastic quality of the arrangements which governments have devised to try to keep world peace. As conditions altered, nations which saw it in their interest to promote the survival and effective working of the United Nations adapted the measures of the world community to cope with a new environment.

The world organization has already negotiated successfully several phases and transitions in its history. As we consider its prospects for future peacekeeping, we can take encouragement from a record of intelligent adaptability.

The United Nations is a young organism. It continues to grow and to change. The serious difficulties that confront it in an uncertain and still dangerous world are evident. But the possibilities for constructive thought and action in building the structure of peace are unlimited. I believe we may have good hope of the future.

[6] BULLETIN of Jan. 27, 1964, p. 112.

United Nations Day, 1964

A PROCLAMATION[1]

WHEREAS the United Nations is dedicated to the same noble principles that have made our Declaration of Independence and our Constitution a constant beacon of hope and inspiration for all mankind; and

WHEREAS the United Nations has for 19 years repeatedly and decisively proved to be an increasingly effective and respected action agency for world peace, progress, and prosperity; and

WHEREAS the United Nations, through its efforts and through those of its specialized agencies, has greatly benefited the United States and each of its other members, individually and collectively; and

WHEREAS the United Nations has kindled an ever-increasing recognition and practice throughout the world of those humanitarian principles to which this country has long been dedicated; and

WHEREAS the United Nations has earned, and is entitled to receive an affirmative expression of, the respect and recognition of this Nation, and of each of its other members, for its inestimable contributions to international peace, justice, and understanding; and

WHEREAS it is essential that the United Nations be supported, both morally and materially, by us and by all of its other members; and

WHEREAS intelligent public support of the United Nations by the people of this Nation depends in large measure upon a wide dissemination to our people of significant and accurate information concerning the United Nations; and

WHEREAS the General Assembly of the United Nations has resolved that October twenty-fourth, the anniversary of the coming into force of the United Nations Charter, should be dedicated each year to making known the purposes, principles, and accomplishments of the United Nations:


NOW, THEREFORE, I, LYNDON B. JOHNSON, President of the United States of America, do hereby urge the citizens of this Nation to observe Saturday, October 24, 1964, as United Nations Day by means of community programs which will demonstrate their faith in the United Nations and contribute to a fuller understanding of its aims, problems, and accomplishments.

I also call upon the officials of the Federal and State Governments and upon local officials to encourage citizen groups and agencies of the press, radio, television, and motion pictures to engage in appropriate observance of United Nations Day throughout the land in cooperation with the United States Committee for the United Nations and other organizations.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this thirtieth day of April in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and sixty-four, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-eighth.

[SEAL]



By the President:
GEORGE W. BALL,
Acting Secretary of State.

[1] No. 3590; 29 *Fed. Reg.* 5939.

Italian Government Provides Vaiont Dam Disaster Relief

Press release 196 dated April 29

The Department of State was informed on April 23 by the American Embassy at Rome that the Italian Parliament enacted law No. 1457, effective November 9, 1963, to provide relief and rehabilitation to persons who sustained property and personal losses in the Vaiont Dam disaster of October 9, 1963. American citizens are eligible to receive the benefits provided by this law, according to the Italian Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Interior.

The law provides payments for:

(1) the reconstruction or repair of privately owned buildings of any kind in the localities affected by the disaster—applications for grants for this type of work are to be made to the Regional Superintendent of Public Works (Provveditore Regionale alle Opere Pubbliche) at Venice for the Province of Belluno, and at Trieste for the Province of Udine;

(2) loss of clothing, household linens, and furniture—applications for payments for this kind of loss should be made to the Provincial Prefecture (Prefettura) at Belluno or Udine, depending on the place of loss;

(3) loss of business enterprises (industrial, commercial, or artisan in nature)—applications for grants to reestablish the business enterprise should be made to the Prefect (Prefetto) for either the Province of Belluno or Udine, depending on the location of the business;

(4) farm losses of fields, livestock, machinery, roadways, canals, and seeds—applications for compensation should be made by May 9, 1964,

to the Provincial Inspector of Agriculture (Ispettorati Provinciali dell'Agricoltura) and District Inspector of Forests (Ispettorati Ripartimentali delle Foreste) either at Belluno or Udine, depending on place of loss. Other benefits are provided in the law in the form of tax relief and suspension of certain types of payments.

Law No. 1457 specifically provides that the rights of the state and of third parties for redress against persons or entities who may in the future be determined to have been responsible for the disaster remain unprejudiced. Persons having claims for damages, in addition to applying for the relief provided in law No. 1457, may also record their claims at the present time with the prefecture of the province in which the loss was sustained and also with ENEL (Ente Nazionale per l'Energia Elettrica), Via del Tritone 181, Rome.

All claims should be presented in the Italian language; no specific form or application has been prescribed. No deadline for the filing of claims has been established, with the exception of farm losses, (4) above.

New legislation is currently under consideration in the Italian Senate, having already passed the Chamber of Deputies, which would broaden the types of compensation to claimants who sustained losses in Belluno and Udine Provinces as a result of the disaster.

Foreign Investment Task Force Reports to President

The White House announced on April 27 that the President had that day received the report of a 13-man task force on promoting increased foreign investment in U.S. corporate securities and increased foreign financing for U.S. corporations operating abroad.

The group, which was originally appointed by President Kennedy on October 2, 1963,[1] called on the President at the White House, accompanied by Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillon.

The President expressed his gratitude to the task force members for the time and effort they devoted to the preparation of their report on an important phase of the program to improve the U.S. balance of payments. He hailed the task force—composed of representatives of government, industry, and the financial community—as a significant demonstration of private–public cooperation in the drive to surmount U.S. balance-of-payments difficulties.

The President assured the task force members that their findings and recommendations would receive his closest attention and consideration. He requested the Secretary of the Treasury to distribute copies of the task force report to interested government departments and agencies for their reaction and comment, and directed him to report back to the President.

The group was originally charged with developing programs in the following areas:

A broad and intensive effort by the U.S. financial community to market securities of U.S. private companies to foreign investors and to increase the availability of foreign financing for U.S. business operating abroad;

A review of U.S. Government and private activities which adversely affect foreign purchase of the securities of U.S. private companies; and

The identification and critical appraisal of the legal, administrative, and institutional restrictions remaining in the capital markets of other industrial nations of the free world which prevent the purchase of American securities and hamper U.S. companies in financing their operations abroad from non-U.S. sources.

The report of the task force includes 39 specific recommendations for action in four main areas:

First, the U.S. financial community; that is, investment banking and brokerage firms, commercial banks, investment companies, and securities exchanges;

Second, U.S. industrial corporations with substantial operations overseas;

Third, U.S. taxation of foreign investors in U.S. securities and clarification of questions which have arisen in connection with the ad-

[1] For background and names of the members of the task force, see BULLETIN of Nov. 11, 1963, p. 752.

ministration of the Federal securities laws; and

Fourth, the reduction—or elimination, where circumstances permit—of monetary, legal, administrative, and institutional restrictions abroad which inhibit investment by foreigners in the securities of U.S. corporations and which hamper U.S. companies in financing their overseas operations from foreign sources.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961.
Entered into force: April 24, 1964.[1]

Fur Seals

Protocol amending the interim convention of February 9, 1957 (TIAS 3948), on the conservation of North Pacific fur seals. Done at Washington October 8, 1963. Entered into force April 10, 1964.
Proclaimed by the President: April 22, 1964.

Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Done at Moscow August 5, 1963. Entered into force October 10, 1963. TIAS 5433.
Ratification deposited: Iceland, April 29, 1964.

Postal Services

Universal postal convention with final protocol, annex, regulations of execution, and provisions regarding air mail with final protocol. Done at Ottawa October 3, 1957. Entered into force April 1, 1959. TIAS 4202.
Ratifications deposited: Laos, January 24, 1964; Venezuela, February 28, 1964.[2]

Property

Convention of Union of Paris of March 20, 1883, as revised, for the protection of industrial property. Dated at The Hague November 6, 1925. Entered into force June 1, 1928; for the United States March 6, 1931. 47 Stat. 1789.
Notification that it considers itself bound: Cameroon, February 10, 1964.

Convention of Union of Paris for the protection of industrial property of March 30, 1883, revised at Brussels December 14, 1900, at Washington June 2, 1911, at The Hague November 6, 1925, at London June 2, 1934, and at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Done at Lisbon, October 31, 1958. Entered into force January 4, 1962. TIAS 4931.
Adherences deposited: Cameroon, Mexico, Norway, April 10, 1964.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with six annexes. Signed at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force January 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4892.
Accession deposited: Kenya, April 11, 1964.

BILATERAL

Israel

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of December 6, 1962, as amended (TIAS 5220, 5490). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington April 27, 1964. Entered into force April 27, 1964.

United Arab Republic

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of October 8, 1962, as amended (TIAS 5179, 5440). Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo April 20, 1964. Entered into force April 20, 1964.

[1] Not in force for the United States.
[2] With a reservation.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on April 29 confirmed the following nominations:

Taylor G. Belcher to be Ambassador to the Republic of Cyprus.

Covey T. Oliver to be Ambassador to Colombia. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated April 2.)

Pauline Tompkins to be a member of the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs.

Designations

Gerard C. Smith as Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Multilateral Force Negotiations, with the personal rank of Ambassador, effective April 22. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated April 27.)

Chester C. Carter as Deputy Chief of Protocol, effective May 1. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 197 dated April 30.)

PUBLICATIONS

Department Releases Volume of Documents for 1960

Press release 195 dated April 29

The Department of State released on April 29 *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*. This volume contains all the major documents portraying United States policy (reports, statements, resolutions, notes, treaties, and agreements) that have been previously released for the year 1960. The material is arranged under 14 headings, which cover the organization and functions of the Department of State, the principles of United States policy, the activities of the United Nations, and the conduct of United States foreign relations with respect to particular problems, countries, and regional organizations.

The volume, which runs to 1034 pages, contains a complete list of documents and a comprehensive index. Lengthy documents already printed in readily available official sources are not reprinted, but they are included in the list, together with citations to the sources in which they may be found.

The volume is issued in continuation of the series which began with *A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941–1949*, published as Senate Document 123, 81st Congress, 1st session. The succeeding 6 years were covered by two volumes published by the Department of State under the title *American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents*. Annual volumes under the title *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents*, have been issued by the Department of State, beginning with the year 1956. The volumes in this series are compiled by the Historical Office and are edited and indexed in the Division of Publishing Services.

The volume for 1960 (Department of State publication 7624) may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402, at $3.50 per copy.

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Office of Media Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Guinea, amending the agreement of May 22, 1963. Exchange of notes—Signed at Conakry November 2, 1963. Entered into force November 2, 1963. TIAS 5487. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities—Barter and Exchange of Commodities under Title III. Agreement with India, amending the agreement of June 27, 1963. Exchange of notes—Dated at Washington December 9 and 20, 1963. Entered into force December 20, 1963. TIAS 5488. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Israel, amending the agreement of December 6, 1962. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington December 24 and 30, 1963. Entered into force December 30, 1963. TIAS 5490. 2 pp. 5¢.

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Israel. Exchange of notes—Signed at Tel Aviv and Jerusalem November 5 and 22, 1963. Entered into force November 22, 1963. Operative October 1, 1963. TIAS 5491. 8 pp. 10¢.

Migratory Workers—Mexican Agricultural Workers. Agreement with Mexico, extending the agreement of August 11, 1951, as amended and extended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Mexico December 20, 1963. Entered into force December 20, 1963. TIAS 5492. 3 pp. 5¢.

Extradition. Convention and Protocol with Sweden—Signed at Washington October 24, 1961. Entered into force December 3, 1963. TIAS 5496. 19 pp. 15¢.

Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV. Agreement with the Syrian Arab Republic—Signed at Damascus November 18, 1963. Entered into force November 18, 1963. With exchange of notes. And amending agreement—Exchange of notes—Dated at Damascus December 28, 1963. Entered into force December 28, 1963. TIAS 5497. 14 pp. 10¢.

Education—Commission for Educational Exchange and Financing of Programs. Agreement with Tunisia—Signed at Tunis November 18, 1963. Entered into force November 18, 1963. TIAS 5499. 8 pp. 10¢.

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with the United Arab Republic. Exchange of notes—Signed at Cairo December 4, 1963. Entered into force December 4, 1963. Operative October 1, 1963. TIAS 5500. 10 pp. 10¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Viet-Nam, amending the agreement of November 21, 1962, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Saigon November 8, 1963. Entered into force November 8, 1963. TIAS 5503. 3 pp. 5¢.

Aviation—Transport Services. Agreement with Bolivia—Signed at La Paz September 29, 1948. Entered into force November 4, 1948. TIAS 5507. 11 pp. 10¢.

Boundary—Solution of the Problem of Chamizal. Convention with Mexico—Signed at Mexico City August 29, 1963. Entered into force January 14, 1964. With exchange of notes—Signed at Mexico City August 29, 1963. TIAS 5515. map, 19 pp. 30¢.

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*189	4/27	U.S. participation in international conferences.
190	4/28	Rusk: CENTO ministerial meeting.
†191	4/28	Rusk: statement on Department budget before Senate appropriations subcommittee.
*192	4/28	Joint U.S.-Canada Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs.
*193	4/29	Williams: NAACP, Pittsburgh.
*194	4/29	Cultural exchange (Latin America).
195	4/29	*American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960.*
196	4/29	Italy provides Vaiont Dam disaster relief.
*197	4/30	Carter designated Deputy Chief of Protocol (biographic details).
*198	4/30	New York office of Chief of Protocol moved to Fair grounds.
*199	4/30	Cleveland: "Switch on the Lights."
*200	5/1	Louchheim: Brooklyn Chapter, National Association of Negro Business and Professional Women's Clubs.
†201	5/2	Air talks with Canada concluded.

*Not printed.
†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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America as a Great Power

This 22-page pamphlet is based on an address made by President Lyndon B. Johnson before the Associated Press at New York City on April 20, 1964.

President Johnson reviews the time-tested principles on which our foreign policy rests but stresses that "particular actions must change as events change conditions." The President then discusses six areas of particular concern: U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations, the Atlantic partnership, Latin America and the Alliance for Progress, freedom in the Far East, the new nations of Africa and Asia, and foreign aid.

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THE
DEPARTMENT
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STATE

BULLETIN



Vol. L, No. 1300

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Atlantic and European Unity

Address by Secretary Rusk [1]

It is a privilege for me to be here. In this place—in Belgium, the home of two of the three European Communities—it seems especially appropriate to remind ourselves how man can employ his talents to improve his condition, how he can rise above both his recent history and the vast complexities of this industrial and nuclear age.

It was the Benelux nations which took the first step to change old national patterns—even before the end of the greatest and most destructive of wars. The customs union of three nations opened the way for the European Community of Six.

Among the many lessons of Benelux, one that retains its pertinence is the need to be wary of prophets of doom. In 1951, according to your great Ambassador to Washington, Ambassador [Louis] Scheyven, wages in Belgium stood at 164 percent of the Dutch level. Consequently, some Belgian businessmen feared an influx of labor-intensive Dutch goods as the customs union went into effect. In point of fact, protests and fears subsided, and the net result turned out to be a trade surplus for Belgium. The evidence then, first with Benelux and later with the Community of Six, is that these changes have brought to the member states not economic dislocation, which some feared, but unrivaled progress and plenty.

If we attempt to sift through the dreams and the real and fancied problems of this great postwar period in Western Europe, what are the major achievements that stand out? And what are the lessons to be drawn?

I suggest that this period has produced three great achievements. First, there has been the discovery and consolidation of common interests. Second, the practice of orderly and organized communication has matured. Third, we have established the importance of institutional creativity in our Western affairs. I shall deal briefly with each of these points.

[1] Made before a luncheon of Belgian-American organizations at Brussels, Belgium, on May 9 (press release 219 dated May 8; as-delivered text).

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. L, NO. 1300 PUBLICATION 7694 MAY 25, 1964

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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Consolidation of Common Interests

First, the Atlantic nations realized what they all should have known before, that they have strong common interests. Then they translated this realization into an operating hypothesis that the security of each nation could be assured only through collective defense—a defense designed, first of all, to prevent another devastating war. Then the consensus developed that this is not an alliance in the pattern of transitory ententes of the past but that the security and well-being of the North Atlantic nations require an enduring and expanding common effort.

This perception derives from more than an aversion to the horrors of armed conflict—more even than the burial of the ancient enmities within the West itself. It comes from the knowledge that the interdependent interests of the North Atlantic nations are deep, complex, and abiding. This conviction is so firm and pervasive that we tend to overlook what a major step forward it is in the ordering of man's affairs—because this is significant in terms of 500 years and not just a decade.

Communication Among Nations

Second, and growing out of this community of interest, there has developed a sense of the importance of orderly communication among our nations—of consultation on our military, political, and economic affairs. In the wake of an intellectual appreciation of this fact, the desire to discuss and consult one another has now matured into a habit. The habit is now so ingrained that departure from it becomes a matter of public attention and recrimination. Rather than note the strength of the rule, we are prone to exaggerate the exception.

I am in Brussels today as a part of this process. Fifteen NATO foreign ministers will have their semiannual meeting at The Hague next week. The political, military, and economic leaders of our governments, within the framework of your European Community, or of NATO, or of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, are in regular and systematic contact to a degree that would have seemed literally impossible a few years ago.

This easy and informal contact is bringing about fundamental changes in the international community. Today, as contrasted with previous periods, such national action as a significant change in one nation's interest rate is considered in terms of its effects on others. Not very long ago it would have been thought novel to suggest that one nation should consult others on the effects on them of a national action of that sort.

Our peoples see quite clearly now that the interests they cherish, which once national sovereignty was presumed to preserve, are better assured through collective action. We know, and our peoples know, that no such thing as absolute sovereignty is to be had in today's world. For compelling and practical reasons the notion of national independence each day gives more ground to the principle of interdependence. At least as it appears to us in the United States, we have never been less sovereign, less independent in our history, because our freedom of action is rigorously circumscribed by our responsibilities and the interest of others in what we do or we do not do. And so we're coming to the point where we almost cannot understand the revival of the notion of independence in dealing with the affairs of the free world, because we have almost none of it ourselves.

Institutional Creativity

This brings me to my third point: the new awareness of the capabilities of international institutions. M. [Paul-Henri] Spaak, drawing on his exceptional experience as President of the U.N. General Assembly, as an engineer of the Treaty of Rome, and as the Secretary General of NATO, spoke to the point in an informal talk at the University of Brussels on February 27. He stressed the crucial importance of institutions to the development of the European Community, and of the willingness of countries to "adapt themselves to the normal play of democracy, that is to say, to accept the rule of the majority and to respect that rule. . . ."

Beginning almost 15 years ago, the Community of Six first devised and then has been learning to operate a new type of political arrangement. In this system, institutions have

played a vital role in steadily enlarging the European Community interest while at the same time preserving essential national interests.

The strength of these institutions and their recognized importance can be seen in the decision reached by the Community's Council of Ministers on February 25. By the end of this year, the Community executives should be merged. And a target has been set for fusing the three Communities—the European Economic Community, the European Coal and Steel Community, and the European Atomic Energy Community—through an agreement now intended to become effective by early 1967.

Those of us who have watched with hope and sympathy the process of European integration are impressed today by the interest it holds for the youth of Europe. We are impressed as well by the attention being given in Europe to ways of strengthening the democratic base of the Community, through such measures as enlarging the powers of the European parliament and the direct election of its members.

Nor is it lost on Americans that the distinguished men who have devoted their energies to the process of European integration are the same men who support with vigor the parallel policy of strengthening our North Atlantic partnership. As for the United States, which has rejected in these postwar years a long tradition of isolation, we are participating fully in North Atlantic institutions and are prepared to move ahead in step with our North Atlantic partners.

Shaping the Future of the Free World

Together, we have made progress in improving the manner and the institutions through which we handle our North Atlantic affairs. What does the future hold for us, and what can we do to shape it to our agreed purpose?

First, we Americans wish you well in your continued quest for European economic and political unity. You have had our support from the beginnings in 1950; you have it now. But this is a European task, and it must continue to be led and carried out by Europeans.

Second, the common security of the members of NATO continues to require the ability to prevent or turn back armed aggression. From our position of combined strength we have been able to see, hopefully, some prospect of easing tensions in relations with Eastern Europe. But as yet only a few very limited agreements have been achieved. These, let me emphasize, do not yet assure the peace. In discussions with the Soviets we should seek to avoid illusion and naivete. But equally, we should—and will—explore patiently every possibility of reaching further useful agreements. The reality is that large and dangerous issues remain unresolved. There can be no stable peace in Central Europe while Germany and Berlin remain divided. The situation in the Caribbean is fraught with danger—and not only for the Western Hemisphere. In Asia our differences with the Communist adversary remain acute.

The leaders of the principal Communist nations are quarreling with each other. But it is far from certain that their dispute will enhance the security of the free world. No major progress has been made in reducing armaments—and it is difficult to see how much can be until the Soviets agree to effective verification of arms to be retained. They maintain a vast conventional and nuclear military establishment facing Western Europe, and these forces are constantly being modernized.

Soviet leaders speak of peaceful coexistence. There is every reason to think that they have a healthy respect for the military capabilities of the West. But they have not renounced their aims of world revolution, and we are still a long way from the concrete agreements which permit a real easing of tensions. In short, there is no justification for relaxing the common effort that has so far preserved the security of the North Atlantic nations.

Nor do we intend to relax. Several of the NATO nations are now well advanced in developing the concept and the practical possibilities of a multilateral nuclear force. The MLF will be the means of helping to meet collectively, and without the dangers of proliferation of national nuclear forces, the military need for increased Western missile strength in the European area.

The multilateral force is an imaginative way of sharing more widely among the members of

NATO the responsibility for deterrence and defense. If the MLF becomes a fact, which I am confident it will, the participants will perforce play an increasingly important role in arms control negotiations. In fact, the MLF should be seen as an important step toward partnership—toward the pragmatic but effective sharing of responsibility between the United States and Europe in this vital field.

Increases in NATO's conventional forces also are needed. While maintaining our capacity to deter a deliberate all-out attack, we should improve NATO's means of coping with lesser degrees of conflict—effectively and without automatic escalation to thermonuclear war. The United States has six divisions in Germany. As I said in Frankfurt 6 months ago,[2]

> We intend to maintain these divisions here as long as there is need for them—and under present circumstances there is no doubt that they will continue to be needed.

Third, I would hope that the members of NATO would increasingly coordinate their policies and efforts outside the North Atlantic area. The Communists know that the North Atlantic community is too strong—militarily, economically, and socially—for them to take over by either direct assault or subversion. They are concentrating their expansionist efforts on the less developed areas of the world. Were they to succeed, they would be in a position to squeeze and eventually to strangle industrially advanced nations. The security and well-being of free Asia, Africa, and Latin America are of vital interest to all the members of the North Atlantic community.

I would here like to pay special tribute to the role which Belgium is playing in contributing to the maintenance of peace and the creation of prosperity in the Congo. This task is of major importance, and a task which only Belgium can uniquely play. The efforts which Belgium is making represent a great contribution to the cause of freedom and stability not only in Africa but right around the globe.

In Southeast Asia the Republic of Viet-Nam is resisting an aggression organized, directed, and supplied by Communist North Viet-Nam, with the backing of the Chinese Communist regime and at least political support from the Soviet Union. The United States is assisting the Government and people of South Viet-Nam. Seven of the eight members of the Council of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization recently declared that the defeat of this aggression is "essential."[3] We hope that free nations will demonstrate their solidarity with these people who are struggling to preserve their freedom by offering them the varieties of help which are needed in many fields.

Next door, in Laos, the North Vietnamese Communists and their Pathet Lao subsidiary continue to violate the Geneva accords of 1962 providing for an independent and neutral Laos.

The Chinese Communist threat hangs over all of South and East Asia. And Peiping continues to demand the surrender of 12 million free people on Taiwan as the *sine qua non* of any improvement in relations with the United States.

We think the entire free world has an important stake in halting Communist aggression in Asia—whether by direct assault or by infiltrating trained men and arms across national frontiers. We believe that all free nations should take care to avoid actions which make curbing aggression more difficult or may encourage Communists somewhere to think that they can profit from militancy.

We believe that the entire free world has an interest also in preventing the use of Cuba as a base for subversion and guerrilla operations. With the help of arms from Cuba, the Communists recently made desperate efforts to prevent a free election in Venezuela. They failed. But, with active Cuban help, they are trying hard to undermine other legitimate governments—at least six in the hemisphere today.

The Organization of American States has unanimously declared the Castro regime to be incompatible with the Western Hemisphere system. It has taken measures to isolate that regime and to reduce its capacity for mischief. And I assure you these measures are having their effect. Certainly we could not recommend Cuba to a friend as a good credit risk. Its economy is in bad condition. We think free nations serve their own best interests when they refuse

[2] Bulletin of Nov. 11, 1963, p. 726.

[3] For text of a communique issued at Manila on Apr. 15, see *ibid.*, May 4, 1964, p. 692.

to sell to Castro items of critical importance to the Cuban economy—and thereby cooperate with the Republics of the Western Hemisphere, which have the primary responsibility for dealing with this threat to democracy.

If we have a rather special view of this in the United States, these problems in other parts of the world, I hope that you will not consider me presumptuous if I just remind you that, since World War II, the American people have received 160,000 casualties all over the world in this struggle against communism, and that we are today receiving casualties every week. Therefore I hope you'll try to understand the concern we feel about imposing limitations upon those who will not leave their neighbors alone.

We must recognize also that the North Atlantic nations and Japan are the main sources of capital for meeting the growing needs of the less developed countries. The Development Assistance Committee of the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] is an instrument for mobilizing this capital and coordinating its use. We in the United States appreciate the increasing contributions of Western Europe and Japan to development assistance, and we hope that this trend will continue.

Fourth, we have a related common responsibility to create a trading environment that will permit the efficient development of our own great Atlantic resources. Never before have our nations had more reason for optimism about the prospect of a trading system with government restrictions on the movement of goods reduced to the minimum. Perhaps you on this side of the Atlantic might have underestimated the revolutionary character of the Trade Expansion Act which President Kennedy obtained from the Congress with great public support. It is the most amazing piece of trade legislation which we have had in more than 30 years.

In devising your Common Market you operated on the premise that the removal of protective devices within a changing and expanding economic society would further and not harm the individual interests of workers and industry, of consumers and nations. The European Community has proved beyond doubt that eliminating trade barriers produces solid mutual benefits.

This week the Kennedy Round negotiations have begun in Geneva. The success of this major onslaught on trade barriers will depend in substantial part on the roles played by the United States and the Common Market. If, as partners, we keep in mind and in perspective our obligation as leaders in the fight for a better free-world trading system, these negotiations will succeed.

In our common approach to the negotiations we would do well to try to re-create the atmosphere that led to the remarkable progress of European integration. You have prospered in your enterprise through willingness to change the established order, to seek the larger interest, and not to insist at each stage on striking an exact balance of advantage.

You in Europe assumed, correctly, that an evolving economic community would benefit all and that advantages and costs would even out. The same set of optimistic assumptions should apply to the Kennedy Round. We expect of course that negotiators will negotiate. But the question is—to what end? If it is to be a ruthless drive for separate national advantages, no country will be the gainer; if it is to achieve the broadest collective but balanced agreement, then the free world as a whole will profit. As stable and prosperous nations we also have a special obligation to provide access to our large and expanding market to the less developed countries—to help a billion less fortunate fellow citizens of the free world to make their way toward a better life.

While the European Community has been concerned with creating an economic union of six nations, the political goals of this process have never been lost. When we deal with tariffs and commercial policy in the Geneva negotiations, we must not forget the political implications of our actions. Unavoidably this will be seen as a test of the Atlantic partnership—and of our sense of responsibility to the rest of the world.

The Next Steps in Atlantic Partnership

On April 20 President Johnson rededicated America to "the development of Atlantic partnership with a stronger and more unified Eu-

rope." [4] In this he reaffirmed a policy consistently supported by Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy, a policy that has no partisan flavor in our national political life. President Johnson noted that "The underlying forces of European life are eroding old barriers, and they are dissolving old suspicions," and that "Common institutions are expanding common interest."

While we should be aware of the many unsolved problems in our Atlantic partnership, there is neither need nor time for dismay. According to Communist doctrine, the European Community could not succeed; but it does. According to the same doctrine, the association of Eastern European Communist nations (CEMA or COMECON [5]) should be a model of effective economic cooperation; but it is not. According to Communist doctrine, the industrial nations of the free world, especially those which formerly had colonial possessions, should be suffering from economic recessions and fighting one another over dwindling markets. Instead they have surged upward to ever higher levels of production and well-being. In the last 10 years they have widened their advantage in production and living standards over the Communist states of Europe. In Asia, Communist China and North Viet-Nam are floundering in misery.

One conclusion we should draw from comparing our world with the Communist world is that we should press ahead all the more vigorously with the constructive tasks of Atlantic partnership. Solid foundations have been laid. In Europe governments and peoples seem to us to be convinced that more, not less, unity is needed and that it should be achieved through new institutions subject to the control of democratic processes. In both Europe and America the question is not whether we should work together but how to do it better. On both sides of the Atlantic there is impatience to move ahead.

I am convinced that diligent attention to the next steps—perfecting and enlarging your own European Economic Community, imaginative use of NATO and the OECD, creation of the multilateral force, and the successful conclusion of the Kennedy Round—will be seen by free men everywhere as genuine progress toward the kind of world which is the central object of our policy and the guiding light of our aspiration.

In conclusion, I would just like to add a personal word to each one of you as though you and I were speaking in your own drawing room. You Belgians have had a deep personal, as well as national, commitment to freedom. Your history is filled with that commitment. And we in our country invented institutions to give us the structure of freedom. You and we are a part of a great historical process, at least 2,000 years old, through which men have been groping for the essential decency of public life in relation to the individual. The imposition of moral restraints upon the exercise of all power, safety from the knock on the door at midnight, opportunity to develop one's family with some reasonable prospect for a good life ahead, security from the marauder who appears at our borders—now these are not just Belgian, not just American, commitments. These are universal commitments shared by ordinary men and women right around the world, in every country, including ordinary men and women behind the so-called Iron Curtain. You and we participate in the unfinished business of the great humane tradition of the human race.

We have enormous unfinished business in our own society. We are facing up to the greatest piece of that unfinished business now this year, after a century: to resolve once and for all the great civil rights issues of our society. I'm sure you feel you have some unfinished business in Europe. But that is not the point. The point is that these tasks shall be addressed in freedom. And as you and we move together on these simple human commitments which we share, we need not worry about allies. We shall find allies wherever we go throughout the world. And we shall not need to fear about confidence, because we can walk the earth in confidence as a part of the great historical tradition of freedom.

[4] For an address made by President Johnson before the Associated Press at New York, N.Y., see *ibid.*, May 11, 1964, p. 726.

[5] Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA), popularly known as the Communist Economic Council (COMECON).

Secretary Rusk Interviewed on BBC's "Encounter" Program

Following is the transcript of an interview with Secretary Rusk for the British Broadcasting Corporation television program "Encounter," which was broadcast over the BBC on May 10. Participating were James Mossman, BBC commentator, Richard Neustadt, professor at Columbia University, and Uwe Kitzinger, Fellow at Nuffield College, Oxford University.

Press release 222 dated May 8

Mr. Mossman: Mr. Secretary, you helped to make American foreign policy under Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and now Johnson. What do you think were the most critical and decisive events in the world since the war?

Secretary Rusk: Well, Mr. Mossman, let me say first how happy I am to be on "Encounter" with you. During these past two decades, I think we've seen some far-reaching events, no one of which could be pointed to as a critical watershed but which together may very well shape the history of the world for many decades to come. I would suggest, for example, that the basic decision made by the American people at the end of the war to turn away from a tradition of isolation was a matter of greatest importance. And that was done on a national basis, on a bipartisan basis. And I have no doubt that that decision will endure.

I think we perhaps have tended to forget the importance of Mr. Stalin's decision after the war to take up again the cold war and to return to the promotion of world revolution. I remember at the time that the United Nations was organized how hopeful all of us were about it. And to use the expression of the soldier, I think we almost had it made, and had that one government committed itself to its commitments under the charter, and worked faithfully on those commitments, I think the shape of this postwar world would be much different.

The takeover of mainland China by communism was a matter of the greatest possible importance. It meant that this issue between the free world and the world of coercion was no longer just a problem in the Russian scene but was now a worldwide confrontation, involving many, many countries.

The organization of NATO, the recognition that the defense of the Western World is indivisible, and in the process, the permanent reconciliation of agelong differences within the West. One doesn't think any more about the possibility of a war between France and Germany, for example. Now that's something that's important in terms of centuries, not just decades.

Then we've seen some explosive qualities in this postwar period, the explosion of states. We're dealing with 114 governments ourselves. I think you are too—about the same number. That means many opportunities for quarrels that would not have been there before. It means a great increase in business. We get about 1,300 cables a day in the Department of State on every working day, and we send out about 1,000 a day. That means 10,000 votes in every meeting of the General Assembly. But it injects a turbulence into the world scene which we had not had quite in the same way.

The revolution of rising expectations, so-called. People all over the world now know that these great ills of mankind are not there because of Providence. They're there because men have failed to do things that are within their reach to do. So they're demanding something be done about it.

The explosion of communications, which you people on television know a lot about. People everywhere now hear about, learn about, events in other parts of the world and react to them very quickly. The pace of events has stepped up, almost beyond management in some situations.

I think also that, particularly in the last decade, something really new has come into the world scene and that is the practical possibility of a full nuclear exchange. That happened in about the midfifties. For the first time a full nuclear exchange is an operational problem before governments. This was brought out in the Cuban missile crisis, where this really became operational for the first time as a possibility. And that reminds us that it's too late to be primitive. We've got to think and work hard at our problems. Otherwise, the very existence of life in the Northern Hemisphere is at stake.

Underneath all these events I think is something else we need to notice, and that is that

there has been emerging, without much attention, what might be called a common law of mankind. We in the United States, for example, attend almost 600 intergovernmental meetings each year, conferences of some sort, working at dealing with the daily order of business before governments, trying to find common interests and finding answers to them. This is a very encouraging and very constructive development. And we think that there is great strength beneath the level of controversy in these determined efforts to solve practical problems affecting the daily lives of men and women in the most effective way.

In summary, I'd say we've come to the point where history is not going to be determined by phrases or sudden inspiration or dashes at one problem or another but is going to be resolved by many governments working very hard, patiently, week in and week out, to reduce crises and tensions, trying to forestall them if possible, but where they arise to try to find answers to them. This sounds undramatic, but the stakes are very high, and I think the common interests that are emerging are a source of great confidence in the world.

America's View of the World Today

Mr. Kitzinger: You mentioned the last decade. How far, in fact, has the world picture, in the view of the American Government, changed since the days, say, of John Foster Dulles?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think, as far as policy is concerned, one shouldn't look for dramatic changes in that period of time. Foreign policy turns on the nature and the character and the position of a particular country and the shape of the world around it. And the basic character and the aspirations and the objectives of the American people have not changed all that quickly, and the shape of the world scene has not changed all that fundamentally. I would think that perhaps one could say that, whereas in the first part of the decade of the fifties we were building alliances, at the present time I would say that we are more concerned now about the genuine independence and security of all states, whether independent or unalined, if you like, or allied. Because if every member of the United Nations were genuinely secure, there would be very little for, say, us and for the Soviet Union to fight about. Our problems with the Soviet Union have to do with what might happen to somebody else. They're not strictly bilateral in character. So we've emphasized the importance of the independence and security of each state, unalined as well as allied.

I think also that we've had to give, and we quite readily and willingly give, much more attention to the revolution of rising expectations. Pressures for economic and social development are moving very fast, and we need to get on with that great job.

Mr. Mossman: Mr. Secretary, how far, though, have you moved from the position of John Foster Dulles in saying to yourselves perhaps that here is a Communist system over a large area of the world which has just got to be lived with and got on with, even at the risk of perhaps helping it to gather strength and confidence?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I don't think that we in our country have changed our minds about the difference in quality between a free system and the Communist system. But I also think that we believe that the changes that might occur in those systems must come from within, primarily, that it's up to the peoples of those countries, and that, as these governments can come to the point of taking up the unfinished business of their own people, this itself will bring about changes both in their internal policy and in their external policy. Now that was a hope that was expressed, I think at times, by Mr. Dulles himself. And I think we see a good deal of movement inside the Communist world. We're beginning to find events pointing to such movement, rather than simply expressing them as an aspiration.

Mr. Mossman: You're not more tolerant of communism?

Secretary Rusk: Oh, I think not at all in that sense. I mean, the basic commitments of freedom in our country are very, very strong indeed and are fundamental in our notions. But we're not ourselves saying that everyone else shares them to the same degree. We know what the answers are from our point of view. But we think others are also groping their way toward

their own answers. And we'll see how it comes out.

Professor Neustadt: As the groping proceeds, Mr. Secretary, do you foresee that there will be less emphasis from the Communist countries on what you've characterized as Stalin's determination to export his revolution?

Secretary Rusk: Well, that remains to be seen. Indeed that is one of the critical issues we have in front of us today. To some extent this is the issue which is being debated between Peiping and Moscow—that is, how to proceed with the world revolution. I have no doubt that all of the Communist countries remain committed to the world revolution. Mr. Khrushchev has said that there is no ideological coexistence. But questions of tactics are themselves important. And I would suppose that over and above that is the question, what are these societies going to do for their own people? And to the extent that goulash and the second pair of trousers and questions of that sort become more important in the Soviet Union, I think to that extent a moderating influence has come into the present scene.

U.S. Assessment of Chinese Communists

Mr. Kitzinger: I suppose it won't be long before you are outnumbered in the United Nations on the question of the admission of China, which is the second big country where perhaps this development may come about. Now in view of what you've just said, what precisely are you hoping to gain by delaying recognition of the regime there and by delaying the admission of China to the United Nations?

Secretary Rusk: Well, there are several reasons. In the first place we are concerned about the doctrine and the course of conduct of Peiping in its present situation. They are not only preaching the doctrine of militancy; they are giving it effect as a practical matter on the ground in Asia. There are pressures in Southeast Asia. Chinese arms are arriving in South Viet-Nam. They did attack India. They have not renounced force in the Formosa Strait. We know of mischief that they are up to in continents like Africa and Latin America. Now, the point is that we would think it would be very unwise to indicate to Peiping that that policy of militancy is profitable, pays dividends, is the course of the future. As you know, we've had contacts though our respective ambassadors in Warsaw for a number of years. And time and time again it becomes clear there that the way for any improvement of relations or attitudes, from their point of view, is the surrender of 11 million people on Formosa to Peiping. And this we don't believe can be allowed to happen.

Mr. Mossman: On the other hand, is there any possibility of a settlement in Southeast Asia about anything without Chinese consent? I mean, in a sense, is it Formosa that's blocking settlement in Southeast Asia?

Secretary Rusk: Well, the problem there is that Chinese consent was already given in the most solemn documents affecting that area in this postwar period—in the Geneva accords of 1954 and in the Geneva accord of 1962 on Laos. Their contempt for their own commitments, solemnly registered on those two documents, is the cause of the problem. There would be no problem in Southeast Asia if Hanoi and Peiping were simply to leave their neighbors alone. As far as we're concerned, we're not interested in any bases or special military position in that area. All we want is that these people in Southeast Asia have a chance to develop their own national lives, free from these threats from the north.

Mr. Mossman: But can you go on ignoring the existence of the government of the largest and most populous nation in the world, particularly if the issue is an area which that vast nation overshadows?

Secretary Rusk: Well, we're not ignoring it at all. It's a very important reality in the scene out there. But I don't quite see the profit in having them give just another bad promise in lieu of the bad promise we've already had from them with respect to the safety of Southeast Asia.

Professor Neustadt: Have you had indications, Mr. Secretary, that they want recognition, seek it or pay a price for it?

Secretary Rusk: This hasn't been taken up with us in these talks. The question of relationships always begins with the demand that we surrender 11 million people on Formosa. In the first place they're not ours to surrender. In

the second place we don't think that it's a result that anyone could accept. And at that point the conversation then goes into the record-playing business.

The Defense of Europe

Mr. Mossman: Can we turn to Europe then and get out of the groove? Putting it like this, say that, during the time that you were out of the range of Russian missiles, your deterrent in the eyes of Europe was absolutely valid, your promise to protect them absolutely valid. Now that Russia can exterminate you as easily as you them, how are you going to deal with European fears that your deterrent is no longer of the same value to them, that your ability, or willingness, to defend, if it means your suicide, may not be quite so strong?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I don't believe that European nervousness about the United States should be any more pronounced than American nervousness about Western Europe. We have no problem on that side, as far as we're concerned. The point is that we are in Europe. We are the strongest European military power. We have a very large commitment in Europe. It is inconceivable that from a purely national, selfish—the harshest terms of self-interest—we could ourselves accept a major attack on Western Europe coming from the East. Our own most vital security is involved in that question. And we think the same is true as between Western Europe and ourselves when you look at us. I don't think we ought to think that these commitments in the security field are in any sense weak reeds to lean upon. They go to the life and death of nations, and the notion that our defense is literally indivisible, I think is fundamental both in military and political terms.

Mr. Kitzinger: How do you make President de Gaulle, for example, understand this or convince President de Gaulle that the Russians understand this?

Secretary Rusk: Oh, I think that President de Gaulle doesn't really have any doubt about the unity of the alliance in the face of a threat from the East. I think that the issues involved there have to do more with the shape of the future, the structure of Europe and the structure of the Atlantic community for the future, and do not really bear upon the fundamental and underlying security commitments of the alliance.

Mr. Kitzinger: Well, if I may take you up on this future structure of NATO, at the moment you've got the monopoly of effective nuclear power, and some of your allies look as if they're feeling rather inferior. How far can you sustain an alliance in those conditions? Is there anything you feel ought to be done about this before long?

Secretary Rusk: Well, there have been some differences of view within the alliance, as you know, about how these weapons ought to be organized. We have ourselves recognized that, when Western Europe is living under the threat of Soviet missiles and large numbers of Soviet missiles, the governments of Western Europe would want to have an opportunity to take a more responsible and operational part in the deterrents to Soviet nuclear strength. We have done this in several ways: joint targeting, jointly agreed guidelines for the use of nuclear weapons in NATO. The proposed multilateral force, we think, will be a major addition on this problem because there a number of members of the alliance—those who elect to do so—will have a chance to participate in the owning and the control and the manning and the operations and the targeting of such a force. We think that that will bring them into an operational relationship without getting into the dissemination of nuclear weapons to those who do not now have them. We'll give them an operational relationship to the problem that they have not had before and that will go a long way toward meeting some of the need that you talked about.

Mr. Kitzinger: But the multilateral force still gives you the hand on the trigger and on the safety catch.

Secretary Rusk: Well, ours will be one of the hands, but I can't imagine that, if there are seven or eight countries, for example, in the force, any one country would make the decisions for that force. All we're saying is that, since there are several countries that are going to make that decision, we should be one of them.

Mr. Kitzinger: Does that mean you are willing to give up a veto on the use of the multilateral force?

Secretary Rusk: Well, the fact that we are among those who would make the decision is not something I would just call a veto, because the others who would have to be in on the decision will also have that share of that decision.

Mr. Kitzinger: But you always have the opportunity of using the national force if you're vetoed on the multilateral force. You have it both ways.

Secretary Rusk: Oh yes, it may be some day that, if Europe achieves a degree of unity so that there is a European organization and a European structure which would support a European nuclear force, this is something that the future may develop. But I don't think Europe is in that position today.

Mr. Mossman: So you would be willing one day to see a separate European force?

Secretary Rusk: This is a question for the future. Since Europe hasn't committed itself to being that kind of Europe, I see no reason for my commenting on other contingencies.

Mr. Mossman: But you wouldn't want to bar that solution?

Secretary Rusk: We're not barring that at all. No, we've said that repeatedly, that this can develop.

Mr. Mossman: Do you think it's a realistic idea? Do you think it will develop?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think the first question is whether Europe will, in fact, move toward a much higher degree of political integration. I think that's an even more important, and sometimes more difficult, question than strictly the weapons question.

Professor Neustadt: But you put that question first. If they can evolve, then the question of their kinds of force is open to change as far as you're concerned?

Secretary Rusk: Yes. But I would think that until then we have a multinational sort of an arrangement whereby national governments join on an agreed basis to work together on these matters.

Professor Neustadt: Now, this leaves us, of course, with also our own strategic force, which is incommensurately greater than that of the individual European governments. So it leaves us always open to the charge that we have something our allies do not and that there's no real equality. What does one answer to this?

Secretary Rusk: I would say it's true. I don't think there's any gainsaying that. Also there go along with that, however, very large responsibilities in other parts of the world, which are not shared equally by our allies in NATO. Remember that the Pacific Ocean area is a very important problem for the United States. During World War II we agreed to make the European theater the first-priority theater. But the second-priority theater in the Pacific defeated Japan without any significant redeployment from Europe. In other words, that was a very large second priority. So that we have commitments elsewhere, which go beyond the commitments of NATO. And we, of course, have to be able to deal with those commitments in other parts of the world.

Differences in Approach to World Problem Areas

Mr. Mossman: Your commitments, one might say, in the broadest sense, are regional ones instead of perhaps just Western allied ones, and quite often your allies' assessments of their importance—I'm not talking now of the Pacific, obviously—your allies' assessments in detail may differ from yours. Take Cuba, as an example. The British can't for the life of them see why you're trying to blockade Castro economically.

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think that there are differences in emphasis and differences of shade in attitudes toward problems in different parts of the world. I don't think this is a large question as between ourselves and Britain, because both Britain and the United States are involved in many, many questions all over the world and are working very closely together on almost all of them. Now, I think on the Cuban question—I think our approach differs primarily in this respect: that to you this, broadly speaking, looks like a question of trade policy. To us this is a problem of a security threat to the Western Hemisphere. And therefore we feel that anything that can be done to limit the capacity of Castro to engage in the mischief that we know he's engaging in in this hemisphere—in the Western Hemisphere—should be done.

Mr. Mossman: In Latin America?

Secretary Rusk: Particularly in Latin America.

Mr. Mossman: But supposing we say it's our liberty and right, historically, to trade with whomsoever we like, and our assessment of Castro is not quite as serious as yours? We say a happy, well-fed Communist is a happy and contented one.

Mr. Kitzinger: You sell wheat to Russia. Why shouldn't we sell buses to Cuba?

Secretary Rusk: Well, the wheat to Russia is about one-tenth of Western Europe's exports to Russia for the same period. In other words, we are far behind Western Europe in that particular regard in terms of trade. But, no, I think there would be differences of policy that are reflected in differences of a sense of involvement and concern. I will, however, comment that for a year before the missile crisis of '62 we discussed Cuba at some length in NATO, frequently, and found relatively little interest in the problem. But in October 1962 it became a matter of some importance for NATO.

Mr. Kitzinger: Of course, there are people in Britain who say, why should we back you on Cuba to that extent when you don't back us on Nasser?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think in the first place that is based upon lack of information about the degree of difference on both these questions, to the extent that there is one. We have a strong interest in the British and the Western position in the Persian Gulf and access to the resources of that area. Britain has an important interest in the security of the Western Hemisphere. Now, there may be differences, I think, rather tactical and minor in character, about when and under what conditions particular efforts should be made and particular moves might be made. But in any event, bear in mind that Britain and the United States are involved with each other in dozens and dozens of questions right around the globe. In most of them we're working very closely together. I would not think that, because one can find one where there might be a shade of difference and another where there is another shade of difference, this is a sort of a tit for tat, when we have so many problems on our common agenda.

Mr. Kitzinger: But would you think the Aden base was as important to the alliance as it is to Britain, in terms of oil?

Secretary Rusk: Oh, I would think that's true, yes.

U.S.-British Relationship

Mr. Kitzinger: There's still a lot of talk in Britain about the special relationship of Britain with the United States. Do you feel it's in the British interest to think a great deal about this one?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think it's in our interest to recall that Britain and the United States have the most far-reaching common commitments. We share a great tradition. The Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights belong to us just as much as they do to you. They're part of our own heritage. We were associated in combat together. And I think any American in uniform would say that if he's in a fight he'd like to have a Tommy in the foxhole with him. There are historical and political—sentimental—reasons why we are aiming at the same goals and purposes. But that is a special relationship which is not invidious in any sense to full cooperation and the closest relationships with other members of the alliance. I think this association between Britain and the United States is there to stay. And I think what we ought to do is for both of us to try to build comparable relationships with other members of the great Western alliance.

Mr. Mossman: But isn't it bad for Britain to feel that she has this sort of a—it's like a handicap in golf, isn't it? The others have a handicap and you haven't. Isn't it bad for us psychologically?

Secretary Rusk: Well, you'll have to assess that. I'm not sure that I could assess that. But I would think that the frankness, as well as the friendliness of our exchanges, and our ability to agree most of the time but disagree when we have to—all that is rather wholesome. I don't believe that either one of us is leaning in any special way or in any unwholesome way on this thing called special relationship. It's one that has to be earned all the time with any ally.

Mr. Kitzinger: Can I call on your frankness?

How far do you agree with [Dean] Acheson that Britain has lost an empire but not yet found a new role?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I don't agree with that very much because, when I look around the world these days at Cyprus and East Africa and the Persian Gulf and Malaysia and the Caribbean, I find a Britain that is bearing a very large share of the burden these days in trying to bring about a peace and maintain the peace. When you add to that Britain's role in the U.N., in NATO, in the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development], and other things, I think there's no problem about finding a role. There's a very large role to be carried out and heavy burdens to be borne.

Mr. Kitzinger: But would you be relieved if Britain abandoned the nuclear deterrent of her own and followed what are clearly your preferences, which are that she should perform a rather more limited function and not try and do everything at once?

Secretary Rusk: I don't know where you would get the notion that we would prefer the more limited role. After all, in 1958 the United States resumed a very active relationship with Britain in the nuclear field; so that doesn't give us any pain.

Professor Neustadt: Do you foresee some new common tasks, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary Rusk: Oh, I think there are very large tasks still on the agenda for both our countries and for other members of the West, chiefly in assistance to the great underdeveloped countries throughout the world. There is where the battleground is to be found in terms of what kind of world order are we going to have. Is it going to be the one described in the United Nations Charter? Or is it going to be the one mapped out by the world revolution? And I think there's an unlimited role to be played there, and that everyone who can play a part not only has an opportunity but an obligation to play it.

New York World's Fair

A PROCLAMATION[1]

WHEREAS many foreign governments and overseas private organizations are active participants in and exhibitors at the New York World's Fair; and

WHEREAS the Fair will attract a great number of visitors from those exhibiting countries and other parts of the world; and

WHEREAS the Government of the United States and the governments of many of the several States of the United States are also active participants in and exhibitors at the Fair; and


WHEREAS the Congress, by Senate Concurrent Resolution 80, agreed to April 21, 1964, requested the President, in the name of the people of the United States, to welcome all who come to the United States to visit the Fair; to extend official recognition to the Fair; and to call upon officials and agencies of the Government to lend such cooperation as may be appropriate for those purposes:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, LYNDON B. JOHNSON, President of the United States of America, in recognition of the value of the New York World's Fair as an effective instrument for the promotion of international understanding, good will, tourism, and trade, do hereby extend the welcome of the people of the United States to those persons who come to our country to visit the New York World's Fair, and express the hope that they will take this opportunity to enjoy the hospitality of other parts of our Nation.

I also urge Federal, State, and local officials, and the people of the United States, generally, to assist in making our overseas visitors welcome and in furthering their enjoyment of their visit to our country.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this thirtieth day of April in the year of our Lord
[SEAL] nineteen hundred and sixty-four, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-eighth.



By the President:
GEORGE W. BALL,
Acting Secretary of State.

[1] No. 3588; 29 *Fed. Reg.* 5935.

NATO and World Responsibilities

by Under Secretary Ball [1]

Alliances have rarely had a good reputation. As an institution they need the services of a diligent press agent. Napoleon's rude remarks on the weakness of alliances are a part of his legend. Bismarck's comments were less quotable but equally scornful.

But contempt for alliances was not invented in the 19th century. Pericles said it all—and said it better—long before, when, according to Thucydides, he observed that, within the classical alliance,

> The great wish of some is to avenge themselves on some particular enemy, the great wish of others to save their own pocket. Slow in assembling, they devote a very small fraction of the time to the consideration of any public object, most of it to the prosecution of their own objects. Meanwhile each fancies that no harm will come of his neglect, and that it is the business of somebody else to look after this or that for him; and so, by the same notion being entertained by all separately, the common cause imperceptibly decays.

Pericles' prediction as to the inevitability of decay of the classical alliance is not applicable to NATO, since NATO is not—or, at least, not merely—a classical alliance. We should never forget that it is something more, something quite different.

And so tonight I should like to recall some elemental facts about this Atlantic institution that you have been discussing throughout the day, an institution with a name that, in Prime Minister [of Canada Lester B.] Pearson's words, sounds like a new breakfast food, but an institution that has nevertheless served us well as the central structural framework for the defense of the free world.

NATO was born in a time of crisis. It developed its present shape and form during a sustained period of tension. Today the fact—or at least the appearance—of relaxation between East and West is subjecting it to a new strain and test.

In today's relaxed environment there is danger that NATO may gradually lose some of its vitality through apathy and a kind of international wishful thinking. The present generally good state of economic health on both sides of the ocean has produced a pervasive sense of well-being, almost of euphoria. The Atlantic world feels increasingly strong and confident of the future. There is danger that, if this happy state persists for long, some may be tempted to regard the obligations of a massive enterprise such as NATO as unnecessarily heavy, and some of our European friends, out of a sense of newfound confidence, may be led to consider NATO as too much an American show—there is already an apparent trend that way.

Character and Meaning of NATO

No human institution is ever perfect, and over time we should continue to improve further the present NATO alliance. But at the same time we must be extremely wary of any suggestion that the alliance is, of course, a good thing but that the NATO structure is a bad idea. Such a suggestion, if seriously regarded, could do great harm. For it might reduce NATO to the status of a classical alliance—an alliance inactive in peace and impotent in war.

Let me recall certain obvious facts about the

[1] Address made before the Center for Strategic Studies of Georgetown University, at Washington, D.C., on May 7 (press release 215).

character and meaning of NATO—facts that we sometimes overlook but which we can never afford to take for granted.

The first relates to the nature of NATO as we now know it. If NATO is not just a classical alliance, what is it?

I suppose it can be accurately described as a full-fledged collective defense arrangement of an unprecedented kind. Obviously, the foundation stone of NATO is the common commitment of the member states that an armed attack against one shall be considered an armed attack against all. But NATO rests on far more than that basic assurance.

NATO expresses the indivisible nature of Western defense. Within its structure the member states have created a unified force of great power and dimensions operating under a unified command. This command, in turn, is subject to a Council of permanent representatives that serves as a conduit for political guidance from the member states.

Development of an Effective Unified Command

This is NATO today, but we sometimes forget that it was not born full-armed. As first established in 1949, it was little more than the Council and a collection of committees. In fact, there was a saying in those days that, "Before we established NATO the Russians could march to the Pyrenees in a fortnight. It will take them much longer now; they will have to walk through all those committees."

Stalin was the author of NATO's present structure. It was only after the Korean invasion, when the West first fully comprehended the magnitude of the Communist danger, that the member nations created a Supreme High Command under General Eisenhower and revamped NATO to make it an effective instrument for collective defense.

The road by which the Western World arrived at this point was long and bloody.

Any illusions as to the virtues of an old-fashioned alliance will be dispelled if one recalls the early years of the First World War. We must never forget the events of 1914 to 1918—nor will we be permitted to do so if one can judge by the spate of books presently being written about that period.

The story of those years is a tragic chronicle of unnecessary slaughter. In 1914, 1915, 1916, and even 1917 the two principal allies—France and Great Britain—worked largely at cross-purposes. There was little joint preparation and management. Planning was only haphazardly coordinated. Strategies, more often than not, were divergent and self-defeating. In fact, it was not until April of 1918—and then only through the efforts of a great French statesman, Georges Clemenceau—that the Entente Powers finally pooled their resources under the strategic command of General Foch, as Commander in Chief of the Allied Armies in France. Soon thereafter—out of disarray—came unity and victory.

Thanks to Sir John Slessor, I need not point out that in the Second World War the same Allies once again went into battle without adequate coordination. In his stimulating paper he describes quite vividly the lack of contact between the British and French staffs that prevailed up to 6 months before the outbreak of the war. Again there was no common policy and no combined strategic planning.

But we have profited—and with good sense we can continue to profit—from all that. Today we have achieved what has never before been possible in peacetime—an effective unified command. This we must cherish and preserve. It is an invaluable resource of the free world. Let us not assess it too cheaply. For if the lack of a unified command proved tragic in 1914, it would be even more catastrophic today. This nuclear age would permit no war of attrition but only of destruction, and we would not have 4 years—or even 4 days—to organize a unified command.

NATO's Unfinished Business

It is not enough, however, merely to safeguard what we have. Like any living organism, NATO must grow and change in order to survive. Several of the papers submitted to this conference emphasize two major pieces of unfinished business:

First, we must develop ways and means for managing the nuclear deterrent power of the West in a manner that will take account of the aspirations for participation by member states

not now possessing atomic weapons. At the same time we must avoid the manifest dangers of proliferation.

Second, we must continue to perfect NATO as an instrument by which the member nations can concert policies with respect to problems that arise not merely within the NATO area but elsewhere in the world.

Each of these pieces of unfinished business is, in my view, complicated by the same central difficulty—that most of the nation-states which form the membership of NATO are not large enough by themselves to play roles commensurate with the requirements of the present age.

Management and Control of a Nuclear Deterrent

Clearly this is true with regard to atomic weapons. The defense of the West requires not merely that an individual nation have the ability to mobilize vast resources of men, money, material, industrial plant, and technology but also that there be unity of control of the life-or-death decision of nuclear destruction.

I am sure that no one here favors nuclear proliferation as an objective of policy. Its dangers are manifest. For first one country, then another, to develop a national nuclear system could not help but heighten feelings of distrust within the Western alliance, while at the same time increasing tensions between the free world and the bloc. The multiplication of national deterrents would increase the danger that a nuclear holocaust might be triggered through accident or miscalculation. At the same time it would multiply the chance that—at some point—nuclear weapons might fall under the control of an irresponsible individual or government. And finally, it would render progressively more difficult the achievement of an ultimate agreement to control or limit nuclear armament.

But the road toward proliferation has no logical ending, and as we start down that road there are no logical stopping points other than the limits which nations impose on themselves or the limits imposed by the availability of resources or technology.

The renunciation of proliferation as a general principle is clearly not good enough. Such a solemn pronouncement is unlikely to influence the decisions of individual governments. Unless we can produce workable alternatives, proliferation will almost certainly occur whether we like it or not.

Here is where the political organization of Europe becomes relevant. If Europe were sufficiently far advanced toward political unity that it could by itself manage and control an atomic deterrent, we could hopefully look forward to an effective and integrated Atlantic defense founded on a true nuclear partnership. But this is not the case today, nor is it likely to be for some time. Effective nuclear control means the delegation to a central executive of the power of life or death involved in the use of atomic weapons. Obviously this presupposes a very high degree of political unity—a degree that far transcends anything immediately in contemplation.

Meanwhile, time will not stand still. Whatever the situation today—and the evidence on the point is confusing—we would delude ourselves if we assumed that the gifted and vigorous people in several of the countries of Western Europe would not sooner or later insist on playing an effective role in their own nuclear defense. If we provide no opportunity for even partial fulfillment of this quite natural desire, the consequences are easily foreseeable. Political pressures for the multiplication of national nuclear deterrents will accumulate, and governments will yield to them. The process, moreover, will feed on itself; the decision of one country to build a nuclear deterrent will almost certainly increase pressures for similar decisions in others.

The dilemma we face cannot, therefore, be safely brushed aside. If we regard the proliferation of national deterrent systems as undesirable and if we consider that the present exclusion of a large part of the members of the Western alliance from nuclear management is not likely to last, what other options do we have?

It is our attempt to answer this question that led us in 1960 to propose the creation of a multilateral nuclear force. I recognize that this force has become a subject of some controversy not merely among you *cognoscenti* in this conference but in similar discussions elsewhere.

Yet, as I see it, those who challenge the wisdom or effectiveness of such a force are yet to suggest an adequate alternative.

The Multilateral Nuclear Force

The multilateral force we are proposing would be organized within the framework of the Western alliance. To constitute a truly international force, we have felt that it should meet four conditions:

First, it should be assigned to NATO by all countries participating in the force. To meet this condition, we propose that it be collectively owned by the participants and that all participating nations share in the costs of creating, maintaining, and operating it.

Second, it should not be predominantly based on the soil of any one nation. To meet this condition, we are proposing a sea-based force consisting of Polaris-type missiles mounted on surface warships. This force, deployed on the high seas, would operate outside the national limits of any state.

Third, it should be managed and operated by nationals of all participating countries under such conditions that it could not be withdrawn from the alliance to serve the national uses of any participating government. To meet this requirement, we propose that the ships themselves be manned by mixed crews of nationals of the participating nations.

The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense have concluded that an efficient first-class force can be created in this fashion. SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander Europe] has stated he would welcome the force as a significant addition to NATO's deterrent forces.

Fourth, the decision to fire the Polaris weapons should be a collective decision of the participating nations. One proposal is that political control be exercised through an executive body representing the participating nations. Obviously this control question is the heart of the matter. We are confident it can be solved.

In an ideal world we could no doubt devise less elaborate means for managing nuclear weapons. But we must work within the limitations of existing political arrangements. Those limitations arise from the fact that Western political institutions have not evolved in pace with the march of our technology. Until the West has achieved a far greater political unity than it possesses today, we believe that the development of a multilateral force is the best available course to pursue.

Not only does it offer the most effective means of dealing with the nuclear problem in the present political framework; it can also make possible a gradual and constructive evolution within that framework. The multilateral force would provide a new opportunity for working toward a greater unity in Europe and a closer partnership between the two sides of the Atlantic.

For the striking progress that has been achieved toward these goals in the past decade and a half has, to a considerable extent, come about from necessity—from the fact that governments have been compelled to cope with specific and immediate problems in Europe and the Atlantic area. And, as we seek to cope with the problem of nuclear management, I have no doubt that we shall—of necessity—make further strides toward a greater political unity in the years ahead.

Over the long pull, it will not be abstract principle but importunate necessity—the urgent need to get hard things done in order that we may survive and flourish—that will move us toward the attainment of the ultimate objective of unity and partnership.

Unequal Allocation of Responsibility

If the lack of political unity in Europe complicates the management of nuclear weapons systems within the NATO alliance, it also limits the development of NATO as an instrument for effective political consultation.

This question of consultation has been a favorite subject for discussions in conferences such as you have been having here today. A strong case can be made—and is frequently made—for greater consultation among NATO members, particularly with regard to world problems that lie outside the scope of the alliance.

The logic of this is clear enough. The member nations of NATO represent 90 percent of the industrial strength of the free world. They are, in Dean Acheson's words, "the central

power which will support—if it is to be supported at all—a non-Communist world system."

I do not mean to suggest that, in the modern decentralized world, it would make sense to reserve the management of world affairs to an exclusive board of directors drawn solely from the NATO nations. Such a proposal would be an affront to friendly nations the world over that are playing responsible roles in their own areas. The United States, for example, has military alliances with 28 countries in addition to its NATO partners. At the same time it is clear that unity of policy among the members of NATO is an essential component of free-world power. To quote Mr. Acheson again: "If the center is not solid, relations with the periphery will not provide strength."

Unity of policy should presumably be hammered out through consultation. But consultation—essential though it be—can be fruitful only if all powers concerned are determined to make it so. It can produce little, for example, in the face of rigid philosophical differences such as those we have encountered in attempting to develop a common economic policy toward Cuba. It will also produce little when the consulting parties hold widely differing concepts of responsibility for world problems.

It is this latter point that imposes the most severe limit on the efficacy of consultation today.

Until the Second World War the metropolitan nations of Europe spread their dominance over vast areas of the world through colonial arrangements. But with the crumbling of the great colonial systems and the emergence in their stead of half a hundred new states during the turbulent years since the war, world power relationships have had to be vastly revised.

During this period the world interests of European states have greatly altered; at the same time America has had to devise new concepts of world responsibility.

I mention this dichotomy between interests and responsibility for it is, I think, fundamental to the question of consultation. We Americans have few national interests—in the narrow sense—outside our own territory, but we have assumed vast world responsibility.

The result is an unequal allocation among the Atlantic nations both of responsibility and of the burden of decision that goes with it. This imbalance derives from the imperatives of history—not from deliberate American choice. We are aware that policy and responsibility must not be divorced. We recognize that no nation can be expected to share one without the other.

The United States today is quite prepared to share both with its NATO partners. So far, however, such sharing has been severely limited by differences of attitude within the NATO alliance. The willingness to accept world responsibility—as distinct from the preservation of national interests—is, in our observation and experience, not universal among the NATO membership.

Hopefully this is a passing phenomenon. For the past decade and a half most European nations have been preoccupied with pressing postwar business—the liquidation of colonial arrangements and the building of strong domestic economies. Now this business is largely finished.

Yet this alone will not solve the problem. The problem will never be fully solved until Europe gets on further with the achievement of its own unity, until it organizes itself on a scale commensurate with the requirements of the age.

There are quite obvious reasons for this. The undertaking of world responsibility requires a world view. The discharge of such responsibility under postcolonial conditions must be based on the command of vast resources for defense and foreign aid—and on the will to use them. Western Europe collectively has more than enough resources, but a fragmented Europe cannot efficiently mobilize them in support of a common effort and a common view.

The existing structure of Europe, therefore, sets limits to the effective sharing both of responsibility and decision. But this does not mean that—within the limits thus imposed—we should not continue to improve the present imperfect allocation. In fact, the United States is quite ready to go forward in sharing its responsibilities around the world wherever there is a will on the part of its European partners to share—and this includes a willingness to provide resources to make that sharing effective.

It was this thought which underlay President

Johnson's comment in his recent speech to the Associated Press in New York when he said, in speaking of our Atlantic relations:[2]

> We also welcome agreed new mechanisms for political consultation on mutual interests throughout the world with whatever changes in organization are necessary to make such consultation rapid and effective.

The Ultimate Goal of NATO

I approach the end of my observations tonight with three general conclusions:

The *first* is that NATO as it exists today—an Atlantic alliance with a unified force in being under a unified command—is an extraordinary peacetime achievement, a platform of accomplishment on which we should continue to build. And we should be wary, indeed, of any actions that might reduce its full effectiveness.

The *second* is that we cannot safely ignore the problem of widening participation in the management of our atomic defense, complicated as it may be by the fragmented structure of Western Europe. And unless you gentlemen are able, out of the collected wisdom represented here, to come up with a better solution than the multilateral force, I strongly urge your support for that proposal.

Finally, if NATO is to fulfill its purpose as the central arrangement for the defense of the free world, it must gradually extend its concern to the larger questions of free-world policy. Here again the limitations that obtain are not hard to isolate. They do not derive from any fault in the institutional structure of NATO but rather from the limited sense of world responsibility—as distinct from national interests—felt by many of our NATO partners.

These, then, are some of the problems for which we must find solutions over the coming months and years. Effective solutions will not be achieved merely by tinkering with the NATO structure but rather by progress in achieving a greater cohesion in relations among the member nations. This, it seems to me, is already in process. It has already produced substantial results, but there is much more to be done.

NATO, therefore, should not be regarded as an end in itself. It should be thought of as one of the pillars in a more comprehensive Atlantic relationship—an Atlantic relationship we must achieve in due course if we are to gain that ultimate goal of which Woodrow Wilson spoke with such prophetic passion—the "universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free."

[2] BULLETIN of May 11, 1964, p. 726.

Assistant Secretary Williams Visits West and Central Africa

Assistant Secretary G. Mennen Williams visited five West and Central African countries May 8–20. Following is a statement he made on May 8 upon his departure from Washington.

Press release 221 dated May 8

This is the second African mission I have undertaken at President Johnson's request because of his deep and continuing interest in that continent. This trip will take me to five West and Central African countries—Senegal, Mali, Ghana, and the two Congos.

The purpose of the visits is to discuss various aspects of American policy with African governmental and political leaders and to acquire additional firsthand knowledge of current African developments. Also, I plan to consult with the United States Ambassadors in the five countries, as well as with American businessmen and other United States citizens living there.

The first stop will be tomorrow morning at Dakar, Senegal, where President and Mrs. Johnson represented the United States at ceremonies marking the first anniversary of that country's independence in 1961. I hope to meet with President [Léopold] Senghor while in Senegal.

From there I go to Bamako, Mali, where I expect to meet with President Modibo Keita and other Malian officials.

The third stop will be Accra, Ghana. In addition to talks there with President Kwame Nkrumah, Foreign Minister Kojo Botsio, and other Cabinet ministers, I plan to see the latest developments at the Volta Dam and to go to

western Ghana, where I expect to see something of the economic, educational, and social development taking place there.

In Congo (Brazzaville) I also plan to go into the countryside. This will be my first visit to Congo (Brazzaville) since a new government came to power last December. I hope to meet with President Alphonse Massamba-Debat, whom I had the pleasure of meeting when he was in the United States, Prime Minister Pascal Lissouba, and Foreign Minister Charles Ganao.

The last stop on this trip will be Congo (Léopoldville), where I will meet with the Congolese leaders and get their current assessments of the outlook for the Congo on the eve of the scheduled U.N. troop withdrawal next month.

President Johnson Determines Immigration Quota for Kenya

A PROCLAMATION[1]

WHEREAS under the provisions of section 202(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, each independent country, self-governing dominion, mandated territory, and territory under the international trusteeship system of the United Nations, other than independent countries of North, Central, and South America, is entitled to be treated as a separate quota area when approved by the Secretary of State; and

WHEREAS under the provisions of section 201(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Attorney General, jointly, are required to determine the annual quota of any quota area established pursuant to the provisions of section 202(a) of the said Act, and to report to the President the quota of each quota area so determined; and

WHEREAS under the provisions of section 202(e) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Attorney General, jointly, are required to revise the quotas, whenever necessary, to provide for any political changes requiring a change in the list of quota areas; and

WHEREAS, on December 12, 1963, the former Colony and Protectorate of Kenya was granted its independence by the Government of the United Kingdom; and

WHEREAS the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Attorney General have jointly determined and reported to me the immigration quota hereinafter set forth:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, LYNDON B. JOHNSON, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the aforesaid Act of Congress, do hereby proclaim and make known that the annual immigration quota of the quota area hereinafter designated has been determined in accordance with the law to be, and shall be, as follows:

Quota area	*Quota*
Kenya	100


The establishment of an immigration quota for any quota area is solely for the purpose of compliance with the pertinent provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act and is not to be considered as having any significance extraneous to such purpose.

Proclamation No. 3298 of June 3, 1959,[2] as amended, entitled "Immigration Quotas," is further amended by the addition of the quota for Kenya.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this thirtieth day of April in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and sixty-four and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-eighth.

[SEAL]



By the President:
GEORGE W. BALL,
Acting Secretary of State.

[1] No. 3587; 29 *Fed. Reg.* 5933.

U.S. and Liberia Sign Agreements on Free Port and Cultural Program

Joint Announcement

Press release 220 dated May 8

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Liberia have signed agreements providing for the transfer of the Free Port of Monrovia to the Government of Liberia, and for the expansion of educational and cultural programs between the two countries by the establishment of an Educational and Cultural Foundation.

The Port was built under lend-lease agreement during World War II. In connection with this present transfer, Liberia agrees to pay the United States, over a period of 35 years,

[2] For text, see BULLETIN of July 6, 1959, p. 19.

approximately $19 million, which is the original cost of the Port.

Under the terms of the agreements, the foundation will be financed by the annual payments received from Liberia in settlement of the lend-lease debt, subject to the availability of appropriations when required by the laws of the United States.

The two Governments welcome the conclusion of these agreements in this year that marks the centenary of the exchange of diplomatic representatives between our two countries.

Secretary Comments on Korean Exchange Rate System Reform

Statement by Secretary Rusk [1]

I have been informed that on May 3, 1964, the Government of the Republic of Korea undertook a major reform of its exchange rate system, initiating a unitary, flexible exchange rate. I understand this action was taken in agreement with the International Monetary Fund.

I am pleased to note this important step toward the strengthening of Korea's foreign exchange earning capability and the establishment of equilibrium in her external accounts. The new flexible rate will be an effective means to achieve these purposes.

The United States will continue to cooperate with the Government of the Republic of Korea toward the success of the 1964 stabilization program and toward the solution of the country's balance-of-payments problems.

A new basis now is being laid for investment in industry, expansion of exports, rising employment, and the broad economic and social progress which Korea's energetic and capable people can achieve, with government and private financial assistance from the United States and from other countries. The United States looks forward to expanding its development lending program in support of sustained Korean efforts.

[1] Read to news correspondents on May 3 by Robert J. McCloskey, Deputy Director, Office of News.

U.S. Adds North Viet-Nam to List of Blocked Countries

The Treasury Department announced on May 5 that it had added North Viet-Nam to the list of blocked countries in the Foreign Assets Control Regulations, effective that day. This action was taken at the recommendation of the Department of State, in the light of the continued Viet Cong Communist aggression in Viet-Nam. The effect of the action is to freeze any North Vietnamese assets which might exist in the United States and to prohibit all financial and commercial transactions by Americans with North Viet-Nam.

Since the so-called "National Liberation Front of South Viet-Nam" was created by the Communist regime of North Viet-Nam and is based in and controlled by North Viet-Nam, this blocking action applies equally to all transactions with that puppet organization.

Letters of Credence

Mauritania

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, Ahmed Baba Ould Ahmed Miske, presented his credentials to President Johnson on May 6. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Deparment of State press release 211 dated May 6.

Panama

The newly appointed Ambassador of Panama, Miguel J. Moreno, Jr., presented his credentials to President Johnson on May 6. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 212 dated May 6.

Rwanda

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Rwanda, Celestin Kabanda, presented his credentials to President Johnson on May 6. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 210 dated May 6.

Foreign Aid Today

by David E. Bell
Administrator, Agency for International Development [1]

It is a privilege for me to speak here this evening, to a group which has such a distinguished record of concern for United States foreign policy.

Our foreign assistance program has played a fundamental role in American foreign policy since the end of World War II. It has been a major weapon in our effort to build up the military strength of the non-Communist world. It is a part of American international economic policy, directly involved in financing exports and in the development of markets. Finally, economic assistance programs are the major factor in the international war on poverty, a war which may well decide whether or not this planet remains a fit place either to do business or to live on.

Tonight I would like to emphasize especially the ways in which the foreign aid program has changed over these last two decades and what it has become today.

It is fitting that we meet here tonight on the 80th birthday of President Harry Truman. Aid to Greece and Turkey, the Marshall Plan, the Point 4 program, were all among the series of practical innovations, designed to meet the realities of the postwar world, which distinguished Mr. Truman's administration.

You could say that our assistance programs began with the passage of the Greek-Turkish aid bill in May of 1947, just 17 years ago this month. The Marshall Plan began in April of the following year. Seventeen years is not a very long time, but even today it is hard to remember how serious matters were and how far we have come since then.

Western Europe and Japan were then still in ruins. Greece was torn by civil war, and Communist guerrillas, at one point, were fighting in the suburbs of Athens. After two bad harvests, rations in France were down to two slices of bread daily and meat once a week, if you could find it. West Germany was trying to support its own people and 10 million refugees with less than a third of its prewar industrial plant. Strong Communist parties were close to winning power in both France and Italy.

These were our allies just 17 years ago, facing a Soviet Union that had not disarmed and that threatened to take by aggression what did not fall through internal subversion.

The rest of the world was a tinderbox. Colonial empires were crumbling, and no one knew what would take their place. But there were plenty of danger signs. The Communist-led Huk rebellion was spreading in the Philippines, Communist guerrillas threatened much of Malaya, traditional regimes were falling in the Middle East, and India and Pakistan were born in a partition marked by nearly a year of violence in which millions lost their lives.

It is easy to forget today that, just 17 years ago, there were some who really believed communism might be "the wave of the future"—by sheer brute force in Europe and by its promise of order, discipline, and an abundant future for the underdeveloped countries.

[1] Address made before the Asilomar Conference of the World Affairs Council of Northern California, Asilomar Beach State Park, Calif., on May 1.

The United States did not stand by and watch. Through successive foreign assistance programs we helped our neighbors in Europe get back on their feet economically and build the defensive shield of NATO. In the emerging nations we began to provide the added margin of skilled people and capital they needed to break out of the vicious circle of poverty, ignorance, disease, and poverty.

In the years since 1947 we have not achieved the millennium. But we have achieved more than many thought possible after World War II.

Perhaps the figures that tell the story most simply are these. Seventeen countries have moved from the need for external aid to self-support; our economic aid programs have done their work and have been ended in 15 European countries, Japan, and Lebanon.

In 14 more countries in Asia, Latin America, and Africa the transition to economic self-support is under way and the need for U.S. foreign aid is drawing to a close. These 14 include such dramatic cases of successful economic progress as Greece, Israel, and free China (Taiwan).

Shift in Emphasis of U.S. Assistance

With the recovery of Europe completed and the buildup of the free world's military strength well underway, our economic assistance programs have changed a great deal. Our aid now goes entirely to the less developed countries, and it is highly concentrated. Of our proposed economic assistance program for the next fiscal year, about 2 percent would go to the 14 countries I have mentioned as being in the transitional stage approaching self-support. Eighty-eight percent of the total would go to 25 countries where we have major programs. The remaining 10 percent would go to 37 countries where we conduct quite limited programs—often consisting only of technical assistance.

This high degree of concentration is not an accident. The development of the poorer nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America is a very different problem from the recovery of developed countries like those in Western Europe and Japan. In the decade or so since the emphasis of our assistance shifted from aid for recovery and reconstruction over to aid for economic development from the ground up, we have learned a few things about how to go about it.

To begin with, we are not working with as large amounts of money, relative either to our own resources or to the population of the recipient countries, as we did during the Marshall Plan. In 1949 U.S. foreign aid amounted to about 2 percent of our gross national product and 12 percent of the Federal budget. Today foreign aid accounts for well under 1 percent of the GNP and under 5 percent of the budget. In terms of the burden on U.S. resources today's foreign aid is much less than half as costly as was the case 15 years ago.

In terms of the recipient countries our aid was relatively much larger then than now. During the height of the Marshall Plan our aid amounted to as much as $20 per European per year. Today the region where our aid is largest per capita is Latin America, where it amounts to about $2.50 per year per person. In Africa and Asia our aid amounts to little over $1 per capita. The contrast with the Marshall Plan reflects, of course, the difference in the problem then and now: Then we were restoring advanced economies which could absorb large amounts of capital; today we are helping developing countries where everything—skills, institutions, and capital investment—necessarily grows more slowly.

Another important change in our foreign aid program is the greater emphasis on Latin America. During the 12 years from 1948 to 1960 U.S. aid to Latin America amounted to about 2 percent of our total assistance effort. Now, with the emphasis on the Alliance for Progress, Latin America receives nearly one-fourth of our technical and capital assistance.

We have learned to make self-help a condition of our assistance. Our help is not "free." In providing equipment, materials, or experts from the United States we expect the recipient countries to share the costs of development projects. We also expect them to take steps to use their own resources better through improved administration, sound fiscal policies, fairer tax laws, and the like.

Today's foreign aid program is distinguished also by the extent to which it is varied and

adapted to the particular circumstances in each country. Let me give you three or four examples.

In Viet-Nam, where sheer survival of a country outside the Iron Curtain is at stake, the economic aid program directly supports the military effort, and it does this in two ways. First, we help to finance commodity imports to keep the Vietnamese economy afloat. Second, AID technicians work directly in the villages providing first aid, distributing improved seeds, fertilizer, and rat poison, helping the peasants ring their villages with barricades of bamboo stakes and American barbed wire, and installing simple radio sets to summon help if the Viet Cong attack.

Obviously, Viet-Nam will need a good many more things if it is ever to start down the road to development. It will need an effective agricultural extension service, more teacher-training institutions, more power, better transport and communications as the foundation for industrial growth, development banks to spur private enterprise, and so on. These are the main kinds of things our aid is supporting in other countries. But not in Viet-Nam—now. The immediate problem there is survival, and we are putting first things first. The weight of our aid program goes into direct economic support for the war effort. For the time being development must be subordinated.

We see another kind of problem entirely in Nigeria, the most populous country in Africa. Nigeria has good leadership, a development plan the World Bank has termed "an excellent beginning," and a stable, hospitable climate for private investment. But, like so many other African countries, Nigeria is short of trained people competent to translate its promise into progress. Nigeria not only needs more schools; it needs an educational system that can turn out graduates at every level of competence, from clerks, typists, and foremen to business managers and government administrators.

In Nigeria more than 40 percent of total U.S. assistance goes into a single field—education. We are engaged, with the Nigerians, in an attempt to transform an educational system for the few into a comprehensive school system equipped to meet Nigeria's massive need for trained manpower at every level. To carry this out, we rely heavily on American colleges and universities. We have contracts with nine different American universities for technical assistance in teacher training, business administration, agricultural research and training, vocational education, and public administration. Included, incidentally, is a 13-man team from the University of California at Los Angeles, working both to expand vocational education in Nigeria's Eastern Region and to help Nigeria's Federal Advanced Teacher Training College meet the national goal of 3,000 graduate teachers annually by 1970.

Still another pattern of aid can be seen in India and Pakistan, Colombia and Chile. These are countries where major development programs are under way. While they have great need for more education, they have now a substantial number of trained and experienced leaders in both public and private activities, and they can make use of significant amounts of capital investment. They are mobilizing their own resources through taxes and savings. They have strong and thriving private sectors in their economies and are attracting increasing amounts of foreign private investment.

These are countries, in short, where we can concentrate U.S. aid resources with confidence that they will contribute to solid and lasting progress. Their problems are far from solved. It will be years before India, for example, could hope to reach the point of self-sustaining economic growth. But the right kind of effort is under way, and the right kind of progress is being made.

Finally, let me mention the Republic of China on Taiwan, where we have a still different pattern of U.S. assistance. A decade ago Taiwan was as heavily dependent on U.S. aid to stay afloat as Viet-Nam is today. But not any longer. With our help, it has conducted one of the most successful land reforms in Asia and achieved an exceptional record of growth in both agriculture and industry. Taiwan today is very near economic self-support, and for the past year AID has concentrated heavily on technical assistance to Taiwan's booming private sector. We are engaged now chiefly in financing short-term consultants from U.S. in-

dustry to help solve specific production, marketing, or management problems. The major share of Taiwan's needs for technical and capital assistance can already be met through normal commercial channels, including substantial U.S. private investment in an economy that is now clearly a going concern and an attractive market. Taiwan is definitely in transition, and the end of the need for economic aid is in sight.

Aid From Other Free-World Donors Increasing

Another major change that has taken place over these past 17 years has been the steady transformation of free-world aid recipients into aid donors who share with us the burden and the challenge of helping the poorer countries develop.

When President Truman signed the Greek-Turkish aid bill in May 1947, the United States was the only country in the non-Communist world able to provide any substantial help to anyone else. Today many free-world countries other than the United States provide substantial aid to the less developed nations, and more are undertaking aid programs.

Eleven of these other donors—Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United Kingdom—are members, with the United States, in the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] in Europe, the Committee that has become the center for free-world aid coordination. These 11 countries account for about 95 percent of the bilateral aid from sources other than the United States. The other 5 percent comes from 6 other countries: Australia, Austria, Kuwait, New Zealand, Sweden, and Switzerland.

More aid recipients are becoming donors today. For example, Israel, the Republic of China on Taiwan, and Mexico now provide technical assistance to nations less developed than themselves.

We have also seen the rise of international agencies equipped to provide technical and capital assistance to the less developed world, agencies such as the World Bank, the International Development Association, the European Development Fund, and the Inter-American Development Bank. Ten years ago the World Bank was the only multilateral source of capital for this purpose.

Since 1956, the other developed free-world countries have invested more than $13 billion in aid to the less developed world—about what the United States invested in the recovery of Western Europe through the Marshall Plan between 1948 and 1952.

The aid programs of others are increasing steadily in size. By 1960, the total volume of all free-world aid commitments had climbed to $6.5 billion, of which 40 percent, or $2.6 billion, came either from multilateral agencies or other countries. By 1962, the total volume of free-world aid had increased to $8.5 billion, of which 44 percent, or $3.7 billion, was provided outside the United States bilateral aid programs.

A decade ago, what assistance the European countries were able to provide went exclusively to colonies. Today, less than 10 percent does, although, of course, much French, British, Belgian, Dutch, and Italian aid does go to former colonies that are now independent states. This, of course, does not make it less helpful from our point of view. It means, among other things, that some two-thirds of all development assistance in Africa today is now provided by the Western European nations.

At the same time, France has made sizable aid commitments to Mexico and Greece; Britain is enlarging its technical assistance program in Latin America; and France, the Netherlands, and Italy are all important contributors to the development of India and Pakistan through aid consortia sponsored by the World Bank.

Three of the major donors—Germany, Canada, and Japan—have no colonial connections. Germany has a worldwide program, and in the past 3 years has made loan pledges to 65 less developed countries and provided technical assistance to 70. Canada's assistance ranges through the British Commonwealth countries and Latin America. Japan provides aid in much of Asia and in Latin America.

The other countries do the same kinds of things in their aid programs that we do and conduct them in close cooperation with us. In Thailand, for example, many other countries

have joined the United States in rural development programs designed to counter a serious threat of Communist insurgency in the northeast provinces. The United States is helping to build connecting roads and train Thai Government officials who will build schools and hospitals and carry out community development programs. New Zealand is helping to establish an agricultural university in the northeast, which will provide a training base for an active agricultural extension service. Denmark has established a demonstration dairy farm and is helping to introduce a modern dairy industry. Japan assists a virus research institute, and the United Kingdom is carrying out agricultural projects to improve the output of cotton, rubber, tea, and tobacco.

Some of the newest additions to the list of free-world aid donors are doing some of the most interesting work. Teams of Chinese experts from Taiwan are showing nine African countries how to increase rice output with the intensive cultivation methods that have made Taiwan agriculture one of the most productive in the world. You may have read recent newspaper accounts of the results in Liberia, where the first Chinese team went 2 years ago and produced rice crops five times the norm for that West African country. In arid Libya, at a site deep in the Sahara desert, a 15-man Chinese team has succeeded in raising large rice crops for the first time using piped water from oasis wells to supplement the annual average rainfall of two-fifths of an inch. Despite locusts, salty soil, and temperatures over 100 degrees, they have produced yields of more than 4,000 pounds of rice per acre.

"We Have Come an Amazing Distance"

To summarize what I have said this evening very briefly, it seems to me we have come an amazing distance in a very short time. I do not minimize the risks of the present world we live in or the size of the problems that remain. The outcome of the struggle in Southeast Asia is by no means certain. Dangerous tensions remain in South Asia and the Middle East. The new nations of Africa are just starting down the road toward stability and economic growth. Latin America's attempt to attack the historic problems under the Alliance for Progress is barely 3 years old.

Seventeen years of economic assistance has not relieved us of the need to make difficult foreign policy choices, the need to maintain our defenses, or the need to work out new patterns of trade policy and international order. The world remains a difficult place.

But we no longer face the challenge alone, or with impoverished allies, or without precedent or example in the orderly development of the free world's poor nations. With 17 nations on their feet and self-supporting; with 14 others in Asia, Africa, and Latin America fast approaching that point; with solid growth under way in countries like India, Colombia, Turkey, and Nigeria; with other advanced countries helping to meet the challenge of development—with all these, I see no reason to falter, no reason to assume that the patient, persistent building of a world fit to live in is beyond our resources or our ingenuity. I believe we're on the right path. Let us go forward in confidence.

Mr. Timberlake Named Deputy for Disarmament Talks

President Johnson announced on May 6 (White House press release) the appointment of Clare H. Timberlake as the U.S. Deputy Representative to the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament. The Committee has been meeting at Geneva, Switzerland, since March 1962. Mr. Timberlake, a career Foreign Service officer, will hold the personal rank of Ambassador.

Mr. Timberlake has been serving as chairman of the Disarmament Advisory Staff in the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He will assume his new duties when the Committee resumes its work on June 9.

Department of State Budget Requests for Fiscal 1965

Statement by Secretary Rusk[1]

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: I am glad to have the opportunity to meet with you again to discuss the budget requests of the Department of State. With your permission, in this open session I should like to review some of our administrative problems and accomplishments and comment on the budget requests. Later I hope the committee will allow me to meet with you in executive session to discuss the current international scene.

With me today are my two principal subordinates concerned with the administration of the Department. You all know Mr. William J. Crockett, Deputy Under Secretary for Administration. I would like to introduce Mr. Dwight J. Porter, who assumed the duties of Assistant Secretary for Administration last October. These two gentlemen, as well as the Assistant Secretaries and other officers, will discuss the details of the budget estimates during the course of the hearings.

The House has not yet acted on our appropriation bill. Therefore, we shall be reviewing with this committee the full budget requests for fiscal year 1965. This is a departure from previous years, when our presentation to you has been based largely on the difference between our original estimates and amounts already approved by the House. It is my understanding that the committee will also want to consider the pending 1964 supplemental requests.

In his address to the Congress on November 27,[2] President Johnson said:

> . . . I pledge that the expenditures of your Government will be administered with the utmost thrift and frugality. I ask your help. I will insist that the Government get a dollar's value for a dollar spent. The Government will set an example of prudence and economy. This does not mean that we will not meet our unfilled needs or that we will not honor our commitments. We will do both.

I believe the budget requests before you reflect the spirit of economy and prudence pledged by the President. Our preliminary 1965 estimates were reviewed in early December at the specific direction of the President with a view toward making reductions wherever possible. The budget submitted to the Congress in January[3] reflected the results of that review.

Amendments submitted by the President in March[4] further reduced the January estimates. Those reductions result from revised cost estimates for activities of certain international bodies to which this Government contributes. They also reflect a downward adjustment in personnel to be hired, in accordance with the

[1] Made before the Subcommittee on the Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies of the Senate Committee on Appropriations on Apr. 28 (press release 191).

[2] BULLETIN of Dec. 16, 1963, p. 910.

[3] H. Doc. 265, Part 1, 88th Cong., 2d sess.; for excerpts, see BULLETIN of Feb. 10, 1964, p. 218.

[4] H. Doc. 240, 88th Cong., 2d sess.

President's policy to restrict Federal employment. Our presentation to this committee is based on the revised requests.

We are not asking for any additional positions beyond the 131 for communications in our supplemental request for the current fiscal year. I have asked all the Assistant Secretaries to hold the line.

Improved Use of Personnel

I believe that one of the most effective ways to save money is to improve the quality of personnel. A smaller number of hard-working first-class people can carry the same workload as a larger number of mediocre or less energetic people—and do a better job. When I returned to the State Department in 1961 after 10 years in private life, I made up my mind that I would not approve increases in personnel unless they were clearly necessary to meet new responsibilities or increased workloads. For 3 years I have pressed my colleagues to examine individual workloads, to eliminate unnecessary jobs wherever possible, and to do all within their power to improve the quality of our personnel.

I believe that we now have, on the whole, a lean organization. I know at firsthand how dedicated and hard-working my principal colleagues in the Department are. They and their staffs work long days and long weeks—normally 6 days and sometimes 7. I doubt that there is another organization anywhere in Government or in the business world which receives so much unpaid overtime work. Indeed, I am concerned about the numbers who are working at a pace which cannot be sustained over a protracted period.

Before discussing the budget in greater detail, I would like to review some of the administrative actions taken during the past year. We have continued to assess priorities, to eliminate the marginal, and to achieve cost reductions. We have held to our desire for economy, efficiency, and good management. At the same time we have tried to strengthen our leadership in foreign affairs.

We have found many ways to economize in the conduct of the Department's business. These help us to do more at less cost—to get "a dollar's value for a dollar spent," to use President Johnson's words. Let me cite a few examples:

Fifteen consular posts have been closed or changed in status, reducing costs by $500,000 a year.

The use of economy accommodations for air travel has been extended to all flights—worldwide. We hope to achieve cost reductions of $457,000 in international travel, and we have trimmed the 1965 request accordingly.

Better methods of handling truck and ocean freight shipments have made it possible to move the same volume for $50,000 less.

The method of production of the Biographic Register and the Foreign Service List was revised to cut publication costs by $30,000.

There were other economies, but these illustrate our efforts. Together they help to keep our budget within reasonable limits and to meet new needs or higher costs within the funds made available to us.

We have increased our efficiency in the use of manpower. During the past 2 years the Department has conducted steadily increasing diplomatic and consular activities throughout the world without increasing its total position strength. To achieve this, we have streamlined procedures, reduced reporting requirements, closed marginal consulates, and eliminated low-priority functions. The manpower reductions achieved have enabled us to assign additional personnel to the crisis areas of the world, to new or expanding activities, to new consulates and embassies and to meet increased consular and other workloads.

A few examples will illustrate what we have done:

Visa work has been improved by reducing the number of mandatory visa opinions referred to Washington, by having posts abroad submit directly to the field offices of the Immigration Service requests for routine waivers, by merging the Visa Lookout Books of the Department and the Immigration Service using machine methods, and by reducing consular reports from posts abroad by 30,000 documents annually. All these will result in more visas issued per employee and will help to meet greater demands for visa services.

The Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs abolished 24 lower priority positions to meet urgent new requirements at posts in the Far East.

The Bureau of European Affairs curtailed political reporting from posts in Germany and abolished seven officer positions which were used for higher priority needs at other posts.

The Passport Office issued or renewed 1,018,000 passports in fiscal year 1963 compared with 867,000 in 1962 and increased production per man-year by about 10 percent.

In the long run better utilization of personnel will result from better supervision. We are giving greater emphasis to good supervision. Specifically, we are stepping up our training of firstline and middle-level supervisors so they will do a better job of managing those who report to them.

These are indicative of our search to find ways of doing things better and our efforts to employ our personnel usefully on the work of highest priority. The search will continue, so that we can hold the line on employment and still meet new demands we know will come.

We have taken a number of steps to improve the quality of the Department's personnel and facilities and to strengthen its capacity for leadership in foreign affairs.

An Interagency Council on International Educational and Cultural Affairs has been established under the chairmanship of the Department's Assistant Secretary for Cultural Affairs. Its purpose is to strengthen the coordination of all Government programs of international exchanges.

Our program to contract with persons of outstanding competence from our colleges to produce policy research studies has continued to augment at minimal expense the research and analysis which we must do within the Department to back up foreign policy formulation.

A new Office of International Aviation has been established in the Bureau of Economic Affairs to give Government-wide leadership in making and carrying out U.S. international aviation policy. The whole international air transport picture has changed since World War II with the strong competition of foreign carriers. Protection and promotion of U.S. interests require special attention to the development of U.S. policy in this field and conveying it persuasively to other governments.

We have taken action on recommendations of the Herter Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel. We have made progress in establishing a joint recruitment program for junior officers for State, USIA [U.S. Information Agency], and AID [Agency for International Development], a lateral entry program geared to our manpower requirements, and a stronger program of career management to develop the high-quality specialists that today's diplomacy requires.

Public Information Programs

Today, foreign policy is the concern of every American. We are making a particular effort to improve communication with the public through more effective public information programs. We provide speakers and conduct foreign policy conferences throughout the country, we are improving the quality of our written and printed replies to requests for information, and we are assisting the press and mass media in their efforts to ascertain the facts. Conversely, we are striving to improve channels through which we can obtain the views and desires of the general public on America's role in world affairs.

We have endeavored to meet the demands upon State Department leadership in the area of foreign operations.

We are completing the laborious, but essential, job of writing standardized administrative regulations for the Department, AID, and USIA. This includes the drafting of revised rules and joint instructions on travel, pay allotment, titles and rank, rest and recuperation, local employee compensation, security, and related subjects.

In cooperation with the Defense Department and Budget Bureau, we have begun a study of Defense representation abroad. We will review military attaché, MAAG [Military Assistance Advisory Group], and U.S. training missions in selected countries. I expect that this will result in reduction of the total number of such Defense personnel overseas. We are working with the Budget Bureau to establish

guidelines for other Federal agencies in staffing oversea operations.

During the past year we have developed, tested, and installed in selected embassies a comprehensive country programing system. This system is designed to provide our ambassadors and top management in Washington with an overview of the complex, multiagency programs which we are undertaking abroad in this era of operational diplomacy. It provides a means for planning and using total U.S. resources to achieve our objectives.

Leadership requires investment. It is not cheap. We must attract and compensate the finest minds and the keenest talent for our foreign operations. We must acquire the staff mobility necessary to a tough and flexible worldwide service.

I would like to turn now to a more detailed discussion of the budget estimates.

Budget Summary

The original request of the Department of State totaled $365.8 million for fiscal year 1965. Amendments submitted by the President in March and contained in House Document 240 reduced the total by $6.5 million. The revised request is $359.3 million, an increase of $18.2 million above 1964 appropriations.

The increase is composed of the following:

$12.9 million in salaries and expenses for fixed-cost increases, communications facilities, and improved support of existing personnel.

$7.5 million in the foreign buildings appropriations for construction or acquisition of real property. $4.1 million of this increase is in the regular appropriation for projects as authorized by Public Law 88–94. Utilizing the remaining $3.4 million in U.S.-owned foreign currencies puts to tangible use excess moneys owned by the Government.

$2.4 million in appropriations for the International Boundary and Water Commission, primarily for construction of the Amistad Dam on the Rio Grande.

$5.1 million in mutual educational and cultural exchange activities. This increase in appropriated funds is largely to offset decreases in foreign currency carryover and other nonappropriated funds. The request will provide continuance of the total program at approximately the current year level.

$3.8 million for all other activities. The largest items in this category are $1.1 million for international tariff negotiations, $0.7 million for missions to international organizations, $0.8 million for international conferences and contingencies, and $0.7 million for the Center for Cultural and Technical Interchange Between East and West in Hawaii.

In other appropriations there is a net reduction of $13.4 million, primarily because of a nonrecurring contribution to the U.N. Congo force.

A complete summary by appropriation is shown in the following table:

	1964 appropriations	*1965 revised request*	*Increase*
Salaries and expenses	$153, 000, 000	$165, 850, 000	$12, 850, 000
Representation allowances	973, 000	1, 025, 000	52, 000
Acquisition, operation, and maintenance of buildings abroad	18, 125, 000	22, 257, 000	4, 132, 000
Acquisition, operation, and maintenance of buildings abroad (special foreign currency program)	2, 750, 000	6, 143, 000	3, 393, 000
Emergencies in the diplomatic and consular service	1, 500, 000	1, 600, 000	100, 000
Contributions to international organizations	99, 679, 000	87, 168, 000	−12, 511, 000
Missions to international organizations	2, 500, 000	3, 238, 000	738, 000
International conferences and contingencies	1, 943, 000	2, 778, 000	835, 000
International tariff negotiations	365, 000	1, 500, 000	1, 135, 000
International Boundary and Water Commission	9, 230, 000	11, 629, 000	2, 399, 000
American sections	430, 000	474, 000	44, 000
International fisheries commissions	2, 000, 000	2, 139, 000	139, 000
Mutual educational and cultural exchange activities	42, 625, 000	47, 679, 000	5, 054, 000
Center for Cultural and Technical Interchange Between East and West	5, 100, 000	5, 832, 000	732, 000
Rama Road, Nicaragua	850, 000	----------	−850, 000
Total	341, 070, 000	359, 312, 000	+18, 242, 000

The budget reflects an increase of 112 positions above the number the Congress has thus far approved for the current fiscal year. Except for the 131 positions in the 1964 supplemental for communications personnel, however, our 1965 request is for 19 fewer positions.

Salaries and Expenses

The salaries and expenses appropriation is the Department's principal operating account. The budget request is $165.9 million, an increase of $12.9 million above the 1964 appropriation. The requested increase is in three main categories:

About $5 million in mandatory costs to continue operations at this year's level. This includes annualization of the pay increase effective January 5, 1964, increases in wages of local employees and rising costs of supplies and services purchased overseas, and within-grade salary costs.

About $4.5 million to continue the communications improvement program initiated last fiscal year.

About $5.4 million for improved support of existing personnel, providing funds for additional travel, equipment replacement, security equipment, printing, and other nonsalary items.

The increases are offset in part by transfers and nonrecurring costs of about $2 million.

The Department's communications capabilities continue to be a matter of major concern. Through the assistance of the Congress, particularly in providing funds in the fiscal year 1963 supplemental, the Department was able to order a considerable amount of badly needed equipment, primarily cryptographic in character. A few items of this equipment have already been received.

Because of uncertainties regarding the Department's role in communications when the regular fiscal year 1964 budget was submitted, items for major communications improvements were excluded. A 1964 supplemental request of $5 million is pending before the Congress. Funds for 131 positions and other communications requirements which are reflected in the 1965 budget as an increase are in fact a continuance of the program for which we are asking congressional approval in this current fiscal year. Approximately one-third of the $4.5 million increase is for continuing costs of the communications personnel requested in the supplemental.

The Department was fortunately able to provide better communications support during the more recent crises than had been true in earlier years and particularly during the latter part of calendar year 1962.

By an interagency arrangement additional facilities were created during the last fiscal year. Much more remains to be done. During the balance of fiscal year 1964 and in 1965, the Department expects to replace throughout the world equipment which has become dangerously outmoded.

The Department in today's fast-moving world must have a modern worldwide communications capability. Your favorable action on our fiscal year 1964 supplemental request and the request contained in this budget for communications will enable us to achieve much-needed improvements.

There are several items in the category of improved support of which I would like to take special note.

The budget requests of the various bureaus contain increased amounts for equipment totaling $1.7 million. Nearly $0.6 million is for security requirements, largely to provide security support to the worldwide communications system about which I have already spoken. The remainder is for replacement of equipment and furniture. I make a special appeal for these funds this year.

Another major increase is $2.6 million for travel and transportation. About $1.8 million is needed for home leave and transfer trips. The remainder is for regional conferences of chiefs of mission and commercial attachés, rest and recuperation trips for personnel stationed at hardship posts, and consultation travel of officers located in Washington and at posts abroad.

I would like to mention briefly a few other appropriation items:

Acquisition, Operation, and Maintenance of Buildings Abroad

Legislation authorizing appropriations of $49.8 million for a 2-year program was passed

by the Congress during the last session. The 1964 appropriation for the regular program was $18.1 million, leaving $31.7 million in the authorization. The appropriation request for 1965 is $22.3 million.

By reducing administrative expenses, it has been possible to hold total operating costs to approximately the same figure as in 1964, despite the increased amounts needed for maintenance and operation of buildings. Regional offices have been further reduced from 10 to 3, and 18 positions have been eliminated.

Funds are requested for construction of an office building on a Government-owned site in Montevideo, an office building annex in Ankara, purchase of an office building site in Paris, and for a number of the most urgently needed projects in Africa.

Lack of authorizing legislation for fiscal years 1961 through 1963 brought the acquisition and construction portion of this program to a virtual standstill, and it is imperative that we move it forward now to provide the office space and living quarters essential to our operations abroad.

In the special foreign currency program the request is $6.1 million, an increase of $3.4 million. Projects are planned in India, Israel, Pakistan, Nepal, and the United Arab Republic. Major ones are an office building at Madras, India, and an annex to the Embassy building in Cairo. As you know, this appropriation finances the purchase or construction of oversea properties through the use of excess foreign currencies owned by the Government.

International Organizations and Conferences

Funds for U.S. participation in the activities of international organizations are contained in four appropriations, which comprise more than one-fourth of our budget.

Contributions to International Organizations

The estimate for 1965 is $87.2 million, a decrease of $12.5 million below the 1964 appropriation. Nonrecurring 1964 requirements of $20.1 million for the United Nations Congo force and working capital fund are offset by increases of $7.6 million, as follows:

$4.3 million is our contribution to the United Nations and its specialized agencies. Major items are: (1) the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East, which covers a full 12-month period rather than 6 months as in 1964, and (2) expanded activities of the World Health Organization and the inclusion in its program of the third increment of the malaria eradication budget.

$1.4 million for inter-American organizations. Most of this increase is for Alliance for Progress activities of the Organization of American States, accelerated programs of the Pan American Health Organization, and increased services to member countries of the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences designed to raise their agricultural productivity.

$1.7 million for regional organizations, mostly the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

$0.2 million for other organizations, principally the International Coffee Organization and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Missions to International Organizations

The request is $3.2 million, an increase of $0.7 million above the 1964 appropriation. However, $0.5 million is the transfer to this account of certain expenses previously budgeted in the salaries and expenses appropriation. Aside from mandatory increases due to pay act costs and other factors, the remaining $0.2 million is largely to improve the facilities of our mission in Geneva.

International Conferences and Contingencies

The request is $2.8 million, an increase of $0.8 million above 1964. The Third U.N. Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy and the Disarmament Conference require approximately $0.4 million. The rest of the increase is to permit this appropriation to cover the full cost of participation in international conferences, part of which is now financed by appropriations of other agencies.

International Tariff Negotiations

The request is $1.5 million, an increase of $1.1 million above 1964. Although preliminary work for the Kennedy Round under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade has been proceeding, the detailed negotiations are sched-

uled to begin in Geneva in May 1964. Funds are required to pay the travel, allowance, and per diem costs of the U.S. delegation, which will be in Geneva for most of the 1965 fiscal year.

Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange

For these activities we are requesting an appropriation for fiscal year 1965 of $47.7 million, an increase of $5.1 million over the 1964 appropriation. The Department's mutual educational and cultural exchange activities are financed from several sources of funds, the major source being the annual appropriation before this subcommittee. All sources taken together, the total program in fiscal year 1964 is $56.6 million. For fiscal year 1965, again taking into account all funding sources, the appropriation request before this subcommittee will permit a total program of $57 million, or only $0.4 million larger than in 1964. Although there are some shifts among activities, the major cause of the increased request in the annual appropriation is the declining availability of funds from the several other sources.

This program is a big user of foreign currencies owned by the United States and has a very good record in minimizing the outflow of U.S. dollars. In fiscal year 1965 approximately 48 percent of the total program will be financed with foreign currencies. Of the $5.1 million increase requested in the appropriation, it is planned that not less than $3.5 million will be used to purchase foreign currencies from the U.S. Treasury.

We have come to count increasingly on the contributions which educational and cultural exchanges make in our relations with almost every part of the world.

We cannot, however, expect to build foundations for an enduring peace on any short time schedule. Such peace will come only through perseverance. One of the most hopeful activities in which to persevere and to press forward is educational and cultural exchange.

Exchange has been a formal, governmental activity only a relatively short time—for about a quarter century. In less than 20 years since World War II we have seen exchanges become a powerful, although quiet, element in our foreign policy.

In the passage of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 Congress clearly confirmed the importance of this activity and sought to strengthen it. At the same time, in this act Congress asked that a report on the effectiveness of the Department's programs be made by the United States Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs. This report, by distinguished citizens who founded their conclusions on extensive research here and overseas, provides a sound basis for confidence in exchanges as a path to peace we should pursue.[5]

Our system of exchanges has behind it some of the strongest assets of our open, democratic society. Our colleges and universities—nearly 2,000 of them—give great strength to our total national exchange effort. Nongovernmental organizations and private citizens in great numbers assist the total effort by home and community services. This international activity has developed to a point—as the Commission noted—of unexampled public approval and participation. The record confirms the confidence Congress has placed in this activity.

I urge approval of the full appropriation requested to enable us to maintain and improve this activity. The sixties may well prove a time when the steady pursuit of understanding through exchanges carried us all measurably forward in the pursuit of peace.

1964 Supplemental Requests

I would like to mention briefly the 1964 supplemental requests. They total $42.4 million, of which $37 million is for the purchase of foreign currencies owned by the United States. The breakdown of the total request is as follows:

Appropriation	*Amount*
Salaries and expenses, Department of State	$5,000,000
Emergencies in the diplomatic and consular service	400,000
Preservation of ancient Nubian monuments	12,000,000
Educational and cultural exchange with Japan	25,000,000
Total	42,400,000

[5] A limited number of copies of the report, *A Beacon of Hope: The Exchange-of-Persons Program*, are available upon request from the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

I have already referred to the salaries and expenses request, which is solely for improving our worldwide communications facilities.

The $12 million for preservation of ancient Nubian monuments is for purchase from the Treasury of excess U.S.-owned foreign currencies as a contribution to the UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization] project to preserve the two ancient temples of Abu Simbel. These temples will be submerged by the waters of the Aswan Dam Basin. An engineering plan has been approved by UNESCO to dismantle and remove the temples to higher ground. This work has already begun under a contract signed last fall by the United Arab Republic. Pledges by 47 countries total $28.8 million, including the provisional pledge of the United States.

The request of $25 million for educational and cultural exchange with Japan is for purchase from the Treasury of yen which have accrued from payments by the Japanese Government for postwar economic assistance. Under the terms of the settlement agreement, $25 million in yen can be used only for educational and cultural exchange between the two countries. We propose that this appropriation be used for a one-time purchase of yen from the Treasury. The foreign currency will then be made available to a new binational foundation to be created. Investment of the principal and use of accruing interest will finance a continuing program of exchanges designed to strengthen our relations with Japan.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

88th Congress, 2d Session

Extension of Public Law 480—Titles I and II. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Foreign Agricultural Operations of the House Committee on Agriculture. Serial LL. February 18–28, 1964. 188 pp.

Administration of 1963 Fishery Amendment to Public Law 480. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Foreign Agricultural Operations of the House Committee on Agriculture. Serial MM. February 27, 1964. 31 pp.

Foreign Assistance Act of 1964. Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 10502. Part I. March 23–25, 1964. 119 pp.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

United States Delegations to International Conferences

ICEM Council

The Department of State announced on May 5 (press release 207) that the U.S. Government would be represented by the following delegation at the 21st session of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM), meeting at Geneva May 11–15.

Delegate

Abba P. Schwartz, Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State

Alternate Delegate

George L. Warren, Sr., Adviser to the Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State

Congressional Advisers

Emanuel Celler, U.S. House of Representatives
Arch A. Moore, Jr., U.S. House of Representatives
Peter W. Rodino, Jr., U.S. House of Representatives
Garner E. Shriver, U.S. House of Representatives

Advisers

James L. Carlin, Refugee-Migration Officer, U.S. Mission, Geneva
Elmer M. Falk, Director, Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs, Department of State
Alva L. Pilliod, European Supervisor, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice, Frankfurt
Walter M. Besterman, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives

This will be a regular biannual meeting of the Council. The principal items for discussion are: (1) Report of the Director on the work of the Committee for 1963; (2) Plan of Operations and Budget and Plan of Expenditures for 1964: Revised Estimates.

International Rubber Study Group

The Department of State announced on May 4 (press release 204) that the U.S. Government would be represented by the following delegation at the 17th meeting of the International

Rubber Study Group (IRSG) at Tokyo May 18–22.

Delegate

Edmund E. Getzin, chief, Industrial and Strategic Materials Division, Department of State

Alternate Delegates

J. Bruce Hamilton, Industrial and Strategic Materials Division, Department of State

James Higgins, chief of rubber branch, Business and Defense Services Administration, Department of Commerce

Advisers

Robert A. Badenhop, president, Robert Badenhop Corporation

J. S. Cornell, president, J. S. Cornell Company

Earle S. Ebers, vice president, United States Rubber Company

Bancroft W. Henderson, managing director, International Institute of Synthetic Rubber Producers, Inc.

J. W. Keener, president, B. F. Goodrich Company

W. E. Klippert, vice president, Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company

James G. Paterson, president, H. A. Astlett and Company

Leonard A. Wohler, manager of rubber purchases, Firestone Tire and Rubber Company

The International Rubber Study Group provides a forum for consultation among principal producing and consuming countries on questions relating to production, consumption, and international trade in rubber. It collects and publishes statistics and other information on production, consumption, and trade. The United States is one of the founders of IRSG, and the first meeting was held at Washington in January 1945.

One of the important items to be discussed at this session will be the current and prospective developments in the use of natural rubber and of synthetic rubber.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Designations

Charlotte Moton Hubbard as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 214 dated May 7.)

TREATY INFORMATION

United States and Canada Hold Civil Air Transport Talks

ANNOUNCEMENT OF TALKS

The Department of State announced on April 20 (press release 171) that delegations representing the United States and Canadian Governments would commence negotiations at Washington on April 27 to revise the United States–Canadian Air Transport Services Agreement of 1949.[1]

The Canadian delegation will be headed by Frederick T. Wood, Chairman of the Air Transport Board of Canada, and will include also officials from the Department of External Affairs, the Department of Transport, and the Air Transport Board. The U.S. delegation will be under the chairmanship of Allen R. Ferguson, Coordinator of International Aviation Affairs, Department of State. The U.S. delegation will also include Chan Gurney, member of the Civil Aeronautics Board, and members of the staffs of the Board and the Department of State.

Civil air transport questions were discussed by Prime Minister [Lester B.] Pearson and the late President Kennedy at their meeting in Hyannis Port in May 1963.[2] At that time it was agreed that discussions would be initiated to study air travel arrangements between the two countries from the point of view of the traveling public and the airlines concerned. Subsequently President Kennedy requested Professor John Kenneth Galbraith of Harvard to study this question. During August of 1963 Professor Galbraith held extensive discussions in Washington and Ottawa with government

[1] Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1934, 3456, and 4213.

[2] For text of joint communique, see BULLETIN of May 27, 1963, p. 815.

officials and representatives of the airlines of both countries.

In his report to President Kennedy, Professor Galbraith expressed the view that the present agreement in several instances imposes patterns of service inconvenient for the traveling public and inefficient for the airlines operating the routes. Professor Galbraith recommended that new arrangements be negotiated which would: (a) as nearly as possible accommodate the travel habits of the people of the two countries with a minimum of artificial restraint arising from the international frontier; (b) provide opportunity for the carriers to make optimum use of modern equipment; and (c) provide for equitable access to the traffic between the two countries by the airlines of the two countries.

Professor Galbraith's report was discussed with and received the concurrence of the agencies of the U.S. Government most closely concerned with these questions. After having been submitted to the President it was made available to the Canadian Government. The two Governments subsequently agreed to enter into negotiations for revision of the agreement taking into account Professor Galbraith's recommendations.

President Johnson and Prime Minister Pearson at their meeting in Washington in January 1964 [3] agreed that negotiations should begin in the near future.

TEXT OF JOINT STATEMENT

Press release 201 dated May 2

The United States and Canadian delegations concluded in Washington on Friday, May 1, 1964, the first round of discussions regarding the renegotiation of the Canada-United States bilateral Air Transport Services Agreement. It was agreed that there had been a fruitful exchange of views, and that the second round of these negotiations would begin on July 13, 1964. In the interval work related to the second session will go forward in a number of joint working groups.

[3] *Ibid.*, Feb. 10, 1964, p. 199.

Air Transport Services Agreement Signed With U.A.R.

Press release 206 dated May 5

The United Arab Republic and the United States signed at Cairo on May 5 a bilateral Air Transport Services Agreement, which was initialed *ad referendum* February 4, 1963.[1] The agreement was signed on behalf of their Governments by Ahmad Seif, Director General for Civil Aviation of the U.A.R., and John S. Badeau, U.S. Ambassador to the U.A.R.

The agreement is a revision of the 1946 Air Transport Agreement between the United States and Egypt.[2] It is a more modern version of the standard air transport agreement and as such contains articles on rates and capacity which are in conformity with those included in most of the present agreements of the United States. The agreement defines the routes to the United States which a carrier designated by the U.A.R. will be permitted to serve. The 1946 agreement granted such a route or routes, but left their specific designation to be determined at a later date. Subsequent to issuance by the U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board of a foreign air-carrier permit, the carrier designated by the U.A.R. will be permitted to fly to New York via (a) Greece, Italy, Switzerland, France, and Ireland, and (b) Greece, Italy, Switzerland, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, and Ireland.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Convention on international civil aviation. Done at Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force April 4, 1947. TIAS 1591.
Adherence deposited: Kenya, May 1, 1964.

Law of the Sea

Convention on fishing and conservation of living resources of the high seas. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958.[3]

[1] BULLETIN of Feb. 25, 1963, p. 297.

[2] Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1727.

[3] Not in force.

Notification that it considers itself bound: Jamaica, April 16, 1964.

Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Done at Moscow August 5, 1963. Entered into force October 10, 1963. TIAS 5433.
Ratifications deposited: Ecuador, May 6, 1964; Iran, May 5, 1964.

Telecommunications

Telegraph regulations (Geneva revision, 1958) annexed to the international telecommunication convention of December 22, 1952 (TIAS 3266), with appendixes and final protocol. Done at Geneva November 29, 1958. Entered into force January 1, 1960. TIAS 4390.
Notification of approval: Indonesia, March 14, 1964.
Radio regulations, with appendixes, annexed to the international telecommunication convention of December 21, 1959 (TIAS 4892). Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force May 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4893.
Notification of approval: Indonesia, March 14, 1964.

BILATERAL

Bolivia

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of February 4, 1963, as amended (TIAS 5292, 5323, 5479). Effected by exchange of notes at La Paz April 27, 1964. Entered into force April 27, 1964.

China

Agreement for the financing of certain educational and cultural exchange programs. Signed at Taipei April 23, 1964. Entered into force April 23, 1964.
Agreement for financing certain educational exchange programs, as amended (TIAS 3957, 4713). Signed at Nanking November 10, 1947. Entered into force November 10, 1947. TIAS 1687.
Terminated: April 23, 1964 (superseded by agreement of April 23, 1964, *supra*.)

Congo (Léopoldville)

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1701–1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at Léopoldville April 28, 1964. Entered into force April 28, 1964.

India

Agreement concerning trade in cotton textiles. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington April 15, 1964. Entered into force April 15, 1964.
Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of November 26, 1962, as amended (TIAS 5225, 5317, 5424). Effected by exchange of notes at New Delhi April 17, 1964. Entered into force April 17, 1964.

Jamaica

Agreement amending agreement concerning trade in cotton textiles of October 1, 1963 (TIAS 5435). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington March 31 and April 17, 1964. Entered into force April 17, 1964.

United Arab Republic

Air transport services agreement. Signed at Cairo May 5, 1964. Entered into force provisionally May 5, 1964. Will enter into force definitively 30 days after the United Arab Republic notifies the United States that its constitutional requirements have been completed.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: May 4–10

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to May 4 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 171 of April 20, 191 of April 28, and 201 of May 2.

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†202	5/4	Manning: Massachusetts Joint Bar-Press Symposium.
*203	5/4	U.S. participation in international conferences.
204	5/4	Delegation to International Rubber Study Group, Tokyo (rewrite).
†205	5/4	Delegation to NATO Council (rewrite).
*186–A	5/5	Rusk: additional remarks at Valparaiso University, April 25.
206	5/5	Air transport services agreement with U.A.R.
207	5/5	Delegation to ICEM (rewrite).
*208	5/5	Harriman: University of Virginia Law School (excerpts).
†209	5/5	Rusk: message to OECD welcoming Japanese membership.
210	5/6	Rwanda credentials (rewrite).
211	5/6	Mauritania credentials (rewrite).
212	5/6	Panama credentials (rewrite).
*213	5/6	Cultural exchange (Balkans).
*214	5/7	Mrs. Hubbard designated Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs (biographic details).
215	5/7	Ball: "NATO and World Responsibilities."
†216	5/8	Rostow: "A Perspective on the Tasks of the 1960's."
*217	5/8	Cleveland: Peace Corps plaque, University of Michigan.
†218	5/8	U.S.-Indian cotton textile agreement.
219	5/8	Rusk: "Atlantic and European Unity" (as-delivered text).
220	5/8	U.S.–Liberian agreements on Free Port and on cultural program.
221	5/8	Williams: departure for Africa.
222	5/8	Rusk: BBC interview.
†224	5/9	Talks with Rumania.

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This 22-page pamphlet is based on an address made by President Lyndon B. Johnson before the Associated Press at New York City on April 20, 1964.

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THE
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BULLETIN

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JUN 15 1964
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June 1, 1964

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North Atlantic Council Meets at The Hague

The North Atlantic Council held its regular spring ministerial meeting at The Hague May 12–14. Following are texts of a statement made by Secretary Rusk at the opening session on May 12 and a communique issued on May 14, together with a list of the members of the U.S. delegation.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY RUSK, MAY 12

It is my high privilege, as this year's honorary President of the NATO Council, to open the spring meeting of the NATO ministers. And, on behalf of all members of the North Atlantic alliance, it gives me particular pleasure to thank the Government of the Netherlands for their warm welcome and the excellent arrangements they have made for us. All of us have looked forward with keen anticipation to our meeting at The Hague, both because of its beauty as a city and because of the stanch support which the Government of the Netherlands and the Dutch people have given to NATO.

At a risk of repeating some of the thoughts of my distinguished Dutch colleague and host, Dr. [J. M. A. H.] Luns, I should like to reflect for a few moments upon the fact that NATO is 15 years old this spring. Fifteen years are not long in the life of mankind, but they are long when compared with the lives of some of the transitory alliances of convenience of the past. These 15 years have witnessed great cooperative achievements. NATO's accomplishments are especially noteworthy when weighed against the situation facing the countries of the West when NATO was founded.

Beyond question, NATO has been a fundamental success:

—since its creation, no part of NATO territory has fallen to the Communists;

—in terms of the basic purpose for which it was founded—the defense of the West—there has been complete NATO unity, in the face of hostile threats or pressure;

—NATO has provided the shield behind which the countries of the Atlantic world have attained unparalleled economic well-being and political stability;

—finally, continuing NATO strength and cohesion give the Western Powers a solid base from which to attempt to solve East-West prob-

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lems looking toward a more stable and secure world.

It is not, I think, an exaggeration to say that NATO's first 15 years have been among the most constructive in the history of human freedom. And, for this, NATO deserves no small part of the credit.

We should not, however, let NATO's success blind us to current dangers. Certain of these dangers seem to have diminished; but they can reappear suddenly and without warning. The need for a strong alliance of North Atlantic nations remains essential so long as basic Communist aims remain unchanged.

Consequently, we must continue to maintain NATO's basic military strength as we look to the future. Without letting down our guard, we must adapt NATO to the current international environment—to a period in which certain tensions in Europe appear to have been somewhat relaxed and Communist tactics have been modified to meet new requirements, but in which Communist objectives continue to pose a direct threat to the free world.

In short, since NATO continues as a fundamental instrument of collective endeavor for the countries of the North Atlantic, it must adapt itself to a situation in which the Communist threat takes more diversified and more sophisticated forms; to a situation in which the cohesive element in this alliance must depend upon something more than an imminent military threat. How well we succeed in adjusting to these new requirements will be the critical test for the alliance in the years ahead.

The tasks of democracy are never finished. All of us have a stake in every part of the unfinished business of human freedom. We in the United States are facing up to our own biggest piece of unfinished business—in trying to establish once and for all full equality of rights in our complex society.

Just as it is within each of our nations, so it is with our alliance. It is natural for us, as free men, not to dwell on what we have achieved but to think about next steps. Because all of us have the habit of paying attention to the future, we are interested in suggestions for improvements in NATO.

We in the United States look upon the North Atlantic alliance as an expression of an enduring community of interests and of abiding common commitments to great humane traditions. We are prepared to move ahead with our NATO partners in strengthening the institutions of the North Atlantic community.

We must better develop the process of political consultation so that, as a matter of agreed practice, each of us consults his partners in advance on those policy decisions directly affecting the interest of NATO as a whole.

We must recognize also that NATO's success has somewhat deflected the Communist threat against Europe itself. The Communists are concentrating their expansionist efforts on other areas of the world.

It is essential to the security of the free world that aggression be eradicated—aggression everywhere by whatever means, including subversion, terror, infiltration of arms and trained men, and guerrilla warfare. It is essential that Communists everywhere learn that they cannot expect to gain from a policy of militancy.

The North Atlantic community and Japan are also the principal sources of capital and technical assistance for the developing countries. Men everywhere know that they are no longer sentenced by Nature to starvation or bare existence. They know that modern technology makes possible a decent life. And they are determined to achieve a better life for themselves and their children. There can be neither stability nor enduring prosperity for anybody in a world divided between haves and have-nots. All of the industrially advanced nations of the free world have a long-term vital interest in the economic and social advance of less developed nations.

Let me conclude these brief remarks with a word of appreciation and gratitude to our devoted Secretary General, Dr. Dirk Stikker, who has indicated his desire to relinquish the duties and burdens of office which he has carried in such a distinguished fashion for the past 3 years. All of us are sorry to see Dr. Stikker go. In his career and in his basic philosophy, no man has better personified the true meaning of NATO. And I think it is most appropriate that he should preside over his last ministerial meeting in The Hague, the seat of the govern-

ment of the country which he has served so long and so well.

A short time ago President Johnson [1] expressed our heartfelt feeling of warmth and appreciation for Dr. Stikker in these words:

As its Secretary General he has effectively and imaginatively guided NATO's activities so as to develop the strength of the alliance while seeking to adjust its role to the changing world situation.

He has courageously and impartially championed measures which he considered essential to the growth and integrity of NATO. A wise, distinguished, and experienced international servant, he has recognized that if the ultimate strength of the alliance depends on the collective will of its members, its Secretary General could through vigorous leadership and skillful diplomacy contribute significantly to NATO's cohesion and effectiveness.

I am certain that all of us would echo these sentiments. And I know that I speak for all who are present—indeed, for all those who have contributed to the work of NATO—in saluting our esteemed Secretary General and in wishing him many years of happiness and fulfillment.

TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE, MAY 14

Press release 237 dated May 15

The North Atlantic Council held its Spring Ministerial Meeting at The Hague from 12th to 14th May, 1964.

The Ministers reviewed the international situation. They discussed the annual political appraisal of the state of the Alliance presented by the Secretary-General. They emphasized the role of the Atlantic Alliance as the indispensable guardian of security and peace, and thus as the prerequisite for social and economic progress.

The Ministers reaffirmed their determination to achieve a genuine relaxation of tension in international relations. Although in recent months no serious crises have arisen in Europe, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has nevertheless continued to try to exert different forms of pressure. The Communist countries continue their various efforts to extend their system to the whole world. The fundamental causes of tension in the world therefore persist.

In particular, no solution has yet been found for the problems of Germany and Berlin. The Council reaffirmed that a just and peaceful solution to the problem of Germany can be reached only on the basis of the right of self-determination, and agreed that every suitable opportunity should be taken to bring nearer to realization the wish of the German people for reunification in freedom, and thereby ensure an enduring peace in Central Europe. This problem will continue to be examined. The Council also reaffirmed that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is the only German Government freely and legitimately constituted and therefore entitled to speak for Germany as the Representative of the German people in international affairs. With regard to Berlin, the Alliance stands by the terms of its Declaration of 16th December, 1958.[2]

The Ministers noted with satisfaction that limited steps had recently been taken towards arresting the arms race. They reiterated their desire to bring about a settlement of the basic problems of disarmament, but noted that such a prospect would remain remote as long as the Soviet Union refused to accept effective measures of control and inspection.

In present circumstances, the members of the Alliance are in duty bound to improve their overall defensive capability. They will strengthen their unity by extending and deepening their political consultation. They will intensify their economic effort in order to raise living standards, whether of their own peoples or in developing countries.

The Ministers, referring to the previous resolution concerning the study of the military and economic problems of the defense of the Southeastern region of NATO,[3] expressed the wish that the conclusions of this study be submitted at the next Ministerial Meeting.

The Ministers expressed their concern at the situation in this region arising from the continuing disorders in Cyprus. They reaffirmed the full support of their governments for the action decided on by the United Nations Organization with a view to restoring law and order, and for the efforts of the mediator appointed by the United Nations to seek an agreed solution of the problem.

The Ministers expressed their deep regret at the impending departure of Mr. Dirk U. Stikker, who had announced his intention of retiring from the Secretary-Generalship of the Organization. In their tributes to Mr. Stikker, who was one of those who signed the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, the Ministers expressed their profound appreciation of his outstanding services to the Alliance.

The Council invited Signor Manlio Brosio, former Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister in the Italian Government and at present Italian Ambassador in Paris, to become Secretary-General of the Organization in succession to Mr. Stikker as from 1 August, 1964. Signor Brosio has informed the Council of his acceptance of this invitation.

The next Ministerial Meeting will be held in Paris in December 1964.

[1] In a telegram to Ambassador Thomas K. Finletter dated Apr. 2.

[2] For text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 5, 1959, p. 4.

[3] For text of a communique dated Dec. 18, 1963, see *ibid.*, Jan. 6, 1964, p. 30.

MEMBERS OF U.S. DELEGATION

The Department of State announced on May 4 (press release 205) that the following would be members of the U.S. delegation to the annual spring meeting of foreign ministers of the North Atlantic Council at The Hague May 12–14:

United States Representative

Dean Rusk, *chairman*, Secretary of State

United States Representative on the North Atlantic Council

Thomas K. Finletter

Advisers

John W. Auchineloss, Deputy Director, Office of Political Affairs, U.S. Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations, Paris

Elbridge Durbrow, Deputy U.S. Representative on the North Atlantic Council

Philip J. Farley, Director, Office of Political Affairs, U.S. Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations, Paris

Brig. Gen. J. T. Folda, Jr., USA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

Ernest K. Lindley, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State

Edward S. Little, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State

Robert J. Manning, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs

David H. Popper, *deputy coordinator*, Director, Office of Atlantic Political and Military Affairs, Department of State

John S. Rice, U.S. Ambassador to the Netherlands

Henry S. Rowen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

J. Robert Schaetzel, *coordinator*, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

J. Harold Shullaw, Director, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Department of State

Ronald I. Spiers, Deputy Director, Office of Atlantic Political and Military Affairs, Department of State

Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representative to the United Nations

Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador at Large, Department of State

William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

Christopher Van Hollen, Office of Atlantic Political and Military Affairs, Department of State.

U.S. Welcomes Japanese Membership in OECD

Message From Secretary Rusk [1]

I would like on this significant occasion to express the great pleasure of the people and Government of the United States that Japan has become a full member of the OECD.[2] Even before this organization was established, Japan's role as a contributor of economic assistance to the developing countries merited her membership in the Development Assistance Group. The United States has always believed that the effectiveness of the OECD as one of the major instruments of free-world economic cooperation required the participation of Japan in all OECD activities. The reasons for this are clear: The size of Japan's economy, its dramatic postwar economic growth under conditions of freedom, the significant place of Japan in international trade and economic relations—all underline the importance of broad-scale economic cooperation between this key area of the Far East and the other members of the OECD. With Japan as a full and willing partner in the OECD this vital institution will be better able to meet the economic challenges of today.

Letters of Credence

Ireland

The newly appointed Ambassador of Ireland, William P. Fay, presented his credentials to President Johnson on May 15. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 235 dated May 15.

[1] Read to the Council of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development at Paris on May 5 by John M. Leddy, U.S. Representative to the OECD (press release 209).

[2] Japan deposited its instrument of ratification on Apr. 28.

President Johnson Pledges Redoubled Efforts to Alliance for Progress

On May 11 the ambassadors of the Latin American nations met with President Johnson at the White House for an informal review of the Alliance for Progress and the signing of 12 Alliance for Progress agreements involving 13 countries. Following are remarks made by the President at the signing ceremony.

White House press release ; as-delivered text

Ladies and gentlemen: I want to welcome you to the White House this evening. I am slightly tardy because we have just completed an informal review of the Alliance for Progress problems with all of the ambassadors and the distinguished head of CIAP [Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress]. This kind of exchange, we think, strengthens our common aim and our combined ability to advance the alliance.

So this afternoon I asked all of the ambassadors to meet with me in the Cabinet Room. I am not sure I didn't have a better Cabinet today than I normally have. We talked about our mutual problems, and then I asked them to give me their frank, candid criticisms, suggestions on the problems that face us both, and they were quite helpful.

I learned much that will be very helpful in the days ahead—some of the weaker points that they pointed out, some of the bureaucracy that exists in all government, not just in our government but in their governments as well.

I look forward to further meetings of this kind in the days ahead, and I have asked the Secretary of State to make plans to have the ambassadors in from time to time to have a very frank and open exchange with them. Senator [Wayne] Morse taught me back in the Senate that you could always deal with a fellow across the table easier than you could if you tried to deal with him by correspondence.

On November 18th President Kennedy spoke once again to the hemisphere,[1] and he quoted Robert Frost, saying that "Nothing is true except a man or men adhere to it—to live for it, to spend themselves on it, to die for it." Within a week after that statement was made, his life, consecrated to this cause, had been tragically ended. It is for us, the living, to insure that the hopes that he raised are rewarded.

To that purpose, I said last November, let us make the Alliance for Progress President Kennedy's living memorial.[2]

Today's agreements are part of our pledge. The United States will provide almost $40 million—the countries of Latin America will provide $60 million—for projects that we are beginning in 13 countries. These projects will help eliminate malaria in Brazil. They will help train farmers in Bolivia. They will establish for the first time three rural electric cooperatives serving 10,000 homes and farms in the countryside of Colombia. They will bring credit and assistance to 21,000 small farms in the land reform and colonization areas of Peru. They will touch the lives and ease the struggles of 23 million people across our hemisphere.

These are only the latest steps in 6 months of very extraordinary effort since I became President. Since last December the United States has extended more than $430 million in assistance. In that 6-month period, we have, by working together, completed more than 52,000 homes, 7,000 new classrooms. We have produced more than a million and a half school-

[1] For text, see BULLETIN of Dec. 9, 1963, p. 900.
[2] *Ibid.*, Dec. 16, 1963, p. 912.

books. We have made more than 25,000 loans to farmers. We have put into operation health programs to care for 4 million people and Food for Peace programs to feed more than 10 million of our fellow Americans. We have built more than 500 miles of roads. We have trained more than 10,000 teachers. We have trained more than 1,000 public administrators. We have established already more than 200 credit unions. If any of you want the address after the meeting, I will be glad to supply it to you. We have 300 water systems that will benefit 10 million people.

In the months to come, we intend to more than double the pace of this action. For this is the time and this is the day and this is an administration of action.

Development, Diversity, and Democracy

Our help is only a small proportion of the resources for growth and the reforms for justice contributed by all of you—you, the countries of Latin America. These are the tangible tokens of the constancy of our cause since the signing of the Charter of Punta del Este. What we believed in then—I should not have to repeat—we stand for now. What we agreed to then, we support now. What we sought and looked forward to then, we seek now.

This is as it must be. Our programs and our policies are not founded on the shifting sands of momentary concern or the passing opinions of any one official or any present official. They are the inescapable issue of the events of our past and the hazards of our present.

When President Kennedy made his first statement to the ambassadors in the dining room of this house on the Alliance for Progress, he said we are going to wage a war on the ancient enemies of mankind—poverty, illiteracy, and disease. We say now, if a peaceful revolution is impossible, a violent revolution is inevitable.

These things are rooted in our devotion to our democratic birthright and dedication to our spiritual values. They are, I want you to know, in short, the only objectives possible to men that seek to retain freedom and protect moral values while pursuing progress in a world that is on the march.

Real problems require realistic solutions. Helping to reshape an entire hemisphere requires practical priorities and concrete deeds. But no action, no judgment, no statement will advance our alliance unless it is guided by firm and resolute regard to principles. Those principles must not yield either to immediate expedient or to any present danger.

So we come here today to renew, as we do in the acts of every day, our dedication to the principles of development, of diversity, and of democracy.

Franklin Roosevelt, a man whom I served and a man whom I loved, a man whose precepts I follow, said, and I quote, "Through democratic processes we can strive to achieve for the Americas the highest possible living standards for all of our people." So I pledge to you today that we will continue to pursue that goal until every *campesino*, every worker, is freed from the crushing weight of poverty, disease, and illiteracy and ignorance.

I have asked the Congress for the funds necessary to meet our obligation under the Alliance for Progress.[3] I will fight for those funds with every resource of my Government. Furthermore, I intend to ask for $250 million this year to replenish the Bank's Fund for Special Operations in accordance with the unanimous vote of the Panama meeting of the Inter-American Bank.[4] That Bank, supported first by President Eisenhower, has become a beacon of hope to the oppressed of our lands.

The principle of diversity stems from President Roosevelt's policy of the Good Neighbor. Within the loose and ample frame of the inter-American system there is room for each nation to order its institutions and to organize its economy so long as it respects the rights of its neighbors. In the councils of the alliance we must guide each other toward the most rewarding course of progress. We do not confuse that duty and that responsibility with any desire or any right to impose those views on unwilling neighbors.

---

[3] For text of President Johnson's foreign aid message of Mar. 19, see *ibid.*, Apr. 6, 1964, p. 578.

[4] For a statement made by Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon before the Governors of the Inter-American Development Bank at Panamá on Apr. 14, see *ibid.*, May 4, 1964, p. 717.

In devotion to democracy, we are guided by the command of Bolívar that we must fearlessly lay the foundations of South American liberty: To hesitate is destruction.

Our charter charges each American country to seek and to strengthen representative democracy. Without that democracy and without the freedom that it nourishes, material progress is an aimless enterprise, destroying the dignity of the spirit that it is really meant to liberate. So we will continue to join with you to encourage democracy until we build a hemisphere of free nations from the Tierra del Fuego to the Arctic Circle.

A New Hemisphere

But the charter of the alliance is not confined to political democracy. It commands a peaceful, democratic, social revolution across the hemisphere. It calls upon us to throw open the gates of opportunity to the landless and the despised, to throw open the gates of opportunity to the poor and to the oppressed. It asks that unjust privilege be ended and that unfair power be curbed.

The United States signed that charter. We are fulfilling that commitment. We have already begun an all-out war on poverty in this country, for a just country cannot permit a class of forsaken in the midst of the affluent and the fortunate. We are also marching forward in our struggle to eliminate racial injustice, to permit every man of every race, of every color, of every belief, to share fully in America's national life.

In the same way we will join with those forces across the hemisphere who seek to advance their own democratic revolution. We are finding in the United States that it is not easy to change the customs of centuries. Some seek to halt reform and change. Others seek to impose terror and tyranny. But Bolívar's wisdom is our warning: To hesitate is destruction.

I know my country's policies and my country's help are very important to the Alliance for Progress. But in 1961 a new hemisphere began to be born. In that hemisphere, success or failure does not hinge on testing each shifting wind or each new word which comes from our neighbors. Rather, it depends on the courage and the leadership that we can bring to our own people in our own land. I am doing my dead-level best to provide that leadership in my country now.

The Alliance for Progress, true, is a most complex task. It has many dimensions and many directions. But it does rest on the hopes of people much like those that I have seen in my recent trips through the poverty areas of the United States.

In the last 13 days I have personally met the people in 13 States.

Across this hemisphere there are millions of despairing men and women that I hope to meet when I can get away from Washington. They come to birth, they toil, and they die, never knowing a day without hunger. They never feel the joy of rewarded achievement. They never feel the pride that comes from providing for those they love. They struggle for their self-respect, for their dignity as one of the children of God, against those who exploit them in a world which is closed to their hopes. Faces bent and backs bowed, they see ahead of them only that darkness in which they walk.

Well, we work for these men and women not because we have to. We work because morality commands it, and I said in Atlanta the other morning justice requires it and our own dignity as men depends on it. We work not because we fear the unjust wrath of an enemy—because we do fear the just wrath of God.

The path ahead, I can tell you, is long and the way is hard. There will be many editorials written about us, and there will be many complaints spoken of us. But we must, in the words of the prophet, "Mount up on the wings of eagles, run and not grow weary."

We have reached a turning point.

The foundations have been laid. The time calls for more action and not just more words. In the next year there will be twice as much action, twice as much accomplished as in any previous year in this program. I can say that today with confidence, and I can say that our Alliance for Progress will succeed. The success of our effort—the efforts of your countries and my country—will indicate to those who

come after us the vision of those who set us on this path.

Today, in this room, you have not only the great ambassadors and spokesmen of the great Republics which are part of this worthy endeavor, but you have the leaders in the Congress of both parties whose first concern is humanity, wherever it exists, and who dedicate their lives and their talents and their energies to seeing that their country does her part, and more, in driving the ancient enemies of mankind from this hemisphere.[5]

[5] At the conclusion of the signing ceremony, President Johnson announced that the United States was proposing W. W. Rostow to be the U.S. Representative on the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress, succeeding Teodoro Moscoso. Mr. Rostow, he said, would hold this office in addition to his present appointment as Counselor of the Department of State.

The Alliance for Progress

by Thomas C. Mann
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs [1]

The ultimate purpose of the Alliance for Progress is to help the people—all of the people—of the hemisphere to achieve a better life in freedom. Both the Bogotá and Punta del Este charters speak not only about economic growth but about social justice and the dignity and freedom of the individual.

All of this is consistent with our tradition. As a nation and as individuals we have always been deeply concerned with the well-being of people in other lands as well as for those in our own. This is the concern of the good neighbor.

Being a good neighbor not only reflects our national character but also serves our national interests. Our Latin American policy has as its principal objective the achievement of an American family of democratic, dynamic, prosperous, free nations, each capable of playing its role in a healthy and peaceful world community. This objective cannot be achieved in a hemisphere of frustration, stagnation, and hopelessness.

The Issue of Change

There are those who oppose any and all change—who seek to preserve archaic practices and attitudes which are the legacy of an age already past.

This group is few in number. Their influence on government policies throughout the hemisphere is diminishing with each passing day. As President Johnson said the other day: [2]

> To struggle to stand still in Latin America is just to "throw the sand against the wind."

I should like to state in the very beginning—and to say it very clearly—that the Government and people of the United States do not forget that their own nation was born in revolution. Nor can we forget that the process of social,

[1] Address made before the Washington Institute of Foreign Affairs at Washington, D.C., on May 13 (press release 227).

[2] For text of an address made by President Johnson before the Associated Press at New York on Apr. 20, see BULLETIN of May 11, 1964, p. 726.

economic, and political change in our country has been continuous since 1776. It still goes on. We still seek that kind of change which will bring about the greatest good for the greatest number of our people.

We therefore have a natural sympathy and affinity for those governments who seek change and progress. Those governments which institute bold, soundly conceived programs of reform designed to achieve

national and individual freedom,
a high and sustained level of economic growth,
a greater degree of social justice, and
equal opportunity for all to rise as high in society as their talents and efforts will take them,

will find warmhearted sympathy in Washington. Those who seek to portray the United States as the defender of the *status quo* are deluding themselves. For as President Johnson has said, we, as a nation, are dedicated to "the principles of development, of diversity, and of democracy." This dedication commands change. We are seeking, as the President also said, "to retain freedom and protect moral values while pursuing progress in a world that is on the march." [3]

There is another group, equally small in number, who seem to favor any and all change without adequate thought as to whether it brings in its train

the destruction of freedom, national and individual, political as well as economic;
the destruction, root and branch, of established orders—of the good as well as the bad in existing political, economic, and social systems;
the creation of a new, privileged class and inequality of opportunity instead of social justice;
economic retrogression instead of progress.

At the same time our Government began, the French Revolution was temporarily diverted from its noble design into a reign of terror and chaos. In his analysis of how this came about, De Tocqueville reminds us:

> When we closely study the French Revolution we find that it was conducted in precisely the same spirit as that which gave rise to so many books expounding theories of government in the abstract. Our revolutionaries had the same fondness for broad generalizations, cut-and-dried legislative systems, and a pedantic symmetry; the same contempt for hard facts;—the same desire to reconstruct the entire constitution according to the rules of logic and a preconceived system instead of trying to rectify its faulty parts. The result was nothing short of disastrous. . . .

We need to ask ourselves whether it is really true that the basic tenets of independence, equality, and freedom in which the peoples of our New World placed their trust are too "slow" and too "evolutionary" for our time. And as we do this, we need to ask for clearer definitions of terms, for greater specificity, for more detail and concreteness, about the other paths that are said to lead more quickly to progress.

I do not share the despair about change that I hear expressed in some quarters.

More and more responsible leaders of organized labor are emerging better able to participate in progress;

An ever-increasing number of hard-working men of conscience from industry, from commerce, from the professional groups, and from agriculture are striving for reform and improvement in the established order;

The church, in many areas, is providing leadership in the fight for progress in freedom;

The military establishments are demonstrating an ever greater degree of social consciousness and political responsibility;

The number of qualified and experienced civil servants capable of coping with the complex economic and social problems of our time is rapidly growing;

Many schools and universities are striving for a higher standard of academic excellence. While our attention is more often drawn to irresponsible acts of a well-organized and noisy minority, the great majority of Latin American students are seriously working to acquire the skills and education necessary to improve themselves and their societies.

Our task is to work with all in every country who work for economic progress and for social justice—to work for unity rather than to encourage divisive hatreds—to help build a better hemisphere.

The Alliance for Progress is more than a statement of high resolve. It provides a pro-

[3] See p. 854.

gram for progress consisting of specific, identifiable parts. One of these is agrarian reform.

The Farmer

More than 50 percent of Latin America's population lives in rural areas. The alliance, therefore, very properly gives a high priority to helping the farmer help himself. It seeks to do this by helping him to increase his production because this is the only way, under any economic system, to increase his income and the income of the society as a whole.

We seek, therefore, a technological revolution in Latin American agriculture such as the one that has taken place in many countries, including the United States. Supervised agricultural credit, various kinds of cooperatives, land improvement programs, technical assistance to farmers, agricultural research programs, diversification of product, wider use of fertilizers, better storage facilities, rural education, community development programs, farm-to-market roads, are some of the components of soundly conceived agrarian reform programs.

Improved land tenure systems aimed at giving more farmers titles to the land they work, and hence greater security and dignity as well as an incentive to produce, are also essential ingredients. In some countries land distribution programs are underway or have already taken place on a large scale; others have long had equitable and efficient land tenure systems. Some are now actively engaged in large-scale settlement of farmers in undeveloped portions of their countries in the general pattern of the western movement of farms in our country; fortunately, most countries have large public domains available for settlement and distribution.

Much has been said about the problems of *latifundia*. But we know from bitter experience that farms can be too small as well as too big. *Minifundia*—farms too small to be economically viable—also limit the ability of the farmer to earn an adequate income. Land distribution, as well as other facets of land reform programs, should have, as a principal objective, increased production, which is the only path to higher levels of farmer income.

And helping the individual farmer also helps the nation. Increased purchasing power of the large farming segment of the population is essential to the creation of adequate domestic markets for the products of domestic industry.

The Worker

The alliance is as concerned about the worker as it is about the farmer. The alliance cannot succeed unless it develops a labor force of growing skills and increasing ability to produce in a modern society.

Free trade-union organizations throughout the hemisphere work to insure that labor receives its fair share of increased productivity. As in agrarian reform, these efforts to achieve a better life for the worker also help expand the purchasing power of the people and hence contribute to the ability of domestic markets to support growing industries.

And the free labor movement has always had as one of its prime objectives the protection and enhancement of the dignity of the individual working man. As his education and standard of living improve, the worker is enabled to make his full contribution to his country's future.

The Need for Capital

Another major factor in the alliance is the need for capital for development both from internal and external sources.

The population of Latin America will, say the demographers, double in about 20 years. This is a fact of outstanding importance.

It means that jobs and food production must be increased at an extraordinary rate, or unemployment and hunger will increase. It means that educational and health and all the other facilities required by civilized man today in our age of rising expectations must be built at the same rapid rate. It means that governments must also promptly provide additional infrastructure required by their growing agriculture and industry. Never in our history have political and economic systems been required to meet so many needs in such a short period of time.

If nations are to meet this challenge, their

economies must obviously have very large amounts of capital for development.

Tax Reform

One way to mobilize capital is, of course, to increase tax revenues substantially. In most countries tax systems still do not bring in sufficient revenue for governments to meet their social and economic responsibilities.

The Charter of Punta del Este [4] speaks of the need to reform tax laws so that those who can afford it will shoulder more of the burden. It calls for the elimination of tax evasion and recognizes that taxes which impede growth must be discouraged. There is, I believe, general agreement that reforms in tax administration are essential so that effective tax collection can be achieved with all taxpayers meeting their obligations.

It is encouraging that many governments are already taking concrete steps to improve collection of taxes already on the books. Good initial results have been achieved in several countries. But these efforts must be continued and the techniques of collection constantly improved.

As the charter makes clear, tax policy, as well as administration, is in need of reform. We have no preconceived notions of how quickly it is feasible to reform tax policy. Each country has its own peculiar problems.

Each country must decide for itself what tax system and tax rate can best provide the largest revenue possible without destroying incentives and without impeding a high and sustained rate of growth. Nearly everyone would agree, for example, that developing countries which need to attract capital for investment in productive enterprise should not have tax rates as high as those of countries which are in an advanced stage of industrialization.

Increased revenues from tax reforms must be accompanied by administrative reforms to assure that those revenues are used wisely for development and progress. If the confidence and cooperation of the taxpayers are to be earned, swollen bureaucracies, misuse of public funds, and deficits in public enterprises must be replaced by efficiency, probity, and sound fiscal practice.

Persons with large incomes serve their own interests by helping to bring about changes necessary if governments are to meet their growing responsibilities to their expanding populations. The middle and professional classes must also bear their fair share of the tax burden.

AID Program

If a greater effort is required of Latin American taxpayers, it is equally essential that our country continue to meet its commitment to supply, through our foreign aid program, that vital margin of resources for development. We shall continue to meet our obligations under the Charter of Punta del Este.

At the same time we must continue to do what we can to encourage other capital-exporting nations to provide a larger volume of capital for Latin America not merely in export credits but in long- and medium-term loans for development.

Loans and, in appropriate cases, grants from foreign governments are an essential ingredient of progress. But they can supply only a fraction of the capital needed. Unless they are accompanied by adequate self-help measures on the part of the developing country itself, the alliance goals will not be achieved. We therefore must continue to relate the amount of our financial assistance to the efforts of the developing country to create conditions propitious for economic growth and social progress.

International Trade

We must also address ourselves to the potentialities of trade as a major source of development capital.

We have entered the Kennedy Round of tariff negotiations [5] within the GATT framework, which will, we hope, further reduce United States tariff barriers to Latin American exports. Meanwhile developing nations are meeting at Geneva, under the auspices of the United Nations, to advance proposals of their own for increasing trade, for broadening their access to

[4] For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463.

[5] See p. 878.

markets in the industrial countries. Some of the proposals have been supported by the United States for some time. Others are new and will require study. The Under Secretary of State, Mr. Ball, recently discussed some of the complex considerations which must be taken into account.[6] We are participating in the conference with a sincere desire to search for sound, fair, and constructive ways to help Latin America acquire foreign exchange needed for development.

In order to expand exports from Latin America greater attention needs to be paid to developing mass national markets and in some cases regional markets, for the test of ability to compete in international trade is the ability to develop extensive markets for manufactures at home. This is one reason why high priority is being given to raising productivity and income in rural areas and to modernizing systems of marketing. It is also a reason why Latin America should aim at larger scale and lower cost production of manufactured goods.

A source of great encouragement in the field of regional trade has been the successful beginning of the Central American Common Market. The breakdown of trade barriers within that region is creating a larger market and thus providing the necessary incentive to greater investment and production.

Similarly, LAFTA [Latin American Free Trade Association] provides an opportunity for greater regional integration and trade.

This hemisphere offers an ever-expanding market, and the development of trade within the hemisphere deserves and will receive our urgent attention.

Coffee

Any mention of trade would be incomplete without specific reference to coffee, which is of such importance to so many Latin American economies.

Unfortunately the achievement of an International Coffee Agreement, after years of effort, was accompanied by acts of nature which destroyed production and created a temporary imbalance in world supply and demand which, in turn, brought about rapid and sharp increases in coffee prices.

The agreement did not bring about the recent fluctuations in price. Once fully operative, it is expected to prevent violent price swings which historically have plagued the world coffee industry, at times have harmed the consumers, and at other times have plunged various Latin American economies into economic stagnation and recession.

Given a fair chance to prove its value to consumer and producer alike, and given the kind of cooperation and fair play we have the right to expect from both producing and consuming nations, this agreement can be an important factor for progress. We shall continue to support it.

Domestic Private Capital

Most industry and agriculture in Latin America is privately and domestically owned. About 90 percent of private-sector capital investment in expanding industry and agriculture is domestic, not foreign. If this hemisphere is to achieve and maintain the high and sustained rate of economic growth so urgently needed to meet rising expectations and to keep pace with the population increase, the role and responsibilities of domestic private capital in the development process need to be better understood.

Clearly the tax revenues of governments, even when they are substantially increased, as they must be, will be inadequate to finance industrial and agricultural expansion; a large part of domestic public-sector funds must be invested in economic infrastructure, education, health, and social projects, which the private sector cannot finance. It is equally clear that public- and private-sector funds of foreign, capital-exporting nations, including the United States, can supply only a small part of the capital required to finance the rapid expansion needed to prevent rising unemployment and hunger.

Great dependence must therefore be placed on the domestic private sector.

If the domestic private sector is to play its vital role, it must be more venturesome, more

[6] For text of a statement made by Mr. Ball before the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development at Geneva on Mar. 25, see BULLETIN of Apr. 20, 1964, p. 634.

imaginative, and more willing than it has been in the past to risk its capital in job-producing industries which can supply the goods needed by their peoples.

Governments have a heavy responsibility in this regard. They must create the conditions favorable for expansion, growth, and prosperity by giving to their own people a sense of faith and confidence; by following the fiscal and monetary policies which make large-scale domestic savings and private investments feasible; by giving leadership and direction to the development process; and by discouraging too much investment in real estate and other investments which are marginal from the standpoint of economic development.

How many times have we seen governments, in order to gain an imagined short-term political advantage, destroy confidence that the legitimate rights of their own private capital, and even the government's contracts, will be respected? How many times have we seen governments fail, for some imagined political advantage, to prevent runaway inflation? How many times have we seen governments destroy the confidence of their own people by openly collaborating with Communist political groups as if they believed tyranny rather than freedom is the "wave of the future," by issuing demagogic statements, by professing exotic doctrines, and by promoting class hatred?

The result is always the same. Domestic capital takes flight to foreign countries. Domestic capital already abroad is not repatriated. Domestic capital which remains in the country is not invested in expansion and new enterprises. Economic growth rates decline. Balance-of-payments deficits grow. Confidence in the stability of currencies is undermined.

Neither economic nor social progress is possible when these conditions prevail.

Foreign Private Capital

The foreign private investor contributes only about 10 percent of the total private-sector investment in growth. But because the foreign investor brings with him his own capital, the benefits of research, advanced technology, and know-how, he makes a much greater contribution than the percentage suggests.

Contrary to some assertions, the United States has no internal economic reason to urge its private investors on any foreign country. Any sovereign government has a right to decide for itself whether or not it will accept foreign investors. And we prefer that our investors go only where they are welcome even though this may mean a reduction in the rate of growth of those which reject it.

In our country we have reason to be proud of the modern role of our private sector. As our capital moves abroad, investors must be alert to the needs and aspirations of the countries in which they are to invest and work. The social consciousness of the foreign investor, his role in labor relations, and his attitudes toward the host country need continual review by the investor to assure that his investment will make a successful contribution to development.

We do believe, however, that when United States investors are invited to participate in the economic development of other countries they are entitled not to privileged but to fair, nondiscriminatory, and nonconfiscatory treatment.

For those countries which welcome United States private investors, we offer, and will continue to support, investment guaranties and other incentives to encourage growth-producing private investment in this hemisphere.

Social Justice

Economic growth is not, of course, the only goal of the Alliance for Progress. We place equal emphasis on social justice, for rising national incomes are not the only measure of the well-being of societies and the individuals that compose them. We seek societies based on social justice in which the fruits of production are widely and fairly shared, in which the farmer owns his own land and the worker benefits fairly from his labor, in which educational and health facilities are available to all, in which equal opportunity and individual dignity have real meaning in the life of all the people.

Each nation of the alliance has its own problems in reaching the goal of social justice. Each must seek its national way. Neither conformity nor uniformity is desirable or feasible.

The experience of the United States has rele-

vance. We have used our tax system, for example, as an instrument for achieving social justice, by placing the burden on those best able to bear it, by reducing excessive disparities in the income of our people, and by using the revenues from that system to provide for education, health facilities, and other services needed by the people, while at the same time maintaining the incentives of individuals and business to save and invest—to contribute, in a word, to national growth.

In the United States we still have far to go in eliminating poverty and assuring equal rights and opportunity for all. But it is also true that we have achieved a great deal. We need not apologize for our social and economic systems. Through our tax systems, our judicial systems, and a variety of other means, the record of social achievement in the United States has been impressive. This country has experienced a continuously rising curve of individual productivity and unmatched domestic purchasing power. No economic system in the world pays so well its workers in the factories and on the farms, its teachers, and its professional people—all of those who produce goods or render services. And under no other system has there been more success in achieving an equitable distribution of the national product and in preventing the exploitation of man by man. We have, under our system, achieved a large degree of social justice—and we have the framework under which more progress is made each day.

The Future

Finally, I should like to say a few words about the spirit of the alliance and the hope which it inspired in the hearts of men throughout the hemisphere.

Hope and spirit are not only important; they are essential to the success of the alliance. But in the long run the best way to nourish hope is by solid achievement. And the way to get solid achievement is to identify the obstacles in the way of progress and then to cooperate in their removal.

There is no quick, easy, cheap way to success. The road is long, and our task will require courage, steady nerves, and sacrifice by all the peoples of the hemisphere.

I do not think we should arouse false hopes in this complex and dangerous world we live in. Nor do I think that the alliance is on the road to failure.

Great progress has been made in the last few years. Many countries are marching forward in the quest for progress under the alliance. Others unfortunately face internal problems at the moment, some serious and some less formidable.

But the nations of the hemisphere have demonstrated their firm intention of dealing with their problems and of trying to meet the challenges of the coming years. By common agreement, an Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress has been established under the leadership of a distinguished hemisphere statesman, Sr. Carlos Sanz de Santamaría. Its task is to provide leadership, guidance, and assistance to all the signers of the Charter of Punta del Este in the formulation and implementation of social and economic policies designed to bring a better life to all the peoples of the continent.

What is needed today is a rededication by all the American peoples, from the Great Lakes to the Straits of Magellan, to the noblest of all alliances: an alliance not to prepare for war but to make the blessings of peace available to all; not to defend what is bad in the established order but to defend freedom and produce what we need; not to deny opportunity to anyone but to make the circle large enough for everyone. Let us, through this alliance, make the Americas one great community, where every man, woman, and child is free, equal, and as prosperous as enterprise and talent allow.

This is the dream of Simon Bolívar and Thomas Jefferson.

The United States is fully and irrevocably committed to this program. Our pledge to cooperate with the nations of Latin America in making it succeed is secure. Our dedication has not slackened. The dream will come true. How soon will depend on our collective wisdom, our will, and our courage.

A Perspective on the Tasks of the 1960's

by W. W. Rostow
Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council [1]

The world of government, as you know, is a world of practical, concrete tasks. Every step taken in foreign policy, in military policy, or in policy here at home requires that an enormous number of factors be taken into account. Legitimate interests, domestic and foreign; the limits and possibilities of our democratic procedures; a wide array of hard, technical facts—all this and more must be woven into the making of national policy or the design and passage of a piece of legislation.

The tasks of government lie, as it were, in the domain of engineering and art, not pure science or abstract ideas, although, as with engineering and art, science and ideas are a fundamental part of government.

It was with some awareness of this inescapable characteristic of government—derived from an experience reaching back to the summer of 1941—that I pasted in the back of one of the two books I brought with me to Washington in January 1961 the following quotation from John Maynard Keynes:

> Words ought to be a little wild, for they are an assault of thought upon the unthinking. But when the seats of power and authority have been attained, there should be no more poetic licence. . . . When a doctrinaire proceeds to action, he must, so to speak, forget his doctrine. For those who in action remember the letter will probably lose what they are seeking.

On the other hand, there is another dictum from an even more relevant British source—these words of Winston Churchill:

> Those who are possessed of a definite body of doctrine and of deeply rooted convictions upon it will be in a much better position to deal with the shifts and surprises of daily affairs than those who are merely taking short views, and indulging their natural impulses as they are evoked by what they read from day to day.

I do not intend this morning to arbitrate between a great academic's warning against doctrinaires in government and a great statesman's plea for doctrine in the making of public policy, but I should like to talk—not about a doctrine—but about a perspective on the period through which we are passing, which, I believe, does illuminate a little where we are in the sweep of history, the character of our tasks, and the way we are most likely to succeed in prosecuting them. While the tasks we face are complex and their unfolding may be irregular—or even erratic—there is a broad shape in them and a clear-cut sense of direction which derives not merely from the character of the problems themselves but from the very roots of our society, its history, and its ultimate objectives on the world scene.

Moving Steadily Toward Large Objectives

The perspective I would suggest on the 1960's differs from that which has governed some of our judgments of the past.

American historians and political scientists have tended to rate as "great" periods in our political life the administrations of Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, Wilson, and Franklin Roosevelt. Closer still, and perhaps somewhat more debatable, I would add the administration of President Truman.

Lincoln's period inevitably falls in this category. He saw us through a civil war which

[1] Address made at Kenyon College, Gambier, Ohio, on May 11 (press release 216 dated May 8).

maintained the unity of this nation and overcame the tragic divisions which boiled up in the 1850's and which Buchanan could not master.

In this century we generally think of "great" periods under two sets of circumstances.

The first were intervals in domestic policy when there occurred a sudden outpouring of major new legislation, with permanent consequences for the organization of our society. Since 1900 there were two such intervals: the legislative execution of Wilson's concept of the "New Freedom" during his first term, and the vast flow of New Deal legislation in Franklin Roosevelt's first term.

Theodore Roosevelt's administrations belong, I believe, on the list of great periods, although new legislation actually passed in his time was limited and there were no great international crises to be overcome. He nevertheless laid the groundwork for new attitudes and policies, at home and abroad, which foreshadowed many fundamental later developments.

The second phases of greatness in the 20th century were occasions of desperate crisis on the international scene. Theodore Roosevelt's effort to educate the Nation to the vistas of world power and responsibility had not sufficiently succeeded. In 1917 the United States had to go to war to avoid the passage of power in Western Europe and in the Atlantic to forces hostile to the United States and its way of life. Thus we undid our previous commitment to isolationism.

In 1941, with the passage of lend-lease and then our full engagement after Pearl Harbor, we again had to salvage vital American interests by engaging in a world conflict, undoing a prior, costly return to isolationism.

In 1947 we had to reverse the course of immediate postwar policy in order to salvage and protect Western Europe and the balance of world power, having weakened our position by hasty and drastic demobilization. In June 1950 we had to go to war in Korea to meet a major act of Communist aggression and repair the weakness of our conventional military establishment in the Far East, which, in turn, resulted from our relatively low postwar military budgets.

The great periods in executive leadership in this century have, thus, been periods where radical action was taken at home to correct previous distortions in our domestic affairs or to cope with desperate crises abroad.

In the 1960's it is clear that we have faced and still face both at home and abroad issues and challenges which, by any standard of the past, are great. Basic characteristics of our domestic society are at stake as well as life-and-death issues on the world scene.

By any standards of the past they require of us great performance, both in our government and in our society at large. But there is a difference. In a nuclear age we cannot afford to let matters slide away from us—as they did in the years before 1917, 1941, and even 1947—to the point where a massive, convulsive response is required to overcome the danger and redress the balance.

At home we face—in race relations, in our balance-of-payments position, in the need to achieve and maintain the full and regular use of our human and material resources, in overcoming serious margins of poverty in our society, in developing an educational system adequate to the needs of our society, and in other directions as well—truly great tasks. But here, too, it would be unwise for us to permit any of these problems to become so massive that they yielded a domestic crisis of the kind which in the past was generally required to yield national consensus and a massive, vigorous response.

My theme today is, then, simply this: The task of American leadership in the 1960's—and the task of our society at large—is to bring about movement toward large objectives by small increments over considerable periods of time. It is no longer safe for public policy in the United States to oscillate in the classic rhythm of our past: between periods of relative passivity, in the face of mounting problems, and periods of heroic but convulsive and sometimes bloody endeavor. To protect the Nation's essential values and interests, our style in public life must be steadier, more regularly active and forward-moving, than it has tended to be in the long sweep of our history.

It is something like this vision which has governed national policy since President Kennedy's inaugural in January 1961.[2] In the wake of a

[2] For text of President Kennedy's inaugural address, see BULLETIN of Feb. 6, 1961, p. 175.

narrow victory at the polls, he, nevertheless, called on the Nation to "begin anew."

Problems Confronting President Kennedy

In domestic policy he set out to lead the Nation toward higher but steadily maintained levels of employment and overall growth; toward the correction of our balance-of-payments deficits; toward a new justice in race relations; toward the reduction of the margins of poverty in our society; toward a strengthening through Federal action of the educational foundations of our society; toward the acceptance of collective responsibility for the medical care of the aged. None of these were problems which yielded, either technically or politically, to immediate definitive solution. But all of them were moved forward in his time in a series of limited steps. Each step required clarity and determination about the objective, but it also required realism, care, and often caution about the extent to which progress was possible as of the moment of forward movement. For example, historians will, I believe, find fascinating and perhaps somewhat surprising the intimacy with which President Kennedy personally guided the delicate but essential effort to move simultaneously toward sustained business expansion and toward balance-of-payments equilibrium.

Picking up from the day he assumed responsibility, President Johnson in 6 months has moved forward on all these fronts with the vigor which is his mark, leaving already his strong imprint on the march down these long roads of domestic progress.

In foreign policy, where I am more directly involved, much the same is true.

In 1961 President Kennedy faced two massive tasks.

First, he had to deal with a series of dangerous and degenerative crises. These took their origins from the period after the first Sputnik was launched in October 1957. The Communist world was swept by a wave of confidence and aggressive enterprise. It was in 1958 that Khrushchev laid down his ultimatum on Berlin and the Communists began to press hard in Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Second, President Kennedy had to define a set of longrun positive objectives and begin to devise policies which would move toward them, step by step.

With respect to Western Europe and Japan, he held up the vision of a partnership in world affairs that would replace the acute dependence on the United States, which had marked the early postwar years. With respect to Latin America—and the other developing areas—he alined the United States firmly with those who were committed to reshape their societies so as to reconcile economic growth, social equity, and the development of democratic political institutions.

With respect to the Communist world, he radically increased our military strength but simultaneously set the Government to work with a new intensity to find the means to start—even in small ways—down the long road to arms control and disarmament.

This is not the occasion to detail how these enterprises were carried forward. But between May 1961 and October 1962 Khrushchev's post-Sputnik offensive was painstakingly defused. This was done not by war. It was accomplished by a series of military and political moves, each difficult and protracted, each involving moments of hazard, climaxed, of course, by the Cuba missile crisis.

As President Johnson has underlined, from his state of the Union message [3] on, our cold-war problems have by no means ended. We face, in particular, the task of dealing in Southeast Asia and the Caribbean with those who would foment Communist insurrection by the illegal infiltration of arms and men across international frontiers.

But we have seen in these 3 years one of the most dramatic shifts in the balance of power in modern history.

From the latter days of January 1961, however—amidst the unrelenting pressure of multiple crises—the constructive enterprises were nevertheless launched and carried forward.

The arrival of Ambassador [Edwin O.] Reischauer in Japan and the visit of Prime Minister [Hayato] Ikeda to Washington launched a new phase of more profound asso-

[3] For the foreign policy portion of President Johnson's message, see *ibid.*, Jan. 27, 1964, p. 110.

ciation in our relations with Japan and also set in motion forces which have drawn Japan deeply into the nonmilitary affairs of the North Atlantic community.

In the fields of trade, monetary affairs, political consultation, and nuclear cooperation, enterprises were launched which moved the Atlantic community forward on new lines, despite some evident frustration and even setback. Above all, the Atlantic community proved its essential vitality and unity in the Berlin and Cuban crises.

We set out on the Alliance for Progress with a decade as the initial working horizon, and despite what may appear a slow start, substantial progress has been made. Elsewhere, in the developing areas—in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia—new efforts were launched both to help protect the independence of the developing societies and to strengthen the underpinnings of that independence by programs of development assistance.

And, choosing his moment in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis, President Kennedy, in his American University speech of June 1963 [4] found the occasion to begin to move forward on the path of arms control he had defined so vividly in his inaugural more than 2 years earlier. The atmospheric test ban agreement [5] and President Johnson's initiative in cutting back production of fissionable material [6] are first steps along the way.

Our Ultimate Task on the World Scene

Behind all these ventures is a vision of our ultimate task on the world scene. That task is to help build an orderly and peaceful world community to supplant the world system which was shattered in 1914 and never replaced. This is the grand purpose which suffuses the effort to build a great partnership in the north stretching from Tokyo east to Berlin, to build a new north-south relationship between the more developed and developing nations of the free world. This is our ultimate objective in East-West relations, where we aim not merely to frustrate Communist aggression but to draw the nations now under Communist rule into an orderly and peaceful world community, for the struggle with communism is ultimately a struggle about how this small planet shall be organized.

In talking about our foreign policy we are talking about the biggest piece of architecture ever undertaken at a time of peace. None of the lines of action we have launched is yet complete. But, while final results have not been reached, these have not been paper programs nor policies of rhetoric. We have moved some distance down long roads: toward a binding up into partnership of the more advanced nations of the free world, across the Atlantic and the Pacific; toward new relations of dignity and collaboration within the free world between the advanced nations of the north and the developing nations to the south; toward a definitive frustration of the Communist thrust; and toward controlling the dangers posed for humanity by the existence of nuclear weapons.

What is required both within the Government and in our country as a whole is the will and the capacity to persist. We need steadiness, patience, and a stubborn sense of direction. In all conscience, the world is complicated and dangerous enough to insure that crises will arise. But our objectives will prove attainable if we bring to them the mood of the old schoolyard game of Indian wrestling, where victory went to him who summoned the extra moment of endurance.

The frontiers of the past were probed, explored, and consolidated by stubborn, protracted enterprise, not by the convulsive reaction to crisis; and this is the way it is—and should be—with the new frontiers of the 1960's.

I am deeply convinced that, if we in the United States do a job that lies wholly within our capacity and if the free world maintains a reasonable degree of unity and common purpose, the events, decisions, and initiatives launched in recent years could mark the beginning of the end of the cold war.

The Cuba missile crisis of 1962 could emerge as the Gettysburg of that global civil conflict. We owe it to all free men to labor to make it so.

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[4] For text, see *ibid.*, July 1, 1963, p. 2.
[5] For text, see *ibid.*, Aug. 12, 1963, p. 234.
[6] *Ibid.*, Feb. 10, 1964, p. 223.

Foreign Policy and the People's Right To Know

by Robert J. Manning
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs [1]

As a newspaperman of many years' experience I naturally have a familiarity—one might call it a longstanding familiarity—with the combination of press and bar. The particular combination represented here today is not the kind I refer to, but I can readily see the great value of such a joint meeting. I am sure that much could be accomplished in the public interest if this effort at cooperation and mutual exploration by the press and the bar were duplicated in other parts of the United States.

Besides disputing which of the two professions is the more ancient, lawyers and newsmen plainly have many other matters to ponder in common. To begin with, both deal with people and language, in that order. A reporter might argue that with him words come first, but I think a close examination of the case (to use the language of the bar) will show that both professions deal in the first instance with people—their deeds, their foibles, their ideas, and their artifacts—and secondly with describing people and their conduct in language understandable to judge, jury, or reading public.

The professions are related, too, in that each asks of its practitioners what by ordinary standards is a complex ethical way of life. A lawyer must be devoted to his client, the law, truth, and justice, as well as to his own personal need for income. Each must have its due; all must remain in proportion. Similarly, a journalist is called upon to balance the conflicting demands of friendship, the truth, a sense of relevance and importance, and a devotion to the standards of his craft, to say nothing of the easy temptations to sloppiness, the personal quirks of his editor, and his publisher's motive for profit. Both professions have problems of conscience as well as of technique. Members of each are from time to time called upon to carry water on both shoulders. And the amazing thing is that so many in each profession do it so well, achieving a proper balance without visible signs of strain.

When I speak of the press or of journalism in these remarks I address myself not just to the print media, which fell such vast areas of Canadian spruce each day, but also to their brethren in daily communication: radio and television. The differences between the print and electronic media are very real and often important. In most courtrooms one is permitted, the other not. But for purposes of purveying information on foreign policy—the subject that most concerns me in my present job—the differing media are related means to similar ends.

A study published in a recent issue of *Daedalus*, the journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, shows that television and newspapers are more complementary than competitive. During television's years of rapid growth, newspaper circulation in the United States has continued to increase both in absolute terms and relative to population, to the present alltime high of 60 million copies sold each day. The publisher of a Midwest newspaper recently commented: "Television whets the appetite, and people want to read more and better reports in the newspapers." Both media have their shortcomings, about which I will have something to

[1] Address made before the Massachusetts Joint Bar-Press Symposium at Boston, Mass., on May 5 (press release 202 dated May 4).

say later, but let us agree there is more to be said in defense of television than the case stated by one of its most skilled practitioners, David Brinkley, who recently said: "At least television is punctual—it's always on time."

Protecting the Rights of the Individual

Do the people have a right to know? It seems an odd question to ask here in Boston, where press freedom has a long and noble heritage. Yet the fact that so many of you have assembled here to discuss this question suggests that perhaps its answer is not as simple as sometimes supposed—a suggestion which I heartily share.

Plainly, a large part of your deliberations at this conference concern the question posed in one of your panel discussions: "Free Press vs. Fair Trial: What is the people's right to know?" Under our system of government the fair trial is a cornerstone of individual liberty and rights. A degree of privacy is often necessary to insure that a trial will in fact be fair. Concern is often expressed—and I am sure has been expressed at this conference—about the damage that can be done to the private rights of individual Americans by news stories, photographs, radio, and television. Many articles in recent weeks, prompted in part by the Ruby trial, argue this question pro and con. The articles ask: Are the rights of an individual charged with crime adequately protected against the hurt that can be done by publicity? It is an important question, and at this conference I am sure it is receiving sober consideration.

There are, of course, many procedures now in use designed to protect individual rights against damage by publicity. Jurors are examined to make sure their judgment has not been warped by news accounts. Cameras are excluded from courtrooms in virtually all jurisdictions. Underage wrongdoers are given the additional benefit of a private trial; if they are tried openly, the press frequently refrains from printing their names. In the courtroom itself there are rules of evidence to guard against irrelevance, error, and second-hand testimony. Change of venue may be considered if local hostility to the defendant has developed to the extent that a fair trial is impossible. In a variety of ways a defendant has his rights defended, be it before Congress or in court.

Protecting the National Security

I should like to turn the searchlight you are throwing on this important subject into another, somewhat less discussed area. First, an analogy: What if the "defendant" in a difficult and delicate proceeding is U.S. foreign policy in a sensitive area? This is a subject about which I have had ample occasion to speculate in my present position, having come to it with a legacy of some 26 years spent in journalism. Here are some of the points that have occurred to me.

Concern about the plight of an individual defendant disarmed by the cruel hand of publicity is widely expressed. Sometimes it forms an important part of an advocate's argument. But similar concern is rarely focused on the damage which can be done to our national security as a result of publicity in the press regarding a subject or policy knowledge of which could greatly assist our adversaries. Yet the damage done to this "defendant" can injure much more than just a single individual.

The apparent lack of concern in the press about this problem is in itself a cause for concern. That is why it is impressive to see the profession of journalism, as represented in the membership of the Massachusetts Bar-Press Committee, willing to accept that there is indeed a question mark about "the people's right to know."

It is not an easy question for a government official to tackle for two reasons. One is obviously that there is no simple solution, no single answer to the problems that pose the question. Second, among the more superficial spokesmen for journalism (and these seem characteristically to include the most vocal) the very raising of the question brings forth such cries of outrage, of heresy, of treason, that the poor chap who raised the question may find himself forced to choose between self-imposed exile to a peaceful place like Cyprus or the Mekong Delta and public boiling in a vat of hot linotype lead.

This conditioned reflex of outrage comes

forth, in my opinion, from a confusion about just who are custodians of the people's right to know and what are the obligations of this custodianship. This in turn lies close to the question of who is to judge what the people want to know and, more important, what they should and should not be told. Having ventured into this treacherous ground, I may as well plod along the trails of my personal (as against official) thoughts and prejudices in the hope at least of illuminating some vital questions even though not providing the answers to them.

Broad Outlines vs. Specific Details

Certainly there is a public interest implicit in the people's right to know. But it can also be said (and here is when the signal is usually given to start boiling the linotype lead) that the people have the right *not* to know when that knowledge can gravely compromise our defense or foreign policy. The press on the whole wants to know a great deal more than do the people in whose name it acts. That is understandable. The history of freedom is decorated with the special cases of those who were more zealous than the norm in pursuit of their rights and liberties. But the freedom of the press to print without fear or reprisal, a freedom so basic in our nation that it is singled out for protection in our Constitution, can, if improperly or unwisely used, run contrary to an equally basic part of the public interest and general welfare, namely, the ability of the government to carry out the people's business of defending our interests abroad and guarding the Nation's security. There is a real dilemma here, and it is silly to ignore it. Let's look at some cases.

Not long ago one leading newspaper by dint of shrewd reportorial enterprise was able to describe some of the proposals the United States was soon to advance in the Geneva disarmament talks. This had two obvious consequences: (1) American citizens interested in this important but rather technical subject were able to find out somewhat sooner than would otherwise have been the case what proposals we were going to make, with an indication of which ones we considered most important and which ones we might be willing to yield on. (2) It told the highly expert Soviet negotiating team at Geneva what we were going to say and gave them important clues as to the order of priority in which we ranked our proposals.

Now let's look at this episode in the light of the two goals of public interest which I suggest may come into conflict. First, the public's right to know was indeed generously served—for most Americans, perhaps more generously than necessary, since they do not feel a need to be informed on the details of our disarmament negotiation position. But second, what of the public interest in having our security and foreign policy successfully advanced? Here a minus must go up on the scoreboard. It doesn't take much of a poker player to know the importance of keeping certain cards face down until the right time to play them. When a hole card is inadvertently displayed in poker, it frequently shapes the outcome. When that happens the hand is often tossed in and played over. In the case of the disarmament talks, some important cards were displayed prematurely to our negotiating adversaries, with an indication of how we were planning to play them.

But we can't toss in the cards and play the hand over at international confrontations of this kind. Rather, our negotiators had to pursue the goals they had come to Geneva to seek, tinkering here and there with their strategy to offset the damage done by publicity, taking into account the fact that their opposite numbers knew quite accurately what they planned to do, but remaining themselves unarmed with similar information about Soviet proposals or intentions.

I cite this example not because it is dramatic, not because it seriously crippled our diplomacy at Geneva, but as an almost everyday example of the problems that constantly beset government officials and newsmen alike as they go about their differing tasks. And let me be emphatically clear on a central point: The questions I am raising about disclosure of information in this case concern the specific details, not the broad outlines of our policy. The public's right to know should always be served, and fully, with regard to the basic premises and

purposes of our undertakings in foreign affairs. In disarmament, to take the present example, there is not just a right but a need to make sure that the aims of the negotiations are understood. There must be ample time for debate, in Congress, on editorial pages, and in the country at large. Our government courts disaster if it embarks on an important policy purpose without making certain first that a large body of Americans is informed about them and has had opportunity to discuss them.

In the disarmament field we seek effective, enforcible means toward arms reduction and control; we seek to prevent proliferation of nuclear and other advanced weapons; we seek new means to prevent accidental war. Broad-ranging public discussion about these aims, and the means that can be adopted to achieve them, has appeared in the press and elsewhere. This is absolutely essential for the future success of steps that may be taken in this field. I assure you that much of my own work, and that of the entire Department of State, is devoted to making sure that in this and other fields the public right and need to know is satisfied.

Exposure for Exposure's Sake

Informed discussion and debate on foreign policy—which have their most visible expression in Congress and in the press—are a basic part of our strength as an open society. We consider ourselves a leading world nation, *the* leader, in fact, of the free world. But that leadership does not reside entirely in our military and economic strength. Our inheritance of liberty, and the way we practice it, enable us to lead by example. (That is why our civil rights shortcomings can hurt us in our foreign policy undertakings.) The fact that what we do and what we are is open to the world to see is probably our greatest single strength as a nation. It should not be minimized for even an instant.

But this important truth should not be allowed to obscure another important fact, and that is that we are often handicapped when it comes to the detailed execution of a foreign policy undertaking. And it is here—in matters of tactics, not the broad sweep of policy—that the occasionally mindless devotion of the press to exposure for exposure's sake can put us at a disadvantage. This is especially so in the sensitive area where military and political considerations merge.

Let me document the kind of disadvantage I have in mind by reviewing the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, an event which is considered by many to mark a turning point in the cold war. If hard cases make bad law, this is an example which should give rise to sound principles, since its outcome was on the whole satisfactory—though en route a lot of nerves were strung very taut and properly so, for this was the world's first direct nuclear confrontation.

As you know, the U.S. Government obtained the first evidence of the Soviet offensive missiles in Cuba by means of aerial reconnaissance one afternoon in mid-October. In the week that followed extraordinary efforts were made to keep the U.S. planning and preparations wholly secret. The small cluster of top-level leaders around President Kennedy gave secrecy the highest order of priority.

On the whole, the precautions worked. There were exceptions. Two days before the President spoke a suspicious Washington press corps knew something was up. Some headlines were very near the truth; the wire services were accurately reporting the movements of troops and certain equipment; and several reporters had at least a glimmering of what the crisis was all about.

But on the whole, the interval of privacy necessary to analyze the intelligence evidence, to consider appropriate responses, and to make the detailed preparations needed to carry out the chosen course of action, was preserved and maintained. It took a telephone call from the President to the editor of at least one leading paper to keep the story out of the news in the final 24 hours, but nevertheless it worked. For approximately 1 full week it was possible, in circumstances of the utmost gravity and national peril, to avoid the compromise of vital information and plans through disclosure in the press and other media. We should not underestimate the importance of this achievement nor overlook the cooperation and good judgment of reporters and editors that made it possible.

But before drawing conclusions, let us look at this crisis from another point of view—that of the Soviet Union. In this case we deal not with a period of 1 scant week but with a time interval of some months, perhaps half a year, going back to an unknown date when the Soviet Union decided that Cuba provided a hospitable site for medium- and intermediate-range missiles.

Consider for a moment what then had to be accomplished to bring about the situation that was finally photographed from our highflying reconnaissance plane in mid-October. Large numbers of specialists and technicians had to be gathered and prepared for their mission to a Spanish-speaking island 6,000 sea miles away. The missiles had to be assembled, taken to ports, loaded on ships which had to be specially fitted and their crews trained. Communications links between Moscow and Cuba had to be prepared, to say nothing of the planning and discussions that must have accompanied every phase of the venture. My point is not to document this side of the story with any accuracy or detail but only to suggest that on the Soviet side of this crisis it was possible to conduct a logistic exercise of enormous scope over a period of at least several months in conditions of extreme secrecy. It illustrates the observation by Sir William Hayter, former British Ambassador to Moscow, who said of the Soviet Union that:

> It is true of them, as of no other government, that every public action in their own country can be made, if desired, to conform to their diplomatic needs.

The difference between the tightly sealed, closed society of the Soviet Union and our own open society, as shown by the Cuban crisis, is so obvious that it tends to be taken for granted. It may be argued, as it was by some critics, that our intelligence community should have had earlier inklings of what the Soviets had set in motion. This argument—and there are points to be made on each side—tends to obscure the much larger significance of this crisis; namely, that it was possible for one side to mount an undertaking of impressive scale over a period of months without leaving any footmarks or fingerprints, while the other side was able to carve out a brief week for essential deliberations only by dint of near superhuman effort directed at keeping the subject out of the papers.

Deceptively Easy Solutions

There are several deceptively easy distinctions that are often introduced into the argument at this stage. They are popular with editors and publishers, and they have the convenience of appearing to be simple to apply. But appearances can be deceptive; so let me discuss them and tell you why I do not think they go very far toward solving the problem I have outlined.

1. The first distinction is that between facts and policy or, putting it another way, between things you can count and decisions about those things. The former are in the category of traditional military secrets and include such data as the size and shape of military hardware, the numbers of troops and weapons moving from A to B, and so forth. While my colleagues at the Pentagon could probably overwhelm me with exceptions, it is my impression that as a rule, and on the whole, the press recognizes its share of responsibility for keeping information of this kind out of print when to publish it might materially assist our adversaries.

In testimony last year before Congressman John Moss's Subcommittee on Government Information editors and publishers unanimously stated their view that military secrets of this kind—namely, specific, quantitative data about equipment and personnel—should not be printed if this would violate military security. But it was argued with equal vigor that almost all other information was fair game for the press and that government spokesmen who sought to keep it from the minions of the Fourth Estate deserved at best a fair trial before being hanged.

I do not think the matter is anywhere near that simple. As the examples I have already mentioned show, information about our intentions, about the extent of our own knowledge, and about our policies can be at least as valuable to a potential enemy as the performance characteristics of a new piece of hardware. If an adversary knows within narrow limits what we plan to do with a particular piece of equipment, this information may be more valuable than the device itself. Another brief example: During the Cuban missile crisis, reporters asked daily whether the United States intended to fly

a reconnaissance mission that day over Cuban territory. They were not told on the perfectly sound grounds that the success of the mission, the life of the pilot, the rights of the pilot's family, and, indeed, the United States interest should not be jeopardized by advance notification to Russian and Cuban antiaircraft batteries.

Some of the most important intelligence "finds" disclose almost no information about the gadgetry of modern warfare. But they are considered enormously valuable by analysts and policymakers for the clues they provide to the behavior of a potential enemy. For example: A collection of documents on the structure of government and the military in Communist China recently came into the possession of U.S. intelligence authorities. The significance of this information—which was hailed as a major intelligence find—was to provide new knowledge not of military hardware but of the probable behavior of the Chinese Communist leadership.

It has often been shown that the U.S. press does provide an enormous amount of information of a kind that could help an actual or potential enemy. There are few mysteries about a government that operates in a goldfish bowl.

One experienced Washington newsman who regularly lunches with a member of the Soviet Embassy staff suggested to us not long ago that we should take pains to point out to the Russians when a particular story in the American press is wrong. The reporter said there are certain columnists and reporters whose articles the Soviets take as gospel concerning the views of our government. What makes this story disturbing is that at least one of the writers mentioned is often far from accurate in describing U.S. policy.

My point is surely not that thorough discussion of U.S. policy should not appear in our press. Far from that. Such discussions are an essential part of our democratic decision-making process and should be encouraged. But some descriptions of policy which are not essential to a proper understanding by U.S. citizens of what our foreign policy is all about, and which do give our adversaries specific, useful information on what we plan to do, should, it seems to me, be evaluated with an eye to the public interest that resides in nondisclosure where national security and foreign policy goals are at stake.

A lot of information about policy can and should be published that now isn't. But equally, a certain amount that gets in print would leave the public's right to know very little the worse for being omitted.

In the movie "Dr. Strangelove" the Soviet Ambassador announces that his country had built a Doomsday Device, rigged to destroy the earth, after learning that the U.S. was planning to construct one. Where had they gotten that idea? His reply, in a heavy Russian accent: "We read it in the New York Times." Here both sides' weaknesses with regard to publicity were revealed. The Soviets had built the weapon but hadn't told anyone about it; so it hadn't entered into American calculations. The U.S. had not built one, but a newspaper said we would and the other side acted on that information. It was not—let me stress—facts and figures about the device that mattered. Its technology, according to Dr. Strangelove, was "Zimple." In this fictional case it was a story about a policy decision, false as it turned out, that brought about the end of the world, not with a whimper but with a bang.

2. A second easy distinction that is often used to cut a trail through the difficult choices I have described is the one drawn between peace and war. In time of war, the argument goes, a code of conduct including censorship procedures would be quite acceptable. Such codes have sometimes been prepared voluntarily by the press. In addition, press and other media representatives have cooperated with Federal agencies to draw up an official code, on a standby basis. These are then put on a high shelf where they will gather dust until they are vaporized by the nuclear explosion that will indicate that we are in fact at war.

In our present time of continuing crisis an old-fashioned thumb-rule distinction between war and nonwar is no longer a useful way of dealing with this problem. Waiting for a declaration of war is a way to avoid the problem, not solve it. Using a definition of "serious crisis short of war" is slightly more realistic, but this too fails to confront the issue head on.

Some crises which look serious may not be as important as others which are barely visible. Let me give two examples of nearly invisible crises that could have very grave consequences for U.S. policy. One would be a decision by the government of Communist China to pursue a stepped-up militant policy of foreign ventures; another would be a decision by Moscow that no arms control plan incorporating inspection and safeguards against surprise attack will ever be acceptable. In the mid-1960's either of these events would have far-reaching and critical consequences for the United States. Both would call for special alertness and special caution. Yet by no definition that I have ever seen would either of these crises bring into effect any official or voluntary code of press conduct.

The problem is little easier in the case of a "visible" crisis short of war. When the offensive missiles were spotted in Cuba, there was no way to tell the press to observe a censorship code without giving the whole show away. The government had to use its own resources to keep the crucial information to itself. Even after the President's speech, events moved too fast for a code to be put into effect. There is no reason to think that future crises will present themselves tidily packaged to permit adoption of standby procedures essentially dating from a previous era, when events as well as communications moved more slowly and it was possible to distinguish with some realism between peace and war.

3. There is a third approach to the problem that I think offers an even less satisfactory solution. This is the view that it is the government's job to keep secrets and the job of the press to pry them loose and print them. I expect there are many editors and reporters who apply this dictum to the county courthouse and city hall, where it may make sense, but who also apply it to foreign policy and national security, where, I submit, it does not.

Fortunately, this is a point well understood by the best correspondents, among whom I would count many who make the State Department their regular beat. These men know the value of getting information "off the record" or on background. Such information, which may include highly sensitive intelligence data and policy judgments, strengthens the reporter by enabling him to write a piece on the record with a solid footing in all the relevant facts.

The individual reporter is clearly the key-man in this process. His integrity permits high officials to trust him with information that could greatly embarrass our purposes abroad if it were released but which is essential to a full understanding of a matter that is the proper subject of a news report. His writing skill permits him to use the information without compromising it. And his background as an experienced reporter enables him to apply acid tests for truth and relevance to what he is told. He can separate the real from the bogus and can give an accurate account without unnecessarily dispensing ladlefuls of sensitive information.

Of the better reporters who cover foreign affairs, few would entirely agree, I am convinced, that it's the government's job to keep secrets, theirs to pry them loose. If that really were the prevailing philosophy, I can assure you the government could do a much more thorough job of keeping information to itself.

Mutual Obligations of Government and Press

As I see it, a relationship of trust and mutual respect is essential in a democratic society for the press and foreign policy to coexist successfully. On the government side certain standards are basic. There can be no effort to mislead; background and off-the-record briefings should not be misused to try to float trial balloons; at all times, truth and accuracy are essential. A government information officer who violates these standards soon loses his effectiveness as well as—if I have any say in the matter—his job.

The press too brings obligations to this dialog. Without exception the reporters who provide the most accurate and complete accounts of foreign policy and national security matters live up to those obligations. If there was a time when the State Department and the working reporters assigned to cover it occupied themselves chiefly with tilting lances at one another, it was before my arrival. From the point of view of the reporter himself, an old-fashioned, simple-minded "adversary relationship" does not yield the best kind of foreign affairs reporting.

John Hightower, the senior Associated Press correspondent at the State Department, who for 20 years has covered the Department—and eight successive Secretaries—recently made a similar point somewhat more tartly when he wrote:

> The real interests of journalists and policymakers generate a love-hate relationship. What the two groups must accept is that both are necessary to the functioning of a democracy.

I think that a trend in this direction is both inevitable and necessary. Government on the national level today, particularly that part of it occupied with foreign policy and national security, is too complex and too vast for a reporter to take his stance outside and aloof as an independent critic. To get any adequate idea of what is going on a reporter must enter into a fairly close relationship with his sources.

The Exercise of Judgment

All that we have covered up to now, while it may contain debatable points, can, I submit, survive logical scrutiny. Now we come to the difficult part. Every development that is or purports to be news is subject to judgment. The judgment of those who possess the facts as to whether and how to reveal them. The judgment of reporters as to whether and how to report them. The judgment of editors as to whether and how to print them. The judgment of readers as to whether to read them and how to use them.

For the vast bulk of news, the judgment as to how much gets into print and the notoriety it receives is left to journalism. Every day in every way journalism exercises swiftly, sometimes precisely, sometimes with bias, sometimes without, almost always arbitrarily, this necessary exercise of judgment. Every front page is an announcement of the editor's judgment, a daily symbol of his effectiveness as a manager of news. Every newspaper and magazine is transitory monument to the judgment of its editors or owners.

It is the daily judgment of editors of the Washington Post, for example, that its readers need or want approximately five pages of comic strips; it is the judgment of editors of the New York Times that its readers do not need or want any. It is the judgment one week of the Press section of Time Magazine that the newsmen covering the situation in Viet-Nam are prejudiced incompetents—and the judgment of the Press section of Newsweek that they are, in one canonized heap, this year's candidates for the Pulitzer Prize.

Day after day, hour after hour, journalists swim the torrent of more events than they have discovered how to handle and stay afloat. For every item they print, they throw away a dozen or more. The average American daily prints about one-fourth of the foreign news carried on the Associated Press main wire each day—not to mention news from other sources. The news managers in the city rooms and broadcasting studios run the show. They cut. They blue-pencil. The compose headlines. They consign one item to the bright exposure of page one, another to the back-page limbo of the laxative ads. And, to a tremendous degree, they omit. What to throw away? That is, alas, one of the most demanding problems today's journalist confronts each day.

In most respects the vast and demanding responsibility of judging what the people of our free and open society are to be told is entrusted *de facto* to journalism, with its great resources, its constitutional freedoms, and its broad dedication to the business objective of staying solvent and making a profit. Another long speech could be devoted solely to the question of whether this responsibility is being adequately carried out by our journalism in a time when foreign affairs are growing greater in number and complexity and when a growing segment of the American public wants more and better coverage of such affairs. As much as we ought to be concerned about the shortcomings, we should also be concerned about the high degree of complacency and self-satisfaction with which so much of journalism regards its performance.

But I would prefer to examine briefly another, more intricate aspect of this matter of custodianship and the application of judgment. In addition to the Fourth Estate, two other elements of our society also carry certain responsibilities and enjoy certain rights in this regard. One is the government, which is made up to a great extent either of elected officials or of offi-

cials appointed to office by elected officials. The other is, of course, the public itself.

Most times the questions of access to and publication of information are put as if the argument, when there is one, is between the press and public on the one hand and the government on the other. Too often there is implicit in debate of news questions the notion that the government official's obligation to the press and public are the same, that in obliging the demands or needs of the press the official is synonymously serving the public.

We all know that in many instances, perhaps most instances, the synonym applies. If this were to be accepted as the invariable rule, however, the government and public would jointly be in the position of vacating completely to the press the hour-by-hour, day-by-day judgment of what ought to become public knowledge.

If it were possible to reveal everything to the light of day and *if*—this is a very big "if"—journalism had the talent and will fully to convey everything, then we would have no problem to discuss here today. But we all know that such is not and cannot be the case. Like the press, officials in government must constantly make judgments about the timing and content of disclosures. I refer not only to those who, like myself, are primarily in information work but to a broad variety of officials right up to the top. All of them, as a normal part of their operations in this open society, have frequent contact with press and public. Indeed, in Washington, a very large part of the high official's time is devoted to public business—speechmaking, press conferences, background interviews with correspondents, congressional testimony, TV interviews. If you doubt it, merely look at a typical week's calendar of the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense. Or drop into the White House rose garden and see for yourself.

On the average day, Washington officials push into the public domain appreciably more intelligence, more facts, more "news" than journalism in its collective judgment is able or willing to pass on to its audience. Admittedly this flow frequently does not include some of the information the press may be pressing for. A government that loses sight of its obligation to use this power with enlightenment and fullest loyalty to the democratic process could do great harm to the public weal.

The issue, then, is not whether government officials have such power but how they use it.

One of the greatest services the press can perform is in its constant examination of the way government employs such power. For that reason, it is proper and inevitable that a continuing attitude of skepticism—a posture of guerrilla warfare, if you will—should characterize relations between press and government in this country (just as a steady infusion of skepticism and dissatisfaction in the public's attitude toward journalism is good for the health of journalism).

It is unlikely in our society that there will ever be a unanimously accepted answer to the crucial question: Who is to judge what needs to be public and what needs to be private? But if, through gatherings such as this and through the many avenues of discussion that are open to us, we can push the debate of the question to a level of substance and intelligence; if we can reach above the cliches and the self-serving banalities, we will find, I think, that the Republic has at its service something similar to the system of checks and balances provided by the three branches of government. The pendulum swing of the interests of the public toward those of the press in one case, toward those of government in another, is quite capable of keeping the clockwork of democracy in good order.

For the system to perform at its best in this time of tortuously complex and highly explosive world events, we must demand more effort and higher performance from each part of the system.

Government needs to understand more about the processes of information, the needs of the public, and, in particular, the workings and requirements of modern-day journalism. Many in government have a fine instinctive sense of good public relations, and most, I can assure you, have a healthy respect for the subject of this seminar, the people's right and need to know. But there remains in the diplomatic profession a fair-sized remnant of the elderly notion that the requirements of negotiation and the requirements of public knowledge are

always locked in total conflict. Too many instances still occur where, because of timidity, undue attachment to privacy, or both, our government fails to make its case publicly and so exposes our position to aimless speculations or to the public relations artifices of other governments. I can assure you that my own office devotes a great deal of time and effort to dealing with this problem.

Journalism needs to know more about the workings of government. My time in government hasn't been long, but I am convinced that it has made me a far better reporter. As Yogi Berra once said, "You observe a lot by watching." The news profession would be strengthened if more newsmen had direct experience of government. It would make good sense to establish a program to make it possible for skilled, experienced reporters to serve for a year or two in government.

Lastly, the public must constantly promote its own interest. As Louis Lyons, curator of journalism's Nieman Foundation, noted in a recent article, "Communication is a two-way street." Many editors and publishers excuse their product with the claim that they are giving the public only what it wants. There is some justice in the claim, and many will continue to use it to justify inadequate journalism or, for that matter, inadequate government. Unquestionably the public appetite for more and better coverage of serious affairs has grown in this country. In 1940 half our teenagers finished high school, and of these 12 percent went on to higher education. In 1962, 70 percent completed far more sophisticated high school courses, and of these 53 percent went on to college. Only by making known its rising standards, by rejecting the bogus and ridiculing the oversimplicities, can the public get what it needs and, let us hope, deserves.

The relationship we are discussing today, of government and press, raises hard questions and eludes easy answers. It is a subject that has furrowed intelligent brows in the past and, we all must hope, will continue to do so for a long time to come. I congratulate you for tackling it afresh in this conference and welcome this opportunity to join your deliberations.

Annual Foreign Policy Briefing Held for Nongovernmental Organizations

The Department of State announced on May 15 (press release 238) that its annual National Foreign Policy Conference for Nongovernmental Organizations would be held on May 19 and 20.

The purpose of the conference is to provide opportunity for discussion of international affairs between leaders of nongovernmental organizations and senior Government officials. By means of these conferences the membership of nongovernmental organizations, and through them a much broader public, gain deeper understanding of international issues.

U.S.-U.S.S.R. Film Committee Confers on Exchanges

The Department of State announced on May 14 (press release 230) that motion picture officials of the United States and the Soviet Union will meet this month for the third time in 6 years as joint members of the Standing Committee on Cinematography, as provided for in the U.S.–U.S.S.R. exchanges agreement.[1]

Frank G. Siscoe, director of the Department's Soviet and Eastern European Exchanges Staff, will serve as the U.S. representative and chairman of delegation and will arrive in Moscow May 17. He will be joined there by three American motion picture executives for a meeting with Soviet officials beginning May 19 to discuss the further implementation of the motion picture section of the exchanges agreement as it concerns the purchase and sale of feature films in both countries.

The U.S. motion picture industry member of the Standing Committee for this meeting will be Arnold Picker, executive vice president of the United Artists Corporation. He will be assisted by Kenneth Clark, vice president of the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., and Ilya Lopert, vice president and European manager of United Artists.

[1] Treaties and Other International Acts Series 5112.

GATT Ministers Open Kennedy Round of Trade Negotiations

The Trade Negotiations Committee of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade formally opened the sixth round of GATT trade negotiations—popularly known as the Kennedy Round—at a ministerial meeting held at Geneva May 4–6. The TNC, which is comprised of representatives of countries participating in the Kennedy Round, was established by the GATT ministers in May 1963 to formulate negotiating rules and supervise the conduct of the negotiations. Following are remarks made by Christian A. Herter, the President's Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, at the opening public session on May 4 and the text of a declaration adopted unanimously by the GATT ministers on May 6.

REMARKS BY MR. HERTER, MAY 4

Before beginning my own remarks, Mr. Chairman, may I read a message from the President of the United States.

Upon the opening of this meeting of GATT, an important and effective instrument for the expansion of world trade, I should like to send you best wishes for success from the people of the United States. Your meetings, universally known as the Kennedy Round, exemplify the hope and commitment of our late President to bring together the nations of the world in peaceful pursuits. I believe, as he did, in the necessity of success in your work.

We in the United States look upon these negotiations as an important opening to a better world. If we act together with dedication and purpose, all can gain and none need lose. Not only the major commercial nations, but all the countries of this shrinking world—poor and rich alike—have the right to expect success from our endeavors.

For the United States, I can assure you that we shall spare no effort in seeking to help bring this meeting, and the meetings which will follow, to a happy and fruitful conclusion.

Mr. Chairman, in 17 years of practical experience the GATT has proven itself to be the world's most successful vehicle for reducing the obstacles to the flow of international trade and promoting its expansion. This sixth round of GATT negotiations, which we are formally opening today, can be the most comprehensive and productive in its history. Building upon its solid record of success—and taking into account the changes in the world and particularly the importance of the developing nations' playing a greater role in international trade—GATT can move forward into new and wider areas of service. It was just a year ago that we met to lay the groundwork for these negotiations. The resolution that we adopted set out the principles by which our work should be guided:

—that we should achieve a significant liberalization of world trade.

—that the negotiations shall include all classes of products and shall deal not only with tariffs but also with nontariff barriers. In the case of agricultural products, the negotiations should provide for acceptable conditions of access to world markets.

—that the negotiations should proceed on the basis of substantial linear tariff reductions with a bare minimum of exceptions and special rules of general and automatic application to govern cases where there are significant disparities in tariff levels.

—and that every effort should be made to reduce trade barriers to exports of the less developed countries, though the latter cannot be expected to provide reciprocity.

Mr. Chairman, these are ambitious objectives, but in the months of negotiations that lie ahead we—and the GATT—will be measured by them. In living up to them, as we must, it will be necessary for all countries to reach a balanced agreement at a maximum rather than a minimum level. After all, we should never lose

sight of the fact that trade liberalization is good for all. It is good:

—because our peoples as consumers will gain readier access, at reasonable prices, to a wider variety of goods.

—because our businessmen and industrialists will have a clear picture of the new challenges and new opportunities in international trade and will be stimulated to respond to them.

—because producers and consumers alike will benefit from an increased international flow of an abundant supply of reasonably priced food.

—because the developing countries will gain wider opportunities to earn through exports the funds needed for their development programs. These negotiations—and GATT itself—can promote the expansion of their trade on a practical and workable basis.

In addition to adopting a set of principles at the meeting last year, we established procedures for putting them into effect.[1] The Trade Negotiations Committee was formed in order to work out a negotiating plan to be adopted before the start of the conference. It is now time to take stock of what has been accomplished.

We are agreed, as we were a year ago, that there should be a bare minimum of exceptions and that they should be subject to confrontation and justification. We are now also agreed that the negotiations should be based on offers of linear tariff reductions of 50 percent.

We are conditionally agreed on some elements of the "special rules of general and automatic application" on disparities, but all elements of this formula have still not fallen into place. We have, unfortunately, made little progress on agriculture. We have not yet come to grips with the problem of nontariff barriers. While considerable achievements have been made on rules and procedures relating to less developed countries, we have a good deal more ground to cover.

It is now our joint responsibility to move ahead, more rapidly and successfully than in the past, to fill the remaining gaps. The longer the rules are left open, the longer we procrastinate in setting the formulas by which these negotiations will proceed, the more we risk the success of the entire trade negotiations. Let us use this meeting to dedicate ourselves and our governments to prompt, effective efforts to settle these issues quickly.

Gentlemen, I have been brief—because time is pressing. We have in GATT an unequaled instrument for trade expansion. We are breaking new ground in the worldwide attack on trade barriers through negotiations of unparalleled complexity. In this difficult but essential task we have the invaluable assistance of GATT's Executive Secretary [Eric Wyndham White], to whose skilled and selfless services all of us owe so much. What we can and must contribute is the determination to get on with the job.

[1] For statements made by Mr. Herter and text of a resolution adopted on May 21, 1963, see BULLETIN of June 24, 1963, p. 990.

DECLARATION OF GATT TRADE NEGOTIATIONS COMMITTEE, MAY 6

A. *Tariffs*

1. The Trade Negotiations Committee in opening the trade negotiations, notes that:

(i) The rate of 50 per cent has been agreed as a working hypothesis for the determination of the general rate of linear reduction provided for in paragraph 4 of the Resolution of 21 May 1963;

(ii) the ultimate agreement on tariff reductions in accordance with the application of this hypothesis is linked with the solution of other problems arising in the negotiations, for example, tariff disparities, agricultural problems, exceptions and non-tariff problems, and, in general, with the achievement of reciprocity;

(iii) it is the intention of the participants to cooperate to solve these problems.

2. The Trade Negotiations Committee decides that exceptions lists will be tabled on the basis of the hypothesis of a 50 per cent linear reduction.

It is recognized that nothing in the negotiating rules would preclude any participant from making a larger reduction in, or completely eliminating, duties on particular products.

3. The Trade Negotiations Committee notes the progress made towards solving the problems relating to the question of disparities.

4. The Trade Negotiations Committee recalls that it was agreed, on 21 May 1963, that there should be a bare minimum of exceptions which should be subject to confrontation and justification.

It decides that the method to be followed for such confrontation and justification shall be elaborated as rapidly as possible and that the study of that method shall be undertaken immediately. The method shall take account of the need to safeguard the confidential nature of the negotiations.

It decides also that exceptions lists shall be tabled on

10 September 1964, such exceptions to be necessitated only by reasons of overriding national interest.[2]

B. *Agriculture*

The Committee, while reaffirming that the trade negotiations shall provide for acceptable conditions of access to world markets for agricultural products in furtherance of a significant development and expansion of world trade in such products, notes that it has not yet been possible to formulate agreed rules to govern, and methods to be employed in, the negotiations. In view of the importance of this subject to the success of the negotiations, the necessary rules and procedures shall be established at an early date.

The Committee notes that negotiations have been initiated with a view to the formulation of general arrangements on certain products. The negotiations have so far related to cereals and meat, and preparations have been made for the early initiation of such negotiations on dairy products.

C. *Non-tariff barriers*

The Committee recalls that the trade negotiations must relate not only to tariffs but also to non-tariff barriers.

It notes that many participants have already indicated the measures on which they wish to negotiate, and that others will shortly do so. In view of the importance for the full success of the negotiations of solving these problems, the Trade Negotiations Committee shall, at an early date, draw up the necessary procedures.

D. *Participation of less-developed countries*

The Committee reaffirms that in the trade negotiations every effort shall be made to reduce barriers to exports of less-developed countries and agrees that this consideration should be borne particularly in mind in the approach to the question of exceptions.

The Committee notes with satisfaction that all participants are prepared to consider the possibility of taking such steps as are open to them to make cuts deeper than 50 per cent in, or to eliminate completely, duties on products of special interest to less-developed countries.

The Committee also notes with satisfaction the intention to entrust to a special body the task of examining and calling attention to any problems arising in the negotiations which are of special interest to the less-developed countries and of action as a focal point for bringing together all issues of interest to these countries.

The Committee agreed that it would pursue further the question of trade in tropical products with a view to working out arrangements and procedures for their treatment in the negotiations.

The Committee recalls the decision of the Ministers that developed countries cannot expect to receive reciprocity from the less-developed countries. It agrees that the contribution of the less-developed countries to the overall objective of trade liberalization should be considered in the light of the development and trade needs of these countries.[3]

E. *The problem of countries with a very low average level of tariffs or a special economic or trade structure such that equal linear tariff reductions may not provide an adequate balance of advantages*

(a) *Countries with a very low average level of tariffs*

The Committee notes that the countries concerned reserve the right to submit proposals in this connection at a later date.

(b) *Countries with a special economic or trade structure*

1. The Committee agrees that Canada falls in the category of countries with a special economic or trade structure such that equal linear tariff reductions may not provide an adequate balance of advantages.

2. The Committee further agrees that Australia, New Zealand and South Africa are countries which have a very large dependence on exports of agricultural and other primary products and therefore, by virtue of the understanding reached at the Ministerial Meeting in May 1963, also fall in the category of countries referred to in 1 above.

3. The Committee reaffirms that the objective in the case of all these countries should be the negotiation of a balance of advantages based on trade concessions by them of equivalent value.

4. The Committee notes that appropriate procedures in pursuance of this objective have been agreed.

5. The Committee notes with satisfaction that Greece and Portugal have indicated their intention to participate actively in the negotiations and will be submitting proposals at a later date on the basis for their partlcipation.

F. *Participation of Poland in the trade negotiations*

The Committee notes that there has been under consideration for some time the question of ways and means of Poland's participation in the Kennedy Round. This consideration has taken place on the basis of the Polish proposals listed and explained in TN.64/NTB/15. The interest of Poland in participating actively in the trade negotiations is warmly welcomed and there is general agreement that it should be feasible to work out a practical arrangement. The Committee recommends that these discussions should be actively pursued to an early conclusion.

[2] These exceptions are distinct from any modification of its offers which, as agreed by the Ministers at their meeting in May 1963, it shall be open to each country to make in the course of the negotiations, where this is necessary to obtain an over-all balance of advantages between it and the other participants. [Footnote in original.]

[3] Argentina and Brazil accepted this paragraph on the understanding that the phrase "development and trade needs" covers the requirements of the current financial situation. [Footnote in original.]

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings[1]

In Session as of May 15, 1964

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development	Geneva	Mar. 23–
6th Round of GATT Tariff Negotiations	Geneva	May 4–
UNESCO Executive Board: 67th Session	Paris	May 4–

In Recess as of May 15, 1964

Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament (recessed Apr. 28, 1964, until June 9, 1964).	Geneva	Mar. 14, 1962–

Scheduled June Through August 1964

U.N. ECAFE Seminar on National Accounts	Bangkok	June 1–
1st International Short Film Festival	Cracow, Poland	June 1–
3d Consultative Meeting Under Article IX of the Antarctic Treaty	Brussels	June 1–
U.N. ECE Committee on Housing, Building and Planning: 25th Session.	Washington	June 2–
OECD Pulp and Paper Committee	Paris	June 9–
UNESCO International Oceanographic Commission: 3d Session	Paris	June 10–
ICAO Limited European-Mediterranean Communications Regional Air Navigation Meeting.	Paris	June 15–
U.N. ECOSOC Technical Assistance Committee	Vienna	June 15–
U.N. Special Fund Governing Council: 12th Session	The Hague	June 15–
U.N. Special Committee on Friendly Relations	México, D.F	June 15–
International Labor Conference: 48th Session	Geneva	June 17–
U.N. ECE Coal Trade Subcommittee	Geneva	June 22–
U.N. ECE Working Group on Productivity Statistics	Geneva	June 22–
International Wheat Council: 39th Session	London	June 23–
14th International Film Festival	Berlin	June 26–
FAO Desert Locust Control Committee: 9th Session	Rome	June 29–
U.N. ECA Seminar on Industrial Estates	Addis Ababa	June 29–
International Sugar Council: 17th Session	London	June
UNICEF Executive Board and Program Committee	New York	June
U.N. ECAFE Working Party on Customs Administration: 4th Session.	Bangkok	July 1–
14th International Film Festival	Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia.	July 4–
BIRPI Industrial Property Seminar for Latin America	Bogotá	July 6–
FAO Intergovernmental Committee for the World Food Program	Geneva	July 6–
27th International Conference on Public Education	Geneva	July 6–
ANZUS Council	Washington	July 13–
IMCO Panel on Stability of Fishing Vessels: 1st Session	London	July 13–
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 37th Session	Geneva	July 13–
OECD Manpower and Social Affairs Committee	Paris	July 15–
IMCO Subcommittee on the International Code of Signals: 6th Session.	London	July 20–
17th International Film Festival	Locarno	July 22–
IA–ECOSOC Committee of Governmental Experts in Aviation: 2d Meeting.	Santiago	July
South Pacific Commission: Final Meeting on Revision of the Commission.	Wellington	July
8th FAO Regional Conference for Latin America	Viña del Mar, Chile	Aug. 1–
IMCO Working Group on Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Sea: 6th Session.	London	Aug. 4–
UNESCO International Conference on Youth	Grenoble	Aug. 23–
3d U.N. International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy.	Geneva	Aug. 31–
Meeting of the Parties to the Convention for High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean.	Ottawa	Aug. 31–
17th Annual Edinburgh Film Festival	Edinburgh	August

[1] Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, May 15, 1964. Following is a list of abbreviations: ANZUS, Australia, New Zealand, and United States Security Treaty; BIRPI, United International Bureaus for the Protection of Industrial and Intellectual Property; ECA, Economic Commission for Africa; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IA–ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Protocol amending articles 48(a), 49(e), and 61 of the convention on international civil aviation (TIAS 1591) by providing that sessions of the Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization shall be held not less than once in 3 years instead of annually. Done at Montreal June 14, 1945. Entered into force December 12, 1956. TIAS 3756.
Ratification deposited: Jamaica, October 18, 1963.

Coffee

International coffee agreement, 1962, with annexes. Open for signature at United Nations Headquarters, New York, September 28 through November 30, 1962. Entered into force December 27, 1963. TIAS 5505.
Accession deposited: Japan, April 6, 1964.

Finance

Agreement supplementing the agreement of September 19, 1960 (TIAS 4671), relating to the Indus Basin Development Fund. Open for signature at Washington from March 31 until April 8, 1964. Enters into force when it has been signed on behalf of all the parties.
Signatures: United States and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, March 31, 1964; Australia, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, Pakistan, and United Kingdom, April 6, 1964.
Entered into force: April 6, 1964.

Law of the Sea

Convention on the continental shelf. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958.
Ratification deposited: United Kingdom, May 11, 1964.
Enters into force: June 10, 1964.

Northwest Atlantic Fisheries

Protocol to the International Convention of February 8, 1949 (TIAS 2089), for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries relating to harp and hood seals. Done at Washington July 15, 1963.[1]
Ratification deposited: United Kingdom, May 8, 1964.

BILATERAL

Canada

Agreement for a joint program of ionospheric research by means of satellites. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa May 6, 1964. Entered into force May 6, 1964.

[1] Not in force.

Mexico

Agreement concerning the level of future exports of beef and veal from Mexico to the United States. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 14, 1964. Entered into force May 14, 1964.

Yugoslavia

Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; U.S.C. 1731–1736), with exchange of notes. Signed at Belgrade April 27, 1964. Entered into force April 27, 1964.

Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; U.S.C. 1731–1736). Signed at Belgrade April 28, 1964. Entered into force April 28, 1964.

PUBLICATIONS

Foreign Relations Volume on Near East and Africa, 1943, Published

Press release 226 dated May 11, for release May 17

The Department of State released on May 17 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, Volume IV, The Near East and Africa.* Volumes already released for 1943 cover the conferences at Cairo and Tehran;[1] general problems;[2] the British Commonwealth, Eastern Europe, the Far East;[3] and China.[4]

In this volume there is documentation on the relations of the United States with 15 countries arranged alphabetically. Most of the content relates to wartime problems, particularly the defense of the Near East and Africa against Axis penetration or attack. Among the compilations of particular interest are those on U.S. policy regarding the postwar political organization of Greece, the problems of coalition warfare as they affected Iran, and the attitude of the United States toward the entry of Turkey into the war and toward the future status of Palestine.

Copies of *Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume IV, The Near East and Africa* (viii, 1,188 pp.; publication 7665) may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402, for $4.00 each.

[1] Department of State publication 7187.
[2] Department of State publication 7585.
[3] Department of State publication 7601.
[4] Department of State publication 6459.

Africa. Foreign Relations Volume on Near East and Africa, 1943, Published 882
American Principles. A Perspective on the Tasks of the 1960's (Rostow) 864
American Republics
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Releases issued prior to May 11 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 202 and 205 of May 4; 209 of May 5; and 216 of May 8.

No.	Date	Subject
*223	5/11	U.S. participation in international conferences.
†225	5/13	Japan liberalizes imports of U.S. lemons.
226	5/11	*Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, Vol. IV, The Near East and Africa* published.
227	5/13	Mann: "The Alliance for Progress."
*228	5/13	ICEM, 25th session.
*229	5/13	Harriman: "Developments in the Sino-Soviet Conflict" (excerpts).
230	5/14	U.S.-Soviet film committee confers on exchanges.
†231	5/14	Meat agreement with Mexico.
*232	5/14	Cultural exchange (Poland).
†233	5/15	Chayes: "The U.N. Charter, the Purse, and the Peace."
*234	5/15	Program for visit of President of Ireland.
235	5/15	Ireland credentials (rewrite).
*236	5/15	Harriman: Indonesian Pavilion, New York World's Fair.
237	5/15	NATO communique.
238	5/15	Foreign policy conference for nongovernmental organizations (rewrite).
†239	5/15	Shipping talks concluded.
*241	5/16	Harriman: "The United States and the Development of African Leaders" (excerpts).

*Not printed.
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ADDRESS

CITY, STATE

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Vol. L, No. 1302

June 8, 1964

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Laos and Viet-Nam—A Prescription for Peace

Address by Secretary Rusk[1]

I appreciate very much indeed your invitation to speak to this distinguished institute—all the more so because I suppose I might be regarded as a poacher on a traditional lawyers' preserve. I am informed that of the 52 men who have served as Secretary of State I am one of 7 who have not been lawyers. No doubt more than one conclusion might be drawn from that small statistic. But I must confess that at one time I aspired to join you. So intent was I that it required a world war to stop me.

I am glad to recall that, in a prior incarnation, I was associated with the Rockefeller Foundation, which has had long and friendly relations with the American Law Institute. Over the years this collaboration has been mutually satisfying and beneficial. Your most recent work on the restatement of the foreign relations law of the United States is a significant contribution to the rule of law in a world scene of considerable turbulence.

I should like both to salute and to solicit the continuing creativeness of the legal profession. We frequently hear of the great contributions which science and technology have made to the transformation of the human condition. We seldom are reminded that these vast contributions could have amounted to little had they not been accompanied by legal, constitutional, and social invention by those who devise the law. The breathtaking pace of science and technology requires that social and legal invention keep pace if the capacity of man at his best is to be protected from the appetites of man at his worst. The legal has a never-ending responsibility to address itself to the emerging problems on the near and far horizons of human affairs to insure that the rule of law can maintain the essentials of order as well as progress.

I was tempted to talk tonight about the further evolution of international law—as seen by a nonlawyer—and the steady development of what one of your colleagues has called "the common law of mankind." But several of my

[1] Made before the American Law Institute at Washington, D.C., on May 22 (press release 251).

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colleagues, especially the lawyers, strongly urged me not to do so. I am not sure whether they were thinking of your welfare or of mine. But I accepted their advice, at least in part, and shall comment tonight upon one or two of the tempestuous problems which threaten the peace and remind us that basic divergence of purpose cannot be reconciled by words and phrases.

The Rule of Law Among Nations

It can be said quite simply that the notion of the rule of law is deeply embedded in the objectives of our foreign policy. We have learned through much experience that law enlarges the area of freedom and curbs the use of raw power. The United States is now party to some 4,100 international agreements—agreements intended to enlarge our opportunities and protect us from the arbitrary conduct of others.

Unfortunately, one cannot yet speak of a consensus among governments about the role or the rule of law. There are still those who think that sovereignty remains unbridled by solemn agreement. There remains the schism between those who look upon agreement as commitment and those who look upon agreement as a tactic. The pervasive crisis of our period of history turns on just this point.

The great majority of governments of the world are committed to the structure of a world community outlined in the opening sections of the United Nations Charter. But there is a large minority, and I am speaking of the Communist world, committed to the destruction of that community and the substitution of what they call their world revolution. The ideological gap is very wide. The problem is not translation; the problem is how to find words, in any language, which represent a meeting of minds among those whose purposes are so basically at odds. "Understanding" is fleeting, "agreement" is contingent or illusory, "commitment" is unreliable, and "predictability" becomes impossible.

If once the international rule of law could be discussed with a certain condescension as a utopian ideal, today it becomes an elementary practical necessity. *Pacta sunt servanda* now becomes the basis of survival. It is in this context, therefore, that I wish to speak of threats to the peace at a time when it is too late to be primitive and too dangerous to be unfaithful.

Laos—the Issues Today

Let me speak first of Laos. When such a problem reappears on the front page, we tend to look upon it as something new and rivet our attention upon what it means for the days and weeks ahead. We tend to forget that such problems have roots and that solutions have to take into account what has gone before. I hope, therefore, you will pause with me to recall how that situation developed in order to understand a little better just what the issues are today.

Laos is a landlocked country about three-fifths the size of California, much of it covered by dense jungle and rugged mountains. Its population is estimated to be between 2 and 3 million. Geography gives it special importance. It has six neighbors, two of which are Communist. It has about 260 miles of common border with Communist China, more than 800 with Communist North Viet-Nam (approximately the distance from New York City to Charleston, South Carolina). It shares 300 miles with South Viet-Nam, almost 300 with Cambodia, more than 1,000 with Thailand, and about 150 with Burma.

In 1949 accords were reached with the French which gave Laos independence within the French Union. We recognized its government, but our legation in Vientiane was served by our Minister-Resident in Saigon until 1954.

During the Indochinese war there was minor guerrilla activity in Laos but no major military campaigns until the spring of 1953, when Communist Vietnamese forces attacked northern and central Laos. These Viet Minh troops were accompanied by Lao Communists—Pathet Lao—trained and equipped in North Viet-Nam. When the Indochinese war was brought to a close by the Geneva agreements of 1954,[2] the Communists controlled two provinces in Laos. But under those agreements, which were signed by the Communist regimes of mainland China and North Viet-Nam, among others, Laos was to be one country and the Pathet Lao forces

[2] For texts, see *American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents*, vol. I (Department of State publication 6446), p. 750.

were to be integrated into the Royal Lao Army. Those agreements also prescribed that all foreign military forces were to be withdrawn from Laos, excepting limited forces and two bases permitted to France.

The Lao Communists were slow in complying with the Geneva agreements. They did not accept reintegration, even in principle, until the end of 1957. By early 1959 their hopes of taking over Laos from within were plainly withering—the Lao Government had launched programs of reform, civic action, and economic development. One of the two Pathet Lao battalions which theoretically had been integrated into the Lao National Army mutinied and, with active Viet Minh help, soon started guerrilla action. In September 1959 the Royal Lao Government appealed to the United Nations on the ground that North Viet-Nam was committing aggression against Lao territory. A United Nations presence in Laos temporarily quieted things down. But infighting—first political, then military—among non-Communist groups in Laos opened the door to further violence. The Soviet Union airlifted arms and ammunition from Hanoi to neutralist and Pathet Lao forces in northeast Laos; the United States supported the Government forces established in the Mekong Valley. Early in January 1961, neutralist and Pathet Lao forces, with the help of Viet Minh advisers and cadres from North Viet-Nam, seized the strategic Plaine des Jarres.

This was the situation which President Kennedy faced at the end of January 1961. There were three main options. One was to turn away from the problem and let the Communists move further into Southeast Asia, with consequences which were very clear—and unacceptable. A second was to make Laos a major battleground and subject its peace-loving people to the misery and suffering of war, or to carry the war elsewhere and multiply the suffering manyfold. A third was to find some way to leave the Laotians alone, by all sides, and not catch them up in the vast contending forces beyond their borders. Laos left alone would threaten no one; no one needed bases there for their own security. Objectively considered, it seemed that it ought to be possible to give the Laotians their chance to work out their own future for themselves.

The Soviet Union indicated that it favored an independent and neutral Laos. We had no wish beyond a free Laos which could live at peace with its neighbors. We agreed, therefore—subject to a cease-fire—to attend a conference on Laos, the purpose of which would be to insure Laotian independence and neutrality and that its people be left alone. The conference met in Geneva in May 1961.

In June in Vienna President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev discussed the matter at some length and jointly stated that they "reaffirmed their support of a neutral and independent Laos under a government chosen by the Laotians themselves, and of international agreements for insuring that neutrality and independence, and in this connection they have recognized the importance of an effective cease-fire." [3]

Agreement for a Neutral Laos

It was more than a year, however, before agreement was achieved at Geneva. Part of the difficulty lay in persuading the different factions in Laos to combine in a new national government under Prince Souvanna Phouma.

A Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos and an accompanying protocol were signed in July 1962.[4] The heart of these commitments was simply this: The people of Laos were to be permitted to live in their own country without interference or pressures from the outside.

Laos was to be independent and neutral. All foreign troops, regular or irregular, and military personnel were to be withdrawn from Laos within 75 days—excepting a limited number of French instructors as requested by the Lao Government. No arms were to be introduced into Laos except at the request of the Lao Government. The signatories agreed to respect the territorial integrity and to refrain "from all direct or indirect interference in the internal affairs" of Laos.

They promised also not to use Lao territory to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. This stipulation plainly barred the passage of men and arms from North Viet-Nam to

[3] For text of a joint communique, see BULLETIN of June 26, 1961, p. 999.

[4] For text, see *ibid.*, Aug. 13, 1962, p. 259.

South Viet-Nam by way of Laos—over the so-called "Ho Chi Minh trail" which the Communists had been using since 1959.

An International Control Commission of three—Canada, India, and Poland—was set up to assure compliance with the agreements. The cochairmen of the Geneva Conference (the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain and the Soviet Union) were to exercise general supervision over the agreements. And all the signatories promised to support a three-faction coalition government under Prince Souvanna Phouma.

These were among the principal pledges made at Geneva by 14 governments, including Communist China, Communist North Viet-Nam, and Poland, as well as the Soviet Union.

Communist Violations of Accords

What happened? The non-Communist elements have complied with and supported the accords; the Communist elements have persistently undercut and frustrated them.

We withdrew all 600 of our military advisory personnel from Laos. The Pathet Lao allowed several thousand North Vietnamese military combat men to remain—these are the backbone of almost every Pathet Lao battalion. Later, additional North Vietnamese troops returned to Laos—many of them in organized battalions. The North Vietnamese have continued to use the corridor through Laos to reinforce and supply the Viet Cong in South Viet-Nam. And they have improved communications through that corridor.

The Royal Lao Government opened the areas under its control to access by all Lao factions and by the International Control Commission. The Communists have denied access to the areas they control, not only to other Lao groups, including the Prime Minister, but to the International Control Commission. They have fired repeatedly at personnel and aircraft on legitimate missions under the authority of the Royal Lao Government.

In negotiations with other Lao factions the Pathet Lao have persistently demanded unilateral concessions and have used threats and armed attacks to erode the basic accords. After innumerable attempts to achieve a compromise, Prince Souvanna went to Hanoi and Peiping in April. He received promises of support. But the Communists deliberately broke up a tripartite meeting at the Plaine des Jarres by insisting their demands be accepted without further discussion.

Faced with this act of bad faith, Prince Souvanna announced his intention to resign. This precipitated an attempted seizure of power by a group of military leaders of the conservative forces in Vientiane. We deplored this seizure and called for the restoration of the conditions required by the Geneva accords. We pledged our support for Prince Souvanna Phouma and all aspects of the Geneva agreement.[5]

A few weeks later the Communists started a series of military attacks, including a heavy assault on the neutralist forces of General Kong Le on the Plaine des Jarres, driving him and his troops off the Plaine where they had been since 1961.

In these persistent and increasingly flagrant violations of the Geneva accords, the Pathet Lao have had active assistance from North Viet-Nam. Indeed the Pathet Lao seems to be no more than a puppet subsidiary of Hanoi. Peiping has consistently supported these violations. Poland has consistently opposed effective action by the International Control Commission, although the representatives of India and Canada have acted with courage and vigor to carry out their responsibilities. The Soviet Union, while continuing to declare its support for the Geneva accords, has been either unwilling or unable to bring effective weight to bear to support them.

Obviously the situation in Laos raises the gravest questions. Clearly a Communist takeover of Laos would be an unacceptable answer for Laos and for Southeast Asia. The use of Laos as a corridor for aggression against South Viet-Nam must cease. Beyond that the people of Laos are entitled to the freedom from outside intervention, to the opportunity for the tranquillity they were solemnly promised. In his efforts to secure compliance with the Geneva agreements and preserve the independence of his country, Prince Souvanna has been patient almost to the limits of endurance.

---

[5] *Ibid.*, May 4, 1964, p. 703.

The Communist assault on South Viet-Nam involves the larger question of whether the Communists are to be permitted to succeed in aggression by terror, guerrilla warfare, and the infiltration of arms and military personnel across national frontiers. These are more than violations of solemn contracts; these are criminal acts against neighbors.

Aggression in South Viet-Nam

Next door to Laos, in South Viet-Nam, a major aggression is under way. I say "aggression" deliberately. Some of the pertinent evidence was summarized at the Security Council yesterday [May 21] by Ambassador Stevenson.[6] Beyond question this aggression was initiated and is directed by Hanoi. It is led by cadres trained in the north by Hanoi and, in significant part, is equipped and supplied by Hanoi—the same Hanoi which directs and conducts the aggression in Laos.

Hanoi in turn has been guided and, in material ways, assisted by Peiping. Arms made in Communist China have been captured in South Viet-Nam. And the Soviet Union lends political support to the aggression against South Viet-Nam, although we think it may perhaps understand better than Peiping and Hanoi the danger that hostilities of this type may develop into larger and more destructive wars.

The renewed Communist assault on South Viet-Nam was decided upon and, in 1960, was publicly proclaimed by Hanoi with the support of Peiping. This decision was simply the open avowal of a Communist plan which had been pursued since the partition of the country in 1954. The decision to intensify the assault, however, may well have been influenced by the remarkable economic and social progress of South Viet-Nam, which cast into a dark shadow the Communist "paradise" in North Viet-Nam. Certainly progress in the south had dashed Communist hopes of taking over that country from within.

With impetus provided by this major effort, the Communist campaign of terror and outrage against the South Vietnamese people mounted to serious proportions by the end of 1961. President Kennedy substantially increased United States assistance to check this increased threat to the freedom of South Viet-Nam. Combined efforts brought about a gradual improvement that continued until the late spring of last year. At that time deep divisions appeared among the South Vietnamese people as a result of unfortunate decisions by President [Ngo Dinh] Diem's government. That government was replaced in early November 1963, and still another change occurred in January of this year. These abrupt changes caused dislocations in the government's administrative structure and military organization and effort. The Communists were quick to take advantage of the resultant confusion to step up their attempts to seize control.

As a result both time and ground were lost. Today the situation in South Viet-Nam is serious. But General [Nguyen] Khanh is an energetic and impressive leader. He fully recognizes that the first imperative for his government is to obtain the full confidence of the Vietnamese people and to give them assurance that his government will protect them and offer them opportunities for a better life. To this end he has initiated administrative reforms and new economic and social programs. At the same time he is taking vigorous steps to strengthen his military forces and to make effective a military strategy designed to counter the tactics of Communist insurgency.

Four Alternatives in Viet-Nam

You are all aware of the four principal alternatives in South Viet-Nam which have been referred to in recent discussion. The first would be to withdraw and forget about Southeast Asia. That would mean not only grievous losses to the free world in Southeast and southern Asia but a drastic loss of confidence in the will and capacity of the free world to oppose aggression. It would also bring us much closer to a major conflagration. Surely we have learned, in the course of the last 35 years, that a course of aggression means war and that the place to stop it is at its beginning.

A second alternative is to give the South Vietnamese Government and people every possible assistance to defeat the attacks against them and to build their society as they themselves would have it. This is the course we have fol-

[6] See p. 907.

lowed for the past 10 years. The tactical advantage of the elusive guerrilla is considerable: He can destroy, but he cannot build; he can assassinate schoolteachers and health workers, but he cannot serve the people; he can use terror in the villages to demand assistance; and he can make things difficult for the far larger security forces whose object is to maintain order.

A third choice would be to expand the war. This can be the result if the Communists persist in their course of aggression.

Fourth, there has been talk of a new political settlement of one sort or another. We have heard the word "neutralization." A new political settlement? Political settlements were reached, after painful negotiation, in 1954 and 1962. "Neutralization"? The Geneva accords of 1962 were precisely agreements to neutralize Laos. Before the ink on them was dry the Communists began to flout them. What new agreements are required? What is needed is not new agreements but compliance, not new undertakings but good faith.

All that is needed to restore peace in Laos and Viet-Nam is for the Communists to live up to the agreements they have already made. All that is needed is for the Communists to stop their aggressions, to go home, to leave their neighbors alone. When they stop their aggressions and the freedom of mainland Southeast Asia is assured, there will be no further need for any American military presence. We have never sought and we do not desire today any base or other military position in South Viet-Nam—or Laos or Cambodia. Our forces in Southeast Asia are there solely in response to the threat and reality of aggression from the north.

At the meeting of the Council of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization in Manila last month,[7] seven of the eight members joined in declaring the defeat of the aggression against South Viet-Nam to be "essential not only to the security of the Republic of Vietnam, but to that of South-East Asia." And, they said, its defeat "will also be convincing proof that Communist expansion by such tactics will not be permitted."

It is not my purpose this evening to anticipate decisions which may lie ahead and on which governments are in consultation. I wanted to review for you some of the background of today's headlines, some of the experience which lies behind them, and some of the issues which are now before us. The timing of these remarks this evening in relation to the events themselves makes it unwise for me to do more.

I hope that the Security Council will be able to resolve the border problems between South Viet-Nam and Cambodia, and we are encouraged to know that both these countries desire a solution. This would add a building block to the structure of peace in Southeast Asia.

The prescription for peace in Laos is there in the Geneva accords of 1962.

We have made it clear that we are not going to abandon people who are trying to preserve their independence and freedom. This is the signal which must be read with the greatest care in other capitals, and especially in Hanoi and Peiping.

Both in Laos and in Viet-Nam there is a simple prescription for peace: Leave your neighbors alone.

President Johnson Urges Congress To Increase U.S. Aid to Viet-Nam

Message of the President to the Congress[1]

THE WHITE HOUSE, *May 18, 1964.*

To the Congress of the United States:

Last January, in my budget message to the Congress,[2] I pointed out that this budget made no provision for any major new requirements that might emerge later for our mutual defense and development program. I stated then that if such requirements should arise I would request prompt action by the Congress to provide additional funds.

That need has emerged in Vietnam. I now request that the Congress provide $125 million in addition to the $3.4 billion already proposed

[7] For a statement made by Secretary Rusk and text of a joint communique, see BULLETIN of May 4, 1964, p. 690.

[1] H. Doc. 307, 88th Cong., 2d sess.

[2] H. Doc. 265, Part 1, 88th Cong., 2d sess.; for excerpts, see BULLETIN of Feb. 10, 1964, p. 218.

for foreign assistance; [3] $70 million is required for economic and $55 million for military uses in Vietnam.

Since the 1965 budget was prepared, two major changes have occurred in Vietnam:

First, the Viet Cong guerrillas, under orders from their Communist masters in the north, have intensified terrorist actions against the peaceful people of South Vietnam. This increased terrorism requires increased response.

Second, a new government under Prime Minister [Nguyen] Khanh has come to power, bringing new energy and leadership and new hope for effective action. I share with Ambassador [Henry Cabot] Lodge the conviction that this new government can mount a successful campaign against the Communists.

In March, Prime Minister Khanh declared his intention to mobilize his nation. This intention has now been confirmed by his new and enlarged budget for 1964. It provides for:

> Expanding the Vietnamese Army, Civil Guard, Self-Defense Corps, and police forces, and integrating their operations with political, economic, and social measures in a systematic clear-and-hold campaign.
>
> Greatly expanding and upgrading the Vietnamese civil administrative corps to increase the Government's effectiveness and services at the village, district, and Province level. Local government capacity, responsiveness to popular needs, and initiatives are to be strengthened.
>
> Better pay scales for the men and adequate budgets for the organizations engaged in this struggle of many fronts.
>
> Manifold expansion of training programs, to provide teachers, health workers, agricultural, financial, and administrative staffs for the rural areas.

These and other measures, if promptly carried out, will require an increase of about 40 percent in Vietnam's domestic budget expenditures over the 1963 level—a far greater expansion of Vietnamese effort than was assumed in the assistance plans submitted in January. Under present circumstances, Vietnam's domestic revenues cannot be increased proportionately. Severe inflation resulting from a budget deficit would endanger political as well as economic stability, unless offsetting financial actions are taken. We expect the Vietnamese Government to take all possible self-help measures to deal with this problem internally, but substantial increases in economic assistance also will be required. We must share the increased costs of the greatly intensified Vietnamese effort.

Our more direct support of the expanded Vietnamese military and civil operations also must keep pace with the intensified Vietnamese effort. On the civil side—through AID's [Agency for International Development] counterinsurgency program—this means more fertilizer, medical supplies and services, repair parts and replacements for war-damaged railway rolling stock, school supplies and building materials, well-drilling equipment and teams to bring fresh water to the villagers, and enlarged advisory staffs in the Provinces.

On the military and paramilitary side, additional equipment, ammunition, training, and supplies will be needed as the organization and functioning of the armed forces improves. Additional aircraft, pilot training for the Vietnamese, and airfield improvements are required. Increased activity will require additional ammunition. Additional support equipment is required for all forces.

The vigorous decisions taken by the new Government of Vietnam to mobilize the full resources of the country merit our strongest support. Increased Communist terror requires it.

By our words and deeds in a decade of determined effort, we are pledged before all the world to stand with the free people of Vietnam. Sixteen thousand Americans are serving our country and the people of Vietnam. Daily they face danger in the cause of freedom. Duty requires, and the American people demand, that we give them the fullest measure of support.

We have reviewed the entire budget for mutual defense and development programs once again to determine whether we can accommodate within it these added requirements. We cannot. In fact, recent events in Brazil and elsewhere may add to the economic programs originally planned. Military programs have already

[3] For text of the President's message to the Congress on foreign aid, see *ibid.*, Apr. 6, 1964, p. 518.

been cut to the bare minimum. We cannot respond to the new situation in Vietnam within the limits of the original budget proposal without unacceptable danger to our other basic security interests.

I am today forwarding to the Speaker of the House of Representatives amendments to my 1965 budget increasing my request for appropriations for supporting assistance from $335 million to $405 million, and for military assistance from $1 billion to $1.055 billion.[4] Both of these increases are covered by the budget's allowance for contingencies, so that they will not affect overall budget totals.

I ask the Congress to enact authorization for supporting assistance and military assistance sufficient to permit appropriations in these amounts.

I strongly urge the Congress to provide this additional $125 million to Vietnam, and to appropriate the full $3,517 million now required for our mutual defense and development programs.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

The Defense of the Free World

by Robert S. McNamara
Secretary of Defense [1]

For more than 15 years, one of the foundation stones upon which the United States has built its foreign policy has been the program of economic and military assistance to friendly nations. The fact that this policy has held communism in check and has helped many of our allies and other nations of the free world toward self-sustaining growth is proof of its success.

Yet this program is under fire.

Many Americans are disturbed because, although President after President has requested funds annually to support armed forces and economic development in countries far from our shores, the Congress seems to reduce the requests as a standard practice. Many of the questions raised in the Congress, by the press, and among our citizens reveal misunderstanding of the program, including the military assistance part of it.

Last year, for example, the military assistance program submitted to the Congress by President Kennedy called for $1.4 billion in appropriations.[2] The Congress, halfway through the fiscal year in which the money was to be spent, cut that amount to $1 billion. This was a severely disrupting reduction of almost 30 percent. In January this year President Johnson, after taking account of the mood of the Congress and the public, as well as of the minimum need, requested just $1 billion for the fiscal year beginning July 1.[3]

It is against this background that I would like to talk to you tonight about military assistance. I shall not discuss economic assistance in detail because it does not fall within the area of my immediate responsibility. However, as a citizen and as one who has been close to the issues, I assure you that strong and plentiful plowshares are as important as sharp swords in the complex equation that produces national security. And I assure you further that the

[4] H. Doc. 305, 88th Cong., 2d sess.

[1] Address made before the National Industrial Conference Board at New York, N.Y., on May 21.

[2] For excerpts from President Kennedy's budget message of Jan. 17, 1963, see BULLETIN of Feb. 11, 1963, p. 224.

[3] For excerpts from President Johnson's budget message of Jan. 21, 1964, see *ibid.*, Feb. 10, 1964, p. 218.

President's program for economic aid deserves your full support.

My theme tonight is that the defense of the free world and of the vital interests of the United States are dependent upon the strength of the entire free world and not merely upon the strength of the United States alone. Although the United States is the central power source in the free-world struggle for national independence, integrity, and economic progress, the United States, by itself, cannot be everywhere at once, doing everything best. Only with stanch friends, well armed and ready, can we provide the integrated balance of forces and the options necessary in a nuclear world.

The military assistance program is designed to help achieve that integrated balance. It helps support military forces that complement our own armed forces.

What the Military Assistance Program Has Done

Let me remind you, first, of the past of the military assistance program.

The year 1945 found the American people proud of victory but weary of war. Our men returned to civil life. Our industries shifted to meet demands long denied by war.

While we demobilized, the Soviets maintained enough of their wartime strength to pursue an aggressive policy in Europe. The war legacy of poverty, destruction, and political disruption left no European nation or group of European nations capable of resisting the power of the Soviet Union. Thus, the Communist system was imposed on Eastern European states occupied by Soviet forces.

In the Far East, the Chinese Communists spread from the base areas they had developed in the war against Japan over all of mainland China. By 1949 they were in physical control.

Communist movements, generally directed from Moscow, were dangerously close to seizing power in Greece, Italy, the Philippines, Malaya, and, many feared, in scores of other countries. Communist military pressures mounted against those nations on the periphery of the Communist bloc, particularly against Greece, Turkey, and Iran.

The erosion of freedom and independence throughout the world could be stopped effectively only if the United States gave leadership. No other free country then had sufficient resources. Our response was in the American tradition. It was humanitarian and utilitarian.

The Marshall Plan provided the basis for the recovery of economic strength in Europe. Both military assistance and economic aid were provided to assist Greece, Turkey, and the Philippines in their struggles against Communists. These programs, and the warning given to the Soviets to withdraw from northern Iran, signaled the beginning of our efforts to meet the rapidly growing Communist threat in all corners of the world.

The United States assumed this leadership in its own self-interest. In a shrinking, increasingly interdependent world we could no longer wear the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans as blinders.

The Berlin blockade in 1948–49 and the attack on South Korea in 1950 merely confirmed that we were faced in faraway places with major challenges to our security. Our response was to increase our own military strength. At the same time we made appropriations five times as large as today's for programs of military assistance to free nations throughout the world whose security was vital to the United States and who could not fully support their own requirements.

What was accomplished with these resources?

Most of the funds appropriated during the early 1950's were used as a matter of priority to build the forces of our European allies. Neither the United States alone nor our European allies alone could provide forces enough to meet a Soviet threat in Europe. Furthermore, our European allies could not recover economically and at the same time train and equip the forces they needed. Therefore a combination of U.S. forces on the one hand and U.S. equipment and training for European forces on the other helped create the needed military strength in Western Europe.

The policy worked.

The Soviets were deterred from moving against this strength. Indeed, by the late fifties, recovery in Europe had advanced markedly and this crucial focus of Allied power became better able to support its own military forces. One of the first steps which President Kennedy took in 1961, therefore, was to direct

the closing out of our military assistance programs to the European NATO nations, except for Greece, Turkey, and Portugal. In the case of two other countries, Norway and Denmark, we are completing prior commitments.

During the buildup in Europe there was a strenuous effort toward buildup in the Pacific as a result of the confrontation with Communist China in Korea. Foremost in our concern were the Republics of Korea and of China, whose combined forces reached more than 1 million men.

Here, too, the program worked. Communist Chinese aggression against these two outposts has been deterred.

At the peak of our military assistance program during the midfifties, the United States was contributing to the development and equipment of a free-world strength of 200 divisions of friendly military forces—forces with some 27,000 aircraft and 2,500 naval vessels.

The great accomplishments of the foreign economic and military assistance programs in the past, particularly in Western Europe, have not by any means eliminated the need for a sizable level of effort to promote free-world security in the present and in the future. The Communist threat that we and our allies continue to face is great, and it is complex. At one end of the spectrum there is the possibility of nuclear war. At the other end there is the threat of subversion and terrorism. In between the extremes are the threats of major conventional attack, local probes, and logistics and manpower support across borders. This entire spectrum remains relevant, and the threats must be dealt with where they cast their shadow.

Unfortunately we shall not have time this evening to discuss three of the smaller portions of the President's request for military assistance funds. One of these elements, accounting for 14 percent of the funds requested, provides for the small but very important military assistance programs for the 15 countries in Latin America; the aid for the 3 countries where we have military base rights; the projects for the emerging nations where resistance to the extension of Communist influence is critical to our national interests; and the programs for the 3 countries—Denmark, Norway, and Japan—where our aid is being phased out.

A second of these elements includes the highly inflexible 11 percent of the budget figure which must go to cover administrative and support expenses of the military assistance program.

And the third, accounting for 11 percent of the budget, includes funds to finance military sales or to cover the U.S. share of the cost of facilities and activities which are essential to effective overseas deployment of United States military strength.

The "Forward Defense" Nations

Our military assistance program today is oriented mainly toward those countries on the periphery of the major Communist nations where the threats are greatest and in which the indigenous resources are least. In the fiscal year 1965 program now before the Congress,[4] about two-thirds of the total amount is scheduled to go to the 11 nations on the southern and eastern perimeters of the Soviet and Red Chinese blocs. These sentinels of the free world, in a sense, are in double jeopardy from potential military aggression from without and from attempted subversion from within. These countries are under the Red shadow. They face the major threat, and they are the ones most affected by the modernization of Communist forces. For this group we requested $745 million in military assistance. They best illustrate the points I want to make.

Imagine a globe, if you will, and on that globe the Sino-Soviet bloc. The bloc is contained at the north by the Arctic. To the west are the revitalized nations of Western Europe. But across the south and to the east you find the 11 "forward defense" nations—Greece, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, India, Laos, Thailand, South Viet-Nam, the Philippines, and the Republics of China and Korea. These nations, together with stretches of the Pacific Ocean bearing the U.S. Fleet, describe an arc along which the free world draws its frontlines of defense.

The frontlines are there in the interests of those 11 nations; the lines are there also in the interests of the United States and the rest of the free world. The areas which this 11-nation arc protects are of obvious strategic importance

[4] For President Johnson's message on foreign aid, see *ibid.*, Apr. 6, 1964, p. 520.

to the United States. More significant, however, is the importance of the arc to the principle that nations have a right to be independent—a right to develop in peace, in freedom, and according to the principle of self-determination. United States support of these rights at the frontiers thickens the blood of the free-world family; it strengthens our security at home.

We must recognize, however, that the United States does not have the resources to maintain a credible force by itself along all of this great arc of forward positions. Such a strategy would be unbearably costly to us in both money and human resources. The United States maintains major combat units ashore in forward positions only in Europe and in parts of the Far East. Such deployments are costly and hurt our balance-of-payments position. We do not now contemplate additional semipermanent deployments of forces abroad.

On the other hand, the free world cannot leave long stretches of that arc undefended. The answer to the problem, of course, is a mix of forces—of local forces deployed in their homelands and of U.S. and other defense treaty forces ready for rapid deployment in the event of attack wherever and whenever it might come.

The United States part of the mix has grown greatly in strength and flexibility:

Since 1961 the U.S. has made great strides in developing strategic retaliatory forces. These bomber and missile forces, which stand ready at all times, are a powerful deterrent to nuclear war in particular and, indeed, to major war of any sort. They are one of the great U.S. contributions to the free-world defense posture.

We are making dramatic increases in strategic airlift.

We have organized the United States Strike Command, which comprises a powerful array of forces that can be deployed rapidly abroad.

Our improved amphibious lift, together with modernized Marine forces, provides us with the ability to keep forces just over the horizon, so to speak, from any threatened spot and to commit these forces quickly where and when needed and to support them over a sustained period of time.

Local Forces, First Line of Resistance

No matter how much we spend and no matter what advances are made in military transportation or in the weapons available to the United States to provide the vital and mobile reserve behind the local forces, the requirement for local forces—forces on the spot—as the first line of resistance remains. To make the strategy effective, these forces must both appear to be able and actually be able to force external aggression to be unambiguous, to hold vital terrain long enough for reinforcement, and to fight and win in concert with other free-world forces. In this mix, it should be noted, local forces sometimes have important advantages over U.S. forces. They are more familiar with local terrain and conditions. In the main, they can get much of their support locally; they are defending their own homelands.

The 11 "forward defense" nations contribute more than 3½ million men to the defense of freedom. Together, they maintain more men under arms than does the United States. A completely fair cost comparison is impossible. But it should be noted that the estimated average annual cost of each United States soldier overseas—just for his pay, allowances, subsistence, and individual clothing—is almost $4,000. The average cost of the 3½ million men under arms in the 11 "forward defense" countries ranges from $200 to $750 per soldier—a cost fully borne in all but three cases by the nation itself. For the United States to replace the contribution in manpower that these countries make would require a completely unacceptable level of conscription in this country. And the cost would be enormous.

Let me come at this point from another direction.

Why do we have a military budget exceeding $50 billion, exclusive of military assistance? We do not need that much to maintain the forces required at this moment in time to defend the territorial limits of the 50 United States. A large fraction of the $50 billion is spent on things designed to insure that aggression is stopped at the outer limits of the free world, far from our territory. Such insurance necessarily implies close cooperation, and allocation of functions, among the nations of the free world.

Just as we do our best to allocate our resources sensibly within the U.S. military budget, so must we allocate our resources sensibly in the larger context. The United States has advantages in technology and wealth over the countries at the frontier. But the nations at the frontier have advantages, too—in manpower, proximity, and familiarity with local conditions. If they tried to do for themselves what we can do best, there would be enormous waste and frustration.

Similarly, if we tried to do for ourself what they can do best, the cost in men and other resources could increase by a factor of 5, 10, or 20, if we could do it at all. Therefore, just as a given number of dollars spent on the U.S. Navy would make no sense if disproportionately few dollars were invested in the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force, so it is that $50 billion spent on the U.S. component of the free-world mix of forces makes no sense if disproportionately few resources are invested in the components which our allies and friends can best provide.

It is nonsense to forge a strong horseshoe without strong horseshoe nails.

But how can the local-force element of the mix be achieved? Most of our friends along the Communist periphery are poor—some very poor. The annual per capita gross national product in these countries ranges from $440 in Greece to $80 in India. By way of comparison, our per capita gross national product is almost $3,000. It is as unrealistic to expect them to equip their own units adequately as it is to expect the United States to provide the manpower. With proper training, their men can use modern equipment well, and they have a profound awareness of the threat they face.

The answer is: They must have U.S. military assistance.

Viet-Nam

To give you an idea of the situation that now exists in the "forward defense" countries, I am going to talk about three examples—Viet-Nam, Greece, and Turkey. In two of these there is no major effort being made at subversion. The third—Viet-Nam—is the country of the forward group which now faces the most serious and direct armed action. Let me say a few words about that special case first.

In Viet-Nam, as I reported fully after my March trip,[5] we are faced with active and unprovoked externally supplied and directed insurgency. Our military assistance—equipment, training, advice—is vital there not only to answer the call of the South Vietnamese and to help prevent the danger of Communist expansion throughout that part of the world but also to prove that the free world can cope with "wars of liberation" as we have been able to cope with Communist aggression at other levels.

I was in Viet-Nam again last week, as you know. I found some progress in the fight there—progress toward "bottoming out" the difficulties caused by the recent double change in government—but the journey ahead will still be long, difficult, and frustrating. We have agreed with the Vietnamese Government that their regular military and paramilitary forces must be increased substantially and soon. We are now strengthening the Vietnamese Air Force with 100 A–1 aircraft, and the number of Vietnamese combat pilots is being doubled. The A–1 aircraft are suited to the changed type of war being fought today and to the capabilities of the Vietnamese to fly and maintain them. To meet these and other special requirements, the President this week asked the Congress to add $55 million in military assistance for Viet-Nam to the 1965 budget request.[6]

Greece and Turkey

Now let me turn to Greece and Turkey.

The Turks and the Greeks cannot forget that their territory has been the target of Russian aggressive intentions that long predate the Communist revolution. They remember that the Russians asked for territorial concessions from Turkey after the Second World War. The Turks are aware that their control of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles puts them astride a gateway of great strategic importance to Russia. The Greeks well remember the Red-inspired civil war.

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[5] For background, see *ibid.*, p. 522.

[6] See p. 891.

Opposing these two countries are the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, which have been modernizing their forces. Improvements in U.S. forces have generally kept pace with the U.S.S.R. and her satellites, but this has not been possible in the case of Greece and Turkey. Equipment of several types is rapidly becoming obsolete. This obsolescence, particularly in the face of modernization on the other side, could create a dangerous feeling of weakness among our allies and could invite adventurous sorties by their Communist neighbors.

Consider what has happened in Bulgaria. The Bulgarian army structure since 1959 has changed from one consisting of 10 rifle divisions with limited defensive strength to one consisting of 7 motorized and 3 tank divisions with strong offensive capabilities.

The increased mobility of Bulgarian forces has not been matched by improvements in Greek and Turkish equipment. Bulgarian forces, for example, are now equipped with Russian T–54 and T–55 tanks, which are first-line medium tanks equipped with the 100-mm. gun. In addition to the standard military trucks which have been introduced to motorize the infantry divisions, the Bulgarians have received the newest Russian eight-wheeled armored personnel carrier. Bulgaria also possesses relatively large quantities of self-propelled guns, howitzers, and antiaircraft guns, as well as the various communications, maintenance, and support equipment required by a modern army.

This impressive record of modernization and improvement has not been matched by equivalent progress in the Greek and Turkish armed forces. In almost all categories of equipment the Greeks and Turks are either seriously short of equipment or are operating equipment which is so old as to be of marginal usefulness. The Grecks and Turks have the manpower, and they have the will to defend themselves; the problem is that the necessary equipment is missing and that Greece and Turkey, valiant as they are, are simply too poor to purchase it on their own account.

Now, how did this situation come about?

Improved mobility, firepower, and communications for Greek and Turkish forces could not be provided in the fiscal year 1963 military assistance program because of the combined effect of a congressional reduction in the administration request and increased requirements in Viet-Nam and India which had to be funded within the overall total available. Some of the most vital requirements could have been met within the $1.4 billion request for fiscal year 1964. However, the congressional 29-percent reduction to $1 billion forced cuts of over 20 percent in the programs for both Greece and Turkey. These reductions, for example, meant complete elimination of self-propelled 105-mm. howitzers and machineguns from the programs for these countries and reductions in the number of rockets and vehicle spares.

Maintaining an Adequate Level of Assistance

It is proper that the total level of military aid has been reduced over the years. The termination of assistance to economically sufficient countries of Europe justifies a reduction. However, the reductions that have taken place go well beyond those warranted by the world situation. As cuts have continued, the executive branch has attempted to trim its planning and its requests to a level which would permit full congressional support and avoid the administrative difficulties, inefficiency, and waste that are inevitable when previously planned programs are sharply reduced. The requests for military assistance have been consistently decreasing. President Johnson's request for the fiscal year beginning July 1 is roughly half of President Eisenhower's request for fiscal year 1962. Despite these decreasing requests, congressional budget cutting has continued unabated. The cuts have ranged from 10 percent in 1961 to last year's 29 percent.

The prospects for the future are not bright.

General [Maxwell D.] Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has characterized the 1965 level for military assistance and the program associated with it as "a holding operation of borderline adequacy." He believes that we cannot operate with that level in the next few years "without a serious loss of military effectiveness in many countries which it is in our interest to support." I agree. But in light

of public attitudes toward this program reflected in the reductions made each recent year by the Congress, I was unwilling to recommend that the President request a higher figure.

Past appropriations by the Congress significantly below the level requested by the executive branch have made a shambles out of the military assistance planning process and have caused waste. I would rather request and receive $1 billion than request a substantially higher figure only to have the request sharply cut after months of controversy and well into the year in which the funds are to be committed.

If I am able to leave but one thought with you this evening, it is this: It would be less than wise—indeed, it would be foolhardy—for the United States to spend $50 billion a year to develop and maintain its own forces and at the same time to refuse to help provide training and equipment to the people in the frontlines who must complement our forces and who are the key to successful joint defense. To have a strong U.S. Military Establishment, and at the same time to neglect the allied forces who would fight alongside our own, is a shortsighted and wasteful approach to our national security. As I said earlier, it is nonsense to forge a strong horseshoe without strong horseshoe nails. We must maintain a balance, and that balance can be maintained only by an adequate level of military assistance.

Unwillingness to devote sufficient resources to military assistance will weaken the national forces of our friends and thereby weaken the combined forces of the free world on which we rely for defense and for the credibility needed to prevent Communist miscalculation in showdowns.

The alternatives are clear: If military assistance is cut, the United States either must make up for the reductions with U.S. forces or must retrench its foreign policy.

The executive branch has stated that military assistance must be kept at the necessary level. The question now rests with you and the Congress of the United States.

Letters of Credence

Spain

The newly appointed Ambassador of Spain, Alfonso Merry del Val y Alzola, the Marques de Merry del Val, presented his credentials to President Johnson on May 19. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 244 dated May 19.

Foreign Policy Conference To Be Held at Cleveland

Press release 248 dated May 20

The Department of State will hold a foreign policy conference at Cleveland, Ohio, on June 18 cosponsored by the Adult Education Council of Greater Cleveland, the Cleveland Press, and Western Reserve University, Division of General Studies, Cleveland College. Forty-six other Cleveland organizations are cooperating in the conference.

Invitations will be extended throughout Ohio to members of the press, radio, television, and nongovernmental organizations concerned with foreign policy, and to business and community leaders.

The purpose of the meeting is to bring together citizen leaders and media representatives with government officials responsible for formulating and carrying out foreign policy.

Officials participating in the conference will be George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State; G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs; John T. McNaughton, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; William H. Sullivan, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Viet-Nam Affairs; James L. Greenfield, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs; and Joseph J. Sisco, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs.

The U.N. Charter, the Purse, and the Peace

by Abram Chayes
Legal Adviser [1]

For most of February of this year violence on the island of Cyprus was headline news. A pointblank clash between two NATO allies threatened. Broader East-West issues were inevitably involved. The urgent requirement was to restore the peace.

On February 15 the Governments of Cyprus and the United Kingdom brought the issue before the United Nations Security Council. Eighteen days later, on March 4, the Council recommended "the creation, with the consent of the Government of Cyprus, of a United Nations peacekeeping force in Cyprus." [2] The force was to be under a U.N. commander appointed by and reporting to the Secretary-General. Following on the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East and the United Nations Operation in the Congo, it was the third major U.N. peacekeeping effort in less than a decade.

Although the Council acted on March 4, the first token contingents of the U.N. Force did not arrive on the island until March 27, more than 3 weeks later. The delay measurably increased the risk of a major outbreak. By contrast, in 1960, 4,000 U.N. troops were on the ground in the Congo within 3 days after Security Council action. When the peace is in the balance, time is always of the essence. In Cyprus time came perilously close to running out.

The delay was the work of a number of factors. Member states had to be persuaded to commit troops. Another important factor was the uncertain arrangement for financing the Force. The method employed is different from that in the Congo and UNEF operations. For both of these, the General Assembly levies assessments under article 17 of the charter, which grants the Assembly plenary authority over the organization's finances. A like approach was available in the Cyprus situation. The 1963 General Assembly made the customary provision for emergencies that might arise when it was not in session. It authorized the Secretary-General to spend up to $2 million on his own initiative for "unforeseen and extraordinary expenses . . . relate[d] to the maintenance of peace and security," and another $8 million with the concurrence of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions.

This authority was not employed. Instead, the Secretary-General followed the Security Council's recommendation, contained in the resolution authorizing the Force, that the costs of the operation should be met by the governments supplying troops or by other voluntary contributions. Thus, he had not only to persuade member states to submit their forces to the hazards of duty in Cyprus but also to go to them hat in hand for the needed funds. Not unnaturally, some governments asked to commit troops were reluctant to do so until funds were assured.

In the end, the United States came forward

[1] Address made before the International Law Association at Montreal, Quebec, Canada, on May 15 (press release 233).

[2] For background and text of resolution, see BULLETIN of Mar. 23, 1964, p. 465.

with $2 million of the estimated $6 million cost of a 3 months' operation, and Britain, which is contributing half the troops, had contributed $1 million besides. The Secretary-General has managed to collect most of the remaining $3 million—enough to get the Force off the ground and on to Cyprus. Today, like its predecessors in the heat of the crisis in the Congo and the Gaza Strip, it is dealing day by day with an extremely delicate situation in an effort to maintain the peace.

There may be situations where voluntary contribution is the best solution to the problem of financing all or part of a particular U.N. operation. But in the Cyprus case, the choice was not a matter of operational preference over other methods. It was a reflection of the financial plight of the United Nations.

Financial Plight of the United Nations

The central fact of that plight is that the United Nations is burdened with a deficit of $125 million, mainly representing expenses incurred in earlier peacekeeping operations. But bankruptcy is not the problem, at least not yet. Most of these obligations run to member states in the form of accounts payable by the United Nations. These states thus far have not pressed their claims to the point of precipitating an immediate cash crisis.

The problem centers on the U.N. effort to collect its accounts receivable—primarily the assessments for peacekeeping in the Congo and the Middle East that have been levied on members in accordance with the regular fiscal procedures of the United Nations. A number of members still fail or refuse to pay these assessments, some of them, including the Soviet bloc and France, on grounds of principle.

The chief formal sanction for enforcing payment of financial obligations is article 19 of the United Nations Charter. It provides that a member more than 2 years in arrears in its contributions to the organization "shall have no vote in the General Assembly." Eighteen members, including the Soviet Union and several Communist countries, have overpassed the limit. Unless they make payments against their arrearages to bring them under that ceiling before the next General Assembly session, the charter sanction will apply.

Thus far the Soviet Union has maintained that it will not pay. So a constitutional battle of major dimensions may erupt in the next meeting of the Assembly. The shadow of that coming battle is what "sicklied o'er" the action of the Security Council on Cyprus. And as the Cyprus case foreshadows, what is ultimately at stake is not the U.N.'s ability to pay its bills but its ability to do its job.

The World Court's Opinion

A constitutional battle of momentous dimensions means, of course, a matter of high policy and high politics. But in this case, in a way that seems familiar to us in the United States because of our constitutional system, it is also very much a matter of law.

It is a matter of law, also, in a much more comfortable and conventional sense than is usual in the international field. For this is not a situation where international law is rudimentary or ill adapted to the situation. The legal issues do not turn on the opinions of publicists or hypothetical reasoning. The question of U.N. finances brings into play a developed corpus of law and legal materials. It was argued to a court and pronounced upon by judges. Therefore, the way this question is finally resolved will tell us a good deal about the state of the rule of law in world affairs.

The United Nations went into the Middle East in 1956 and the Congo in 1960 with near unanimous consensus among its members on what was to be done. The obligation to pay for what was to be done was not initially challenged. Nevertheless, when the Secretary-General first pointed out that many members were increasingly in arrears in paying their assessments for these operations, some questioned their legal liability to pay. A number of grounds were advanced: that the operations themselves were *ultra vires* or had not been properly authorized by the organization; that the Assembly was without power to compel money contributions in support of such operations or, in any case, had not intended to do so in its assessment resolutions.

There was an obvious way to resolve these issues. The charter provides in article 96:

> The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question.

Pursuant to this article, the General Assembly put to the Court the question whether the expenses authorized in the assessment resolutions covering the U.N. operations in the Congo and Middle East were "expenses of the Organization" within the meaning of article 17 of the charter so that, by virtue of article 17, they "shall be borne by the members as apportioned by the General Assembly."

Twenty countries made written submissions in the case—more than in any other World Court proceeding. They represented many parts of the globe and all major legal systems. Nine pleaded orally before the Court. The United Kingdom and Ireland were represented by their Attorneys General; Australia by its Solicitor General; Canada, the Netherlands, Italy, Norway, and the United States sent the Legal Advisers of their respective Foreign Offices.[3] The U.S.S.R. appeared in the Court for oral argument for the first time in history, represented by the distinguished lawyer, Mr. Grigory Tunkin, former Chairman of the International Law Commission and Director of the Juridical-Treaty Department of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

On July 20, 1962, the Court, by a vote of 9 to 5, gave an affirmative answer to the question presented.[4] It held that the expenditures authorized in the financing resolutions were indeed "expenses of the Organization" within the meaning of article 17, with the consequence that assessment of those expenses by the General Assembly was binding on the members.

The opinion of the Court in a case like *Certain Expenses of the United Nations* is characterized as "advisory." It cannot be "binding" in a juridical sense because there are no parties before the Court upon whom a judgment could operate. But for all other purposes, I would suppose that the opinion of the Court in an advisory case properly before it is an authoritative statement of the law. In the *U.N. Expenses* case all the conditions were met. The case was before the Court at the request of the General Assembly under article 96 of the charter. The issue was a narrowly defined question of legal liability, fully matured and ripe for adjudication on concrete facts comprehensively developed before the tribunal.

But whether or not the opinion by its own force establishes the law, the General Assembly has removed any possible question about the status of the Court's pronouncement. The opinion was transmitted to the General Assembly at its 17th session. After consideration and debate, both in appropriate committee and on the floor, the Assembly, by a vote of 76 to 17, with 8 abstentions, declared that it "*Accepts* the opinion of the International Court of Justice on the question submitted to it."[5] Thus this phase of the case came to a close.

History and Application of Article 19

Since the Court's decision, 27 countries which had previously paid nothing on their Congo and Middle East peacekeeping assessments, have made payments of $7 million on these arrears. Last year 10—including some Communist states (Cuba and Hungary, for instance)—went temporarily over the 2-year limit. In each case, these states made a sufficient payment in advance of the then forthcoming session of the General Assembly to forestall the application of article 19.

We are hopeful that all U.N. members now in arrears will make adequate payment before the next General Assembly session. What if some do not? It is our view that such a member, by the mere fact of being more than 2 years in arrears and without the need of any decision of the General Assembly, has lost its right to vote in the General Assembly.

The language of the charter provision leaves little room for any other reading. Article 19 says members in arrears to the specified extent "shall have no vote." The interpretation is buttressed by the wording of the second sentence

[3] For a statement made before the Court by Mr. Chayes on May 21, 1962, see *ibid.*, July 2, 1962, p. 30.

[4] For a Department statement on the Court's opinion, see *ibid.*, Aug. 13, 1962, p. 246.

[5] *Ibid.*, Jan. 7, 1963, p. 37.

of article 19, which provides that the General Assembly "may, nevertheless, permit such a member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the member." The contrast between the permissive "may" of the second sentence and the mandatory "shall" of the first is clear.

The legislative history of article 19 confirms the position. The records of the San Francisco conference show that the framers intended the first sentence of article 19 to apply automatically. The report of the commission which dealt with article 19 states that "a member which has fallen two years in arrears on its financial obligations to the Organization . . . will not be allowed to vote except by special decision of the Assembly." The "special decision" must be taken to refer to exculpatory action under the second sentence of the article, for there is no other ground for a "special decision."

Further, the practice of the U.N. persuasively shows that no affirmative action is needed by the General Assembly in applying the sanction of article 19. As I said a moment ago, a number of states have been more than 2 years in arrears just prior to recent sessions of the Assembly. In every case but one, these countries made payments before—often just before—the opening of the General Assembly in amounts sufficient—often barely sufficient—to bring them under the 2-year limit. This is itself a cogent demonstration of their view of the force of article 19.

The one exception, where payment was not made until after the session had begun, is even more explicitly instructive. When last spring's special session opened, the Secretary-General informed the President of the Assembly that Haiti was in arrears in an amount exceeding that specified in article 19. The Assembly President that year was Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, a distinguished international lawyer who had served a term as judge of the World Court. In his reply to the Secretary-General's letter the following day, he said:

> I have received your letter of 14 May 1963, informing me that, at the opening of the Fourth Special Session of the General Assembly, Haiti was in arrears in the payment of its financial contribution to the United Nations within the terms of Article 19 of the Charter. I would have made an announcement drawing the attention of the Assembly to the loss of voting rights in the Assembly of the Member State just mentioned, under the first sentence of Article 19, had a formal count of vote taken place in the presence of a representative of that State at the opening plenary meeting. As no such vote took place, and as the representative of Haiti was not present, this announcement became unnecessary.

Ten days later, Haiti paid an amount sufficient to bring her under the ceiling and resumed participation in the work of the Assembly. Later, Sir Zafrulla amplified his views of the required procedure in a television interview. In response to the question whether he believed the sanction of article 19 should be applied to countries such as the Soviet Union, which were likely to be in default in the near future, the President replied:

> The matter has nothing to do with my opinion or belief. The article is perfectly clear. Article 19 of the charter says that when that situation arises which you have mentioned, that a member is in default up to a certain point, it has no vote in the Assembly. . . . It is not for me to decide whether it has or it hasn't.

Finally, the constitutions of five of the U.N. specialized agencies—the ILO [International Labor Organization], the Food and Agriculture Organization, UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization], the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, and the International Atomic Energy Agency—all contain provisions virtually identical to article 19. In each of these agencies it is established by long and unbroken practice that a member state in arrears by the required amount, as computed by the agency's secretariat acting ministerially, automatically loses its vote.

Refuting the Soviet Argument

What then is the Soviet position? The U.S.S.R. has argued that the General Assembly must decide by vote to apply the article 19 sanction and that the decision must be taken by a two-thirds majority. This is said to follow from paragraph 2 of article 18, which provides that among the "important questions" requiring a two-thirds majority of the Assembly are "the suspension of the rights and privileges of membership" and the "expulsion of Members." But this passage refers to articles 5 and 6, not to

article 19. Indeed it tracks the language of the former articles, specifying the circumstances under which a member "may be suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership" (article 5) or "may be expelled from the Organization" (article 6), in each case "by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council." In contrast to these articles, with their use of the permissive "may" and their express requirement of Assembly action, the self-executing statement of article 19—that a member in the requisite arrears "shall have no vote in the General Assembly"—leaves no room for the operation of article 18. There is no decision to be taken, whether by a vote of two-thirds or by simple majority.

A second contention is that a General Assembly decision is required before the sanction of article 19 can be applied in order to confirm the existence of the required 2 years' arrearages. The arrearages, however, are calculated arithmetically. The process is governed by accounting procedures laid down in the organization's Financial Regulations and Rules, already unanimously approved by the Assembly. Their execution is no more than a ministerial act to be performed by the Secretariat. And so it has uniformly been regarded in the practice not only of the U.N. itself but of the specialized agencies as well. The General Assembly cannot by its vote alter the rules of addition and subtraction. And it does not take a two-thirds majority of the nations of the world to check the Secretary-General's arithmetic.

Of course, if a member believes that a mistake has been made on the U.N.'s books, it may seek an Assembly decision on the matter. A member may assert, for example, that it is entitled to a setoff of its unpaid claims against the organization for goods or services, and the Assembly might have to decide this question. What the General Assembly may *not* lawfully decide is whether a member 2 years in arrears shall, absent conditions beyond its control, have a vote in the Assembly. That question was decided by the charter.

The U.S.S.R. also argues that arrears on assessments for the peacekeeping operations in the Congo and the Middle East should not be included in calculating article 19 arrears. These operations, it says, were illegally authorized; peace and security, including the financial aspects, are the sole province of the Security Council. The Congo and UNEF operations, involving General Assembly action, were thus *ultra vires*, and the Assembly was without power to make assessments binding on the members to defray those costs.

The argument has a number of lacunae.

First, the Congo force, accounting for much the greater part of the outstanding arrearages, *was* initiated by Security Council resolution. And the Soviet Union, which now complains that the operation was a camouflage for a colonialist adventure, was recorded as voting in favor not only on the first Security Council resolution of July 14, 1960, but, except for one abstention, on each of the subsequent Council actions dealing with the operation from 1960 to date.

Second, the Soviet argument overlooks express charter language. Article 11 authorizes the Assembly to "discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any Member . . . and . . . make recommendations with regard to any such questions. . . ." And article 17 has been held more than once by the International Court to vest plenary authority in the Assembly to assess members for the payment of any and all expenses lawfully incurred by the organization.

Third, and perhaps most important in an assemblage of lawyers, this very contention was made to the International Court of Justice in the *U.N. Expenses* case and was explicitly rejected by it. After fully considering the contention, ably and forcefully argued to the Court by Mr. Tunkin, the Court held that article 11, paragraph 2, "in its first sentence empowers the General Assembly, by means of recommendations to States or to the Security Council, or to both, to organize peacekeeping operations, at the request, or with the consent, of the States concerned." As I said a moment ago, this decision was overwhelmingly accepted by the General Assembly.

States may, of course, continue to persist in their refusal to pay. But they cannot ask us to accept that their refusal is based on legal

grounds. When they argue for a result different from that pronounced by the Court, they assert the right to be judges in their own case.

Confirming the Fiscal Authority of the U.N.

In essence, of course, the Soviet position is not a legal one at all. The real basis on which they hope to defeat our arguments can be seen in the statement of a Soviet spokesman at the U.N.: ". . . if there is any attempt to act along these lines," he said, "we may be obliged to reconsider our attitude towards United Nations activities." The sentence sounds a wistful echo of the childhood insistence that "unless I can make the rules, I won't play." And it takes no very perceptive newspaper reader to hear in it other echoes—of the Soviet boycott of the Security Council in 1950 or the troika proposal of 2 or 3 years ago.

Seen in this perspective, the Russian refusal to honor its financial obligations can be recognized for what it is: not an East-West issue or another cold-war alarum between the United States and the U.S.S.R. It is one in the series of repeated Soviet challenges to the United Nations as an effective, functioning, operating institution.

Indeed, if we look at the line of constitutional growth in United Nations peacekeeping over the last decade, we can see just how close this Soviet thrust comes to a vital nerve. As we all know, with the semiparalysis of the Security Council, the center of peacekeeping activities has become the General Assembly. The Assembly, of course, can establish subsidiary organs, like peacekeeping forces; and it can give directives to the Secretary-General. But the only binding requirement it can make on member states is to pay assessments; and the only sanction for that requirement is the application of article 19.

Thus, if the Soviets by argument, cajolery, or truculence can secure that the sanction is not applied, they will have shattered the very foundation for modern United Nations peacekeeping, the financial authority of the General Assembly.

In essence the Soviet position is designed to vitiate the power of the General Assembly, as its use of the veto vitiates the power of the Security Council and as the troika proposal would have vitiated the power of the Secretary-General. The target is the Assembly's capacity to act, and the impact would be primarily on those newer and smaller states whose voice in world affairs is heard mainly through the Assembly.

As in the case of those earlier challenges, a certain amount of fainthearted counsel is to be heard today. There are those who say we must save the organization by abandoning the charter.

It may be, of course, that, in the experience of the past decade with large-scale U.N. peacekeeping operations, we can find some pointers for fairer or more effective exercise of the Assembly's financial power in the future. The United States has developed some proposals to this end. As President Johnson said in his New Year's letter to Chairman Khrushchev,[6] we are prepared to discuss them with the U.S.S.R. as well as other interested governments in New York. But such plans must be firmly grounded on the Assembly's charter power to make binding assessments and the members' charter obligation to pay those assessments as made. As the Cyprus experience suggests, any other course holds grave dangers for the U.N.'s capacity to keep the peace.

I do not believe the nations of the world will be so easily frightened into undermining what has served them so well. The African states, for example, will not readily be persuaded that the U.N., in helping to establish a unified Congo while keeping the cold war out of their continent, was really embarked on a colonialist adventure. The countries that watched the world tremble on the brink at Suez will not soon be convinced that their safety lies in depriving the United Nations of the capacity for effective action in that kind of situation.

As debate and discussion proceed, the question of article 19 will increasingly be perceived as fundamentally a question going to the U.N.'s capacity to act to preserve the peace. It will be seen also as implicating the basic commitment to the rule of law in world affairs.

When these things are understood, I believe that, as in the past, the nations will rally to the

[6] For text, see *ibid.*, Feb. 3, 1964, p. 157.

support of their charter. And when that prospect becomes clear, the response of the Soviet Union will not be, I predict, to take a walk. Also running true to their past performance, the Soviets will find some way to live with and by the decision of the organization.

In thus confirming the fiscal authority of the United Nations we will have taken another step in fashioning from the words of the charter a living organism to serve our world.

King of Burundi Calls on President Johnson

The White House announced on May 17 that His Majesty Mwambutsa IV, King of Burundi, would call on President Johnson on May 19. Following his visit with the President, the King met with Secretary of State Rusk and was the guest of honor at a luncheon given by Under Secretary of State Ball at the Department of State.

The Burundi Chief of State is in the United States on a private visit to the New York World's Fair.

Germany Completes Liberalization of U.S. Industrial Exports

Press release 247 dated May 20

The Department of State has been informed that the Federal Republic of Germany will eliminate quantitative import restrictions on neat, or bovine, leather at the end of May of this year, effective June 1. This action was taken in conformity with Germany's obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

Neat leather was the last U.S. industrial item subject to quantitative import restriction in Germany. Germany has thus completed the process of eliminating the wide range of restrictions on U.S. industrial products employed during the postwar period.

The State Department and other U.S. Government agencies have continually urged Germany and other foreign governments to eliminate quantitative restrictions hindering U.S. exports.

Japan Liberalizes Imports of U.S. Lemons

Press release 225 dated May 13

The Government of Japan has announced the liberalization of imports of lemons from the United States. This action was taken in conformity with Japan's obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

American citrus producers, who are Japan's principal foreign suppliers, shipped approximately $1½ million worth of fresh lemons to Japan last year. It is expected that U.S. lemon exports will expand significantly, now that quantitative restrictions have been removed.

Japan first placed quantitative restrictions on lemon imports in 1957. The Japanese action removing these restrictions came after extended discussion of the subject between the two Governments.

U.S.–Canada Defense Committee To Meet at Washington

Press release 252 dated May 22

The Department of State announced on May 22 that the Canada–United States Ministerial Committee on Joint Defense will meet at Washington on June 25. The U.S. delegation at the meeting will consist of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, and Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon.

The Canadian delegation will consist of Secretary of State for External Affairs Paul Martin, Minister of National Defence Paul Hellyer, Minister of Finance Walter Gordon, Minister of Defence Production C. M. Drury, and Asso-

ciate Minister of National Defence Lucian Cardin.

Prime Minister Pearson and President Kennedy agreed at Hyannis Port last year[1] to arrange more frequent consultations between their two Governments on matters of mutual interest. Pursuant to this goal, the Prime Minister and President Johnson decided during their talks in January 1964[2] that the Ministerial Committee on Joint Defense should meet during the first half of 1964. The United States invited the Committee to convene at Washington on June 25, and Canada has accepted.

The Committee was set up in 1958[3] to consult periodically on matters affecting the joint defense of Canada and the United States and to discuss any problems that may arise in order to strengthen further the close and intimate cooperation between the two Governments on joint defense matters.

[1] BULLETIN of May 27, 1963, p. 815.
[2] *Ibid.*, Feb. 10, 1964, p. 199.
[3] *Ibid.*, Aug. 4, 1958, p. 208.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

U.S. Calls for Frontier Patrol To Help Prevent Border Incidents Between Cambodia and Viet-Nam

Statement by Adlai E. Stevenson
U.S. Representative in the Security Council[1]

The facts about the incidents at issue are relatively simple and clear.

The Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam already has confirmed that, in the heat of battle, forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam did, in fact, mistakenly cross an ill-marked frontier between their country and Cambodia in pursuit of armed terrorists on May 7 and May 8, and on earlier occasions. That has been repeated and acknowledged here again today by the representative of Viet-Nam.

The Government of Viet-Nam has expressed its regrets that these incidents occurred with some tragic consequences. It has endeavored to initiate bilateral discussions with the Cambodian Government to remove the causes of these incidents.

But these incidents can only be assessed intelligently in the light of the surrounding facts: namely, the armed conspiracy which seeks to destroy not only the Government of Viet-Nam but the very society of Viet-Nam itself.

Mr. President, it is the people of the Republic of Viet-Nam who are the major victims of armed aggression. It is they who are fighting for their independence against violence directed from outside their borders. It is they who suf-

[1] Made in the Security Council on May 21 (press release 249).

fer day and night from the terror of the so-called Viet Cong. The prime targets of the Viet Cong for kidnaping, for torture, and for murder have been local officials, schoolteachers, medical workers, priests, agricultural specialists, and any others whose position, profession, or other talents qualified them for service to the people of Viet-Nam—plus, of course, the relatives and children of citizens loyal to their Government.

The chosen military objectives of the Viet Cong—for gunfire or arson or pillage—have been hospitals, schoolhouses, agricultural stations, and various improvement projects by which the Government of Viet-Nam for many years has been raising the living standards of the people. The Government and people of Viet-Nam have been struggling for survival, struggling for years for survival in a war which has been as wicked, as wanton, and as dirty as any waged against an innocent and peaceful people in the whole cruel history of warfare. So there is something ironic in the fact that the victims of this incessant terror are the accused before this Council and are defending themselves in daylight while terrorists perform their dark and dirty work by night throughout their land.

Why the U.S. Is Involved in Viet-Nam

Mr. President, I cannot ignore the fact that at the meeting of this Council 2 days ago, Ambassador [N. T.] Fedorenko, the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, digressed at great length from the subject before the Council to accuse the United States Government of organizing direct military action against the people of the Indochinese peninsula.

For years—too many years—we have heard these bold and unsupported accusations. I had hoped that these fairy tales would be heard no more. But since the subject has been broached in so fanciful a way, let me set him straight on my Government's policy with respect to Southeast Asia.

First, the United States has no, repeat *no*, national military objective anywhere in Southeast Asia. United States policy for Southeast Asia is very simple. It is the restoration of peace so that the peoples of that area can go about their own independent business in whatever associations they may freely choose for themselves without interference from the outside.

I trust my words have been clear enough on this point.

Second, the United States Government is currently involved in the affairs of the Republic of Viet-Nam for one reason and one reason only: because the Republic of Viet-Nam requested the help of the United States and of other governments to defend itself against armed attack fomented, equipped, and directed from the outside.

This is not the first time that the United States Government has come to the aid of peoples prepared to fight for their freedom and independence against armed aggression sponsored from outside their borders. Nor will it be the last time unless the lesson is learned once and for all by *all* aggressors that armed aggression does not pay—that it no longer works—that it will not be tolerated.

The record of the past two decades makes it clear that a nation with the will for self-preservation can outlast and defeat overt or clandestine aggression—even when that internal aggression is heavily supported from the outside, and even after significant early successes by the aggressors. I would remind the members that in 1947, after the aggressors had gained control of most of the country, many people felt that the cause of the Government of Greece was hopelessly lost. But as long as the people of Greece were prepared to fight for the life of their own country, the United States was not prepared to stand by while Greece was overrun.

This principle does not change with the geographical setting. Aggression is aggression; organized violence is organized violence. Only the scale and the scenery change; the point is the same in Viet-Nam today as it was in Greece in 1947 and in Korea in 1950. The Indochinese Communist Party, the parent of the present Communist Party in North Viet-Nam, made it abundantly clear as early as 1951 that the aim of the Vietnamese Communist leadership is to take control of all of Indochina. This goal has not changed—it is still clearly the objective of the Vietnamese Communist leadership in Hanoi.

Hanoi seeks to accomplish this purpose in South Viet-Nam through subversive guerrilla warfare directed, controlled, and supplied by North Viet-Nam. The Communist leadership in Hanoi has sought to pretend that the insurgency in South Viet-Nam is a civil war, but Hanoi's hand shows very clearly. Public statements by the Communist Party in North Viet-Nam and its leaders have repeatedly demonstrated Hanoi's direction of the struggle in South Viet-Nam. For example, Le Duan, First Secretary of the Party, stated on September 5, 1960, "At present our Party is facing [a] momentous task: . . . to strive to complete . . . revolution throughout the country. . . ." He also said this: "The North is the common revolutionary base of the whole country." Three months after the Communist Party Congress in Hanoi in September 1960, the so-called "National Front for the Liberation of South Viet-Nam" was set up pursuant to plans outlined publicly at that Congress.

The International Control Commission in Viet-Nam, established by the Geneva accords of 1954,[2] stated in a special report which it issued in June 1962 [3] that there is sufficient evidence to show that North Viet-Nam has violated various articles of the Geneva accords by its introduction of armed personnel, arms, munitions, and other supplies from North Viet-Nam into South Viet-Nam with the object of supporting, organizing, and carrying out hostile activities against the Government and armed forces of South Viet-Nam.

Infiltration of military personnel and supplies from North Viet-Nam to South Viet-Nam has been carried out steadily over the past several years. The total number of military cadres sent into South Viet-Nam via infiltration routes runs into the thousands. Such infiltration is well documented on the basis of numerous defectors and prisoners taken by the armed forces of South Viet-Nam.

Introduction of Communist weapons into South Viet-Nam has also grown steadily. An increasing amount of weapons and ammunition captured from the Viet Cong has been proven to be of Chinese Communist manufacture or origin. For example, in December 1963 a large cache of Viet Cong equipment captured in one of the Mekong Delta provinces in South Viet-Nam included recoilless rifles, rocket launchers, carbines, and ammunition of Chinese Communist manufacture.

The United States cannot stand by while Southeast Asia is overrun by armed aggressors. As long as the peoples of that area are determined to preserve their own independence and ask for our help in preserving it, we will extend it. This, of course, is the meaning of President Johnson's request a few days ago for additional funds for more economic as well as military assistance for Viet-Nam.[4]

And if anyone has the illusion that my Government will abandon the people of Viet-Nam—or that we shall weary of the burden of support that we are rendering these people—it can only be due to ignorance of the strength and the conviction of the American people.

Communist Violations of Political Settlement

We all know that Southeast Asia has been the victim of almost incessant violence for more than a decade and a half. Yet despite this fact, it has been suggested that we should give up helping the people of Viet-Nam to defend themselves and seek only a political solution. But a political solution is just what we have already had, and it is in defense—in support—of that political solution that Viet-Nam is fighting today. The United States has never been against political solutions. Indeed, we have faithfully supported the political solutions that were agreed upon at Geneva in 1954 and again in 1962.[5] The threat to peace in the area stems from the fact that others have not done likewise.

The Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962 were—quite precisely—political agreements to stop the fighting, to restore the peace, to secure the independence of Viet-Nam and Laos and Cambodia, to guarantee the integrity of their fron-

[2] For texts, see *American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents*, vol. I, (Department of State publication 6446), p. 750.

[3] Reprints of the ICC report of June 2, 1962, are available upon request from the Office of Media Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

[4] For text of the President's message to Congress, see p. 891.

[5] For text of a Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos and an accompanying protocol signed at Geneva on July 23, 1962, see BULLETIN of Aug. 13, 1962, p. 259.

tiers, and to permit these much-abused peoples to go about their own business in their own ways. The United States, though not a signatory to the 1954 accords, has sought to honor these agreements in the hope that they would permit these people to live in peace and independence from outside interference from any quarter and for all time.

To this day there is only one major trouble with the political agreements reached at Geneva with respect to Viet-Nam, Cambodia, and Laos in 1954 and again with respect to Laos in 1962. It is this: The ink was hardly dry on the Geneva accords in 1954 before North Viet-Nam began to violate them systematically with comradely assistance from the regime in Peiping. Nearly a million people living in North Viet-Nam in 1954 exercised the right given to them under the Geneva agreement to move south to the Republic of Viet-Nam. Even while this was going on, units of the Viet Minh were hiding their arms and settling down within the frontiers of the Republic to form the nucleus of today's so-called Viet Cong—to await the signal from outside their borders to rise and strike. In the meantime they have been trained and supplied in considerable measure from North Viet-Nam—in violation of the Geneva agreement, the political settlement. They have been reinforced by guerrilla forces moved into the Republic of Viet-Nam through Laos—in violation of the Geneva agreement, the political settlement.

This is the reason—and the only reason—why there is fighting in Viet-Nam today. There is fighting in Viet-Nam today only because the political settlement for Viet-Nam reached at Geneva in 1954 has been deliberately and flagrantly and systematically violated.

As I say, Mr. President, this is the reason why my Government—and to a lesser extent other governments—have come to the aid of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam as it fights for its life against armed aggression directed from outside its frontiers in contemptuous violation of binding agreements. If the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam is fighting today, it is fighting to defend the Geneva agreement which has proven undefendable by any other means. If arms are being used in Viet-Nam today, it is only because a political solution has been violated cynically for years.

The Situation in Laos

The same disregard for the political settlement reached at Geneva has been demonstrated—by the same parties—in Laos. Violation has been followed by a period of quiet—and then another violation. Limited aggression has been followed by a period of calm—and then another limited aggression. Throughout the period since July 1962, when the Laotian settlement was concluded, the Prime Minister of Laos, Prince Souvanna Phouma, has with great patience and fortitude sought to maintain the neutrality and independence of his country. He has made every effort to bring about Pathet Lao cooperation in the Government of National Union.

Now, in the past few days, we have seen a massive, deliberate, armed attack against the forces of the coalition government of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma. The attack was mounted by a member of that coalition government, with the military assistance of one of the signatories of the Geneva accords. These violations are obviously aimed at increasing the amount of Lao territory under Communist control.

The military offensive of recent days must be seen as an outright attempt to destroy by violence what the whole structure of the Geneva accords was intended to preserve. Hanoi has persistently refused to withdraw the Vietnamese Communist forces from Laos despite repeated demands by the Lao Prime Minister. Hanoi has also consistently continued the use of Laos as a corridor for infiltration of men and supplies from North Viet-Nam into South Viet-Nam.

It is quite clear that the Communists regard the Geneva accords of 1962 as an instrument which in no way restrains the Communists from pursuing their objective of taking over Laos as well as South Viet-Nam.

The recent attempt to overthrow the constitutional government headed by Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma was in large part attributable to the failure of the machinery set up with the Geneva accords to function in response to

urgent requests by the Government of Laos. This machinery has been persistently sabotaged by the Communist member of the International Control Commission, who has succeeded by misuse of the so-called veto power in paralyzing the machinery designed to protect the peace in that area and thereby undermining support of the Souvanna government. Today, however, that government which was created under the Geneva agreements remains in full exercise of its authority as the legitimate government of a neutral Laos.

The other Geneva signatories must live up to their solemn commitments and support Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma in his efforts to preserve the independence and neutrality which the world thought had been won at Geneva. These solemn obligations must not be betrayed.

"Let All Foreign Troops Withdraw"

Mr. President, my Government takes a very grave view of these events. Those who are responsible have set foot upon an exceedingly dangerous path.

As we look at world affairs in recent years, we have reason to hope that this lesson has at last been learned by all but those fanatics who cling to the doctrine that they can further their ambitions by armed force.

Chairman Khrushchev said it well and clearly in his New Year's Day message to other heads of government around the world.[6] In that letter he asked for "recognition of the fact that territories of states must not, even temporarily, be the target of any kind of invasion, attack, military occupation or other coercive measures, directly or indirectly undertaken by other states for any political, economic, strategic, boundary, or other considerations, whatsoever."

There is not a member of this Council or a member of this organization which does not share a common interest in a final and total renunciation—except in self-defense—of the use of force as a means of pursuing national aims. The doctrine of militant violence has been rendered null and void by the technology of modern weapons and the vulnerability of a world in which the peace cannot be ruptured anywhere without endangering the peace everywhere.

[6] For text, see *ibid.*, Feb. 3, 1964, p. 158.

Finally, Mr. President, with respect to Southeast Asia in general, let me say this. There is a very easy way to restore order in Southeast Asia. There is a very simple, safe way to bring about the end of United States military aid to the Republic of Viet-Nam.

Let all foreign troops withdraw from Laos. Let all states in that area make and abide by the simple decision to leave their neighbors alone. Stop the secret subversion of other people's independence. Stop the clandestine and illegal transit of national frontiers. Stop the export of revolution and the doctrine of violence. Stop the violations of the political agreements reached at Geneva for the future of Southeast Asia.

The people of Laos want to be left alone.

The people of Viet-Nam want to be left alone.

The people of Cambodia want to be left alone.

When their neighbors decide to leave them alone—as they must—there will be no fighting in Southeast Asia and no need for American advisers to leave their homes to help these people resist aggression. Any time that decision can be put in enforcible terms, my Government will be only too happy to put down the burden that we have been sharing with those determined to preserve their independence. Until such assurances are forthcoming, we shall stand for the independence of free peoples in Southeast Asia as we have elsewhere.

The Cambodia–Viet-Nam Frontier

Now, Mr. President, if we can return to the more limited issue before this Council today: the security of the frontier between Cambodia and the Republic of Viet-Nam. My Government is in complete sympathy with the concern of the Government of Cambodia for the sanctity of its borders and the security of its people. Indeed, we have been guided for nearly a decade, in this respect, by the words of the final declaration of the Geneva conference of July 21, 1954:

> In their relations with Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, each member of the Geneva Conference undertakes to respect the sovereignty, the independence, the unity and the territorial integrity of the abovementioned states, and to refrain from any interference in their internal affairs.

With respect to the allegations now made

against my country,[7] I shall do no more than reiterate what Ambassador [Charles W.] Yost, the United State delegate, said to this Council on Tuesday morning:[8] The United States has expressed regret officially for the tragic results of the border incidents in which an American adviser was present; our careful investigations so far have failed to produce evidence that any Americans were present in the inadvertent crossing of the Cambodian frontier on May 7 and May 8; and there is, of course, no question whatever of either aggression or aggressive intent against Cambodia on the part of my country.

Let me emphasize, Mr. President, that my Government has the greatest regard for Cambodia and its people and its Chief of State, Prince Sihanouk, whom I have the privilege of knowing. We believe he has done a great deal for his people and for the independence of his country. We have demonstrated our regard for his effort on behalf of his people in very practical ways over the past decade. We have no doubt that he wants to assure conditions in which his people can live in peace and security. My Government associates itself explicitly with this aim. If the people of Cambodia wish to live in peace and security and independence—and free from external alinement if they so choose—then we want for them precisely what they want for themselves. We have no quarrel whatsoever with the desire of Cambodia to go its own way.

The difficulty, Mr. President, has been that Cambodia has not been in a position to carry out, with its own unaided strength, its own desire to live in peace and tranquillity. Others in the area have not been prepared to leave the people of Cambodia free to pursue their own ends independently and peacefully. The recent difficulties along the frontier which we have been discussing here in the Council are only superficially and accidentally related to the Republic of Viet-Nam. They are deeply and directly related to the fact that the leaders and armed forces of North Viet-Nam, supported by Communist China, have abused the right of Cambodia to live in peace by using Cambodian territory as a passageway, a source of supply, and a sanctuary from counterattack by the forces of South Viet-Nam, which is trying to maintain its right to live in peace and go its own way, too. Obviously Cambodia cannot be secure, her territorial integrity cannot be assured, her independence cannot be certain, as long as outsiders direct massive violence within the frontiers of her neighboring states. This is the real reason for troubles on the Cambodian border; this is the real reason we are here today.

Now it is suggested that the way to restore security on the Cambodian-Vietnamese border is to reconvene the Geneva conference which 10 years ago reached the solemn agreement which I just read to you.

Mr. President, we can surely do better than that. There is no need for another such conference. A Geneva conference on Cambodia could not be expected to produce an agreement any more effective than the agreements we already have. This Council is seized with a specific issue. The Cambodians have brought a specific complaint to this table. Let us deal with it. There is no need to look elsewhere.

We can make, here and now, a constructive decision to help meet the problem that has been laid before us by the Government of Cambodia—to help keep order on her frontier with Viet-Nam and thus to help eliminate at least one of the sources of tension and violence which afflict the area as a whole.

Let me say, Mr. President, that my Government endorses the statement made by the distinguished representative of Cambodia [Voeunsai Sonn] to the Council on Tuesday when he pointed out that states which are not members of the United Nations are not thereby relieved of responsibility for conducting their affairs in line with the principles of the charter of this organization. We could not agree more fully. Yet the regimes of Peiping and Hanoi, which are not members of this organization, are employing or supporting the use of force against their neighbors. This is why the borders of Cambodia have seen violence. And this is why we are here today. And that is why the United Nations has a duty to do what it can do to main-

[7] For text of the Cambodian complaint, see U.N. doc. S/5697 dated May 13.

[8] For text, see U.S./U.N. press release 4391 dated May 19.

tain order along the frontier between Cambodia and Viet-Nam—to help uphold the principles of the charter in Southeast Asia.

As for the exact action which this Council might take, Mr. President, my Government is prepared to consider several possibilities. We are prepared to discuss any practical and constructive steps to meet the problem before us.

One cannot blame the Vietnamese for concluding that the International Control Commission cannot do an effective job of maintaining frontier security. The "troika" principle of the International Control Commission, which is to say the requirement under article 42 of the Geneva agreement on Viet-Nam that decisions dealing with questions concerning violations which might lead to resumption of hostilities can be taken only by unanimous agreement, has contributed to the frustration of the ICC.

The fact that the situation in South Viet-Nam has reached the crisis stage is itself dramatic testimony of the frustration to which the International Control Commission has been reduced. With the exception of the special report on June 2, 1962, to which I referred, condemning Communist violations of the Geneva accords, the Commission has taken no action with respect to the Communist campaign of aggression and guerrilla warfare against South Viet-Nam.

The representative of Cambodia has suggested that a commission of inquiry investigate whether the Viet Cong has used Cambodian territory. We have no fundamental objection to a committee of inquiry. But we do not believe it addresses itself to the basic problem that exists along the Viet-Nam–Cambodian border. More is needed in order to assure that problems do not continue to arise.

Several practical steps for restoring stability to the frontier have been suggested, and I shall make brief and preliminary general remarks about them. I should like to reiterate what Ambassador Yost said, that we have never rejected any proposal for inspection of Cambodian territory.

One suggestion is that the Council request the two parties directly concerned to establish a substantial military force on a bilateral basis to observe and patrol the frontier and to report to the Secretary-General.

Another suggestion is that such a bilateral force be augmented by the addition of United Nations observers and possibly be placed under United Nations command to provide an impartial third-party element representing the world community. We also could see much merit in this idea.

A third suggestion is to make it an all-United Nations force. This might also be effective. It would involve somewhat larger U.N. expenditures than the other alternatives. But if this method should prove desirable to the members of the Council, the United States will be prepared to contribute.

We would suggest, Mr. President, that whether one of these or some other practical solution is agreed, it would be useful to ask the Secretary-General of the United Nations to offer assistance to Cambodia and the Republic of Viet-Nam in clearly marking the frontiers between the two countries. One of the difficulties is that there are places where one does not know whether he stands on one side of the frontier or the other. Certainly it would help reduce the possibility of further incidents if this uncertainty were to be removed.

In conclusion, Mr. President, let me repeat that I am prepared to discuss the policy and the performance of my Government throughout Southeast Asia. But the issue before us is the security of the Cambodia–Viet-Nam border. I have expressed my Government's views on that subject. I hope other members of the Council also will express their views on that subject and that the Council, which is the primary world agency for peace and security, can quickly take effective steps to remedy a situation which could threaten peace and security.

U.S., Japan, and 10 European Nations End Shipping Talks

Joint Announcement

Press release 239 dated May 15

Government officials representing ten European nations, Japan and the United States today [May 15] concluded discussions at the Department of State which began yesterday on some aspects of the dual-rate shipping contracts approved by the Federal Maritime Com-

mission and made public on March 30, 1964. The European nations represented in the discussions were Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

The participants had a fruitful exchange of views with respect to the jurisdictional aspects of the contracts.

Mr. John E. Chadwick, Commercial Minister of the British Embassy in Washington, was spokesman for the officials representing the European nations and Japan at the meeting. Mr. Richard Hankey of the Treasury Solicitor's Department, London, took part as legal adviser.

Rear Admiral John Harllee (ret.), Chairman of the Federal Maritime Commission, headed the United States representation, which included Mr. Timothy May, Managing Director of the Federal Maritime Commission. Mr. Charles P. Nolan, Director of the Office of Telecommunications and Maritime Affairs, Department of State, was chairman of the meeting.

TREATY INFORMATION

United States and India Conclude Cotton Textile Agreement

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

The Governments of the United States and India announced on May 8 (press release 218) the conclusion of a bilateral agreement concerning certain trade in cotton textiles between the two countries for the 2½-year period from April 1, 1964, to September 30, 1966. The agreement was negotiated under article 4 of the Long-Term Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles, done at Geneva on February 9, 1962,[1] and was effected by an exchange of diplomatic notes.

The agreement, which is designed to promote the orderly development and growth of cotton textile exports from India to the United States, is the culmination of bilateral talks held in Washington in February between representatives of the Government of India and a U.S. delegation consisting of representatives of the Departments of Commerce, Labor, and State. During the talks, representatives of the two Governments discussed the fact that India has been concentrating and probably will continue to concentrate its cotton textile exports to the United States in five categories of fabrics and one category of made-up goods.

The principal features of the agreement are as follows:

1. It provides specific export ceilings for category 9—carded sheeting; categories 18/19—printcloth shirting; category 22—carded twills and sateens; category 26—fabrics not elsewhere specified; and category 31—other towels.

2. India's cotton textile exports to the United States in the five principal fabric categories (9, 18/19, 22, and 26) are limited during the first 6 months to an aggregate level of 18.5 million square yards increased by 1¼ percent. The annual aggregate level for these categories, which is 37 million square yards, will be increased by a growth factor of 2½ percent for the next 12-month period and on a cumulative basis by a growth factor of 5 percent for the final 12-month period.

3. Each of the specific category ceilings is also subject to the same increases that apply to the aggregate ceilings.

4. The following table indicates the specific and aggregate ceilings with the percentage increases included:

[1] For text, see BULLETIN of Mar. 12, 1962, p. 431.

Category	Description	Unit	1st 6 mos. 4/1–9/30/64	1st full yr. 10/1/64–9/30/65	2d full yr. 10/1/65–9/30/66
9	Sheeting, carded	Syds.	6, 075, 000	12, 300, 000	12, 915, 000
18/19	Printcloth shirting	Syds.	3, 037, 500	6, 150, 000	6, 457, 500
22	Twill and sateen, carded	Syds.	2, 278, 125	4, 612, 500	4, 843, 125
26	Duck only	Syds.	1, 113, 750	2, 255, 000	2, 367, 750
26	Fabrics, n.e.s., other than duck	Syds.	8, 606, 250	17, 425, 000	18, 296, 250
	Aggregate for categories 9, 18/19, 22, 26	Syds.	18, 731, 250	37, 925, 000	39, 821, 250
31	Other towels	No.	1, 341, 562	2, 716, 250	2, 852, 062

5. The U.S. Government agreed not to request restraint under article 3 of the Long-Term Arrangement in respect of the above categories which are subject to specific limits during the term of the bilateral agreement.

6. The two Governments agreed to exchange such statistical data as are required for the effective implementation of the agreement and to consult on any questions arising in the implementation of the agreement.

7. The Indian Government agreed to use its best efforts to space evenly annual exports within the categories covered by the agreement.

8. In a separate note, the U.S. Government informed the Indian Government that it was concerned about the growth of exports of certain types of cotton bedspreads (category 36) from India to the United States late in 1963 and advised the Indian Government that if the rate of growth continued to increase, it might be required to request consultations under article 3 of the Long-Term Arrangement on cotton bedspreads.

EXCHANGE OF NOTES EFFECTING THE AGREEMENT

U.S. Note to Ambassador of India

APRIL 15, 1964

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to recent discussions in Washington between representatives of the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India concerning exports of cotton textiles from India to the United States and to the conclusions reached by the Cotton Textiles Committee of GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] at its meeting in December of 1963.

As a result of these discussions and in furtherance of the conclusions of the GATT Cotton Textiles Committee, I have the honor to propose the following Agreement relating to trade in cotton textile fabrics and made-up goods between India and the United States.

1. The Government of India shall limit exports in Categories 9, 18, 19, 22 and 26 for the twelve-month period beginning October 1, 1964 to an aggregate limit of 37 million square yards. Within this aggregate limit the following specific ceilings shall apply:

Category	Million Square Yards
9	12.0
18/19	6.0
22	4.5
26 (duck only)	2.2
26 (other than duck)	17.0

2. The Government of India shall limit exports in Category 31 for the twelve-month period beginning October 1, 1964 to 2.65 million pieces.

3. Each Government agrees to supply promptly any available statistical data requested by the other Government. In particular, the Government of India shall supply the most current export data to the Government of the United States, and the Government of the United States shall supply the most current import data to the Government of India.

4. For the duration of this Agreement the Government of the United States shall not exercise its rights under Article 3 of the Long-Term Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles to request restraints on the export of cotton textiles in Categories 9, 18, 19, 22, 26 and 31 from India to the United States. All other relevant provisions of the Long-Term Arrangement shall remain in effect between the two Governments.

5. The levels specified in paragraphs 1 and 2 for the twelve-month period beginning October 1, 1964 may be increased by 2.5 percent.

6. The limitations on exports established in paragraphs 1 and 2, as modified by paragraph 5, shall be increased by 5 percent for the twelve-month period beginning October 1, 1965.

7. The Governments agree to consult on any questions arising in the implementation of this Agreement.

8. The Government of India shall use its best efforts to space evenly annual exports within each category enumerated in paragraphs 1 and 2.

9. In the implementation of this Agreement, the system of categories and the rates of conversion into square yard equivalents listed in the annex hereto shall apply.

10. From April 1, 1964 until October 1, 1964, the Government of India shall maintain exports from India in Categories 9, 18, 19, 22, 26 and 31 within the following levels:

Category	Ceiling
9	6 million square yards
18/19	3 " " "
22	2.25 " " "
26 (duck only)	1.1 " " "
26 (other than duck)	8.5 " " "
Aggregate ceiling, Categories 9, 18, 19, 22 and 26	18.5 " " "
31	1.325 million pieces

11. The levels specified in paragraph 10 for the period from April 1, 1964 until October 1, 1964, may be increased by 1.25 percent.

12. This Agreement shall continue through September 30, 1966, provided that either Government may propose revisions in the terms of this Agreement no later than September 30, 1965, and provided, further, that either Government may terminate this Agreement effective September 30, 1965 by written notice to the other Government given no later than June 30, 1965.

If these proposals are acceptable to your Government, this note and Your Excellency's note of acceptance on behalf of the Government of India shall constitute an agreement between our Governments.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

For the Acting Secretary of State:
PHILIP H. TREZISE

ANNEX

LIST OF COTTON TEXTILE CATEGORIES AND CONVERSION FACTORS FOR FABRICS AND MADE UP GOODS

Category Number	*Description*	*Unit*	*Conversion Factor*
Fabrics			
5.	Ginghams, carded yarn	sq yds	
6.	Ginghams, combed yarn	sq yds	
7.	Velveteens	sq yds	
8.	Corduroy	sq yds	
9.	Sheeting, carded yarn	sq yds	
10.	Sheeting, combed yarn	sq yds	
11.	Lawns, carded yarn	sq yds	
12.	Lawns, combed yarn	sq yds	
13.	Voiles, carded yarn	sq yds	
14.	Voiles, combed yarn	sq yds	
15.	Poplin and broadcloth, carded yarn	sq yds	
16.	Poplin and broadcloth, combed yarn	sq yds	
17.	Typewriter ribbon cloth	sq yds	
18.	Print cloth, shirting type, 80 x 80 type, carded yarn	sq yds	
19.	Print cloth, shirting type, other than 80 x 80 type, carded yarn	sq yds	
20.	Shirting, carded yarn	sq yds	
21.	Shirting, combed yarn	sq yds	
22.	Twill and sateen, carded yarn	sq yds	
23.	Twill and sateen, combed yarn	sq yds	
24.	Yarn-dyed fabrics, n.e.s., carded yarn	sq yds	
25.	Yarn-dyed fabrics, n.e.s., combed yarn	sq yds	
26.	Fabrics, n.e.s., carded yarn	sq yds	
27.	Fabrics, n.e.s., combed yarn	sq yds	
Made Up Goods			
28.	Pillowcases, plain, carded yarn	numbers	1. 084
29.	Pillowcases, plain, combed yarn	numbers	1. 084
30.	Dish towels	numbers	. 348
31.	Towels, other than dish towels	numbers	. 348
32.	Handkerchiefs	dozen	1. 66
33.	Table damasks and manufactures	pounds	3. 17
34.	Sheets, carded yarn	numbers	6. 2
35.	Sheets, combed yarn	numbers	6. 2
36.	Bedspreads, including quilts	numbers	6. 9
37.	Braided and woven elastics	pounds	4. 6
38.	Fishing nets	pounds	4. 6

Indian Reply

APRIL 15, 1964.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your note of today's date concerning trade in cotton textiles between India and the United States which reads as follows:

[Text of U.S. note.]

I have the honour to confirm the foregoing understandings on behalf of the Government of India.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

For the Ambassador:
K. S. SUNDARA RAJAN

His Excellency
GEORGE W. BALL,
Acting Secretary of State of the United States of America.

EXCHANGE OF NOTES CONCERNING CATEGORY 36 EXPORTS

U.S. Note

APRIL 15, 1964.

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: In the Agreement concluded today by our two Governments concerning exports of cotton fabrics and made-up goods from India to the United States, no provisions were made concerning exports in category 36 from India to the United States. During the course of the discussions between representatives of the two Governments, it was observed that exports from India in this category have risen gradually since 1958. However, for the year ending December 1963, Indian exports expanded in excess of this historical trend. While the United States does not desire to request the Government of India to restrain these exports at this time, it wishes to advise the Government of India of its concern over the rapid expansion of imports in the latter part of 1963, and to advise the Government of India that should the rate of increase in these exports continue to increase substantially, the United States may request consultations under Article 3 of the Long-Term Arrangement.

I would be grateful if you would confirm these understandings if they are acceptable to your Government.

Sincerely yours,

For the Acting Secretary of State:
PHILIP H. TREZISE
Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

His Excellency
BRAJ KUMAR NEHRU,
Ambassador of India.

Indian Reply

APRIL 15, 1964

DEAR MR. TREZISE: I acknowledge the receipt of your note of April 15, 1964 which reads as follows:

[Text of U.S. note.]

I wish to confirm on behalf of my Government the understandings set forth in the note quoted above.

Sincerely yours,

For the Ambassador:

K. S. SUNDARA RAJAN
Minister (Economic)

The Honorable
PHILIP H. TREZISE,
Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs,
Department of State.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Protocol amending article 50(a) of the convention on international civil aviation (TIAS 1591) to increase membership of the council from 21 to 27. Done at Montreal June 21, 1961. Entered into force July 17, 1962. TIAS 5170.
Ratifications deposited: Argentina, November 19, 1963; Costa Rica, January 9, 1964; Jamaica, October 18, 1963; Peru, March 12, 1964.

Protocol relating to amendment to convention on international civil aviation (to increase number of parties which may request holding an extraordinary meeting of Assembly). Adopted by Assembly at Rome September 15, 1962.[1]
Ratifications deposited: Denmark, October 30, 1963; Indonesia, December 9, 1963; Malaysia, January 20, 1964; Pakistan, November 27, 1963; Philippines, November 12, 1963; Switzerland, February 3, 1964; Venezuela, February 11, 1964; Yugoslavia, November 5, 1963.

Consular Relations

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at Vienna April 24, 1963.[1]
Accession deposited: Algeria, April 14, 1964.

Cultural Property

Convention for protection of cultural property in event of armed conflict, and regulations of execution;

Protocol for protection of cultural property in event of armed conflict.

Done at The Hague May 14, 1954. Entered into force August 7, 1956.[2]
Ratification deposited: Austria, March 25, 1964.

Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April 24, 1964.[2]

[1] Not in force.
[2] Not in force for the United States.
[3] With reservations made at time of signing.

Accessions deposited: Algeria, April 14, 1964; Rwanda, April 15, 1964.

Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Done at Moscow August 5, 1963. Entered into force October 10, 1963. TIAS 5433.
Ratifications deposited: China, May 18, 1964; Liberia, May 19, 1964.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with six annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force January 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4892.
Ratification deposited: Iraq, April 6, 1964.[3]

BILATERAL

Austria

Agreement regarding the return of Austrian property, rights and interests, with schedule and annex. Signed at Washington January 30, 1959.
Entered into force: May 19, 1964.

Canada

Agreement amending the agreement of September 27, 1961 (TIAS 4859), relating to the continental air defense system. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa May 6, 1964. Entered into force May 6, 1964.

Kenya

Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Effected by exchange of notes at Nairobi March 19 and April 20, 1964. Entered into force April 20, 1964.

Norway

Agreement relating to the use of Norwegian ports and territorial waters by the NS *Savannah*. Signed at Oslo March 1, 1963.
Entered into force: May 8, 1964.

Yugoslavia

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreements of January 5, 1955, November 3, 1956, December 22, 1958, April 28, 1961, and December 28, 1961, as each has been amended. Effected by exchange of notes at Belgrade April 15, 1964. Entered into force April 15, 1964.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Office of Media Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Experimental Communications Satellites—Interconti-

nental Testing. Agreement with Canada. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington August 13 and 23, 1963. Entered into force August 23, 1963. TIAS 5474. 3 pp. 5¢.

Technical Cooperation. Agreement with Afghanistan, extending the agreement of June 30, 1953, as extended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Kabul November 9 and 17, 1963. Entered into force November 17, 1963. TIAS 5477. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Bolivia, amending the agreement of December 17, 1962. Exchange of notes—Signed at La Paz June 24, 1963. Entered into force June 24, 1963. TIAS 5478. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Republic of the Congo, amending the agreement of February 23, 1963. Exchange of notes—Signed at Léopoldville December 18 and 19, 1963. Entered into force December 19, 1963. TIAS 5484. 8 pp. 10¢.

Education—Educational Foundation and Financing of Exchange Programs. Agreement with Greece—Signed at Athens December 13, 1963. Entered into force December 13, 1963. TIAS 5486. 14 pp. 10¢.

Peace Corps Program. Agreement with Indonesia. Exchange of notes—Dated at Djakarta March 8 and 14, 1963. Entered into force March 14, 1963. TIAS 5489. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV. Agreement with Paraguay—Signed at Asunción September 16, 1963. Entered into force September 16, 1963. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5493. 11 pp. 10¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Paraguay—Signed at Asunción November 14, 1963. Entered into force November 14, 1963. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5494. 13 pp. 10¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Sudan—Signed at Khartoum January 31, 1963. Entered into force January 31, 1963. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5495. 14 pp. 10¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Tunisia, amending the Agreement of September 14, 1962, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Tunis December 19, 1963. Entered into force December 19, 1963. TIAS 5498. 3 pp. 5¢.

Double Taxation—Taxes on Income. Agreement with United Kingdom, relating to the continued application to Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland of convention of April 16, 1945, as modified. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington December 31, 1963. Entered into force December 31, 1963. TIAS 5501. 2 pp. 5¢.

Trade. Agreement with Venezuela, relating to United States Schedule to the agreement of November 6, 1939, as amended and supplemented. Exchange of notes—Signed at Caracas July 15 and 23, 1963. Entered into force July 23, 1963. TIAS 5502. 3 pp. 5¢.

Atomic Energy—Equipment for Use at La Plata University. Agreement with Argentina. Exchange of notes—Signed at Buenos Aires November 8, 1962, and November 30, 1963. Entered into force November 30, 1963. TIAS 5504. 4 pp. 5¢.

International Coffee Agreement, 1962. Agreement with Other Governments, formulated at the United Nations Coffee Conference at New York July–September 1962. Open for signature at United Nations Headquarters September 28–November 30, 1962. Entered into force December 27, 1963. TIAS 5505. 293 pp. $1.

Technical Cooperation. Agreement with the Somali Republic, extending the agreement of January 28 and February 4, 1961, as extended. Exchange of letters—Signed at Mogadiscio December 24 and 29, 1963. Entered into force December 29, 1963. TIAS 5508. 2 pp. 5¢.

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with China, relating to the agreement of June 25, 1952, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Taipei December 30, 1963. Entered into force December 30, 1963. TIAS 5509. 7 pp. 10¢.

Aerospace Disturbances—Research Program. Agreement with Australia. Exchange of notes—Signed at Canberra January 3, 1964. TIAS 5510. 3 pp. 5¢.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: May 18–24

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Releases issued prior to May 18 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 218 of May 8, 225 of May 13, and 233 and 239 of May 15.

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*240	5/18	U.S. participation in international conferences.
*242	5/18	Program for visit of King of Burundi.
*243	5/18	Dr. Tompkins sworn in as member of Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs (biographic details).
244	5/19	Spain credentials (rewrite).
*245	5/19	Oliver sworn in as Ambassador to Colombia (biographic details).
†246	5/19	Gentile: microphones found in American Embassy at Moscow.
247	5/20	Germany completes liberalization of U.S. industrial exports.
248	5/20	Foreign policy conference, Cleveland, June 18.
249	5/21	Stevenson: Cambodian complaint, U.N. Security Council.
*250	5/21	Ball: "Philadelphia in a World of Change."
251	5/22	Rusk: American Law Institute.
252	5/22	U.S.–Canada Ministerial Committee on Joint Defense.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Vol. L, No. 1303

June 15, 1964

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Dedication of George C. Marshall Research Library

Remarks by President Johnson[1]

If George Marshall could see us here today, this gathering would please him greatly, I think. Here, in tribute, are men whom his far-seeing vision marked for far-reaching victories.

President Eisenhower, you were his most beloved and respected protege. It is a measure of his stature that he selected you for that decisive command which as a soldier he must have deeply coveted. In that judgment he and his superiors were vindicated and the world was richly rewarded.

General Bradley, you were his cutting edge, the field commander of more American fighting troops than any commander in any era. On your skill rested much of his hope for victory for our cause.

Here the captains and the companions of George Marshall are in rendezvous, and I am so proud and so honored to be at their side. No word of mine can add to the eloquence of your presence.

The name which can command your tribute gains no luster from what I might say. It is we and our country that are ennobled by this ceremony. For the greatness of people can be measured by the qualities of the men that they honor. Great as he was, George Marshall does not stand in towering isolation. He is part of a long line of legendary captains who were more than instruments to be hurled against the enemy. To these men victory in war was important. But the fruits of that victory were even more important. They did not shrink from the blood of battle. But they knew that blood would be spent in vain unless the survivors labored for a country where liberty was safe in a nation of peace.

Listen to the roll of some of those great names, warriors in war and apostles in peace, names which ring across the centuries of our history with that single theme: George Washington, Andrew Jackson, Robert E. Lee,

[1] Made at the dedication of the George C. Marshall Research Library at Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, Va., on May 23 (White House press release; as-delivered text).

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. L, NO. 1303 PUBLICATION 7700 JUNE 15, 1964

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Douglas MacArthur, George Marshall, Omar Bradley, Dwight David Eisenhower.

Many men have, as these men had, the qualities of greatness. But it is fortune's hazard whether character can join with circumstance to produce great deeds. For George Marshall the tragedy of war gave scope for his soldier's art. The trials of a restless peace gave shape to his statesman's skill. He was picked for supreme command, over many of his seniors, by a man of great vision, Franklin D. Roosevelt. When he had helped guide us to victory, he knew that peace, like victory, would go not just to the righteous but to the skillful, not just to the free but to the brave. He followed Harry Truman's wise reminder that "Peace is not a reward that comes automatically to those who cherish it. It must be pursued, unceasingly and unwaveringly, by every means at our command." [2]

To this end, under President Truman's direction, he proposed the Marshall Plan. We know how much our freedom, and the freedom of all Western Europe, owes to that single stroke. But that vision did not stop where Soviet conquest began. To General Marshall, permanent peace depended upon rebuilding all European civilization within its historic boundaries. The Iron Curtain rang down upon that hope. But the correctness of his conviction has not changed. Today we work to carry on the vision of the Marshall Plan. First, to strengthen the ability of every European people to select and shape its own society. Second, to bring every European nation closer to its neighbors in the relationships of peace. This will not be achieved by sudden settlement or by dramatic deed. But the nations of Eastern Europe are beginning to reassert their own identity. There is no longer a single Iron Curtain. There are many. Each differs in strength and thickness—in the light that can pass through it and the hopes that can prosper behind it.

We do not know when all European nations will become part of a single civilization. But as President Eisenhower said in 1953: "This we do know: a world that begins to witness the rebirth of trust among nations *can* find its way to a peace that is neither partial nor punitive." [3]

We will continue to build bridges across the gulf which has divided us from Eastern Europe. They will be bridges of increased trade, of ideas, of visitors, and of humanitarian aid. We do this for four reasons: First, to open new relationships to countries seeking increased independence yet unable to risk isolation. Second, to open the minds of a new generation to the values and the visions of the Western civilization from which they come and to which they belong. Third, to give freer play to the powerful forces of legitimate national pride—the strongest barrier to the ambition of any country to dominate another. Fourth, to demonstrate that identity of interest and the prospects of progress for Eastern Europe lie in a wider relationship with the West.

We go forward within the framework of our unalterable commitment to the defense of Europe and to the reunification of Germany. But under the leadership of President Truman and President Eisenhower, and our late beloved President Kennedy, America and Western Europe have achieved the strength and self-confidence to follow a course based on hope rather than hostility, based on opportunity rather than fear. And it is also our belief that wise and skillful development of relationships with the nations of Eastern Europe can speed the day when Germany will be reunited. We are pledged to use every peaceful means to work with friends and allies so that all of Europe may be joined in a shared society of freedom. In this way I predict the years to come will see us draw closer to General Marshall's bold design than at any time since he stood at Harvard and began to reshape the world.

It is a great man who can guide the course of a great nation long after he has left the scene. The men around me today on this platform are such men. General Marshall was another. We honor him not only for what he did but for what he was. Had he lived unknown and unsung, his character would have illuminated the lives of all who knew him. He was among the

[2] For text of an address made by President Truman at Chicago, Ill., on Apr. 6, 1946, see BULLETIN of Apr. 14, 1946, p. 622.

[3] For text of an address made by President Eisenhower on Apr. 16, 1953, before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, see *ibid.*, Apr. 27, 1953, p. 599.

noblest Americans of them all. Not only a great soldier, not only a great statesman, he was first and foremost a great man.

This institution is here to produce such men. And so it is quite appropriate that the George C. Marshall Research Library is located here, among these cadets. Before the battle of Chancellorsville, Stonewall Jackson said, "The men of Virginia Military Institute will be heard from today." Throughout our history—our long, glorious history—when the day was in doubt and freedom seemed to falter, the voice of VMI has always helped lead our nation to victory.

The qualities forged here, and by your graduates of a hundred battlegrounds, are the hard fiber of this nation's national strength. You and I are in the same service, the service of a nation for which we are prepared to die but for which we wish to live.

I welcome you to that service. I will go back to my tasks with a heart knowing, as did my predecessors, that the men of VMI are at my side in the service of our country.

United States and Rumania Agree To Broaden Mutual Relations

ANNOUNCEMENT OF TALKS

Press release 224 dated May 9

The United States and Rumania have agreed to open discussions in Washington on May 18 on a number of items of interest to both Governments. These talks will deal primarily with economic subjects, especially trade, but will also cover other matters which affect relations between the two countries.

The Rumanian delegation will be headed by Vice Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Chairman of the State Planning Committee Gheorghe Gaston-Marin and will include Minister of the Petroleum and Chemical Industry Mihail Florescu, First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs George Macovescu, Deputy Minister for Foreign Trade Mihai Petri, Rumanian Minister to the United States Petre Bălăceanu, and technical advisers and experts.

The U.S. delegation will be led by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs W. Averell Harriman and will include U.S. Minister to Rumania William A. Crawford; Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Domestic and International Business Jack N. Behrman; Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Richard H. Davis; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Philip H. Trezise; Director of the Bureau of International Commerce, Department of Commerce, Eugene M. Braderman; Assistant Legal Adviser for Economic Affairs, Department of State, Andreas F. Lowenfeld; and Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State, Harold C. Vedeler; as well as a number of experts from various agencies in the U.S. Government.

TEXT OF JOINT COMMUNIQUE

Press release 263 dated June 1

Representatives of the Governments of the United States of America and of the Rumanian People's Republic met in Washington from May 18 to June 1, 1964 to discuss matters of common interest, particularly economic and trade matters. The Rumanian delegation was headed by Gheorghe Gaston-Marin, Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Chairman of the State Planning Committee. The United States delegation was headed by W. Averell Harriman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.

In the course of the negotiations, the two delegations noted the improvement in the relations between the two countries following the agreement of March 30, 1960 which provided for the reciprocal settlement of claims and other financial questions.[1] They noted in particular the mutually beneficial results of the increased cultural, educational, scientific, and other exchanges between the two countries in the past several years.

The representatives of the two Governments agreed that further steps should be taken to carry forward the improvement in mutual re-

[1] For text, see BULLETIN of Apr. 25, 1960, p. 671.

lations. To this end they reached the following understandings:

1. The United States Government agreed to establish a General License procedure under which most commodities may be exported to Rumania without the necessity for individual export license. In addition the United States Government agreed to grant licenses for a number of particular industrial facilities in which the Rumanian delegation expressed special interest.

The Government of the Rumanian People's Republic agreed to authorize enterprises and institutes in Rumania to sell or license Rumanian technology to United States firms.

The two Governments agreed that products, designs, and technology exported to Rumania from the United States would not be transshipped or re-exported without the prior consent of the United States Government. They agreed further that contracts between United States firms and Rumanian state enterprises for imports from Rumania could provide for limitations on re-export or transshipments without prior consent of the Rumanian supplier. The two Governments will mutually facilitate the exchange of information on the use and disposition of products, designs and technology exported from one country to the other.

2. The two Governments also agreed on arrangements for the mutual protection of industrial property rights and processes. It was agreed that commercial contracts between United States firms and Rumanian state enterprises could provide for the settlement of commercial differences and disputes by arbitration in third countries or by appropriate international tribunals, as agreed by the parties to the contracts.

3. The two Governments further agreed to consult, at the request of either party, about any other problems that might arise as the trade between the two countries grows.

4. In order to promote trade between Rumania and the United States, the representatives of the Rumanian Government expressed their desire to expand the activity of the New York Trade Office of the Rumanian Mission in the United States. The United States delegation discussed plans for setting up in Bucharest a trade promotion office of the United States Mission in Rumania. It was also understood that tourist promotion offices could be established in the two countries.

5. Both Governments agreed to facilitate the entry, travel and work of the representatives of firms and enterprises, and of trade missions. They also agreed to facilitate the exchange of trade exhibits and the publication of trade promotion materials.

6. Both delegations recognized that the development of significant and durable trade relations between the two countries requires the promotion of trade in both directions.

The Rumanian delegation emphasized that Rumanian products cannot compete on an equal basis in the United States market under the tariff treatment accorded such products. It stated that this factor could limit the expansion of trade between the two countries. The United States delegation took note of this concern, and explained the applicable provisions of United States law. The two delegations agreed to give continuing consideration to means of increasing trade between the United States and Rumania.

7. The two delegations noted the forward steps that had been taken in consular matters, and on behalf of their Governments agreed that further measures would be taken to facilitate the mutual settlement of consular problems. In the interest of further improvement of consular relations, they agreed that representatives of the two Governments would meet in Washington in September 1964 to negotiate a new consular convention between the two countries.

8. The delegations stated the intention of the two Governments to expand the existing program of cultural, educational, scientific, and other exchanges between the United States and Rumania.

9. The Governments of the United States of America and of the Rumanian People's Republic today raised the level of their diplomatic missions in Washington and Bucharest from Legations to Embassies. Ambassadors will be exchanged at an early date.

At the conclusion of the meetings, Under Secretary Harriman and Vice-Chairman Gaston-Marin expressed the hope on behalf of their

Governments that progress in carrying out the understandings reached would furnish the basis for a further broadening and improvement in the relations between the United States and Rumania.

President Expresses Grief at Death of Prime Minister Nehru

Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, died at New Delhi on May 27. Following is the text of a message sent by President Johnson to Dr. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, President of the Republic of India.

White House press release dated May 27

May 27, 1964

Dear President Radhakrishnan: Once again we come together in grief over the death of a great and beloved man—this time your own leader, Prime Minister Nehru.

Words are inadequate to convey the deep sense of loss which we in particular feel at his passing. For so long we had counted on his influence for good; it now seems impossible to believe that he is no longer with us. Yet his spirit lives on. The rich heritage he left us, his faith in his people and in humanity, will, I know, serve to sustain you and yours as we strive together to translate his ideals into reality.

History has already recorded his monumental contribution to the molding of a strong and independent India. And yet, it is not just as a leader of India that he has served humanity. Perhaps more than any other world leader he has given expression to man's yearning for peace. This is the issue of our age. In his fearless pursuit of a world free from war he has served all humanity.

As it was for Gandhi, peace was the ideal of Jawaharlal Nehru; it was his message to the world. There could be no more fitting memorial to him than a world without war. It is my sincere belief that in his memory the statesmen of the world should dedicate themselves to making his ideal a reality. Our country is pledged to this, and we renew our pledge today in tribute to your great departed leader.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Meeting at Honolulu Reviews Situation in Southeast Asia

White House Announcement

White House press release dated May 28

The President has asked a number of high U.S. officials to meet in Honolulu on June 1 and 2 for discussions of the situation in Southeast Asia. The meeting will be chaired by Secretary Rusk[1] and will include Secretary [of Defense Robert S.] McNamara, General [Maxwell D.] Taylor, and other officials from Washington, together with Ambassador [to the Republic of Viet-Nam Henry Cabot] Lodge and other high-ranking Americans stationed in Southeast Asia. The purpose of the meeting will be to review the situation in the entire area.

Letters of Credence

Chad

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Chad, Boukar Abdoul, presented his credentials to President Johnson on May 25. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 253 dated May 25.

[1] Secretary Rusk left Washington on May 27 to attend funeral services for Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who died at New Delhi on that day.

President de Valera of Ireland Visits United States

Eamon de Valera, President of the Republic of Ireland, visited the United States May 26 to 30. He met with President Johnson and other Government officials at Washington May 27–29. On May 28 President de Valera addressed a joint session of Congress. Following are the texts of exchanges of arrival remarks and toasts with President Johnson and President de Valera's address to the Congress.

ARRIVAL REMARKS

White House press release dated May 27

President Johnson

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen: Mr. President, I am very happy and proud to welcome you to the United States. We consider this to be your second country, and you are always welcome on this soil.

On your first trip 45 years ago, you came to interest America in the cause of Irish freedom, much as Benjamin Franklin, the envoy of the American Revolution, visited Ireland in 1772.

Freedom for Ireland has been the driving, mastering passion of your life, and America is honored today to have back a native son who has become Ireland's liberator, Ireland's senior statesman, and Ireland's President.

There is one man who is not here with us today who would especially be proud of this moment—John Fitzgerald Kennedy. President Kennedy loved Ireland, and he held for you, Mr. President, personally the deepest affection.

When he returned from Ireland last summer, we all knew how impressed he had been with the great reception that had been given him by the people of his ancestral land.

Now it is our turn and our privilege to greet you, Mr. President. To no other Irish leader do we owe a greater debt than you for the contributions which Ireland has made—and is making—to the building of a world community under the rule of law.

This is the country of your birth, Mr. President. This will always be your home. You belong to us, Mr. President, just as in a very special way John F. Kennedy belonged to you.

So this morning it gives me great pride and pleasure on behalf of all of the American people to welcome you home. We are glad that you are here.

President de Valera

Thank you, Mr. President, for your very gracious words of welcome. I am sure the people of Ireland appreciate this gesture on your part.

We all know that in your position with your responsibilities it is not easy to find time for occasions like this. We appreciate it, therefore, all the more, and I am more than grateful that you should be here in person to greet me and also that Mrs. Johnson should be good enough to come down to meet me here.

As you have said, this is a great occasion—or at least, as you have suggested, this is a great occasion for me, and so it is. I was here 45 years ago, and in my work to interest the people of America in Ireland's struggle at that time for independence I traveled throughout the whole of the United States, practically. I spoke in all of your major cities; so truly I feel somewhat at home.

But 45 years is a long span in human life. It has always been for me a great longing that I should some day be able to return here to the United States while in a representative capacity and travel throughout the country and say to the people in all of the large cities where

such favor has been shown to us back 45 years ago and tell all the old friends there how much their aid helped us at that time. Unfortunately, if it were possible for me to go around the country, not many of the old friends would still be left.

Back 25 years ago I had planned such a visit. I had intended traveling to all of the principal centers where great demonstrations had shown in what way the Irish people regarded Ireland's rights at that time. Although all of the arrangements were made, there was a threat of conscription of people in six of our northeastern counties and I had to cancel the visit. Mr. [Sean T.] O'Kelly, my deputy at that time, and later President, who had the pleasure of being received here some 4 or 5 years ago, took my place.

As I have said, I do not think that any other Irishman could find an occasion like this. I find immense pleasure in coming back and being able to speak here from the Capital of your nation to all our friends throughout the country. How deeply we appreciate and how well I remember all the help that was given to us at that time!

I don't want to detain you, Mr. President, but this morning I was taken by the good office of Mr. [Carlisle H.] Humelsine to Williamsburg. I was taken in a coach and pair to see the old city and some of the houses in the old city, the Governor's House, and so on. But I was taken to the House of Assembly, and I was sitting on the Speaker's chair and brought again to the seat from which Patrick Henry spoke. Mr. President, it was not the first time that I sat on that chair or sat on that bench. I did it 45 years ago, because I was taken at that time to all of the spots famous in American Revolutionary history—to Lexington, to Concord, to Bunker Hill, and so on—and I was, of course, taken to the seat of the Revolution in Virginia.

Once more, Mr. President, I want to express to you my very deep gratitude and on behalf of the Irish people their gratitude.

In our own language, may I say: Is mór agam na briathra fáilte a dubhairt tú. Táim anbhuióch díot as ucht do chineáltais. (Translation: I deeply appreciate your words of welcome. I am most grateful for your great kindness.)

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS

White House press release dated May 27

President Johnson

Mr. President, all of the pleasure of life is a visit to Ireland. If that is not possible, the second is to have Ireland visit us. So we are happy, Mr. President, tonight that you have come back to the country of your birth, home to the people who claim you as one of their own.

You and I have a great deal in common, Mr. President, not the least of which is that a lot of Irishmen vote for us—and occasionally vote against us. Furthermore, in our work we are both surrounded by Irishmen. I have heard it said that there are more Irishmen in the White House than people. I know that I have become an Irishman by osmosis.

Mr. President, this is your fifth trip to our country, and I cannot help but compare it to your first visit in 1919, when you were smuggled ashore to outwit those who would thwart your efforts to win support for Irish liberation. Since then, Mr. President, you have become a symbol of the contributions our two countries have made to each other. In a real sense, Mr. President, we gave you to Ireland in partial payment for the thousands of Irish who came to America to enrich our lives.

Foremost among those was John Fitzgerald Kennedy, whose name will live forever as the symbol of the ties that bind our countries together. His tragic and untimely death left all our hearts deeply wounded, but we are all better men for the life he lived while on this earth.

Few men, Mr. President, have had the satisfaction that you have had. Not only did you play a leading role in the birth of your nation, but you have continued to exert great influence long after Ireland became a significant force in world affairs.

In the United States, in the Congo, and in Cyprus, the voice of Ireland is the symbol of sanity and sage counsel and self-sacrifice, and this is the story of De Valera—and that is the story of Ireland.

I want to pay a very special tribute tonight to your Minister of External Affairs, Mr.

[Frank] Aiken, for his very active role in the United Nations; to Ambassador [William P.] Fay, with whom I want to cultivate very close relationships; and to Mrs. de Valera, the First Lady of Ireland, a woman of enormous talent and keen spirit; and, finally, to you, Mr. President, as a small expression of our affection and appreciation not only for your having come to our country but for your having brought Speaker [of the U.S. House of Representatives John W.] McCormack and his wife to have dinner with us for the first time.

So, as a small expression of our appreciation and as a token of our profound respect for your life and labors, I should like to ask those of you who have joined us this evening, my colleagues and my friends, to join with me in raising our glasses in a toast to the President of Ireland—a great Irishman and a very great friend.

President de Valera

Mr. President, I have been accustomed to speaking in the days when we did not have these things, and I had to keep my eye on the farthest man in the crowd to see whether he was listening to me or not or following what I said.

Mr. President, I do not know how I can express to you my thanks for your generous invitation to be here and for the kind words which you have said of me since I came here.

The trouble with me is that when I come to the United States, there is a danger that I presume too far. I feel so much at home here, and I think Americans coming to Ireland feel at home also. I feel so much at home that I have to be careful not to act as if I were an American.

There was a time when the phrase "hyphenated American" was used—most of you people are too young to remember those days—but there was a certain sting in the phrase, and it hurt our people; so, as a counter, I am 100 percent American. When I was pronounced on one occasion in an American assembly to be the 100 percent American in the room, it happened like this. I had been accepted or made a chief of the Chippewa tribe. As a matter of fact, I have been made a chief of two Indian tribes. But this man speaking of me pronounced that I was the 100 percent American in the room, that I was born in America and I was an Indian chief.

Well, as I say, the danger I have in coming to America is that I might presume too far and do things which it would not be proper for me, belonging to another country, to do.

Being in Washington, I should tell you a story which may interest you. There was a lady here when I was here—I think she has passed away long ago so there won't be any harm in mentioning her name, which I think was Alice Paul—who played a very prominent part in the Suffragettes, as we called them and as they used to be called in England—in the "votes for women" campaign.

She was a great friend of ours, and she got all of her organization to help us in our efforts to get the American people to pronounce in favor of recognition of the Irish Republic. She never asked for any award of any kind until one day she came to me and said, "Now, you know we have all been working for you, helping you. I want you to do something for us."

She said, "There is one State left, and if we get that State we will have won our campaign." I think it is two-thirds—I forget the number now—of the States have to vote in order to get a change in the Constitution.

She said, "There is one State left, and in that State we only want four votes to get it, and there are four Irishmen against us. These four Irishmen"—I won't mention the State; it is not far from here—"and anything we say cannot change their minds to get them to vote for us. Would you be good enough to go down and try to get these four men to change?"

I had not interfered in American politics, although some people said I had, because our campaign was a campaign to ask America at the time that if they were going to ratify the Treaty of Versailles they put in some reservation at any rate which would not bind America to helping England to maintain Ireland as a part of British territory. I felt that I could do that as an outsider. We were affected by it, and America was going to take action which I thought would be detrimental to us. Therefore, I felt quite free, but otherwise I had nothing to do with American politics.

But this was a terrible temptation. So she pressed very, very hard, and, being a woman, I couldn't refuse. So I fell. I went down to this State. I interviewed the four Irishmen. Do you think they would stir? Not a bit—not a bit. They were as firm in their opinions, and they weren't going to listen to any outsider suggest anything to them. I had only high regard for them afterward because of the fact that they had their own opinions in their own country and it was best, although I did believe that women deserved to vote.

Now, as I say, my danger in coming here is that I should presume too far, but I do feel always at home. Whenever I come to an American city, I know that there are quite a number of friends. A I said today, the older friends have passed away. If you add 45 and 45 you get 90, and most of the people who were active in our cause at that time were 45 years of age or so; so most of them have passed to their reward. But I know that their children were there and that they were also taught by their parents the right of the Irish to be free.

So, indeed, it is for me an occasion of deep emotion, if I might say so, to come back here and to come as President once more, as President of the Irish Republic, and to be received here by the President of the United States and by his good lady.

I have spoken personally because it is for the moment particularly that aspect of it that comes to my mind, but of course, as you said, Mr. President, it is symbolic of the relations that have been between our two countries for centuries.

You mentioned, Mr. President, I think, Benjamin Franklin today. He was back dealing with the Colonial patriots of that particular time, but the ideals that were held out by the patriots here in America in the period of the Revolution have been the ideals of the Irish people. We are fundamentally democratic—and I don't mean anything about parties. But, simply, we believe in the right of the people to choose their own governors, to choose those who should rule them. We believe in the equality and the dignity of the human person, and we really believe in all the things that have been put forward as the ideals of Americans back along through the whole of the period in which our two histories have run upon in a certain sense pilot courses.

You have been a great nation, and you have great things to do in the world today in the leadership of the world, in striving to get for humanity the peace as a foundation of progress. You are doing that to the admiration, I think, of right-thinking people, certainly to the admiration of the people of Ireland. We in Ireland are trying to do the same. We have a certain freedom which you haven't got. As a smaller nation, we are not suspect. A big power is always suspect in its actions; no matter how well-intentioned its actions may be, it is always open to a certain amount of suspicion. A small nation is not.

I have always hoped that our people would keep clear of blocs of every kind so that at any particular moment they would be able to advocate what they considered right and true. When we do it and say it, we are not suspect. Therefore, we have complementary parts to play, I think, in the world today.

It is a great joy for me as representative of our people, Mr. President, to be here as your guest and to assure you that that close relationship between our countries which has existed for centuries, insofar as one human foresight can possibly measure, is likely to continue.

I don't know if it would be in order for me to do so, but I ask you all to raise your glass in a toast to the President of the United States.

ADDRESS TO THE CONGRESS[1]

Mr. Speaker, Mr. President pro tempore of the Senate, Members of the Congress of the United States, my first word to you must be to thank you from my heart for the great privilege you have granted me in permitting me to appear before you and to address you.

I was here some 45 years ago and I toured throughout this great country. You may remember that on the 21st of January 1919 the National Assembly of Ireland—Dail Eireann—declared Ireland independent and a republic, just as the Second Continental Congress here

[1] *Congressional Record* of May 28, 1964, p. 11804.

declared the independence of America.

President Wilson during the First World War had put the rights of people to self-determination as a fundamental basis for peace. We in Ireland took advantage of the fact that that principle had been enunciated by the head of this great Nation. There was a general election due at the time, and we took advantage of that election to make it clear that the people wanted independence. The elections were held under British law and therefore there could be no suggestion of any interference in our favor. The results of the elections were such that it would be impossible for anyone to deny what was the status of the nation and what was the form of government that the Irish people desired.

I was sent here some months later—in June of 1919. I have told you that our Declaration of Independence was made on the 21st of January 1919. That is our Independence Day, as July 4 is yours.

I was sent here to the United States with a threefold mission. First, to ask for official recognition of the independence, and the Republic that had been declared in Ireland in full accordance with the principles of self-determination. I was sent here also to try to float an external loan for the uses of that Republic. And, finally, I was asked to plead with the American people so that if the covenant of the League of Nations and the Treaty of Versailles, which were under discussion, were to be ratified, the United States would make it clear that notwithstanding article X of that covenant the United States was not pledging itself to maintain Ireland as an integral part of British territory.

Some weeks after we had declared our independence—I think it was on March 4—the House of Representatives here passed a resolution, by something like 216 votes to 41, asking the peace conference that was sitting in Paris and passing judgment upon the rights of nations to favorably consider Ireland's right to self-determination.

A few months later, on June 6, your Senate here passed a resolution earnestly requesting the American Peace Commissioners, then in Paris, to endeavor to secure that the representatives who had been chosen in Ireland for the purpose, would get a hearing at the peace conference in order that they might present Ireland's case.

But the Senate went further. Nearly a year later, when the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles was under discussion, it passed a resolution which was intended to be a reservation to the treaty, if adopted, reaffirming its adherence to the principles of self-determination and its previous vote of sympathy with the aspirations of the Irish people for a government of their own choice, and went further and expressed the earnest hope that once Ireland had got self-government it would be promptly admitted as a member of the League of Nations.

You know that on account of articles in the covenant and circumstances of the day the treaty was not ratified.

But the resolutions here in Congress, supported as they were, and mirroring as they did the attitude of the American people as a whole were made manifest by immense demonstrations in all the principal cities throughout the United States. Recognition was given by the mayors of your principal cities, by the governors and legislatures of many of your States, so that Congress here was expressing accurately the will of the American people in regard to Ireland.

It is not necessary for me to tell you how heartened our people were by these expressions of sympathy and friendship. We were in a very difficult struggle, facing very great odds. And it was a comfort and an earnest of ultimate success that this great freedom-loving nation of America and its people were behind our efforts.

What was the gratitude of the Irish people was clearly evident to anyone who saw the reception that was given to your late President, President Kennedy. He was welcomed not merely because he was of Irish blood, not merely because of his personal charm and his great qualities of heart and mind, nor even because of the great leadership which he was giving to the world in critical moments; but he was honored because he was regarded by our people as the symbol of this great Nation, because he was the elected President of this great people.

In honoring him they felt that they were in

some small measure expressing their gratitude to the people of the United States for the aid that had been given to them.

The United States since the Declaration of Independence has been looked upon by all freedom-loving peoples as the champion of human liberty, the liberty of nations, and the liberty of individuals. We in Ireland have constantly looked to you as such a champion.

We all know that the former League of Nations came into being as the result of American initiative—although, as I said, for reasons which seemed good at the time to the American people they did not ratify the treaty or become members of the League. But the idea came from America, in modern times, anyhow.

And the successor of the League—the United Nations Organization—also came into being as the result of American influence.

Most thinking people will admit that if we are to look forward to peace, to anything like a lasting peace in this world, it can only be secured by the working of such an organization—an organization that will purposely devote itself to bringing about the rule of law and, where other means have failed, judicial determination of international disputes and enforcement of peace when that becomes necessary.

Now, you all know that we are far from being at that goal at present. But there is no one who has read the speeches of President Kennedy or the speeches of President Johnson or the speeches and statements of your Secretary of State or of the chairman of your Foreign Relations Committee, but must be satisfied that American leaders are thinking at the highest level and that they are facing realistically the complicated situations that confront them and also the social evils that have to be remedied.

It is a great comfort to know that a nation like yours is thinking at that level. And we have the hope that as long as there is thinking at that level and as long as this Nation is guided by the Divine Spirit that ultimately the peace and the conditions which we all wish for will be realized.

But freedom and peace are but the foundations. They are the necessary foundations.

The United States as a great nation and ours as one of the smaller nations, working in our complementary ways, are endeavoring to build, to secure that these foundations will be well laid.

But that is not all, of course. An Irish poet thinking some 120 years ago of the role he would wish his nation to play addressed us in these words:

> Oh, Ireland, be it thy high duty to teach the world the might of moral beauty and stamp God's image truly on the struggling soul.

President Kennedy in his address at Amherst College,[2] thinking of the future that he would wish and that he foresaw for America, said he wished an America whose military strength would be matched by its moral strength, the moral strength of its people; its wealth by their wisdom; its power by their purpose—an America that would not be afraid of grace and beauty.

In short, he said, an America that would win respect not merely because of its strength but because of its culture. I am sure that is the America that ultimately you would want, as it is the Ireland that we would want.

But these things can only be secured by undeviating pursuit of the foundations that I have mentioned and pursuit, ultimately, of the higher ideals that mean the mental life, the full life of the people.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to confess and confess freely that this is an outstanding day in my own life, to see recognized, as I have here in full, the recognition of the rights of the Irish people and the independence of the Irish people in a way that was not at all possible 45 years ago.

I have longed to come back and say this to you and through you to the people as a whole.

I would, indeed, be fully happy today were there not one serious setback that had occurred in these 45 years.

When I was addressing you here in 1919 and 1920 our ancient nation, our ancient Ireland, was undivided. Since then it has been divided by a cruel partition.

As my predecessor, Mr. Sean T. O'Kelly, when he was addressing you here said, partition is one of our serious problems but, please God, that, too, will be solved.

And I salute here, in prospect, the representa-

[2] For text, see White House press release dated Oct. 26, 1963.

tive of Ireland who may be permitted to address you as I have been permitted, and who will be able with full heart joyfully to announce to you that our severed country has been reunited and that the last source of enmity between the British and Irish peoples has disappeared and that at last we can be truly friends.

And now, Mr. Speaker, I would like to renew to you and to the Members of Congress my thanks for this great privilege—and, of course, to the President of the United States, without whose generous invitation I could not be here. I am deeply grateful. I hope that the close ties which have kept our countries together for centuries will continue into the future.

And that representatives of Ireland may be able to talk to the American people as close friends, and representatives of the United States to talk to the people of Ireland as their close friends.

May I pray in our own language, the Irish language, that this may be so:

Go dtuga Dia gur mar sin a bheas, agus go stiúra an Spiorad Naomh na daoine a bheas mar thercoraithe ar ár ndá thír, agus taoisigh an domhain fré chéile, ar bhealach na síochána agus leasa an chine dhaonna. (Translation: God grant that it be so, and may the Holy Spirit guide the leaders of our two countries, and those of the whole world, on the way of peace and human betterment.)

U.S. Discovers Microphones in Walls of Embassy at Moscow

Statement by G. Marvin Gentile
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security

Press release 246 dated May 19

During the past month a network of microphones has been found embedded in the walls of the American Embassy in Moscow and has been removed and destroyed. Today [May 19] U.S. Ambassador Foy Kohler delivered a formal protest about this matter to the Soviet Government.[1] This discovery is the most recent instance of a continuing effort to penetrate American posts in Eastern Europe with listening devices and microphones. Prior to this, over 130 listening devices of various types have been located and removed from American embassy buildings in those countries by security officers of the Department of State since 1949.

Protective measures against attempts at penetration of our embassies are in continuous effect. For example, United States personnel at many posts are instructed always to act on the assumption that listening devices have been installed in offices and residences. Special precautions, some of which remain highly classified, are taken with respect to the handling of sensitive information. These include specially constructed rooms inside certain embassy buildings where sensitive discussions can occur without audio penetration.

The technical characteristics of the recently discovered microphones and their presence deep in the structural walls of the building indicate that they were placed in the building prior to its occupancy by the United States Government in 1953. It must be assumed that at least some of them were in operating condition when discovered. A review is being made to determine whether there has been any significant compromise of sensitive information in light of the measures taken for protection against such a possibility.

[1] Not printed.

Dr. Wiesner Visits Soviet Union

The White House announced on May 20 that Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner, formerly Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology and Chairman of the President's Science Advisory Committee, would arrive at Moscow May 21 for a 10-day visit to the Soviet Union at the invitation of the U.S.S.R. State Committee for Scientific Research. Dr. Wiesner is presently a member of the President's Science Advisory Committee and will be making the trip in that capacity.

The 10-day trip to the U.S.S.R. is expected to take Dr. Wiesner to Moscow, Leningrad, and Novosibirsk, the "science city" in central Siberia.

United States Ends Grant Aid to Republic of China

Statement by Richard I. Phillips
Director, Office of News [1]

Because of the healthy economic growth of the Republic of China on Taiwan, the Agency for International Development is planning to terminate its programs there at the end of the next fiscal year, that is June 1965.

The United States Government notes the interest and willingness of industrial and financial institutions, private money markets, and foreign private investments to provide an increasing flow of development capital to Taiwan.

The United States will continue to encourage this trend. While the AID program in Taiwan will be ended, the United States will continue its military assistance program and the sale of surplus agricultural commodities under P.L. 480, that is the Food for Peace program.

At the same time, the effect of funds committed in prior years to development programs on Taiwan will be felt for several years to come as the development loans are drawn down.

The United States has shared with the Government of China its gratification over the country's exceptional growth, which has been due to successful accomplishments of an industrious and capable people, making good use of large-scale U.S. assistance.

Since 1953 the country's gross national product has increased at a rate of more than 6 percent per year. Agricultural production has increased 4 percent annually, and industrial production between 10 and 12 percent annually.

Reflecting this outstanding growth, Taiwan's export earnings rose 11 percent in 1962 and 50 percent in 1963. Since 1949 the United States has provided Taiwan with $3.6 billion in military and economic aid. This breaks down to $2.2 billion in military aid, $205 million in Public Law 480 agricultural commodities, and $1.2 billion from AID and predecessor agencies.

For the final year of its program in Taiwan, the AID appropriation request to Congress includes about $500,000 for advisory services in industrial development.

[1] Read to news correspondents on May 28.

United States and Greece Sign Debt Settlement

Department Statement

Press release 258 dated May 28

Minister of Foreign Affairs Stavros Costopoulos and American Ambassador Henry R. Labouisse today [May 28] signed an agreement for the refunding of indebtedness due from the Government of Greece to the United States Treasury. The United States Government welcomes this action by the Greek Government in arranging to meet this old obligation and thus giving further evidence of the progressive strengthening of Greece's economy.

The debt arose from an interest-bearing $12,167,000 loan granted to Greece in 1929 by the United States Government with congressional authorization for the purpose of helping to finance the work of the Refugee Settlement Commission, established under the League of Nations auspices. Partial repayments were made by the Greek Government until 1940, when the World War II invasion of Greece occurred.

Under the new arrangement Greece has agreed to repay a principal of $13,155,921. Interest will be payable at 2 percent from the date of the settlement. Redemption of principal will be accomplished through yearly sinking fund payments. This settlement follows the pattern of the agreement reached in October 1962 between the private United States bondholders and the Greek Government.

The Government of the United States has agreed, subject to congressional approval, to use all of the funds derived from this settlement for financing a cultural and educational exchange program between Greece and the United States. The signing of this agreement is regarded as a further sign of the cooperation and friendship which continue to characterize relations between the two countries.

World Trade Week, 1964

A PROCLAMATION[1]

WHEREAS reciprocal world trade advances our progress toward global prosperity and abundance, freedom, and well-being; and

WHEREAS the Kennedy Round of multilateral trade negotiations, which was opened in Geneva, Switzerland, on May 4,[2] is designed to reduce international trade barriers in order to expand market opportunities for the benefit of both developed and developing countries of the world; and

WHEREAS the expansion of United States export trade is vital to the improvement of our balance of international payments, to the continuing growth of American industry, and to the fuller employment of American workers; and

WHEREAS the quickening pace of economic progress in nations around the world is enlarging the opportunities for our businessmen to sell American products abroad; and


WHEREAS the progressive opening of national markets everywhere to greater international competition challenges American businessmen to participate more vigorously in the exchange of goods and services among nations and, thus, to provide an inspiring demonstration of the vigor and value of competitive private enterprise:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, LYNDON B. JOHNSON, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim the week beginning May 17, 1964, as World Trade Week; and I request the appropriate Federal, State, and local officials to cooperate in the observance of that week.

I also urge business, labor, agriculture, educational and civic groups, as well as the people of the United States generally, to observe World Trade Week with gatherings, discussions, exhibits, ceremonies, and other appropriate activities designed to promote continuing awareness of the importance of world trade to our economy and our relations with other nations.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this eighth day of May in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred [SEAL] and sixty-four, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-eighth.



By the President:
GEORGE W. BALL,
Acting Secretary of State.

[1] No. 3591; 29 *Fed. Reg.* 6373.

[2] For background, see BULLETIN of June 1, 1964, p. 878.

THE CONGRESS

President Signs International Development Association Bill

Remarks by President Johnson[1]

I am very proud to sign this bill to authorize our country's continued participation in the International Development Association.

This legislation makes it possible for the United States to help an international institution which had its beginnings in the United States, has made it possible for other industrial nations to aid less developed countries, and is now performing its duties efficiently and successfully.

The United States Governors of the Association will be authorized to vote for a proposed $750 million increase in the Association's resources. Our share of $312 million will be provided over a 3-year period. Other countries will put up more than $1.40 for every dollar the United States provides. This money will be used for easy-term loans to important projects which the development countries could not afford at regular commercial terms.

This action is one more milestone in our efforts to enlist the cooperation of free-world countries in the common task of helping less fortunate nations to help themselves. It is also another milestone in our historic commitment to help other people lift from their weary shoulders the burdens of poverty and disease, illiteracy and hunger. We can no more accept a world in which we are surrounded by poverty than we can accept poverty within our own borders.

This is international sharing at its best and a victory for the American people, for an effective foreign policy, and for common sense in our international relationships.

[1] Made on May 26 on the occasion of the signing of S. 2214, the International Development Association bill (White House press release).

I want to thank each Member of the Congress who participated in successfully handling this legislation. I want to congratulate the Members of the Senate and the House who made this victory possible. You will be proud of this action in the days to come.

Bill Prohibits Fishing by Foreign Vessels in U.S. Territorial Waters

Following is a statement made by President Johnson on May 20 when he signed S. 1988, together with a Department statement of the same date regarding the application of the legislation to Japan.

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON

White House press release dated May 20

I have today [May 20] signed into law S. 1988, a bill which prohibits fishing by foreign vessels in the territorial waters of the United States. This law fills a longstanding need for legislation to prevent foreign fishing vessels, which in recent years have appeared off our coast in increasing numbers, from fishing in our territorial waters.

The new law will not establish any new rights to the continental shelf. But it will make possible the enforcement of whatever rights now exist or may be established. Since the waters over the continental shelf are high seas, efforts will be made to work out in advance with foreign countries procedures for enforcement there. In this connection, the United States has assured Japan that in such consultations with Japan full consideration will be given to Japan's long-established king crab fishery.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT

The Governments of Japan and the United States have held a series of discussions in Washington on the effect of the U.S. legislation S. 1988, which was signed by President Johnson today.

The United States Government has explained to the Japanese Government that this legislation would not, of itself, constitute the assertion of any right to jurisdiction over resources that does not already exist and that it is concerned primarily with providing meaningful protection to such rights as now exist or which might be acquired at some time in the future.

The position of the Government of Japan is that it is not bound by the convention on the continental shelf, to which Japan is not a party, and that therefore the rights of the Government of Japan will not be affected by the provisions of S. 1988 relating to fishery resources of the continental shelf. The Government of the United States has taken note of this position.

The United States Government has assured the Japanese Government that prior to implementing this legislation with respect to fishery resources of the continental shelf, the United States Government will consult with the Japanese Government and that in such consultations full consideration will be given to the views of the Japanese Government and to Japan's long-established king crab fishery.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

88th Congress, 1st Session

International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos. Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on S. 1627, a bill to enable the United States to contribute its share of the expenses of the International Commission as provided in article 18 of the protocol to the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos. September 24, 1963. 26 pp.

88th Congress, 2d Session

Discriminatory Ocean Freight Rates and the Balance of Payments. Hearings before the Joint Economic Committee. Part 4. March 25–26, 1964. 180 pp.

Foreign Assistance Act of 1964. Hearings before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on H.R. 10502, to amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and for other purposes. Part II, April 6–9, 1964, 187 pp.; Part III, April 10–15, 1964, 175 pp.

Temporary Suspension of Duty on Certain Natural Graphite. Report to accompany H.R. 10537. H. Rept. 1326. April 15, 1964. 3 pp.

Reduction of Oil Pollution in the St. Lawrence Seaway and Adjacent Waters. Report to accompany H. Con. Res. 45. H. Rept. 1345. April 27, 1964. 3 pp.

International Reciprocity for Amateur Radio Operators. Report to accompany S. 920. H. Rept. 1349. April 27, 1964. 16 pp.

Security Council Continues Debate on Cambodian Complaint

Following are two statements made on May 26 in the U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representative Adlai E. Stevenson.

FIRST STATEMENT

U.S./U.N. press release 4398

I will not dwell on the repeated charges by the representative of the Soviet Union of aggression by the United States against Cambodia. Such unsupported attacks and accusations have been a standard fixture in the cold-war rhetoric of the Soviet Government for many years.

But I must express my surprise at the repetition by Cambodia in this Council of unsubstantiated charges of aggression by my Government. The Council has so far met upon 3 days to consider the Cambodian complaint. Each day my Government has denied any aggressive actions or intentions toward Cambodia. We have specifically denied that Americans crossed the border on the occasions about which Cambodia has complained. Each day, however, the Cambodian representative—most recently their distinguished Foreign Minister [Huot Sambath]—has reiterated these unfounded charges.

I remind the members of the Council that long before these meetings commenced the United States admitted that in one instance an American had crossed into Cambodia and expressed its sincere regrets to the Cambodian Government. It has, as I said, denied the other charges. Nor has any evidence been introduced to support them. Nevertheless, the distinguished representatives of Cambodia in this Council have continued to repeat imprecise and unsupported assertions implying that numerous Americans have violated Cambodian territory on several occasions, specifically with regard to the incidents of May 7 and 8. I hope we will hear no more of such charges.

In the meantime—to remove any vestige of doubt—let me repeat once more that the United States has not committed any act against Cambodia which could possibly be considered aggression by any objective and reasonable onlooker. Let me repeat again that, with the exception of the Chantréa incident, our investigations show that no American personnel have crossed into Cambodian territory. And, finally, let me say that United States personnel assisting the Vietnamese Army in its efforts to defend its country are under strictest orders not to cross the Vietnamese-Cambodian border.

I also wish to add that as a result of the close association my Government has had with Viet-Nam, the United States is convinced that Viet-Nam has no aggressive designs toward Cambodia whatsoever and cannot be charged with acts of calculated aggression against Cambodia. The reasoned presentation of the Vietnamese representative [Vu Van Mau] here yesterday was further confirmation of the anxiety and efforts of the Republic of Viet-Nam to restore good relations with its ancient neighbor, Cambodia.

Indeed, it is almost ludicrous to suggest that Viet-Nam—with all its energies concentrated on a life-and-death struggle to defeat guerrilla forces sponsored and supported from outside—would choose to embark upon a policy of aggression toward its neighbor. Border frictions there have been. But this is hardly surprising

when the nature of the border and difficulty of controlling it, the mixed ethnic population along it, and the Viet Cong activities there are taken into account.

U.S. Would Welcome U.N. Border Control Force

Next, I must confess that I am unable to understand the views of the Cambodian representative concerning the role of the United Nations in this complaint.

First, the Royal Government of Cambodia filed a complaint against Viet-Nam and the United States [1] and, on May 13, asked for a meeting of the Security Council as soon as possible.[2] Next, the Cambodian representative stressed the responsibility of the Security Council to seek a solution in this matter. Last Tuesday, for example, he stated in this Council that:

> The Security Council, to which our organization has entrusted the main responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, has an undoubted supervisory responsibility over a situation which seriously threatens peace and security.

Last Thursday he said:

> The main objective of the United Nations is the maintenance of peace, and to this end our organization must, in accordance with the terms of the Charter, not only stop any acts of aggression but also try to avoid a recurrence of such acts if they have taken place.

However, almost at the same time the Cambodian representative seems reluctant to consider United Nations machinery to do precisely what he requests. Specifically, on last Thursday, he also told the Council:

> It has been suggested that a new and efficient mechanism under the aegis of the United Nations should be devised; but we think such a new mechanism would *not* be able to resolve the question in a definite and permanent manner.

I must confess to some bewilderment. A situation threatening peace and security is brought to the United Nations with an urgent plea for help, in accordance with the peacekeeping responsibilities of the charter, and then the complainant argues that the solution lies outside the United Nations. And the distinguished representative of France [Roger Seydoux] yesterday said, if I understood him, that he agrees that the solution lies outside the United Nations.

I am perplexed—since there has been no explanation why they believe the United Nations, to which Cambodia has appealed for action, cannot act quickly and decisively. The unsupported conclusion that it cannot act quickly and decisively escapes me entirely. It seems to me that it certainly can do better on both points than any other means. And if not, why was the complaint filed in the Security Council?

I believe all of us here will agree that the United Nations has an admirable, albeit imperfect, record in dealing with problems equally or more serious than the problem now before the Council. I think most of us can also agree that the United Nations' peacekeeping machinery, whatever its shortcomings, stands up in shining splendor in comparison with the frustrations, hesitancy, and inactivity which have marked the record of machinery set up under Geneva agreements—that is, the International Control Commissions. Under these we have endless war in Laos and Viet-Nam, and now these charges of border violations in Cambodia.

The whole sad history of the International Control Commissions—whether in Viet-Nam, Cambodia, or Laos—makes it patently clear that the Commissions, by the very nature of their composition, are incapable of quick, decisive action—the kind of action which will be necessary to prevent a recurrence of the recent unfortunate incidents along the Cambodian-Vietnamese border. The present sad experience in Laos is certainly demonstrating for all to see that the ICC can be prevented—by the willful action of only one member, in clear violation of the agreement establishing the Commission—from performing even the most routine duties assigned to it under that agreement.

With this background and experience in mind, my Government is not prepared to agree to the extension of the ICC system beyond its present bounds to deal with the problems which have arisen on the Cambodian-Vietnamese border.

If the Royal Government of Cambodia truly wishes effective control and protection of the border between Cambodia and Viet-Nam, the

[1] U.N. doc. S/5666.
[2] U.N. doc. S/5697.

means are available here and now in this Council. Cambodia has appealed for assistance to the world's primary agency for the maintenance of peace and security—the Security Council. The representative of Cambodia has called for the Security Council to try to avoid a recurrence of the border incidents. Viet-Nam and the United States, against whom the complaint has been made, would welcome a United Nations border control force. They are prepared to establish it here and now. We are also anxious to have the border clearly marked. The Council can act, and act effectively. The remedy is available—if Cambodia wants what it asked for.

Use of Cambodian Territory by Viet Cong

As I stated before the Council on May 21,[3] my Government has an open mind toward suggestions that the United Nations—*in addition* to taking prompt action to establish a force for supervising and controlling the Cambodian-Vietnamese border—appoint a committee of inquiry to look into various aspects of the border problem. The proceedings in the Council, however, make it clear that such a committee, to be worth while, must be assigned a task more useful than that of investigating alleged charges that the Cambodian Government is guilty of complicity with the Viet Cong.

Should the Council—in addition to establishing a force—deem it advisable to establish a committee of inquiry in response to the Cambodian request, the committee must be given access to all available information. It must be given access to the terrain and population on both sides of border spots which have been troublesome in the past, as well as to prisoners captured by either side, be they Vietnamese or Viet Cong. To be useful, such a committee should be empowered to make recommendations to this Council concerning further steps to contribute to stability in the region. It thus should address itself to the question of how the Cambodian-Vietnamese border can be made immune from border violations emanating from any source, and from either side of the border.

In short, if the cause of border incidents is to be rooted out, the Vietnamese must be expected to refrain conscientiously from crossing into Cambodian territory, and Cambodia must likewise be expected to insure that the Viet Cong cannot and do not make use of Cambodian soil.

The Vietnamese representative has presented impressive evidence to substantiate the fact that the Viet Cong do, in fact, make use of Cambodian territory. I have no desire to detain the Council by reviewing this evidence again. Our own evidence supports that of Viet-Nam. I would point out also that the Cambodian representative's statement that no Viet Cong has ever moved into Cambodian territory is surprising, to say the least, not only because of its sweeping and categorical nature in an area where borders are ill-marked and indifferently controlled but also because it contradicts previous statements from the Cambodians themselves.

As an example I wish to call to the Council's attention an announcement by the Cambodian General Staff on September 7, 1961. The announcement stated that armed units of the Cambodian Government had engaged an armed band of 100 "foreigners" at the border in Svay Rieng (the Vietnamese border), taking prisoners and destroying "the entire encampment consisting of about 50 shelters." One of the prisoners, according to the announcement, admitted to being captain of a Viet Cong unit which had been carrying on "combined exercises on our (that is, Cambodian) territory since August 1961" but was "regularly quartered about one kilometer from the frontier in Vietnamese territory."

Prince Sihanouk, himself, has admitted Viet Cong use of his frontiers. In a signed article published in the July 20, 1962, issue of *Réalités Cambodgiennes* Prince Sihanouk said that "as for serving as a Viet Cong zone of passage in spite of ourselves, it is strange that Laos which, according to the American White Paper (A Threat to the Peace), is nine times more important as a source of Viet Cong transit, has not been punished as severely as ourselves. . . ." "What country in the world," the Prince asked, "is capable of sealing its frontiers against all smugglers and spies? . . . How can we, with 29,000, do what South Viet Nam cannot accomplish with 300,000?"

The regrettable incidents of May 7 and 8 of this year have produced further evidence that

[3] For text, see BULLETIN of June 8, 1964, p. 907.

the Viet Cong continue to use Cambodian territory. During the operations of May 7 and 8, the Vietnamese Army was successful in capturing 13 Viet Cong prisoners. Interrogation of three of these prisoners has produced statements which are of direct relevance at this point. They stated that each time there is an operation by the Vietnamese armed forces, Viet Cong units normally run over into Cambodian territory. From late 1963 until the time of their capture, they stated, they had several times run into Cambodian territory to avoid operations of the Vietnamese Air Force. They also stated that their Viet Cong units purchased most of their food in Cambodia and, to this end, every month sent two or three supply groups of about 30 persons each from Viet-Nam into Cambodia.

Lest there be any misunderstanding, let me repeat that my purpose in bringing this evidence to the attention of the Council is not to charge or even imply that the Cambodian Government consciously assists the Viet Cong by permitting them to use Cambodian territory. My purpose, rather, is to demonstrate that both Cambodian authorities and the Viet Cong themselves admit that the Viet Cong have used and continue to use Cambodian territory—obviously to the disadvantage of the Vietnamese in their fight against an armed insurrection supported and directed from outside their borders.

The Task Before the Security Council

In conclusion, however, I would say this. The Security Council should be less concerned with faultfinding than with putting an end to the causes of international discord and friction, and in this case with responding to the complaint brought here by Cambodia.

We are told that the Government of Cambodia seeks no more than the effective guarantee of its territorial integrity and neutrality. So far as the United States is concerned, we believe that effective steps should be taken toward this end by the Security Council and that in the course of taking the appropriate decisions the Security Council would naturally wish also to call on all states to respect Cambodia's territorial integrity and political independence, as well as that of Viet-Nam.

In most general terms the Security Council is in a position to take concrete steps which would, by fact and by word, provide what Cambodia appears to seek. But this Council is *not* in a position to provide the words without the practical steps; indeed it would be grossly misleading and irresponsible to seek through this Council any paper guarantees of the sort which are today being torn up in Laos.

This Council should respond to the justified concerns which have been expressed here by the representative of a member state. These incidents, for the most part, have brought pain and suffering to the people of Cambodia itself. We can assist in avoiding such incidents in the future.

We, as members of the Security Council, therefore have two tasks before us:

First, that of weighing the evidence and reaching a careful and balanced evaluation of the full sources and origins of the incidents between Cambodia and the Republic of Viet-Nam.

Second, deciding on practicable steps by which the United Nations can use its peacekeeping experience to meet the needs of a situation which has been characterized by the Government of Cambodia as "an extremely grave threat to the peace and stability of Southeast Asia."

To sum up, Mr. President, Cambodia came to the Council for the kind of help that only the U.N. can provide—to stop the trouble on its border with Viet-Nam. Let us provide that help.

SECOND STATEMENT

U.S./U.N. press release 4399

Evidently Ambassador [N. T.] Fedorenko, speaking on behalf of the Soviet Union, is not very familiar with the political system that exists in this free country. Briefly, let me inform you, Mr. Ambassador, that our Government is divided into three branches: the legislative, the executive, and the judicial. It is the legislative branch that makes the laws. It is the executive branch that executes them. It is the judicial branch that interprets them. Subject to the laws, current policy of the United States is made and executed by the executive

branch and not by Senator Goldwater or any other Senator.[4]

If I understood his sometimes obscure and generally offensive language, the Soviet representative, Ambassador Fedorenko, has asked me for a clear and unambiguous answer as to whether the policy of the United States in Southeast Asia is more peace or more war. Well, I am very glad to answer his question by repeating what I had said here in the Council the other day. And perhaps it would save us time hereafter if my distinguished colleague from the Soviet Union listened to what I said—or I wonder if that, perhaps, would spoil the effect of his rhetorical mythology. A wise man once said in this country that there is nothing more horrible to witness than the murder of a beautiful myth by a horrible fact.

Well, this is what I said—I had not expected to have to repeat it, but I welcome the chance. I said here, speaking on May 21:

> . . . the United States has no, repeat *no*, national military objective anywhere in Southeast Asia. United States policy for Southeast Asia is very simple. It is the restoration of peace so that the peoples of that area can go about their own independent business in whatever associations they may freely choose for themselves without interference from the outside.
>
> I trust my words have been clear enough on this point.
>
> Second, the United States Government is currently involved in the affairs of the Republic of Viet-Nam for one reason and one reason only: because the Republic of Viet-Nam requested the help of the United States and of other governments to defend itself against armed attack fomented, equipped, and directed from the outside.

Now, let me, with apologies to all of you for detaining you at this late hour, say something else to the Security Council. The Soviet representative has in the worst tradition of the cold war which he has revived here laid before us allegations concerning military measures which the United States might in the future take in Southeast Asia. He has not explained—and we can hardly be surprised that he has not—the military measures which the Hanoi regime, with the assistance of its powerful Communist allies, has for many years been taking inside the territories of its neighbors, Laos and the Republic of Viet-Nam. It is the outrageous, the persistent military action of the Hanoi regime which constitutes the longstanding threat to the peace of Southeast Asia and to the territorial integrity of the other nations of that region. That, and that only, is the cause of the war in Southeast Asia.

Let the Communist powers cease their aggressions, and it will no longer be necessary for the United States to help those nations preserve their independence and maintain the Geneva accords. Unless and until they do cease their aggression, the United States will, indeed, as I assured the Council last week, help by whatever means are necessary the free nations of Southeast Asia to remain free. I trust the position of the United States is clear, and clear enough to satisfy the representative of the Soviet Union.

[4] In a statement on May 26 Mr. Fedorenko said that Senator Goldwater had appealed for the use of atomic weapons in Viet-Nam.

U.S. and Euratom To Cooperate on Fast Neutron Reactors

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

Press release 257 dated May 27

Secretary of State Dean Rusk on May 27 welcomed the understanding reached between the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) to engage in a comprehensive program of cooperation in the development of fast neutron reactors as "a concrete example of Atlantic partnership at work."

Secretary Rusk expressed his great satisfaction with the increasingly close relationship that has come to exist between the United States and EURATOM since the latter was established in 1958. He emphasized that these new cooperative arrangements held exceptional promise for realizing our common long-term objective of producing abundant and inexpensive nuclear power for peaceful purposes.

As announced by Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Glenn T. Seaborg, technological progress with respect to fast reactors will be facilitated by the full exchange of technical

information developed from complementary research efforts. The exchange arrangements which relate specifically to an initial period of 10 years anticipate continued cooperation beyond 1974.

During the next 5 years it is expected that the United States will spend some $150 million to $200 million on its research and development program in the field of fast reactors. During the same period, the Europeans plan to spend an approximately equal amount on their fast-reactor program.

AEC ANNOUNCEMENT

Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, announced on May 27 completion of arrangements between the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the AEC for close technical cooperation in the development of fast neutron reactors. An agreement was signed on that day by representatives of the United States and EURATOM in Brussels. This cooperation will take place in implementation of the Additional Agreement for Cooperation concluded between the U.S. Government and EURATOM on June 11, 1960.[1]

The cooperative effort provides for a detailed exchange of information on fast reactors, as well as for the AEC to supply to EURATOM, at the Commission's regular charges, plutonium and enriched uranium needed for the Community's fast-reactor program.

The AEC carries out in the United States an important research and development program in the field of fast reactors, and EURATOM conducts a similar effort in Europe mostly concentrated in contracts between the EURATOM Commission and representatives of three of its six member countries—the Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique (CEA) in France, the Gesellschaft fuer Kernforschung in Germany, and the Comitato Nazionale per le Energia Nucleare (CNEN) in Italy.

The efforts of both the United States and EURATOM have as a principal objective the development of technically and economically feasible nuclear power plants of the fast-breeder type (nuclear reactors which produce as much or more fissionable material than they consume). It is expected that AEC and EURATOM undertakings in the fast-reactor field, for the period of 1963–67, will involve comparable levels of effort.

Under the information exchange arrangements, the AEC and EURATOM will exchange information on all fast neutron reactor programs for civilian central power station applications and applicable research and development programs in this field in which the AEC or EURATOM is now, or will be, participating during the period of the agreement. The exchange arrangements define the areas of technology on which the AEC and EURATOM will exchange detailed information. The agreement also sets up procedures for this cooperation and contains associated patent arrangements. The term of the cooperation is initially for 10 years.

In recent years, as a result of a growing interest of both EURATOM and the AEC in the fast-reactor field, there have been exchange visits of technical teams between the Community and the United States. These visits, supplemented by staff discussions, culminated in an exchange of letters last year between the AEC and EURATOM in which it was agreed that a comprehensive fast-reactor information exchange would be developed, and which included the guidelines for the detailed arrangements to be negotiated.

In order to facilitate the information exchange, the cooperative arrangements provide also for the United States to supply plutonium, subject to appropriate statutory authorization, and enriched uranium. As a result, the parties have agreed to proceed with negotiation of a contract under which EURATOM will purchase approximately 350 kilograms of plutonium from the AEC at the established U.S. domestic base price at time of delivery, valued at $15 million on the basis of current prices. The plutonium will be for use in the Sneak and Mazurka critical experiment facilities in Karlsruhe, Germany, and Cadarache, France, respectively. A substantial portion of the material may be used in both facilities at different times.

[1] Treaties and Other International Acts Series 4650.

The AEC will also supply the U–235 needs of the Community's fast-reactor program, as now foreseen, under a combination of normal and special short-term lease arrangements at the prevailing U.S. domestic use charge for such material, which now is 4¾ percent. At the end of the short-term lease period EURATOM will have an option to purchase the material or return it to the United States.

Consortium To Aid India Pledges $1 Billion for 1964-65

On May 26 the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development released the following communique.

The Consortium of governments and institutions interested in development assistance to India held its tenth meeting in Washington on May 26, 1964, under the chairmanship of the World Bank. The meeting was attended by representatives of the Governments of Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States and by representatives of the World Bank and the International Development Association (IDA). The International Monetary Fund sent an observer.

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss aid for India during 1964/65, the fourth year of India's Third Five-Year Plan. The Consortium had held preliminary discussions on the same subject in Paris on March 17 and 18.

At the beginning of the Third Plan the Government of India assessed the total requirement of external assistance from all sources, including non-Consortium countries and private foreign investment, at $5,460 million. Against this, the members of the Consortium have already pledged $3,417 million of aid to India for the first three years of the Third Plan. At the meeting just concluded, they undertook to make additional aid available for commitment during the fourth year of the Plan in the amount of about $1,028 million, subject as appropriate to legislative action or other necessary authorisation. The new pledges for 1964/65 are as follows:

Countries	*U.S. $ million equivalent*
Austria	1
Canada	41
France	20
Germany	95
Italy	36
Japan	60
Netherlands	11
United Kingdom	84
United States	435
World Bank and IDA	245
Total	1,028

Members of the Consortium considered it important that a substantial part of the aid to be extended to India during the coming year should be in the form of non-project aid which could be used to finance imports required for the maintenance of the Indian economy. Approximately half of the aid pledged at the meeting is expected to be in this form.

The following table sets out the aid pledges made by members of the Consortium in each of the first four years of India's Third Five-Year Plan:

($ million equivalent)

	1961/62	*1962/63*	*1963/64*	*1964/65*	*4-Year Total*
Austria	----	5	7	1	13
Belgium	----	10	10	----	20
Canada	28	33	30½	41	132½
France	15	45	20	20	100
Germany	225	139	99½	95	558½
Italy	----	53	45	36	134
Japan	50	55	65	60	230
Netherlands	----	11	11	11	33
United Kingdom	182	84	84	84	434
United States	545	435	435	435	1,850
World Bank and IDA	250	200	245	245	940
Total	1,295	1,070	1,052	1,028	4,445

It was agreed that the Consortium should meet again early in 1965.

U.S. Concludes Meat Agreement With Mexico

Press release 231 dated May 14

STATE-AGRICULTURE ANNOUNCEMENT

The Government of Mexico has agreed to limit beef and veal exports to the United States this year to a level 9 percent below 1963, the Departments of State and Agriculture announced on May 14.

The agreement with Mexico is along the same lines as agreements the United States concluded with Austria and New Zealand on February 17 [1] and with Ireland on February 25.[2] It covers beef and veal in all forms other than canned, cured, and cooked meats and live cattle. The four countries with which agreements have now been concluded comprise all the principal suppliers of U.S. imports of products covered by the agreements. Together, they supply 90 percent of U.S. imports of these products. Mexico accounts for about 7 percent.

Mexico has agreed to limit its exports to the United States in 1964 to 29,600 long tons (66.3 million pounds), in 1965 to 30,700 long tons (68.8 million pounds), and in 1966 to 31,800 long tons (71.2 million pounds).

The United States has imported the following quantities of beef and veal from Mexico in recent years:

1958:	75.0	million	pounds
1959:	48.9	"	"
1960:	39.1	"	"
1961:	53.4	"	"
1962:	59.3	"	"
1963:	73.0	"	"

The limit specified for 1964 represents the average level of U.S. imports of these products from Mexico in 1962 and 1963. The 1964 limit is 3,000 long tons (6.7 million pounds) below U.S. imports in 1963, a reduction of more than 9 percent. In the absence of an agreement, it is estimated that beef and veal exports from Mexico would have been at least as large as in 1963.

Mexico's exports to the United States in 1965 and 1966 will be allowed to grow by 3.7 percent annually over the limit set for 1964, the rate at which consumption is expected to grow in this market. The agreement provides for triennial review of this growth factor and adjustment as appropriate for each succeeding period.

The agreement with Mexico provides that Mexico will use its best efforts to keep the proportion of fresh or chilled beef and veal from increasing relative to frozen meat in its shipments to the United States. The purpose of this provision is to prevent significant shifts from beef used for manufacturing to beef used for direct consumption in retail and institutional outlets.

The agreement is of indefinite duration but may be terminated by either party upon at least 6 months' notice prior to the end of any calendar year. The two Governments affirm that they favor the negotiation of international arrangements leading to expanding access of meat exporting countries to world markets. The agreement with Mexico could be incorporated into such arrangements.

Although live cattle are not included in the agreement, the subject of live cattle exports from Mexico to the United States was discussed by the representatives of the two countries. These cattle are fattened and slaughtered in the United States and add to the total meat supplies here. For the first 6 months (September 1963–February 1964) of the current Mexican cattle year, U.S. imports of cattle from Mexico were down to 237,000 head compared to 528,000 head for the like period of the preceding year. The total of these imports during the whole of the 1963–64 cattle marketing year is expected to be well below the 770,000 head imported during 1962–63.

[1] BULLETIN of Mar. 9, 1964, p. 380.
[2] *Ibid.*, Mar. 23, 1964, p. 468.

UNITED STATES NOTE

MAY 14, 1964.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to your note of May 14, 1964, concerning trade in beef and veal between Mexico and the United States which reads in translation as follows:

"I have the honor to refer to recent discussions in Washington between representatives of the Government of Mexico and the Government of the United States with regard to the desire of the Government of the United States to arrive at an understanding concerning the level of future exports of beef and veal from Mexico to the United States. As a result of these discussions, I have the honor to propose that the following Agreement shall become effective between our Governments:

The Governments of Mexico and the United States have agreed to the following measures in the interest of promoting the orderly development of trade in beef and veal between Mexico and the United States. In assuming the following obligations, the Governments of Mexico and the United States have agreed on the desirability of preserving approximately the present pattern of trade in these products between the two countries.

1. Accordingly, the Government of Mexico agrees to limit exports from Mexico to the United States of beef and veal (in all forms except canned, cured and cooked meat and live cattle), in accordance with the following:

(a) Exports will be limited to a total of 29,600 long tons in calendar year 1964, 30,700 long tons in calendar year 1965, and 31,800 long tons in calendar year 1966, all in terms of product weight.

(b) In each succeeding calendar year there shall be an increase, corresponding to the estimated rate of increase in the total United States market for these meats. This increase in the total United States market is presently estimated to be 3.7 percent annually.

(c) The purpose of the annual increase established in paragraphs 1(a) and 1(b) is to secure to Mexico a fair and reasonable share in the growth of the United States market. There shall be a triennial review and, as appropriate, an adjustment of this estimated rate of increase in consumption to apply to the succeeding three-year period. The first such review shall take place no later than October 1, 1966.

(d) The Government of Mexico shall use its best endeavors to limit exports from Mexico to the United States of chilled or fresh beef and veal approximately to the percentage which chilled or fresh beef and veal currently constitute of total annual exports of beef and veal from Mexico to the United States.

2. The Government of Mexico shall limit exports from Mexico to the United States upon the understanding that Mexico will not be adversely affected by such limitations in relation to the position of other substantial suppliers in the United States market and so long as Mexico's access to the United States market for beef and veal is not limited by an increase in the duties on these products.

3. The United States Government shall continue to permit access each year into the United States for beef and veal exported from Mexico up to the maximum quantity determined for that year in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 1(a) and 1(b) of this Agreement.

4. The Governments favor the negotiation of international arrangements leading to expanding access in meat importing countries.

5. Should such wider international arrangements be reached, they could subsume this Agreement.

6. The Governments agree to consult, at the request of either Government, on any questions arising on the implementation of this Agreement.

7. Either Government may terminate this Agreement, effective at the end of a calendar year, by written notice given at least 180 days prior to the end of that calendar year.

If these proposals are acceptable to your Government this note and your note of acceptance shall form an Agreement between our Governments."

I have the honor to confirm on behalf of the Government of the United States that the Agreement proposed in your note and set forth above is acceptable to the United States Government and will govern trade in beef and veal between Mexico and the United States.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

GEORGE W. BALL
Acting Secretary of State

His Excellency
ANTONIO CARRILLO FLORES,
Ambassador of Mexico.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Cultural Relations

Agreement on the importation of educational, scientific, and cultural materials, and protocol. Done at Lake Success November 22, 1950. Entered into force May 21, 1952.[1]
Signature: Uruguay, April 27, 1964.

Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April 24, 1964.[1]
Ratifications deposited: Holy See, April 17, 1964; Liechtenstein, May 8, 1964.
Accession deposited: Gabon, April 2, 1964.

[1] Not in force for the United States.

Optional protocol to Vienna convention on diplomatic relations concerning compulsory settlement of disputes. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April 24, 1964.[1]
Ratification deposited: Liechtenstein, May 8, 1964.
Accession deposited: Gabon, April 2, 1964.

Law of the Sea

Convention on the continental shelf. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958. Enters into force June 10, 1964.
Proclaimed by the President: May 25, 1964.

BILATERAL

Austria

Agreement regarding the return of Austrian property, rights and interests with schedule and annex. Signed at Washington January 30, 1959. Entered into force May 19, 1964.
Proclaimed by the President: May 26, 1964.

Brazil

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of September 11, 1963 (TIAS 5471). Effected by exchanges of notes and agreed minutes at Rio de Janeiro May 15, 1964. Entered into force May 15, 1964.

Cambodia

Agreement relating to direct military assistance, with annexes. Effected by exchange of notes at Phnom Penh May 16, 1955. Entered into force May 16, 1955. TIAS 3240.
Notification of termination: November 20, 1963, effective May 20, 1964, except for paras. 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, which remain in force until their revision or abrogation by a new agreement.

Canada

Agreement relating to the phaseout of certain radar stations established under the agreement of August 1, 1951 (TIAS 3049), relating to the continental radar defense system. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 25, 1964. Entered into force May 25, 1964.

Colombia

Agreement providing for the continuation of the rawinsonde observation stations on San Andres Island and at Bogotá. Effected by exchange of notes at Bogotá April 27 and May 13, 1964. Entered into force May 13, 1964.

Liberia

Agreement relating to the transfer of the Port of Monrovia to Liberia. Effected by exchange of notes at Monrovia April 13 and 14, 1964. Entered into force April 14, 1964.
Agreement relating to the construction of a port and port works, with exchange of notes. Signed at Monrovia December 31, 1943. Entered into force December 31, 1943. 58 Stat. 1357.
Terminated: April 14, 1964.
Agreement relating to the designation of a permanent free port area. Effected by exchange of notes at Monrovia July 24 and 26, 1948. Entered into force July 26, 1948. TIAS 2267.
Terminated: April 14, 1964.
Agreement for financing certain educational exchange programs. Signed at Monrovia May 8, 1964. Entered into force May 8, 1964.

Philippines

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1701–1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at Manila May 14, 1964. Entered into force May 14, 1964.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Consular convention. Signed at Moscow June 1, 1964. Enters into force on the 30th day following the day ratifications are exchanged.

[1] Not in force for the United States.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on May 28 confirmed the following nominations:

William McCormack Blair, Jr., to be Ambassador to the Philippines. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated March 26.)

William Witman II to be Ambassador to the Republic of Togo. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated May 19.)

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: May 25–31

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Releases issued prior to May 25 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 224 of May 9, 231 of May 14, and 246 of May 19.

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253	5/25	Chad credentials (rewrite).
*254	5/25	U.S. participation in international conferences.
*255	5/25	Program for visit of Prime Minister of Israel.
*256	5/25	Program for visit of President of Ireland.
257	5/27	Cooperation between U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and EURATOM on comprehensive program.
258	5/28	Debt settlement agreement with Greece.
†259	5/28	Delegation to 23d meeting of International Cotton Advisory Committee (rewrite).

*Not printed.
†Held for later issue of the BULLETIN.

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U.S. Policy Toward Cuba

This 22-page pamphlet, based on an address by Under Secretary George W. Ball at Roanoke, Va., on April 23, 1964, places Castro communism and United States policy toward it in perspective by evaluating the threat of Castro and the present Cuban regime, by defining the two principal lines of United States strategy in dealing with this menace, and by discussing the effectiveness of these policies.

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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Vol. L, No. 1304

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National Security and World Responsibilities

Address by President Johnson [1]

The official mission of the Coast Guard, which hangs in each room of this Academy, places you "in the service of [your] country and humanity."

That mission, your mission, is also the mission of your nation. For today we Americans share responsibility not only for our own security but for the security of all free nations, not only for our own society but for an entire civilization, not only for our own liberty but for the hopes of all humanity.

In pursuit of such responsibilities national security requires more than national strength. It requires, first of all, a nation dedicated to justice and to the improvement of life for its own people. It requires a nation determined to help others eliminate the despair and the human degradation on which the enemies of freedom feed. It requires a nation devoted, through speech and deed, to showing those who may grow weary of will, or fearful of the future, that the cause of human dignity is on the march, its shadow is lengthening, and victory is moving nearer. But our hope for success in the aims of peace rests also on the strength of our arms.

As Winston Churchill once said: "Civilization will not last, freedom will not survive, peace will not be kept, unless mankind unites together to defend them and show themselves possessed of a power before which barbaric forces will stand in awe."

We, as well as our adversaries, must stand in awe before the power our craft has created and our wisdom must labor to control. In every area of national strength America today is stronger than it has ever been before. It is stronger than any adversary or combination of adversaries. It is stronger than the combined might of all the nations in the history of the world.

[1] Made at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy, New London, Conn., on June 3 (White House press release; as-delivered text).

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. L, NO. 1304 PUBLICATION 7701 JUNE 22, 1964

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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NOTE: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the Department of State Bulletin as the source will be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

And I confidently predict that strength will continue to grow more rapidly than the might of all others.

Areas of U.S. Strength

The first area of this increasing strength is our ability to deter atomic destruction. In the past 3 years we have increased our nuclear power on alert two and one-half times, and our nuclear superiority will continue to grow until we reach agreement on arms control.

We have more than 1,000 fully armed ICBM's and Polaris missiles ready for retaliation. The Soviet Union has far fewer, and none ready to be launched beneath the seas. We have more than 1,100 strategic bombers, many of which are equipped with air-to-surface and decoy missiles to help them reach almost any target. The Soviet Union, we estimate, could with difficulty send less than one-third of this number over targets in the United States.

Against such force the combined destructive power of every battle ever fought by man is like a firecracker thrown against the sun.

The second area of increasing strength is our ability to fight less than all-out war. In the past 3 years we have raised the number of combat-ready divisions 45 percent. They can be moved swiftly around the world by an airlift capacity which has increased 75 percent. Supporting tactical aircraft have been increased over 30 percent, and the number of tactical nuclear warheads in Europe has been raised 60 percent. We, and our NATO allies, now have 5 million men under arms. In addition we are now ready to mobilize large reserves in the event of conflict. Six divisions, with all supporting units, can be moved into action in a few weeks.

And we are continuing to build our forces. In a few years our airlift capacity will be five times what it was in 1961. Advanced weapons and equipment are flowing to our armies. Our fleet is being modernized through a decade-long shipbuilding program. And new tactical aircraft are being built.

A third area of increasing strength is the struggle against subversion. Our adversaries, convinced that direct attack would be aimless, today resort to terror, subversion, and guerrilla warfare. To meet this threat we began a large effort to train special forces to fight internal subversion. Since January 1961 we have increased these specialized forces eight times. We have trained more than 100,000 officers in these techniques. We have given special emphasis to this form of warfare in the training of all military units.

Our Army now has six Special Action Forces on call around the world to assist our friendly nations. They are skilled in the languages and problems of the area in which they are stationed. The Navy and Air Force have several thousand men whose abilities, training, equipment, and mission are designed to combat clandestine attack. And behind these groups are five brigade-size backup forces ready to move into instant action.

But just as subversion has many faces, our responses must take many forms. We have worked to increase and integrate all the resources, political and social as well as military and economic, needed to meet a threat which tears at the entire fabric of a society.

But success in fighting subversion ultimately rests on the skill of the soldiers of the threatened country. We now have 344 teams at work in 49 countries to train the local military in the most advanced techniques of internal defense.

Subversive warfare is often difficult, dirty, and deadly. Victory comes only to those with the desire to protect their own freedom. But such conflict requires weapons as well as will, ability as well as aspiration. And we will continue to increase this strength until our adversaries are convinced that this course too will not lead to conquest.

The fourth area of increasing strength is in the development of new weapons for deterrence and defense. In the past several years we have begun many important new weapons systems. Minuteman II will have twice the accuracy of the first Minuteman. The new Nike X, when its development is completed, will give us the option to deploy, if national security requires it, the best antiballistics missile available to any nation. We are developing a new aircraft, the F–III, with much greater range, payload, and ability at air combat than present tactical bombers or fighters.

The Lance missile, the EX–10 torpedo, the A7A attack aircraft, a new main battle tank, new antitank missile systems, are the emerging products of development that we are carrying on. And that effort is without parallel in all the world.

We will continue to carry forward new projects which offer hope of adding substantially to our strength. I can assure the American people that the United States is, and will remain, first in the use of science and technology for the protection of the people.

The fifth area and the most important of increasing strength is the ability of the American fighting man. However impressive or ingenious, our weapons can be no better than the men who man them. The complexities of modern weapons require men of high skill. The complexities of modern warfare require men of great knowledge. The complexities of the modern world require men of broad outlook.

Today 52 percent of our enlisted men are under 25 and are high school graduates, compared with 39 percent in the country as a whole who are high school graduates. Sixty-five percent of our commissioned officers are college graduates today, compared with 7 percent in the Nation. Twenty-five thousand officers hold graduate degrees, and thousands more are studying for such degrees.

In encampments across the world millions of men and women have chosen to serve with low pay and high hazard, with deep devotion and silent sacrifice, so that their fellow Americans might enjoy the rich legacy of liberty. They stand the hard vigil that we may pursue the high vision of flourishing freedom in a world at peace. These are the sources of the strength we build, knowing, in the words of the Bible, "When the strong man armed keepeth his palace, his goods are in peace."

The necessities of our strength are as varied as the nature of our dangers. The response must suit the threat. Those who would answer every problem with nuclear weapons display not bravery but bravado, not wisdom but a wanton disregard for the survival of the world and the future of the race.

No one can live daily, as I must do, with the dark realities of nuclear ruin, without seeking the guidance of God to find the path of peace. We have built this staggering strength that I have told you about not to destroy but to save, not to put an end to civilization but, rather, to try to put an end to conflict.

Tangible Steps Toward Peace

Thus, in the past 3 years, as our strength rose—and, in large part, as a consequence of that rising strength—we have been able to take more tangible steps toward peace than at any time since the cold war began. We established an Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. We agreed with the Soviet Union on a statement of disarmament principles. We signed a test ban treaty. We established the "hot line." We supported a U.N. resolution prohibiting the orbiting of nuclear weapons. We cut back on nuclear production while the Soviet Union did the same. And we have just completed the negotiation of a new consular agreement.[2]

And, as the Geneva conference reconvenes, we have before it a series of proposals that I submitted, designed to freeze strategic nuclear delivery systems, to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, and to prohibit the use of force to solve disputes. And we will welcome any other proposal by any nation which promises realistic progress toward peace.

In farflung corners of this strife-girdled globe ambitious adversaries continually test our tenacity and seek to erode our endurance. American strength is engaged, and American blood is being shed. It requires patience and understanding to continue the search for peace while our adversaries so beset us. But this is what we must do. It is what, God willing, I intend to do.

If we are successful in that search it will be because you, and men like you, gave their lives to duty that our children might live their lives in freedom.

So let us hope that this nation can some day, not too distant, lay aside its awesome power and direct all its genius to the betterment of man. Let us hope that we may soon be able to say, "The night is far spent, the day is at hand: let us therefore cast off the works of darkness, and let us put on the armor of light."

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[2] For text, see p. 979.

President Outlines Basic Themes of U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia

Statement by President Johnson [1]

It may be helpful to outline four basic themes that govern our policy in Southeast Asia.

First, America keeps her word.

Second, the issue is the future of Southeast Asia as a whole.

Third, our purpose is peace.

Fourth, this is not just a jungle war, but a struggle for freedom on every front of human activity.

On the point that America keeps her word, we are steadfast in a policy which has been followed for 10 years in three administrations. That was begun by General Eisenhower, in a letter of October 25, 1954,[2] in which he said to President [Ngo Dinh] Diem:

> DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have been following with great interest the course of developments in Viet-Nam, particularly since the conclusion of the conference at Geneva. The implications of the agreement concerning Viet-Nam have caused grave concern regarding the future of a country temporarily divided by an artificial military grouping, weakened by a long and exhausting war and faced with enemies without and by their subversive collaborators within.
>
> Your recent requests for aid to assist in the formidable project of the movement of several hundred thousand loyal Vietnamese citizens away from areas which are passing under a *de facto* rule and political ideology which they abhor, are being fulfilled. I am glad that the United States is able to assist in this humanitarian effort.
>
> We have been exploring ways and means to permit our aid to Viet-Nam to be more effective and to make a greater contribution to the welfare and stability of the Government of Viet-Nam. I am, accordingly, instructing the American Ambassador to Viet-Nam to examine with you in your capacity as Chief of Government, how an intelligent program of American aid given directly to your Government can serve to assist Viet-Nam in its present hour of trial, provided that your Government is prepared to give assurances as to the standards of performance it would be able to maintain in the event such aid were supplied.
>
> The purpose of this offer is to assist the Government of Viet-Nam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means. The Government of the United States expects that this aid will be met by performance on the part of the Government of Viet-Nam in undertaking needed reforms. It hopes that such aid, combined with your own continuing efforts, will contribute effectively toward an independent Viet-Nam endowed with a strong government. Such a government would, I hope, be so responsive to the nationalist aspirations of its people, so enlightened in purpose and effective in performance, that it will be respected both at home and abroad and discourage any who might wish to impose a foreign ideology on your free people.
>
> Sincerely,
>
> DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.

Now, that was a good letter then and it is a good letter now, and we feel the same way. Like a number of other nations, we are bound by solemn commitments to help defend this area against Communist encroachment. We will keep this commitment. In the case of Viet-Nam, our commitment today is just the same as the commitment made by President Eisenhower to President Diem in 1954—a commitment to help these people help themselves.

We are concerned for a whole great geographic area, not simply for specific complex problems in specific countries.

We have one single, central purpose in all that we do in Southeast Asia, and that is to help build a stable peace. It is others and not we who have brought terror to small countries and peaceful peasants. It is others, not we, who have preached and practiced the use of force to establish dictatorial control over their neighbors. It is other, not we, who have refused to honor international agreements that aim at reasonable settlement of deep-seated differences. The United States cannot fail to do its full share to meet the challenge which is posed by those who disturb the peace of Southeast Asia, but the purpose of America will not change. We stand for peace.

Our soldiers are doing great work, but what they are doing is only part of the job. The issues are political as well as military, economic as well as strategic. Our recent request for additional assistance funds [3] is more than half for economic help.

We are very grateful for the very fine action taken by the House Foreign Affairs Committee,

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[1] Read by the President at his news conference on June 2.

[2] The letter was dated Oct. 1 and released by the White House on Oct. 25, 1954.

[3] For text, see BULLETIN of June 8, 1964, p. 891.

and we hope to have prompt action on that request by the Congress.

The agenda in Honolulu [4] covers plans for progress as well as programs against terror. It is others who make war, and we who seek peace.

I should certainly say that the middle of the Honolulu meeting is not an appropriate time for the announcement of any additional specific programs. I do think as a result of constant reviews of our work in that area of the world that we will try to improve our effectiveness and our efficiency. Secretary McNamara and Secretary Rusk will both have more detailed reports when they return, and that is all I can say about the conference at this time.

Pledge to Freedom Renewed on 20th Anniversary of D-Day

Following are remarks made by President Johnson on June 3 to members of the U.S. delegation to D-Day ceremonies to be held in France on June 6 to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the Allied landing on the Normandy coast.

White House press release dated June 3

Ladies and gentlemen, I have a letter that I am going to present to General [Omar] Bradley, ask him to take it with him and to read it at the ceremonies.

You are leaving tomorrow to cross in peace an ocean hundreds of thousands of Americans have twice crossed before in war. For each of you this must be a mission of remembrance. For your country it is a mission of resolve. You remember, and will never forget, that 6th of June 1944, when America's sons and those of our gallant allies helped carry freedom back to the continent where it was cradled.

Your country remembers and will never forget the resolve born on that D-Day, that, so long as we are able, and other men are willing to stand together, we shall not permit the light of freedom to be extinguished on any continent again. In these last 20 years we and the world have lived between the darkness of midnight for civilization and the brightness of a new dawn, for the rays of that dawn are piercing through the shadows. For if the world is not so safe as we would like it some day to be, we can believe it is not so dangerous as we once feared it must always be.

The beachheads of Normandy have been opened into beachheads of hope for us all—hope for a world without tyranny, without war, without aggression, without oppression. In this, the central force for progress has been, and continues to be, the unity and strength of all nations of the Atlantic alliance. Out of our alliance in adversity has grown a great partnership for peace and prosperity. On the success of that partnership rest the hopes of men everywhere. We of America believe their hopes will not be disappointed, because the success of that partnership will not be frustrated. Men and nations which have united among themselves in grave moments of war must not divide among themselves in hopeful hours of peace.

So let all the world know that when this nation has stood 2,000 years we shall not have forgotten the lands where our sons lie buried nor the cause for which our sons died. Where we have commitments to the cause of freedom, we shall honor them—today, tomorrow, and always. Freedom is not the cause of America alone, however, nor the hope of Western man alone. It is the one cause and the one hope which unites in spirit all men around the globe, whatever their country or their color or their creed. After these last 20 years we can believe that freedom is the tide of history, and we of the West stand astride that wave, confident of what lies ahead.

On this anniversary the memory of yesterday's battles in war only moves us all to fight more valiantly today's battles for tomorrow's peace.

I hope your journey will be a pleasant one. I know it will bring back many memories. I look forward to seeing you upon your return. Thank you very much.

[4] For an announcement of a meeting of U.S. officials at Honolulu June 1 and 2, see *ibid.*, June 15, 1964, p. 926.

The National Interest—1964

Address by Secretary Rusk[1]

I am deeply honored by your invitation. Since I understand that I am the last obstacle between you and your diploma, I shall be brief. I am especially glad to be here because of my personal bias toward women's colleges. I was once a dean of a women's college—a valuable part of my own liberal education. And as a professor I was regularly disciplined by the disconcerting candor of the woman student, a discipline which has endured since one of my students became my wife.

One of my personal assistants is a Smith graduate. Many more of your graduates hold other positions in the Department of State, including nine of our career Foreign Service officers. The Peace Corps has 26 of you serving in 16 countries. Still many others are in other departments of our Government and in international organizations.

I was delighted to learn that about 100 of you in the class of '64 have taken examinations for Government service of one kind or another, including the Foreign Service. I would add the hope that still others will enter the Foreign Service through the other doorway as well—marriage—because I know of no other profession which the wife shares more fully than the great profession of diplomacy.

There is something just a little presumptuous, it seems to me, in commencement speeches to graduating classes. Let me start, therefore, with a little person-to-person honesty. I congratulate you most sincerely on the success of your work for your degree. If you were to ask me what the future will bring, I would have to say I cannot tell you. Were you to ask me for what you should be prepared, I would tell you quite simply for whatever comes. This modesty is a direct result of the combination of complexity and pace in human affairs. I am not so much interested in prediction, therefore, as in direction. General Omar Bradley once put it very well when he said that our age requires us "to chart our course by the distant stars and not by the light of each passing ship."

It was my impression as a professor that students wished to move as quickly as possible from generalization to personal application. "What does what you say mean to me, my home, my community?" It is a highly relevant question about foreign policy in the 1960's. For the rest of the world intrudes into your home and your community and affects your personal lives in the most direct and inescapable ways. And this will be true for as long ahead as many of us can see.

This did not appear so much the case in my own college days. The United States did not consider—incorrectly as it turned out—that it needed to have very much of a foreign policy or a foreign involvement. We felt safe in our continental home. Indeed, in 1934 an eminent American historian, Charles A. Beard, published a two-volume study of American policy which concluded that our national interest would be best served by leaving the rest of the world strictly to its own devices and tending our own "national garden." He said: "Enthroned between two oceans, with no historic enemies on the north or south, the Republic can be defended against any foes which such a policy might raise up against it."

[1] Made at commencement exercises at Smith College, Northampton, Mass., on June 7 (press release 271).

Many who did not lean toward isolation nevertheless believed with another eminent historian, Samuel Flagg Bemis, that "the continental position has always been the strength of the United States in the world" and that when we departed from it we were mistaken. Some spoke in terms of a hemispheric policy. Many realized that water alone could not protect us—that we needed a strong navy. Some thought we would eventually have to come to grips with an aggressively militaristic Japan. Some felt strongly our interest in keeping the western shores of Europe in friendly hands. But hardly anyone envisioned the radical change in the problem of preserving our security which was to occur within the next few years. Even the disciples of Woodrow Wilson thought in terms of preventing the frightful costs of another world war, not of imminent peril to the United States.

In due course we paid a heavy price for thinking that there was safety in continental isolation and in military weakness. But our errors were not irretrievable. The aggressors were not yet able to attack in force our continental home. We had the time and space to muster our strength.

The end of that margin of safety came with the growing range of airplanes and rockets and the unlocking of the atom. In his final biennial report as Chief of Staff of the Army, in 1945, General Marshall said:

> The technique of war has brought the United States, its homes and factories, into the front line of world conflict. They escaped destructive bombardment in the Second World War. They would not in a third.
>
> It no longer appears practical to continue what we once conceived as hemispheric defense as a satisfactory basis for our security. We are now concerned with the peace of the entire world.

Since General Marshall wrote that there have appeared long-range rockets with thermonuclear warheads—in comparison with which the fission bomb of 1945 seems almost primitive. One megaton is 50 times Hiroshima.

The conduct of our foreign policy is no longer a peripheral activity. It is not a game played between "those people in Washington" and other people in or from distant lands. It is as close and important to you as your friends and family, as your hopes and dreams, as everything you cherish. For the central objective of our—your—foreign policy is to protect and promote our national interests properly conceived. And the first of our national interests is, of course, our survival as a people and nation.

It may seem obvious to say that our foreign policy is designed to serve our national interests. But let us not forget that the foreign policies of governments have sometimes been designed to serve purposes other than national interests—for example: the whim or ambition of a prince, the defense or propagation of a particular ideology, the special interests or sentiments of an influential minority, inflamed emotions, national honor. Indeed, the Hague Conference of 1899 named "honor" ahead of "vital interest" in specifying the sorts of disputes it did not expect to be settled by arbitration.

But the foreign policy of a government chosen by the people obviously should be designed to serve *their* interests, and these become the national interest. And as a rule, our Presidents, beginning with Washington, have sought to justify their foreign policies primarily in terms of national interest. But they and others have defined the national interest in many different ways. At times the term was narrowly construed, at times broadly. And doubtless, even from a relatively detached viewpoint, the national interest required different policies and actions at different times.

Our Survival as a Nation

Let us explore briefly where our national interest lies in the world of today. Probably none would dispute that our national interest requires, above all, the survival of our people and way of life. Our first objective is to "secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity."

We must defend our security. But we must try to defend it without a major war if possible. For, while we have the power to obliterate any enemy, we could not expect to emerge from a thermonuclear exchange without the gravest damage. Indeed, for the first time, death in an afternoon is literally possible for most of the northern hemisphere. The primary purpose of the vast and complex military forces

which support our foreign policy is, and must be, to prevent a major war—to protect our vital interests without resort to catastrophic violence.

Our foreign policy also reflects our basic national traditions and ideals. Instinctively, we try to act in harmony with these. We also seek to promote a world environment in which these can thrive. For, quite frankly, we believe that these basic ideas and aspirations suggest the kind of society which best serves both individual human dignity and the common good of the human race.

In a very fundamental sense the United States has no national interest that is clearly separable from the welfare of the international community at large. Our fate is inextricably bound up in the fate of mankind. We can be secure only to the extent that we can make the earth secure—its land, water, and air, and the adjoining areas of space. We have a vital interest in achieving the kind of world projected in the preamble and articles 1 and 2 of the United Nations Charter.

Policies Serving U.S. Interest

From these more general observations emerge various objectives and rules of conduct which serve our national interest.

We have a national interest in the decisive repulse of aggression—everywhere and by whatever means. This world will remain a dangerous place as long as any aggressor, whether in Southeast Asia, the Caribbean, Africa, or elsewhere, thinks he can gain through aggression. For surely we have learned that such appetites feed upon success and it is too late for the world to depend upon satiation.

We have a national interest in the peaceful settlement of disputes. War in the nuclear age has become an increasingly irrational means of achieving rational objectives. The flickering flame of what appears to be a small dispute can be fanned into large conflagration. We must, therefore, pay respectful attention to small flames, using and improving the machinery for handling them, giving patience, persistence, and prudence their fullest chance.

We are the most powerful nation on earth—by a considerable margin. Our national interest lies in the wise use of this power, not only to deter war and defeat aggression but to support the emergence of the kind of world order we—and most other ordinary peoples—want. Power requires responsibility. It is too late in human history to guide its use by primitive reactions. The use of power must be adjusted to the character of the problem we are trying to deal with; Pandora's box is not to be opened every weekend.

Our national interest requires that, as a very great power, we act in a spirit of rectitude since our every act, or failure to act, has wide repercussions. We must act as the trustees of freedom. We must hold the confidence of our associates, and the respect of our adversaries, by scrupulously living up to our commitments. And wherever possible, we should use our power with the approval and cooperation of our friends and allies. A "decent respect to the opinions of mankind" remains both an obligation and a source of strength in times of crisis.

Our national interest requires that other nations honor their commitments to us and to others in behalf of peace and friendly commerce and cooperation. This does not mean a return to "gunboat" diplomacy. But it does require that we find appropriate means to reinforce the notion: *Pacta sunt servanda.*

Our national interest requires a strategy of peace, looking beyond the current nuclear impasse and the major divisive issues, searching incessantly for means of moving away from danger toward controlled disarmament and a more stable peace.

As never before, we have a national interest in the control and limitation of armaments—with reliable inspection and verification. And, as never before, our national interest requires that we not disarm unilaterally, that, indeed, we not reduce our military strength in any significant way without corresponding reductions by our adversaries.

We have a national interest in strengthening the peacekeeping facilities of the United Nations and other international organizations, such as the Organization of American States. We have a national interest in devising and promoting all means for peaceful change where, in simple justice, change is needed. Because we have a national interest in the peaceful settlement of

disputes and in building a world rule of law, we must abide by the awards of international tribunals, even when we don't agree with them.

We have a national interest in the economic and social well-being of other peoples. For, in the long run, there can be no stability in a world containing a few who are well off and many who are poor. We have a national interest in the promotion of international trade. And we know that if we expect to sell we must buy.

We have a national interest in the continuing prosperity of the economically advanced countries of the free world and in the rise of the less developed nations to decent standards of living.

Setting a "Gleaming Example"

We have a national interest in correcting the defects in our own society—in eliminating pockets of poverty, in wiping out our slums, rural and urban, in achieving in full reality equal rights for all, regardless of race, religion, color, or national origin. We must strive untiringly to build what President Johnson calls the "great society." We owe it to ourselves, first of all, to fulfill the American dream. As the leader of the cause of liberty, we must do our best to set a gleaming example.

We have a national interest in the spread of the political institutions of freedom. This is not because we want to impose the "American way" on other peoples. On the contrary, we favor the kind of world in which different peoples can develop their own institutions and cultures. We support a world of diversity. But we are deeply committed to certain basic propositions about the position of man as a free individual and government by the consent of the governed. We believe that these basic propositions have universal validity, and they are, in fact, the aspirations of a great majority of men everywhere, including behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains.

We have a national interest in encouraging trends within the Communist world toward national independence, more personal freedom, and more open societies.

Our deepest and, in the long run, most vital interest lies in the building of a stable world community. The present anarchic condition of human affairs on this tiny planet is dangerously precarious for everybody. We must work untiringly toward a great society for all mankind. Our most elemental national interest—the security of our way of life—demands a world order that provides peace, a rule of law, fraternal cooperation, and progress for the entire human race.

U.S. and Israel Exchange Views on Matters of Mutual Interest

Prime Minister Levi Eshkol of Israel and Mrs. Eshkol visited the United States May 31 to June 11, 1964. The Prime Minister met with President Johnson and other U.S. officials during his stay at Washington June 1–3. Following is an exchange of greetings between President Johnson and Prime Minister Eshkol on June 1 and the text of a joint communique released on June 2.

EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS

White House press release dated June 1

President Johnson

Mr. Prime Minister, ladies and gentlemen: I am very happy, Mr. Prime Minister, to welcome you to our country. Your predecessors have visited my country informally several times in the past, but this is the first official visit by a Prime Minister of Israel. We are pleased that you have come. My countrymen greatly admire the progress made by your people. You have met and mastered monumental problems of economic survival. You have shown all the world how to use science and technology to improve man's life on the planet.

Today Israel is a vital, prosperous land, a symbol of the courage and the strength of her people. The United States is proud to have assisted in this high enterprise. We are prepared to continue our contributions to technical advancement in Israel, particularly in the field of desalinization of water. We are aware, Mr. Prime Minister, of the problems of political

adjustment that Israel faces with her neighbors. We know that you want to live in peace with those neighbors, and we believe it not only possible but imperative that those problems be peacefully resolved, bringing justice to all as well as security for all.

We welcome this opportunity to exchange views with you on matters of mutual interest. We share many common objectives, Mr. Prime Minister, chief of which is the building of a better world, a world in which every nation can develop its resources and develop them in freedom and in peace. I am confident this visit will result in increased understanding between us and a strengthening of our already cordial relations.

Mr. Prime Minister, it gives me great pleasure to say, *Shalom.*

Prime Minister Eshkol

Mr. President and Mrs. Johnson: Mrs. Eshkol and I are deeply grateful for your kind invitation and warm welcome. It is a privilege to meet the statesman on whom destiny has laid so vast and historic a responsibility.

In the short time since you, Mr. President, assumed your exalted office, your deep dedication to peace, to freedom, and to the welfare of ordinary people has aroused hope and confidence throughout the world.

The prophet Malachi, almost 3,000 years ago, delivered this eternal message, and I will cite it in Hebrew: *Halo av echad lekulanu? halo el one echad bareinu?* (Have we not all one Father? hath not one God created us?)

In face of the danger to human survival in our time, this lasting truth, and with it the sense of common destiny, is cutting across the barriers of hostility and ideology which divide nations.

From Jerusalem, city of immortal prophecy and peace, I bear with me the best wishes of the people of Israel to you, Mr. President, the first citizen of this great country. You fulfill the injunction of our sages—to love peace and pursue peace.

Mr. President, from this great center of government, here in Washington, symbol and repository of democracy, there has constantly gone forth a message of encouragement to nations in their struggle for liberty and the affirmation of human values. The aid and sympathy tendered to us by successive United States governments, and by the people of the United States, are engraved for all time on the tablets of our renewed nationhood.

Through you, Mr. President, I wish to convey, from the people of Israel to the people of the United States, a heartfelt message of good will and of best wishes for their happiness and welfare.

Mr. President, this moment will always remain with me. For me, it is symbolic of the providential change which has taken place in the fortunes of my people, of the transition within so short a time from the tragedy which only two decades ago engulfed one-third of my people to the new epoch of independence and construction which commenced with the rise of Israel.

Only lasting faith in the fulfillment of prophecy enabled us to survive tribulation down the ages. In our time it has been given to us to reaffirm in independence the ancient unbroken link between the people of Israel and the land of Israel. It is our belief that, just as the prophecy of the restoration of Zion is being fulfilled, so, too, will the prophecy of universal peace be vindicated.

Mr. President, I thank you from the heart for your friendship, which is a source of the deepest encouragement to my people as it faces the future with faith and hope.

JOINT COMMUNIQUE

White House press release dated June 2

Prime Minister Eshkol and President Johnson have completed two days of discussions on matters of mutual interest and concern. Both welcomed the opportunity presented by the Prime Minister's visit at the invitation of the President for a full exchange of views.

The President presented the views of the United States on various world problems, including those of the Near East. He emphasized the strong desire of the United States for friendly relations with all nations of the Near

East, and its devotion to peace in the area and to peaceful economic and social development of all countries in the area. He congratulated Prime Minister Eshkol on the progress made by Israel since 1948 in the economic, technical, social and cultural fields. He noted the example provided by Israel in economic growth and human development in conditions of freedom.

Prime Minister Eshkol expressed deep appreciation for the consistent interest and sympathy shown by the U.S. and for the generous economic assistance rendered by the U.S. Government and the American people to Israel over the years. He was confident that Israel's development would continue unabated towards the rapid achievement of a self-sustaining economy. It was his deep conviction that peace and the maintenance of the territorial integrity and national independence of all countries in the Near East is of vital interest to the region and to the world.

The President welcomed assurances of Israel's deep concern, which the United States shares, for peace in the area. He reiterated to Prime Minister Eshkol U.S. support for the territorial integrity and political independence of all countries in the Near East and emphasized the firm opposition of the U.S. to aggression and the use of force or the threat of force against any country. In this connection, both leaders expressed their concern at the diversion of vitally important resources from development to armaments.

The two leaders declared their firm determination to make every effort to increase the broad area of understanding which already exists between Israel and the United States and agreed that the Prime Minister's visit advanced this objective.

The agreement reached to undertake joint studies on problems of desalting provided concrete evidence of the desire of the United States to continue to assist Israel in its efforts to solve remaining economic problems. Both countries view this as part of the world-wide cooperative effort being undertaken to solve the problem of scarcity of water and hope for rapid progress toward large-scale desalting in Israel. The knowledge and experience obtained from the joint effort will be available to all countries with water deficiencies.

In conclusion, the President and Prime Minister expressed their conviction that their peoples shared common values and were dedicated to the advancement of man, to individual freedom, and to human dignity.

Prime Minister Shastri Assured of Continued U.S. Cooperation

Following is the text of a message from President Johnson to Lal Bahadur Shastri, Prime Minister of India.

White House press release dated June 2

JUNE 2, 1964

I hasten to send my hearty congratulations on the occasion of your election as Prime Minister of India. The people and Government of the United States look forward to working with you and your countrymen in the same spirit of friendship and understanding that marked the relations between India and our country during the time of your great predecessor. I send my warmest personal good wishes for your success in the great tasks you now undertake, and my assurance of the reliable friendship and cooperation of the United States. Our countries are united in their purpose of peace, their effort for economic progress, and their dedication to human dignity.

On Working With History

by W. W. Rostow
Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council [1]

It is a grand custom that you have here at Haverford which requires the graduation speaker to spend some time with the senior class before he writes his talk. I look back on the schedule that was mounted here for me as a kind of imposed filibuster. I cannot recall two working days when I did more talking. But I also listened. And when, back in Washington, I took stock, I felt those questions centered on two matters:

First, there was a desire to know, in broadest terms, what the foreign policy of our Government aims to achieve on the world scene. What are our objectives? Do they conform to the basic principles and commitments which lie at the base of our society here at home?

Second, there was concern about certain urgent, immediate, day-to-day problems, notably in our relations with the developing nations of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America.

As best I can in 20 minutes or so, I shall try now to speak to those two questions.

Objectives of U.S. Foreign Policy

The United States is a great power on the world scene; but the forces with which we must deal are not putty in our hands. At our best, we have achieved and we can achieve great things; but we can achieve them only if we are simultaneously true to the best that is in us as a nation and if we work with, rather than against, the grain of history.

History always looks inevitable after the event. But there are important margins which depend on what nations do and on what individuals do. History is tolerant of men and nations if they avoid the larger illusions of grandeur: The right stance is a balance between great striving and an acceptance of the limits within which we can affect the course of events.

This means we must begin by understanding and accepting the large forces at work on the world scene which can be shaped and influenced at the margins but cannot be suppressed or eliminated by our wishing or ordering their disappearance.

Specifically, we live in a world dominated by four major historical forces, each interacting with the other, each capable of yielding what, from the point of view of the United States, would be a good outcome or a bad outcome.

First, in the northern part of the free world, from Japan east through Canada to West Berlin, we can observe a thrust by nations and peoples to reduce the degree of their immediate postwar dependence on the United States and to exert a larger control over their own destiny. The basis for this thrust is one of the great success stories of modern history. Japan and Western Europe, beaten down by war, have not merely recovered from wartime devastation; they have moved on to what is, quite literally, the greatest and most sustained interval of development in the whole of their economic history. This has been accompanied by the reemergence of a vital social and political life and a new confidence.

The question posed for us and for them by

[1] Address made at commencement exercises at Haverford College, Haverford, Pa., on June 5 (press release 269).

this phenomenon is whether this new-found strength and confidence will yield a return to old-fashioned nationalism or whether we can, working together, construct an acceptable partnership in all the great affairs of the planet, not merely in defense but also in trade and monetary affairs, in assistance to the developing nations, and in working together in the direction of peace.

Thus the first task of American foreign policy is to use our limited but real margin of influence to help shift our relations with these advanced nations of the north toward partnership and to avoid that fragmentation which would render our resources ineffective and which could, indeed, place all our nations in mortal danger in a nuclear age.

The second great historic fact we must face is that the peoples in the whole southern half of the world—Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East—are swept by a compelling impulse to modernize their societies in such ways as to give them a role of national dignity on the world scene and to bring to their peoples what contemporary science and technology can offer. This process touches every aspect of their traditional life: economic, social, and political. It brings about not merely new methods of production but a new style of family life, new ties between the villages and the cities, new functions and methods in national politics, and new relations to the world outside.

The Communists, sensing the vulnerability of these societies in an interval of transition, seek to disrupt them, to damage their relations with the West, and ultimately to take them over. It is the interest of the United States that this process of modernization shall go forward in such ways that truly independent nations emerge on the world scene, each of which will be permitted to fashion out of its own culture and its own ambitions the kind of society it wants.

The same religious and philosophic beliefs which demand that we respect the uniqueness of each individual lead us to respect the uniqueness of each national society. Moreover, we are confident that, if the independence of these societies can be maintained over the coming years and decades, they will develop their own version of what we would recognize as democratic, open societies.

Thus our second fundamental objective is to mobilize the resources of the more advanced northern part of the free world to help these ardent modernizing societies in the south protect their independence at a vulnerable stage in their history and to do what we can from the outside to help them build the economic, social, and political foundations for their own versions of modern, democratic societies.

Third, we face the double fact of communism: a phenomenon committed by its creed to expand its power to the point where it can organize the globe on a Communist basis—still impelled by its institutions and habits to thrust outward—but now confronted by inner fragmentation, by inner economic and social problems, and by external forces sufficient to guarantee, if they are well and wisely used, that the vision of Communist world hegemony will prove unattainable.

Here our task is to frustrate those in the world of communism who still thrust outward against us while working constructively with those emerging forces of nationalism and liberalism which may, in time, lead the nations now under Communist rule to join, like other nation-states, in building a peaceful and stable world community.

Simply put, our task is to help bring about, by peaceful means, if possible, an end to communism as we have known it.

Fourth, we face the historic fact of nuclear weapons whose use we must contemplate in defense of the free world but whose use could bring tragic consequences for all humanity; and therefore we strive to protect our vital interests in ways that would minimize the likelihood that nuclear weapons will have to be invoked and simultaneously to transform an uncontrolled arms race into a world of arms control and disarmament, in ways which would increase, rather than diminish, our own security and that of others.

Taken all together, our task is to help build an orderly and peaceful world community to supplant the world system shattered in 1914 and never replaced. We have lived now for half a century in a world at war, or in near anarchy, latterly with a nuclear sword of Damocles over our heads. The construction, block by block, of a world community is the

grand purpose which suffuses the effort to build a great partnership in the north, stretching from Tokyo east to Berlin; to build a new north-south relationship between the more developed and developing nations of the free world. This is our ultimate objective in East-West relations, where we aim not merely to frustrate Communist aggression but to draw the nations now under Communist rule into an orderly and peaceful world community; for the struggle with communism is ultimately a struggle about how this small planet shall be organized.

The day-to-day foreign policy of your Government is designed to get us from here to there. The large objectives I have stated are not abstractions written down in policy papers and forgotten, except when June rolls around and we have to make graduation speeches. They are the working guidelines which govern the daily flow of cables, the actions of the missions representing the United States in every quarter of the globe.

In looking at our tasks in these terms, we are, of course, talking about the biggest piece of international architecture ever undertaken in a time of peace. None of the lines of action we have launched in these directions is as yet complete. But, looking back on almost a generation of sustained labor since 1945, during which these broad objectives have governed us, we have moved some distance down long roads; and we have more reason for confidence today that these objectives are attainable than at any period in the past.

Policy Toward Guerrilla Warfare

I should now like to turn to a few of the more specific and immediate questions which were evidently on your minds in our weekend together. They tended to center on the north-south dimension of our foreign policy; that is to say, our relations with the developing nations of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America.

Specifically, you raised three questions with me.

What about our policy toward guerrilla warfare, notably in Southeast Asia?

What is our stance toward political democracy in the developing areas?

What about our policy toward the economic development of these regions?

I should like to say a few words about each.

As President Johnson has often pointed out, since his state of the Union message in January, we are confronted in Southeast Asia and the Caribbean with a purposeful and thoroughly professional effort by Communists outside certain nations to produce Communist insurrection within them by training, arming, and financing guerrilla forces; by introducing them illegally across frontiers; and by guiding their efforts from day to day from abroad.

This technique for Communist expansion is difficult to deal with because it is so brutally economical. Where insurrection has been established, even in limited regions within a country, it takes something like 15 to 20 men on the government side to control and defeat the activities of one guerrilla. This fact arises because the task of a guerrilla force is to disrupt and to destroy, while the government must build and protect what it is building. Guerrilla warfare, mounted from external bases, is a terrible burden to carry for any government in a society making its way toward modernization, as I have had occasion personally to observe in both Southeast Asia and the Caribbean.

This technique is perhaps the last still effective method of aggression open to the Communists, if the free world maintains its strength and unity. Debate upon it lies at the center of much of the controversy among the Communist parties throughout the world. Some Communists see it as the last, best hope of extending communism on the world scene, in the face of the strength and vitality of the free world. Others are more skeptical. Our task is to confirm the doubts of the Communist skeptics.

Difficult as is the task, we must work with those who would defend the independence of their nations, to demonstrate that this form of aggression cannot succeed any more than the whole array of other methods of pressure and aggression which the Communists have mounted against us since Stalin decided early in 1946 that the postwar years were a time for Communist expansion.

In South Viet-Nam, for example, the Viet Cong consist of some 25,000 highly organized guerrillas. Their leaders are systematically trained, infiltrated, and guided from outside the borders of South Viet-Nam, in violation of solemn international agreements. Their objective is to gain control of as much of the rural population as possible, to produce frustration and despair in the cities, and thus to take over the country without an open confrontation like that mounted in Korea in 1950.

We should be quite clear—and the international community should be quite clear—that the ability to mount a force of this kind is not the equivalent of gaining power by a free election. We should all be clear that we are facing a form of systematic aggression quite as real as that launched in Korea in June 1950. Indeed, I find it difficult to imagine our moving forward toward a world of arms control and disarmament until this form of aggression is recognized and sterilized by the international community.

Principle of Political Democracy

The second specific question we discussed is whether the United States is or is not supporting the principle of political democracy—the principle of government by consent of the governed—in the developing parts of the world.

The answer is, of course, that any government representing this society must strongly and steadily support the cause of political democracy. From our 18th-century commitments as this nation was formed, we accepted a role on the world scene as supporter of the democratic cause which never had more meaning and vitality than it does today.

The problem lies in the fact that political democracy is a matter of direction and degree; it is not an absolute. We in the United States, for example, are now gripped of two major problems which affect the degree of democracy in this society; that is, the proportioning of congressional representation and the voting rights of the Negro in parts of the South.

The development of democratic processes is at least as complex and time-consuming a business as economic development. And we do not have it in our power promptly to make all nations into modern democracies by decisions made in Washington, any more that we have it in our power to raise their levels of per capita income overnight from, say, $100 to $1,000.

What we can do and are doing are two things: first, to encourage them to strive for the highest degree of democratic practice of which their societies are capable, at any period of time; and, second, to help them build the longer run foundations for a progressive refinement of democratic institutions, practices, and attitudes.

As we look at the trends in the developing societies from this long perspective, we have every reason for confidence. In Latin America, for example, over the past generation one cannot doubt that the broad trend has been toward the emergence of modern, democratic practice, not away from it.

I do not doubt that democracy is the wave of the future. Every culture has embedded in it—and this includes Russian and Chinese cultures—values and commitments which would set limits to the power of the state over the individual; which would assert the ultimate integrity of the individual while defining his duty to the community; and which would define that government as good which reflects the consent of the governed. I expect these elements in national cultures to assert themselves, with the passage of time, where they are now suppressed; for there is nothing in the performance of totalitarian states—whatever their present stage of development—that responsible free men cannot surpass and are not surpassing where they have set their minds and hearts to the job.

I do not expect the kinds of democracies that emerge to be identical with that of the United States or those of Western Europe; but I do expect men to create modern societies which conform to their own versions of the democratic norms.

Economic Development

Finally, a few words about economic development. The past generation has seen in the developing areas a most significant forward surge. There are, it is true, some cases of stagnation; but, by and large, the developing na-

tions have shown a capacity to produce rates of increase in output in excess of their population increase. Moreover, many of them have acquired in this generation a wide range of industrial and administrative skills.

There have been, however, three systematic distortions in this first phase of industrialization.

First, there has been a general tendency to neglect agriculture.

Second, industrialization has tended to concentrate on the production of manufactured goods for a small upper middle-class market, in substitution for imports. At the present time there are in many developing nations substantial margins of idle industrial capacity, sometimes very large margins.

Third, reflecting this overconcentration of effort in the cities, there has been an excessive flow of people from the countryside to urban slums, at a time when industry lacked the markets and the momentum to absorb these newcomers in industrial work.

The central task in the decade and the generation ahead is to produce a reinforcing agricultural and industrial expansion which will modernize not merely a few cities in the developing nations but the countryside and the nation as a whole. This will require not merely increased attention to agricultural production and more efficient methods of marketing agricultural products in the cities but also the willingness on the part of industry to produce and to market the things the poorer folk want and would buy at lower prices and work harder to get.

The kind of projects we have launched in the past decade—centered on schools, roads, power stations, steel mills—must, of course, continue to go forward; but there is a new challenge: to harness the capacity and skills that have been built to break down the barriers that divide the city from the countryside in most of the developing nations.

We are all conscious of the central importance of the relations between the richer and poorer nations on the world scene; but an equally critical problem is to narrow the gap between the richer and the poorer parts of the developing nations themselves.

Vitality of Western Heritage

Even these brief observations on three aspects of our north-south problems suggest something of the complexity of our tasks on the world scene. To play our part in dealing with the Communist guerrilla warfare threat; to do what we can day by day to encourage evolution in the direction of political democracy; to work with our friends in the new and unfolding tasks of economic development—each constitutes an enormous challenge, straining our capacity to work with others in settings which cannot be read off automatically from the experience of growing up in our own vital but quite unique society.

Evidently, to get from here to there—to build the kind of world community we seek—will take time. Those of you now graduating from American colleges will have, in your time of responsibility, an ample agenda to carry forward, some of whose items we can foresee, some still hidden in the mists.

As one who has been privileged to observe and to participate in a small way in this generation's effort to shape the world along these lines since 1945, I believe that we all can go forward with confidence. That confidence is rooted not merely in simple national pride that our nation, unwillingly drawn from isolation into world responsibility, has, by and large, conducted itself well. Our confidence can have an even wider foundation.

As a nation we are rooted in values and traditions that reach back thousands of years into the Mediterranean heritage. Here, in the second half of the 20th century, those values and traditions are proving to have an abiding relevance and vitality. While the tasks on this planet are new—a planet rendered small and vulnerable and intimate by modern weapons and means of communications—the values that we bring to the solution of these problems are the oldest in our national life and, indeed, in Western civilization. We have passed through many tests, the most recent being the test posed for us by the Communist offensive which took shape in 1958, in the wake of the launching of the first Sputnik, and which was brought to a standstill, in certain critical dimensions, in the

18 months' effort climaxed by the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962.

I am deeply convinced that, if we in the United States do a job that lies wholly within our capacity, and if the free world maintains a reasonable degree of unity and common purpose, the events, decisions, and initiatives launched in recent years could mark the beginning of the end of the cold war.

The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 could emerge as the Gettysburg of the global civil conflict. To get from where we are, without war, to that creative Appomattox, when a stable and peaceful world order has been established, will certainly take time and we shall certainly face further hazards and crises. But, with respect for the historical forces about us, with stubbornness, toughness, and continued loyalty to that great humane tradition of which we are a part, I am confident we can make it.

Strengthening the Machinery for Peace

by Adlai E. Stevenson
U.S. Representative to the United Nations [1]

As you know, at the President's request I recently cut short a mission to Europe in order to participate in the current Security Council session on Cambodia and Viet-Nam.[2] During my stay abroad, however, I was attending meetings and speaking in a number of European capitals. I would like to report some impressions that may interest you—first, as Americans and, second, as Democrats.

This trip abroad was my first since the dark days of last November, when the shock of President Kennedy's death was felt virtually everywhere in the world almost as keenly as it was here in America.

Rarely in history did so many diverse peoples experience a sense of personal loss. Anxiety and uncertainty about the future was universal. There is no better place to sense such attitudes than under that great tent, the United Nations, in New York, where the whole world meets, and talks, and whispers.

Though the shock has not altogether worn off, the key impression I brought home with me is that, even as here in the United States, the early fear and confusion has given way to sober confidence that under Lyndon Johnson there will be no slackening in the effort to explore every path to peace and justice.

The lurking anxiety about jingoism and impatience in the United States is being dissipated more rapidly than many people thought possible. The impression of President Johnson as a firm, incisive, sure-footed, and energetic man has grown with astonishing rapidity. But—even more important—that he too is a man of peace.

In my judgment this is the most important international political development to take place in the first half of 1964. And I assure you, I speak here not of the politics of partisanship but of the politics of humanity. Confidence in the leadership of America is an indispensable ingredient for the achievement of realistic and workable solutions to the critical problems now confronting us in so many sectors of the world.

Actually, though, the impression Mr. Johnson has made abroad should come as no surprise to

[1] Address made before the Woman's National Democratic Club, Washington, D.C., on June 2 (press release 264).

[2] For statements made by Ambassador Stevenson in the Security Council on May 21 and 26, see BULLETIN of June 8, 1964, p. 907, and June 15, 1964, p. 937.

us who know that his dedication to the principles of international cooperation is consistent with the philosophy he voiced in the Senate and during the period he served as Vice President.

I believe I can say with confidence, after talks with many people abroad, that President Johnson is looked upon as a successor who will carry on Mr. Kennedy's work for peace and security with resolution and imagination, while charting his own road to the good society all of us seek.

I happily confess that I had not realized how quickly Mr. Johnson had convinced the world that America had another great internationalist and man of peace as Chief Executive. And in Europe at least he is rapidly and miraculously becoming just about as popular as he is here in America.

Precisely 2 weeks before he assumed the Presidency, he delivered a speech in Brussels [3] that summed up his position on the Atlantic alliance and American commitments abroad. This statement by the then Vice President was not reported widely, but it was significant reading and worth recalling now.

". . . aggressors," he said, "have learned that they must reckon with the Atlantic partnership as a single unit. Before an aggressor could reach Brussels he would have to strike at Boston—at Philadelphia before Paris, at Los Angeles before London, at Chicago before Cologne. Our peril is indivisible. So also is our prosperity."

I don't see how any President could make a clearer commitment than that.

As you know, there are those who have suspected that America might not be depended upon in a pinch to fulfill its European obligations. But at the NATO Council meeting at The Hague last month it seemed clear that this anxiety was diminishing. And for that we can thank not only Mr. Johnson's firm words about the Atlantic alliance but the way he has recently backed up our international commitments with deeds.

For instance, when he recently presented his foreign aid budget to Congress he said his estimate was a rockbottom figure. Now our friends abroad know he meant every word of this. It would be difficult to overstate the impact, therefore, of the action taken just the other day by the House Foreign Affairs Committee in approving the President's request just as he made it.

I was in Europe when the committee acted, and I would like to tell its chairman, Dr. Tom Morgan, that he would have felt well rewarded for his able efforts had he also been present to see the favorable reaction among our allies. If only all our Congressmen realized as he does how such responsible action fortifies our position!

I was abroad, too, when Congress recently reversed itself and restored the appropriation for the International Development Association that it had earlier killed.[4] And the IDA, as you know, is the key to a number of our foreign undertakings, particularly our policy with many of the newer and less developed nations.

The European reaction was very positive indeed. I myself felt like giving a cheer.

You recall when Congress originally made the cut, the President said he would fight to have it restored. That is just what he did, and you can be sure this was noticed abroad.

And while we're on the subject of foreign aid, I think it is about time we stop thinking of ourselves as Uncle Sap. The fact is that poorer nations than the United States donate a larger percentage of their total resources to foreign aid than we do. The French, British, Italian, German, Belgian, and Israeli aid to Africa, for example, totals about twice the United States aid to Africa, considerable as it is. The Russians have already poured $1½ billion into the U.A.R., and now Mr. Khrushchev has just pledged another $227 million to Nasser. And so it goes. Peking is making an immediate grant of $3 million to Kenya to help that young nation balance its budget.

Small potatoes, perhaps, but it's indicative of the fact that, for all their belligerent sounds, even the Red Chinese know the long-range importance of economic aid.

The real question about foreign aid, it seems

[3] For text, see *ibid.*, Dec. 2, 1963, p. 852.

[4] For text of remarks made by President Johnson when he signed the International Development Association bill on May 26, see *ibid.*, June 15, 1964, p. 935.

to me, is not whether we can afford it but whether we can afford not to give it. As for those who argue that it's too expensive, let me point out that the President's foreign aid budget for the next fiscal year is about one-sixteenth of our military budget, less than 4 percent of the Federal budget, less than three-fifths of 1 percent of our gross national product. All in all, if passed in full, its cost to each American will be $17.80.

Fluid State of Contemporary Politics

Our postwar world has gradually turned into one of diversity, with multiple centers of power and influence. And this is true for the East even as it is for the West. As a consequence we tend to become overly fearful that the alliance is breaking up. My recent journey, especially the NATO Council meeting in The Hague, was in that respect very reassuring.

The difficulties and divisions are many, to be sure. The conflict between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus endangers the eastern flank of the alliance. General de Gaulle's policies, while quite understandable, do not advance the integration of Europe and the Atlantic community. One could go on pointing to dilemmas both East and West.

There is no need to underline the fluid state of contemporary politics. Russia's fear of nuclear war and growing standards of living in the Soviet Union have led to the split with China, whose leaders accuse Mr. Khrushchev of revisionism and retreat. Behind this split there is not only a bid for ideological leadership in a world whose poverty is much nearer to the Chinese level than to growing Russian affluence. There could also be very profound divisions of national interest, since China might claim that a large part of Asian Russia has been filched from the old Chinese Empire.

This division in the Communist world, like the division in medieval Europe between Pope and Emperor, is giving subordinate centers of power new opportunities. This is the "polycentrism" which is certainly evident in the great variety of different domestic policies and international attitudes now being pursued by the European satellites.

All this fluidity does give the Western World, in theory at least, new opportunities. However, these opportunities are limited by a number of difficulties and divergences:

The chief cement of the old alliance was fear of a united Communist bloc. The lessening of Russian pressure in Europe has also lessened a sense of cohesion in the alliance.

It may be that Russia, fearful of the extension of Chinese influence, will seek to modify radical policies and to play down the cold war. There are some signs that this is indeed the case in parts of Latin America where Communists seem recently to have been less belligerent than the Castroites. Equally, however, Russia may feel that it cannot let the Chinese outbid it for the support of the developing peoples. They are poor, their frustrations are increasing, their means of coping with them are now growing in a way that meets the steady increase in population. In this condition, radicalism is endemic and the Russians may feel that they cannot be less strident than the Chinese in their attacks on "imperialism." It is, therefore, very likely that the problem of how to deal with communism outside Europe will continue to trouble the alliance, and certainly it is an issue upon which there is no sign of any unanimity of opinion.

Bonds of Common Interest

With the twilight of empire, the emergence of Communist China, the tidal wave of independence—all on the heels of European economic and military recovery—the rapidly changing world has spawned a multitude of other problems and external dangers involving our allies and the United States with its worldwide commitments. Britain is concerned with Aden and Malaysia. We have Cuba and Viet-Nam. France has its former African colonies. And of course we don't all have the same priorities of importance.

These all add to the diversity of our interests, and the hazard for the alliance is not the diversity of interests but that the diversities become divisions.

Also, today, when the external dangers that prompted the formation of NATO 15 years ago

appear to have receded, the problems of Germany and European security remain and many more in distant places have been added.

More, not less, consultation and coordination becomes necessary if we are all to avoid the danger of falling back on purely national solutions. But the Atlantic world dares not follow that course if it wishes to retain its influence and authority. Its highest interest lies in enhanced interdependence to deal with the threats to peace, not just in Europe but everywhere. Moreover, it can lead, in the nonviolent era of competition with Communist regimes that we seem to have entered, only to closer cooperation.

I have no doubt as to the outcome of such a contest—if we can strengthen the bonds of common interest linking North America and free Europe. We are well embarked on ways of doing so. Now it is up to all of us to develop the opportunities we have created.

The U.N. Peacekeeper and Peacemaker

The accomplishments of NATO have been along lines sanctioned by the United Nations Charter. As the President recently said,[5] the charter and the North Atlantic Treaty are indispensable to one another, for neither can keep the peace alone. And it is the fact that both are indispensable that makes the best argument for the continuity of NATO and, I hope, rapid development of the U.N.'s capacity to cope with the peacekeeping problems of the postwar world that are dumped in its lap when there is no other way to handle them.

If I were asked to sum up for you what the U.N. has come to mean to the people of the world, I could do no better than to recall some words spoken by Beardsley Ruml shortly after the charter was signed. It was one of the better prophecies of our age and it goes like this:

> At the end of five years you will think the UN is the greatest vision ever realized by man.
>
> At the end of ten years you will find doubts within yourself and all through the world.
>
> At the end of fifteen years you will believe the UN cannot succeed. You will be certain that all the odds are against its ultimate life and success.
>
> It will only be when the UN is twenty years old that . . . we will know that the UN is the only alternative to the demolition of the world.

What a prescient bit of crystal-ball gazing that turned out to be!

By now, I think, most of us have arrived at the fourth stage in Ruml's 20-year prophecy—that stage where we know that international institutions for peace are "the only alternative to the demolition of the world."

Peacekeeping is only one task of the United Nations. But it is the one that gets most of the headlines, and its record has long since made this international machinery indispensable. It will get more so as the frictions and conflicts multiply. The danger is that it will get smothered by too many. As of tonight, it is in the Congo, in Cyprus, in Yemen, in Gaza, in Kashmir.

Scores of what used to be called "incidents" have occurred around the world during the past decade and a half, but they have occurred without widespread hostilities or even ultimatums. On at least 20 occasions formal fighting has broken out between opposing armed forces. But nearly every one of them—nearly every war, partial war, incipient war, or threat of war—has been averted or halted by a cease-fire, by adjourning to the conference table or by referring the dispute to an international institution for nonviolent solution.

This is one of the outstanding facts of contemporary international political life, the fact that in most of these crises—these outbreaks of violence—the restraining influence, the peacemaker and peacekeeper, has been the United Nations.

But there are things the United Nations can't do either now or, I fear, for a long time to come. Where the vital interests of the great powers are engaged directly, only the great powers can extricate themselves. That's why we have to maintain our defense establishments and the shield provided by our alliance. Yet, even in big-power confrontations, the U.N. can help by internationalizing conflicts, by providing means of extracting rather than escalating, by saving face instead of risking war.

Until now the United Nations has been better at peacekeeping than at peacemaking—nat-

[5] For text of remarks made by President Johnson on Apr. 3, 1964, see *ibid.*, Apr. 20, 1964, p. 606.

urally enough. But it will become increasingly essential for the United Nations to reinforce its firefighting equipment with machinery designed for enduring settlement. A cease-fire only restores the *status quo ante*—which is to say the condition which gave rise to the dispute in the first place.

This, of course, is great and hopeful progress. The United Nations has developed the capacity to maintain some semblance of order to fill the vacuum left when the order imposed by the European empire system was voluntarily and suddenly dismantled after the war.

But if we now are to progress beyond a system capable of invoking cease-fires and preventing the outbreak of wars, if we are to build a reliable system of order with the capacity to induce peaceful change where change is needed, if we are some day to begin to dismantle the gargantuan defense establishments which consume the wealth of nations without producing anything usable—then we shall need more and better machinery to do it. Indeed, there is no other road to significant disarmament.

For, successful as the machinery has been up to now, it has very definite weaknesses, grave weaknesses that threaten to undo all the good. The major weakness, I hasten to point out, is more the implementation of the machinery of peace than the machinery itself.

We see it most clearly today in Laos in the operations of the International Control Commission, which of course is not an organ of the U.N. but which illustrates my point. The Commission devised by the agreement of 1962 is a troika affair which operates on the basis of unanimity. When fighting occurs, as it has recently on the Plaines des Jarres, the Commission must meet and agree before it can even go out and look. Its effectiveness has been persistently sabotaged by the Communist member by misuse of the so-called "veto" power, thereby undermining support to the Souvanna government. Today, however, that government, which was created under the Geneva agreements, remains in full exercise of its authority as the legitimate government of a neutralized Laos.

The other Geneva signatories must live up to their solemn commitments and support Prime Minister Souvanna in his efforts to preserve the independence and neutrality which the world thought had been won at Geneva. As I have told the Security Council, these solemn obligations must not be betrayed.

The problem in Southeast Asia is that Hanoi and Peiping won't leave their neighbors alone, regardless of the Geneva agreements of 1954 and 1962. But the United States won't, as we have made clear, sit idly by while Viet-Nam and Laos are overrun in criminal violation of the Geneva agreements to neutralize these countries. As President Johnson said today: ". . . America keeps her word." [6]

Laos, as I say, points up the deficiency of the peacekeeping machinery contrived at Geneva. But other developments in the same geographical area show how the United Nations might provide machinery that will be effective.

In response to the complaint of Cambodia that its borders were being violated the United States has proposed to send United Nations observers or even a United Nations force to the scene. For the United Nations, as I have pointed out, has repeatedly demonstrated its capacity in such cases.

The Search for Peace

In the light of all this we must understand that the state of the world makes it more imperative than ever before that all of us, together, continue our painstaking search for those interests which unite the nations, for those international instruments of law and security, for those institutions of a stable, working world society.

In short, we must together strengthen the machinery we have already built inside and outside the United Nations.

If we do, we will have reason to hope that between the thermonuclear powers additional areas of common ground can be identified and further agreements reached, until the cold war truly fades into history. And if the cold war does not fade into history, it will not be because of any lack of effort or good will on the part of the United States.

Consider if you will the peace-building record of the 6 months since President Johnson assumed the Presidency:

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[6] See p. 953.

This has ranged from direct correspondence with Chairman Khrushchev to specific proposals both at the Geneva Disarmament Conference and in the forums of the United Nations on how we propose to attain and keep the peace; from an offer to work with the Soviet Union on a manned lunar landing to an agreed cutback in the production of fissionable materials; from a policy of encouraging the evolution now in progress in Communist Europe to the actual working out of significant new agreements with Rumania, Poland, and Yugoslavia on such matters as trade and agriculture.

And, of course, there is the achievement of important new agreements with Russia itself on cultural exchange and the opening of new consulates.[7]

There have been other steps, too, all geared to the greatest possible flexibility in dealing with the shifting trends of today.

What we have done in the past 6 months has convinced both our friends and those who are not our friends that this administration will act with restraint, that it wants peace, that it is unafraid to negotiate where negotiation is appropriate and equally unafraid to stand firm where firmness is required. "Brinkmanship" is outdated. Perhaps the word for today is "thinkmanship"!

As I have pointed out before, the steps taken by the President in the past 6 months may not in themselves end the cold war; they may not assure us of the peace we seek, but they bring peace that much closer. And they are convincing the world that the United States will neglect no work of peace that is within our reach.

In doing so we reaffirm that peace is not merely the absence of war but a virtue, a state of mind, a disposition for benevolence, confidence, justice.

Member of the Parish

by Harlan Cleveland
Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs [1]

To join you here, to speak of the future of our United Nations in this capital city of Canada, is more than a privilege; it's a puzzlement. What grade of intellectual coking coal could I bring to this Newcastle that wasn't first produced here? For in the short and remarkable life of our United Nations, Canada has preeminently served as a source of wisdom and fount of courage.

Since 1948 Canada has assigned Canadians to every peacekeeping operation of the U.N. except West New Guinea—the only country which has done so. Canadians have jounced in white jeeps along the sensitive borders of Israel. Canadians have policed the tender armistice line in Kashmir. Canadians have fought and died for collective security in Korea. Canadians helped zip up the Sinai borders after Suez; helped put out the fuse which could have blown Lebanon apart 2 years later; helped sit on the lid in the Congo 2 years after that; and 3 years later again were assigned to the dusty wastes of Arabia to observe the cease-fire in Yemen.

And now, in Cyprus, you have sent your famed Van Doos—the Royal 22d Regiment—to account for one-sixth of the U.N. Force which polices that tense and troubled island. As often before, you, the Canadians, got there first—and got there in your own planes. And

[7] See p. 979.

[1] Address made before the annual meeting of the United Nations Association of Canada at Ottawa, Canada, on June 6 (press release 270 dated June 5).

because Canadians know what they are doing and do it well, your contingent has been assigned just about the hottest sectors on the island, including Nicosia and the notorious Kyrenia Pass.

And all this time you have been paying your dues to the club of world community—and making the fifth largest contribution to the U.N.'s Special Fund, the fourth largest contribution to refugee relief, the third largest contribution to technical aid and to the support of the Palestine refugees.

You have given the U.N. your best—men of quality and courage like General [Andrew] McNaughton, who helped frame the Kashmir cease-fire; General Howard Kennedy, who brought the Palestine refugee program through a difficult time; and General [E. L. M.] Burns, who, after Suez, in that nervous winter of 1956 became the world's first commanding general of a truly international peace force.

In that confused and curious process of multilateral brokerage by which international diplomats somehow try "to make a mesh of things," it is not easy to single out the man who invented a great idea at a critical moment in a long negotiation. But when the history of mankind's best and most durable effort to build an international order is written down—by historians who survived to write it because the generation that split the atom apart discovered how to weld the world together—they will surely identify as the founding father of modern international peacekeeping your own Prime Minister, Lester Pearson.

Canada's Role in International Peacekeeping

Lester Pearson received the Nobel Peace Prize for inventing a peacekeeping device—a plan for the rapid establishment, with the consent of the nations concerned, of an emergency international U.N. Force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in Suez in early November 1956. What he thus proposed in Canada's name was a truly creative act—in its own way quite as creative as the acts of Orville Wright or Richard Arkwright or Enrico Fermi. Like other great perceptions in the pellmell advance of civilization, "Mike" Pearson's act was a kind of miraculous amalgam—deep understanding of great forces, combined with an intuitive sense of the right moment to take the next step.

Canada, through Pearson, said that measuring "aggression" and assessing blame was not enough; that obtaining a cease-fire and withdrawal of forces was also not enough to cope with the root causes of the struggle. He proposed that the Secretary-General be authorized "to begin to make arrangements with member states for a United Nations force large enough to keep these borders at peace while a political settlement is being worked out." And, he added, "My own Government would be glad to recommend Canadian participation in such a United Nations force, a truly international peace and police force."

This responsible and realistic peacemaker was saying what we have all come to learn from experience: that the intermediate stage of political settlement, the condition precedent to peaceful change, requires an international executive effectively represented at the very scene of conflict; that it requires nations to provide men and money and equipment as risk investment in the maintenance of peace; and that it requires above all a few leaders of at least a few nations who are prepared to make the hard decisions that peacekeeping entails—and then stand by their decisions when the going gets rough.

Everything we have learned since the agony of the Second World War and the healing bonds of the U.N. Charter drew us together in this extraordinary adventure—everything we have learned in Greece and the Middle East, in Kashmir and Korea, in the Congo and in Cyprus, and in the deeply troubled peninsula of Southeast Asia—attests to the prophetic and practical quality of Canadian vision, Canadian will, and Canadian followthrough.

This is why I say that, in the business of international peacekeeping, Canada is a source of wisdom and a fount of courage. A nation's courage may be—I believe it usually is—directly proportional to distance from the danger. Canada therefore may have a certain advantage, even in the age of jets, in its distance from most of the world's most troublesome trouble

spots. But wisdom is proportional to involvement; and precisely because Canada is far from the Congo or the Gaza Strip, it is a tribute to the quality of your perception that Canada has felt so involved with other people's brushfires and grudge fights halfway around the world.

Henri Bergson tells of a man in a parish church who remains impassive while around him the congregation is deeply moved by the pageantry of worship and the brilliance of the sermon. His neighbor in the pew asks him if he lacks all emotion and feeling, to remain thus unmoved, and the man replies: *Mais, Monsieur, je ne suis pas de la paroisse*—"I'm not a member of the parish."

Luckily for mankind, most of Canada's leaders and most Canadians know that they are members of a parish of planetary size.

The U.N.'s Capacity To Act

How much further can—or should—the U.N. develop its peacekeeping capacity? It is a fair question, but no answer today has much chance of making sense tomorrow.

For the U.N. has whatever capacity its members can agree to endow it with—at any given time for any given purpose. As the Secretary-General, U Thant, said in Ottawa the other day, what he does on the executive side of the organization is to be guided by the decisions of the relevant U.N. bodies. Until one knows the nature of a future emergency and then plumbs the will of the U.N.'s majority to act in the face of common danger, no man can say what the "capacity" of the U.N. is to act in defense of the peace.

The day before the Korean invasion, the day before the Suez crisis, the day before the army mutiny in the Congo, nobody would have dreamed that the U.N. would take on the peacekeeping tasks it did in fact assume. The capacity of the U.N. is the sum of the wills of its members to act together.

Dag Hammarskjold said it well, in remarks which Prime Minister Pearson quoted in his Hammarskjold Memorial Lecture here a month ago:

> The basic policy line for this Organization is that the United Nations simply must respond to those demands which must be made of it . . . the United Nations should respond and should have confidence in its strength and capacity to respond.

Obviously, there is always the question of how much of an administrative load can safely be taken on. Obviously, too, there is the sticky and contentious problem of finance, and the always difficult matter of getting first-rate people capable of doing unprecedented jobs in a fog of controversy and frustration. Obviously, the U.N.'s small operations in Greece, Palestine, and Kashmir helped put it in training to climb what Hammarskjold called "the very steep hill of Suez"; and in turn, the operation in the Gaza Strip served as calisthenics for the Congo, and what was learned in the Congo deeply affected the mandate, the strategy, and the tactics of the Cyprus operation.

Yet, if there is one lesson from the 13 alarms to which the U.N. has responded—14, if we include the very recent unpleasantness on the Cambodian–South Viet-Nam border—the lesson is that each peacekeeping task is unprecedented, that the U.N.'s resources are never fixed or exhaustible, that being busy in one place must not preclude getting busy in another place.

So the measure of the U.N.'s future actions for peace, here and there around the world, is not some predetermined quantum of "capacity to act" but rather the complex circumstances under which the requisite majority of its members can agree to pool their strength and act together for the charter's purposes. This is the real variable in the equation, not the age or the experience of the organization, nor the state of its bank account, nor the level of its current workload.

I have been using the term "requisite majorities." As you know, this may mean, in the General Assembly, a two-thirds majority of members present and voting. In the Security Council it means 7 out of 11 votes, modified by the veto of a permanent member.

These are the technical facts of life about U.N. majorities. But the political facts of life in the U.N., as in other parliamentary bodies, endow equal votes with unequal influence and unequal responsibility for the consequences of inaction. If political agreement can be reached among the most influential members, the tech-

nical majorities are more than likely to be forthcoming.

This does not imply that the strongest members lead the less strong around by the nose—any more than the one-country, one-vote principle subordinates the U.N.'s big-power minority to its small-power majority. It implies, rather, that in a responsible organization the less strong have the realism to know that the U.N. depends upon the stronger members for most of its capacity to act—and the good sense to know that when the most powerful members can agree, the less powerful are protected by that agreement.

All this is to say that the U.N. is a political body, and anybody who has worked in a legislature or a school board or even a student council knows the limitations imposed by the politics of consent.

Guidance for Policy in Southeast Asia

Now, you may well say: Assuming these abstractions are valid, are they relevant? Do they, for example, provide some guidance for policy in Southeast Asia? I am frank to say I do not know.

The essence of the problem in Southeast Asia is all too simple: Ten years ago, at Geneva, the new governments in the area and other countries with traditional interests or new ambitions there, signed a series of agreements to leave their neighbors alone.[2] In those agreements a three-member International Control Commission was to observe and maintain the agreements. Yet, for most of the time since then, the Communists of North Viet-Nam, supported by the Chinese Communists from the north, have systematically committed aggression against Laos and South Viet-Nam, and the peacekeeping commissions have been largely paralyzed by obstruction of their Communist members—despite the valiant efforts of Canadians in all three Control Commissions to make them work. So the problem is how to get the Communists of the area to abide by their agreements—and to develop peacekeeping machinery to make it more difficult for aggressive-minded countries to invade their weaker neighbors by stealth.

In all this the question arises about a possible role for the U.N. This possibility was quite deliberately opened for discussion by Ambassador Adlai Stevenson in the Security Council just 2 weeks ago.[3] The U.N. is, of course, no stranger to the area.

In 1959 the Security Council sent a commission to Laos which had a quieting effect on the situation at that time.

A special representative of the Secretary-General has been at work for some time on the border problems between Cambodia and Thailand, with the welcome approval of both countries.

In 1963 a U.N. commission tested the sentiment of the people of Sabah and Sarawak toward union with Malaysia.

Last year the General Assembly also dispatched a mission of impartial inquiry into alleged violations of human rights in Viet-Nam.

For several years the U.N.'s Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East has been laying development plans for the Lower Mekong Basin, which could affect significantly the future of Cambodia, Viet-Nam, Laos, and Thailand.

And this week and last the Security Council has been occupied with the border issue between Cambodia and Viet-Nam.

What further the U.N. can do there is not today in the realm of knowledge but of guesswork—and mighty complicated guesswork it is. But this is a time of trouble and war in Southeast Asia; and the U.N. was built for trouble—and for peace.

Of one thing, however, we can be sure: The U.N. cannot take our problem off our hands and let us go away and forget it. Maybe more effective international machinery is needed to make sure that the attractive peoples of Southeast Asia are left alone by their more powerful neighbors. But even more certainly, our power and determination are needed to persuade the Communists that it is in their interest to stop

[2] For texts, see *American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents*, vol. I (Department of State publication 6446), p. 750.

[3] For statements made by Ambassador Stevenson in the Security Council on May 21 and 26, see BULLETIN of June 8, 1964, p. 907, and June 15, 1964, p. 937.

aggression, start keeping the promises they made at Geneva in 1954 and 1962, and to accept effective international machinery to assure the independence of their small neighbors.

Dangers of Vague Approval

We who live south of your border share not only your continent but your will to build a United Nations that works. We share with you that devotion to peace, that commitment to human dignity, and that lively interest in other people's economic development which are best expressed for our time in the first few pages of the Charter of the United Nations. But perhaps, where the U.N. is concerned, we both are stalwart but vague.

In the United States the pollsters keep saying that 83 percent to 87 percent of us think the U.N. is a good thing and want to strengthen it. In most constituencies political candidates who seem to be opposed to the U.N. seem to suffer on election day. Even the supposedly controversial plan to buy United Nations bonds went through our House of Representatives by a margin of two to one and through the Senate by a margin of three to one.

But there is practical danger as well as misty encouragement in this universal approbation.

One danger is that a warm feeling about an institution is not a very dependable source of support at moments of crises. I well remember how shocked were some of the U.N.'s most ardent supporters when they found that peacekeeping in the Congo entailed the sacrifice of blood and treasure and that soldiers on a peacekeeping mission sometimes had to shoot back at people who insisted on shooting at the peacekeepers.

We have lived through the Congo, and now the U.N. is in Cyprus. Here we begin to get the hint of a second danger that comes from being stalwart or vague about the U.N. If it were not so serious a matter, we could better appreciate the irony when editorial writers who criticized the U.N. for being forceful in Katanga now demand indignantly that the U.N. teach a forceful lesson to those who resist its mandate in Cyprus. Having decided that it's all right for peacekeepers to shoot, there are those among us who forget that the essence of peacekeeping is that soldiers without enemies use force only with the greatest restraint. And that's one of the hardest kinds of soldiering, as some crack Canadian troops can testify.

Looking ahead, there is a further danger: that vague approval may suddenly, in a moment of crisis, become an unrealistic expectation that the United Nations can take on all of a sudden a task which the requisite majority of its members do not yet feel is theirs to tackle.

And so, as we tell each other over and again that peace depends on an institution called the U.N. to replace the institution of war, we had better note two things about the organization of which so many people so vaguely approve:

First, the U.N. is not a supergovernment but an organization *of* governments. Its decisions are based on the consent of governments, and its actions are that most realistic of art forms, the art of the possible.

Second, the U.N.'s resources are what its members will contribute to a common effort—dues voted by the General Assembly, plus voluntary contributions by its members. These resources are no longer puny—the U.N. system is spending more than half a billion dollars this year.

The U.N. is not yet what our children would call a "big deal." Yet the tasks ahead of us, in the fields described by the charter, are big enough to fill our imaginations to overflowing. Atomic weapons are almost 20 years old, and the problem of their control and proliferation still escapes us. Conflicts between nations—rooted in disputes about territory, economics, ideas, and rivalries of race, religion, and tribe—will be with us as far ahead as we can see—and farther than that.

This is to say that the conditions which have historically made for war persist in a world in which major war is historically finished—or had better be, else civilization is finished. In this world, with 20 million men under arms and annual military budgets of $120 billion, the peace turns more and more frequently on the prompt availability of a few thousand men or a few million dollars for international peacekeeping.

There is something almost obscene in this disproportion. No one who considers it soberly

for a moment can seriously conclude that the limit to international peacekeeping really is a shortage of money or manpower.

The more and the sooner we develop the capacity of the nations to act together under the charter, the more and better chance we and our children will have to reach those "better standards . . . in larger freedom" that are the promise of the charter. Our actions together had better contain the dangers we share—for we all have to be brothers whether we like it or not.

Governor of Hawaii Confers on East-West Center

Press release 266 dated June 3

Gov. John A. Burns of Hawaii, chairman-designate of the proposed National Review Board of the East-West Center in Honolulu, met in Washington on June 3 with Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs Lucius D. Battle and Roy E. Larsen of Time, Inc., to discuss implementation of the recently completed Larsen-Davis survey of the East-West Center. This report was tendered in early May to the President, who accepted its recommendations in principle and sent it on to the Secretary of State for action on May 6.

The survey of the East-West Center was undertaken last fall by the United States Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs at the request of Assistant Secretary Battle. Mr. Larsen, in his capacity as vice chairman of the Advisory Commission, was assisted by James M. Davis, then director of the International Center of the University of Michigan.

During its survey, the Larsen-Davis team interviewed more than 150 persons and studied at firsthand the operations of the Center, which was established by Congress in 1960 to promote understanding among the peoples of Asia, the Pacific area, and the United States. Known formally as the Center for Cultural and Technical Interchange Between East and West, it is located at the University of Hawaii, Honolulu, and presently operates programs for more than 700 students, scholars, and trainees from 26 countries.

The report included a number of recommendations which are currently under favorable consideration by the Government. Among these is the establishment of a National Review Board, composed of leaders in civic, educational, and business life to represent the national interest in the Center. While the size and composition of this body have not been decided upon, the President in releasing the report designated Governor Burns to be its chairman.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

88th Congress, 2d Session

Foreign Service Annuity Adjustment Act of 1964. Hearings before the Subcommittee on State Department Organization and Foreign Operations of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on S. 745 and H.R. 10485. March 9–18, 1964. 45 pp.

East-West Trade. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Part I. March 13–April 9, 1964. 362 pp.

Foreign Assistance Act of 1964. Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 10302, a bill to amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and for other purposes. Part IV, April 16–22, 1964, 173 pp.; Part V, April 23–27, 1964, 105 pp.; Part VI, Apr. 29–May 4, 1964, 205 pp.

Implementation of the Humphrey Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Second annual report to the Congress (fiscal year 1963) prepared by the Agency for International Development, Department of State. S. Doc. 65. April 16, 1964. 47 pp.

Economic Policies and Practices: Paper No. 4, Private Trade Barriers and the Atlantic Community. Materials prepared for the Joint Economic Committee. Undated. 42 pp. [Joint Committee print]

Economic Policies and Practices: Paper No. 5, Unemployment Programs in Sweden. Materials prepared for the Joint Economic Committee. April 22, 1964. 51 pp. [Joint Committee print]

Ideological Operations and Foreign Policy. Report No. 2 on Winning the Cold War: The U.S. Ideological Offensive, made by the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. H. Rept. 1352. April 27, 1964. 19 pp.

Prohibition of Foreign Fishing Vessels in the Territorial Waters of the United States. Report to accompany S. 1988. H. Rept. 1356. April 28, 1964. 20 pp.

Protecting Heads of Foreign States. Report to accompany H.R. 7651. H. Rept. 1360. April 28, 1964. 8 pp.

Trading With the Enemy Act. Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee made by its Subcommittee To Examine and Review the Administration of the Trading With the Enemy Act and the War Claims Act of 1948, together with individual views. S. Rept. 1014. April 30, 1964. 6 pp.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

United States Delegations to International Conferences

ECE Committee on Housing, Building and Planning

The Department of State announced on June 1 (press release 260) that Robert C. Weaver, Administrator of the Housing and Home Finance Agency, would be the U.S. representative at the 25th session of the Committee on Housing, Building and Planning of the Economic Commission for Europe at Washington June 2–5. Mr. Weaver's alternate will be James A. Moore, Assistant Administrator of the Housing and Home Finance Agency. Advisers will be Roy J. Burroughs, Housing and Home Finance Agency; Burl Johnson, chairman of the International Committee of the National Association of Home Builders; Roland Sawyer, housing consultant of the United Steel Workers of America; and George Tesoro of the United States Mission to the European Office of the United Nations, Geneva.

The Committee on Housing, Building and Planning, one of 10 major committees of the ECE, advises the Commission on housing problems and acts as a clearinghouse for housing information.

The following countries were invited by the Commission to participate in the meeting: Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelorussian S.S.R., Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukrainian S.S.R., United Kingdom, United States, U.S.S.R., and Yugoslavia. In addition, the Commission invited interested specialized agencies of the United Nations and international nongovernmental organizations to attend. Other countries also attend from time to time in a consultative capacity.

Following the conference, approximately 45 to 50 delegates will tour various American cities to observe U.S. progress in meeting housing and urban renewal problems. The tour was arranged by the Housing and Home Finance Agency in collaboration with professional, business, and civic groups and housing authorities throughout the country, and the Governmental Affairs Institute. Funds to help finance the tour were provided by the Ford Foundation. The tour will begin with orientation meetings at Washington and proceed to Chicago, Lafayette, Ind., Cleveland, Philadelphia, New York, and New Haven, Conn.

International Cotton Advisory Committee

The Department of State announced on May 28 (press release 259) that the U.S. Government would be represented by the following delegation at the 23d plenary meeting of the International Cotton Advisory Committee (ICAC) at Frankfurt, Germany, June 1–10.

Delegate

Horace D. Godfrey, Administrator, Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service, Department of Agriculture

Alternate Delegates

Stanley Nehmer, deputy director, Office of International Resources, Department of State

Robert C. Sherman, director, Cotton Division, Foreign Agricultural Service, Department of Agriculture

Government Advisers

Paul G. Minneman, agricultural attaché, American Embassy, Bonn

Joseph A. Moss, director, Cotton Policy Staff, Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service, Department of Agriculture

Claus W. Ruser, chief, Fibers and Textiles Division, Office of International Resources, Department of State

Joseph H. Stevenson, agricultural economist, Cotton Division, Foreign Agricultural Service, Department of Agriculture

Arthur C. Tendler, assistant to director, Office of Textiles, Business Defense Services Administration, Department of Commerce

Billy M. Waddle, chief, Cotton and Cordage Fibers Research Branch, Agricultural Research Service, Department of Agriculture

Industry Advisers

Eric Catmur, Geo. H. McFadden & Bro., Inc., Memphis, Tenn.

George C. Cortright, Rolling Fork, Miss.

Read P. Dunn, Jr., executive director, Cotton Council International, Brussels, Belgium

Robert C. Jackson, executive vice president, American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc., Washington, D.C.

W. Gordon McCabe, Jr., J. P. Stevens & Company, Greenville, S.C.

F. Marion Rhodes, president, New York Cotton Exchange, Washington, D.C.

The function of the ICAC is to assemble and analyze data on world cotton production, consumption, trade stocks, and prices and to observe and keep in close touch with developments in the world cotton market.

Forty governments are members of the ICAC. They account for over 90 percent of free production and consumption of cotton.

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.

Security Council

Report by the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the functioning of the United Nations Yemen Observation Mission and the implementation of the terms of disengagement covering the period from 3 January to 3 March 1964. S/5572. March 3, 1964. 4 pp.

Letter dated March 4, 1964, from the Secretary General of the Organization of American States addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations transmitting a copy of an OAS report on accusations made by Venezuela against Cuba. S/5586. March 9, 1964. 112 pp.

Report by the Secretary-General on the question of military disengagement in the Congo. S/5428/Add. 2. March 16, 1964. 3 pp.

Reports, letters, and notes on the Cyprus dispute. S/5593/Add. 2, March 17, 1964, 1 p.; S/5634 and Corr. 1, March 31, 1964, 19 pp.; S/5653, April 11, 1964, 6 pp.; S/5671 and Corr. 1, April 29, 1964, 11 pp.; S/5679, May 2, 1964, 7 pp.; S/5691, May 11, 1964, 1 p.; S/5715, May 25, 1964, 3 pp.; S/5719, May 26, 1964, 2 pp.; S/5720, May 26, 1964, 2 pp.; S/5721, May 27, 1964, 4 pp.; S/5726, May 29, 1964, 2 pp.

Reports of the Special Committee on the Policies of *Apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa. S/5621, March 25, 1964, 88 pp.; S/5717, May 25, 1964, 70 pp.

Report by the Secretary-General in pursuance of the Resolution Adopted by the Security Council at its 1078th Meeting on December 4, 1963 (S/5471), concerning apartheid in South Africa. S/5658, April 20, 1964. 43 pp.; and Add. 1, April 21, 1964, 24 pp.

Letter dated May 22, 1964, from the permanent representative of South Africa addressed to the President of the Security Council concerning Council consideration of the "serious situation existing in South Africa." S/5723. May 28, 1964. 14 pp.

Letters on the Cambodia complaint against the Republic of Viet-Nam. S/5666, April 22, 1964, 97 pp.; S/5697, May 13, 1964, 3 pp.; S/5709, May 18, 1964, 2 pp.

Letter dated May 25 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council transmitting the text of a resolution on the question of South West Africa adopted by the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples at its 262d meeting. S/5722. May 27, 1964. 3 pp.

Report by the Secretary-General in pursuance of the resolution adopted by the Security Council at its 1083d meeting on December 11, 1963, (S/5481), concerning territories under Portuguese administration. S/5727. May 29, 1964. 3 pp.

General Assembly

Depositary Practice in Relation to Reservations. Report of the Secretary-General. A/5687. January 29, 1964. 113 pp.

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Information on space launchings: letter dated February 19 from the U.S. representative, A/AC.105/INF.58, February 27, 1964, 2 pp.; letter dated February 20 from the U.S.S.R. representative, A/AC.105/INF.59, February 26, 1964, 2 pp.

Question of South-West Africa. Note by the Secretary-General. A/5690. February 28, 1964. 7 pp.

Economic and Social Council

Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. Report of the Ministerial Conference on Asian Economic Co-Operation. E/CN.11/641. January 6, 1964. 188 pp.

Annual Report of the Committee for Co-Ordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin to the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East for the period ending January 13, 1964. A/CN.11/646. January 16, 1964. 67 pp.

Report of the Governing Council of the Asian Institute for Economic Development and Planning to the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. E/CN.11/650. January 29, 1964. 16 pp.

Report of the Committee on Trade (7th session) to the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (20th session). E/CN.11/648. January 30, 1964. 36 pp.

Economic Commission for Africa:

African Timber Trends and Prospects. Preliminary Report on Western Africa and Equatorial East Africa. E/CN.14/272. January 14, 1964. 212 pp.

Implementation in Africa of United Nations Resolutions on Land Reform With Special Reference to ECA. E/CN.14/278. January 29, 1964. 51 pp.

Report on the Preparation of an African Telecommunication Network. E/CN.14/249. January 29, 1964. 23 pp.

Fertilizers in Africa. E/CN.14/271. January 30, 1964. 26 pp.

The Role of Patents in the Transfer of Technology to Under-Developed Countries. Report by the Secretary-General. E/3861. March 9, 1964. 179 pp.

Co-ordination of Technical Assistance Activities. Report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee established under Council Resolution 851. E/3862. March 10, 1964. 24 pp.

United States and Soviet Union Sign Consular Convention

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON, MAY 27

White House press release dated May 27

We have just concluded negotiations with the Soviet Union on a consular convention. The agreement will be signed in Moscow on June 1. I have authorized Ambassador [Foy D.] Kohler to sign for the United States. I understand Soviet Foreign Minister [Andrei A.] Gromyko will be signing for the Soviet Union.

This treaty, which I will submit to the Senate for its advice and consent, is a significant step in our continuing efforts to increase contacts and understanding between the American people and the peoples of the Soviet Union. It will make possible improved consular services in both countries. American citizens visiting the Soviet Union, either as tourists or for business reasons, will have available to them a greater degree of consular protection than ever before. For example, Americans detained in the Soviet Union for any reasons will be assured of access without delay to American consular officials. American businessmen and shipping companies will be able to call on U.S. consular services to assist in representing their interests. And the mechanics for dealing with a whole range of legal problems from complicated questions of inheritance to simply notary services will be considerably eased.

It is my hope that this treaty—the first bilateral treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union—will be a step forward in developing understanding between our two countries, which is so important in the continuing struggle for peace.

TEXT OF CONVENTION, SIGNED JUNE 1

Press release 262 dated June 1, as corrected

CONSULAR CONVENTION

BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

Desiring to cooperate in strengthening friendly relations and to regulate consular relations between both states,

Have decided to conclude a consular convention and for this purpose have agreed on the following:

DEFINITIONS

ARTICLE 1

For the purpose of the present Convention, the terms introduced hereunder have the following meaning:

1) "Consular establishment"—means any consulate general, consulate, vice consulate or consular agency;

2) "Consular district"—means the area assigned to a consular establishment for the exercise of consular functions;

3) "Head of consular establishment"—means a consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent directing the consular establishment;

4) "Consular officer"—means any person, including the head of the consular establishment, entrusted with the exercise of consular functions. Also included in the definition of "consular officer" are persons assigned to the consular establishment for training in the consular service.

5) "Employee of the consular establishment"—

means any person performing administrative, technical, or service functions in a consular establishment.

OPENING OF CONSULAR ESTABLISHMENTS, APPOINTMENT OF CONSULAR OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES

Article 2

1. A consular establishment may be opened in the territory of the receiving state only with that state's consent.

2. The location of a consular establishment and the limits of its consular district will be determined by agreement between the sending and receiving states.

3. Prior to the appointment of a head of a consular establishment, the sending state shall obtain the approval of the receiving state to such an appointment through diplomatic channels.

4. The diplomatic mission of the sending state shall transmit to the foreign affairs ministry of the receiving state a consular commission which shall contain the full name of the head of the consular establishment, his citizenship, his class, the consular district assigned to him, and the seat of the consular establishment.

5. A head of a consular establishment may enter upon the exercise of his duties only after having been recognized in this capacity by the receiving state. Such recognition after the presentation of the commission shall be in the form of an exequatur or in another form and shall be free of charge.

6. The full name, function and class of all consular officers other than the head of a consular establishment, and the full name and function of employees of the consular establishment shall be notified in advance by the sending state to the receiving state.

The receiving state shall issue to each consular officer an appropriate document confirming his right to carry out consular functions in the territory of the receiving state.

7. The receiving state may at any time, and without having to explain its decision, notify the sending state through diplomatic channels that any consular officer is persona non grata or that any employee of the consular establishment is unacceptable. In such a case the sending state shall accordingly recall such officer or employee of the consular establishment. If the sending state refuses or fails within a reasonable time to carry out its obligations under the present paragraph, the receiving state may refuse to recognize the officer or employee concerned as a member of the consular establishment.

8. With the exception of members of the staff of the diplomatic mission of the sending state, as defined in paragraph c of Article 1 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, no national of the sending state already present in the receiving state or in transit thereto may be appointed as a consular officer or employee of the consular establishment.

Article 3

Consular officers may be nationals only of the sending state.

Article 4

The receiving state shall take the necessary measures in order that a consular officer may carry out his duties and enjoy the rights, privileges, and immunities provided for in the present Convention and by the laws of the receiving state.

Article 5

1. The receiving state shall either facilitate the acquisition on its territory, in accordance with its laws and regulations, by the sending state of premises necessary for its consular establishment or assist the latter in obtaining accommodation in some other way.

2. It shall also, where necessary, assist the sending state in obtaining suitable accommodation for the personnel of its consular establishment.

Article 6

1. If the head of the consular establishment cannot carry out his functions or if the position of head of a consular establishment is vacant, the sending state may empower a consular officer of the same or another consular establishment, or one of the members of the diplomatic staff of its diplomatic mission in the receiving state, to act temporarily as head of the consular establishment. The full name of this person must be transmitted in advance to the foreign affairs ministry of the receiving state.

2. A person empowered to act as temporary head of the consular establishment shall enjoy the rights, privileges and immunities of the head of the consular establishment.

3. When, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of the present Article, a member of the diplomatic staff of the diplomatic mission of the sending state in the receiving state is designated by the sending state as an acting head of the consular establishment, he shall continue to enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities.

CONSULAR FUNCTIONS

Article 7

A consular officer shall be entitled within his consular district to perform the following functions, and for this purpose may apply orally or in writing to the competent authorities of the consular district:

1) To protect the rights and interests of the sending state and its nationals, both individuals and bodies corporate;

2) To further the development of commercial, economic, cultural and scientific relations between the sending state and the receiving state and otherwise promote the development of friendly relations between them;

3) To register nationals of the sending state, to issue or amend passports and other certificates of identity, and also to issue entry, exit, and transit visas;

4) To draw up and record certificates of birth and death of citizens of the sending state taking place in the receiving state, to record marriages and divorces, if both persons entering into marriage or divorce are citizens of the sending state, and also to receive such declarations pertaining to family relationships of a national of the sending state as may be required under the law of the sending state, unless prohibited by the laws of the receiving state;

5) To draw up, certify, attest, authenticate, legalize and take other actions which might be necessary to validate any act or document of a legal character, as well as copies thereof, including commercial documents, declarations, registrations, testamentary dispositions, and contracts, upon the application of a national of the sending state, when such document is intended for use outside the territory of the receiving state, and also for any person, when such document is intended for use in the territory of the sending state;

6) To translate any acts and documents into the English and Russian languages and to certify to the accuracy of the translations;

7) To perform other official consular functions entrusted to him by the sending state if they are not contrary to the laws of the receiving state.

ARTICLE 8

1. The acts and documents specified in paragraph 5 of Article 7 of the present Convention which are drawn up or certified by the consular officer with his official seal affixed, as well as copies, extracts, and translations of such acts and documents certified by him with his official seal affixed, shall be receivable in evidence in the receiving state as official or officially certified acts, documents, copies, translations, or extracts, and shall have the same force and effect as though they were drawn up or certified by the competent authorities or officials of the receiving state; provided that such documents shall have been drawn and executed in conformity with the laws and regulations of the country where they are designed to take effect.

2. The acts, documents, copies, translations, or extracts, enumerated in paragraph 1 of the present Article shall be authenticated if required by the laws of the receiving state when they are presented to the authorities of the receiving state.

ARTICLE 9

If the relevant information is available to the competent authorities of the receiving state, such authorities shall inform the consular establishment of the death of a national of the sending state.

ARTICLE 10

1. In the case of the death of a national of the sending state in the territory of the receiving state, without leaving in the territory of his decease any known heir or testamentary executor, the appropriate local authorities of the receiving state shall as promptly as possible inform a consular officer of the sending state.

2. A consular officer of the sending state may, within the discretion of the appropriate judicial authorities and if permissible under then existing applicable local law in the receiving state:

a) take provisional custody of the personal property left by a deceased national of the sending state, provided that the decedent shall have left in the receiving state no heir or testamentary executor appointed by the decedent to take care of his personal estate; provided that such provisional custody shall be relinquished to a duly appointed administrator;

b) administer the estate of a deceased national of the sending state who is not a resident of the receiving state at the time of his death, who leaves no testamentary executor, and who leaves in the receiving state no heir, provided that if authorized to administer the estate, the consular officer shall relinquish such administration upon the appointment of another administrator;

c) represent the interests of a national of the sending state in an estate in the receiving state, provided that such national is not a resident of the receiving state, unless or until such national is otherwise represented: provided, however, that nothing herein shall authorize a consular officer to act as an attorney at law.

3. Unless prohibited by law, a consular officer may, within the discretion of the court, agency, or person making distribution, receive for transmission to a national of the sending state who is not a resident of the receiving state any money or property to which such national is entitled as a consequence of the death of another person, including shares in an estate, payments made pursuant to workmen's compensation laws, pension and social benefits systems in general, and proceeds of insurance policies.

The court, agency, or person making distribution may require that a consular officer comply with conditions laid down with regard to: (a) presenting a power of attorney or other authorization from such non-resident national, (b) furnishing reasonable evidence of the receipt of such money or property by such national, and (c) returning the money or property in the event he is unable to furnish such evidence.

4. Whenever a consular officer shall perform the functions referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article, he shall be subject, with respect to the exercise of such functions, to the laws of the receiving state and to the civil jurisdiction of the judicial and administrative authorities of the receiving state in the same manner and to the same extent as a national of the receiving state.

ARTICLE 11

A consular officer may recommend to the courts or to

other competent authorities of the receiving state appropriate persons to act in the capacity of guardians or trustees for citizens of the sending state or for the property of such citizens when this property is left without supervision.

In the event that the court or competent authorities consider that the recommended candidate is for some reason unacceptable, the consular officer may propose a new candidate.

ARTICLE 12

1. A consular officer shall have the right within his district to meet with, communicate with, assist, and advise any national of the sending state and, where necessary, arrange for legal assistance for him. The receiving state shall in no way restrict the access of nationals of the sending state to its consular establishments.

2. The appropriate authorities of the receiving state shall immediately inform a consular officer of the sending state about the arrest or detention in other form of a national of the sending state.

3. A consular officer of the sending state shall have the right without delay to visit and communicate with a national of the sending state who is under arrest or otherwise detained in custody or is serving a sentence of imprisonment. The rights referred to in this paragraph shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving state, subject to the proviso, however, that the said laws and regulations must not nullify these rights.

ARTICLE 13

1. A consular officer may provide aid and assistance to vessels sailing under the flag of the sending state which have entered a port in his consular district.

2. Without prejudice to the powers of the receiving state, a consular officer may conduct investigations into any incidents which occurred during the voyage on vessels sailing under the flag of the sending state, and may settle disputes of any kind between the master, the officers and the seamen insofar as this may be authorized by the laws of the sending state. A consular officer may request the assistance of the competent authorities of the receiving state in the performance of such duties.

3. In the event that the courts or other competent authorities of the receiving state intend to take any coercive action on vessels sailing under the flag of the sending state while they are located in the waters of the receiving state, the competent authorities of the receiving state shall, unless it is impractical to do so in view of the urgency of the matter, inform a consular officer of the sending state prior to initiating such action so that the consular officer may be present when the action is taken. Whenever it is impractical to notify a consular officer in advance, the competent authorities of the receiving state shall inform him as soon as possible thereafter of the action taken.

4. Paragraph 3 of this Article shall not apply to customs, passport, and sanitary inspections, or to action taken at the request or with the approval of the master of the vessel.

5. The term "vessel", as used in the present Convention, does not include warships.

ARTICLE 14

If a vessel sailing under the flag of the sending state suffers shipwreck, runs aground, is swept ashore, or suffers any other accident whatever within the territorial limits of the receiving state, the competent authorities of the receiving state shall immediately inform a consular officer and advise him of the measures which they have taken to rescue persons, vessel, and cargo.

The consular officer may provide all kinds of assistance to such a vessel, the members of its crew, and its passengers, as well as take measures in connection with the preservation of the cargo and repair of the ship, or he may request the authorities of the receiving state to take such measures.

The competent authorities of the receiving state shall render the necessary assistance to the consular officer in measures taken by him in connection with the accident to the vessel.

No customs duties shall be levied against a wrecked vessel, its cargo or stores, in the territory of the receiving state, unless they are delivered for use in that state.

If the owner or anyone authorized to act for him is unable to make necessary arrangements in connection with the vessel or its cargo, the consular officer may make such arrangements. The consular officer may under similar circumstances make arrangements in connection with cargo owned by the sending state or any of its nationals and found or brought into port from a wrecked vessel sailing under the flag of any state except a vessel of the receiving state.

ARTICLE 15

Articles 13 and 14, respectively, shall also apply to aircraft.

RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES

ARTICLE 16

The national flag of the sending state and the consular flag may be flown at the consular establishment, at the residence of the head of the consular establishment, and on his means of transport used by him in the performance of his official duties. The shield with the national coat-of-arms of the sending state and the name of the establishment may also be affixed on the building in which the consular establishment is located.

ARTICLE 17

The consular archives shall be inviolable at all times and wherever they may be. Unofficial papers shall not be kept in the consular archives.

The buildings or parts of buildings and the land ancillary thereto, used for the purposes of the consular establishment and the residence of the head of the consular establishment, shall be inviolable.

The police and other authorities of the receiving state may not enter the building or that part of the building which is used for the purposes of the consular establishment or the residence of the head of the consular establishment without the consent of the head thereof, persons appointed by him, or the head of the diplomatic mission of the sending state.

ARTICLE 18

1. The consular establishment shall have the right to communicate with its Government, with the diplomatic mission and the consular establishments of the sending state in the receiving state, or with other diplomatic missions and consular establishments of the sending state, making use of all ordinary means of communication. In such communications, the consular establishment shall have the right to use code, diplomatic couriers, and the diplomatic pouch. The same fees shall apply to consular establishments in the use of ordinary means of communication as apply to the diplomatic mission of the sending state.

2. The official correspondence of a consular establishment, regardless of what means of communication are used, and the sealed diplomatic pouch bearing visible external marks of its official character, shall be inviolable and not subject to examination or detention by the authorities of the receiving state.

ARTICLE 19

1. Consular officers shall not be subject to the jurisdiction of the receiving state in matters relating to their official activity. The same applies to employees of the consular establishment, if they are nationals of the sending state.

2. Consular officers and employees of the consular establishment who are nationals of the sending state shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state.

3. This immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state of consular officers and employees of the consular establishment of the sending state may be waived by the sending state. Waiver must always be express.

ARTICLE 20

1. Consular officers and employees of the consular establishment, on the invitation of a court of the receiving state, shall appear in court for witness testimony. Taking measures to compel a consular officer or an employee of the consular establishment who is a national of the sending state to appear in court as a witness and to give witness testimony is not permissible.

2. If a consular officer or an employee of the consular establishment who is a national of the sending state for official reasons or for reasons considered valid according to the laws of the receiving state cannot appear in court, he shall inform the court thereof and give witness testimony on the premises of the consular establishment or in his own abode.

3. Whenever under the laws of the receiving state an oath is required to be taken in court by consular officers and employees of the consular establishment, an affirmation shall be accepted in lieu thereof.

4. Consular officers and employees of the consular establishment may refuse to give witness testimony on facts relating to their official activity.

5. The provisions of paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4 shall also apply to proceedings conducted by administrative authorities.

ARTICLE 21

1. Immovable property, situated in the territory of the receiving state, of which the sending state or one or more persons acting in its behalf is the owner or lessee and which is used for diplomatic or consular purposes, including residences for personnel attached to the diplomatic and consular establishments, shall be exempt from taxation of any kind imposed by the receiving state or any of its states or local governments other than such as represent payments for specific services rendered.

2. The exemption from taxation referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall not apply to such charges, duties, and taxes if, under the law of the receiving state, they are payable by the person who contracted with the sending state or with the person acting on its behalf.

ARTICLE 22

A consular officer or employee of a consular establishment, who is not a national of the receiving state and who does not have the status in the receiving state of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, shall be exempt from the payment of all taxes or similar charges of any kind imposed by the receiving state or any of its states or local governments on official emoluments, salaries, wages, or allowances received by such officer or employee from the sending state in connection with the discharge of his official functions.

ARTICLE 23

1. A consular officer or employee of a consular establishment who is not a national of the receiving state and who does not have the status in the receiving state of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, shall, except as provided in paragraph 2 of this Article, be exempt from the payment of all taxes or similar charges of any kind imposed by the receiving state or any of its states or local governments, for the payment of which the officer or employee of the consular establishment would otherwise be legally liable.

2. The exemption from taxes or charges provided in paragraph 1 of this Article does not apply in respect to taxes or charges upon:

a) The acquisition or possession of private immovable property located in the receiving state if the persons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article do not own or lease this property on the behalf of the sending state for the purposes of the consular establishment;

b) Income received from sources in the receiving state other than as described in Article 22 of the present Convention;

c) The transfer by gift of property in the receiving state;

d) The transfer at death, including by inheritance, of property in the receiving state.

3. However, the exemption from taxes or similar charges provided in paragraph 1 of this Article, applies in respect to movable inherited property left after the death of a consular officer or employee of the consular establishment or a member of his family residing with him if they are not nationals of the receiving state or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence, and if the property was located in the receiving state exclusively in connection with the sojourn in this state of the deceased as a consular officer or employee of the consular establishment or member of his family residing with him.

ARTICLE 24

A consular officer or employee of a consular establishment and members of his family residing with him who are not nationals of the receiving state and who do not have the status in the receiving state of aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence, shall be exempt in the receiving state from service in the armed forces and from all other types of compulsory service.

ARTICLE 25

A consular officer or employee of a consular establishment and members of his family residing with him who do not have the status in the receiving state of aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence, shall be exempt from all obligations under the laws and regulations of the receiving state with regard to the registration of aliens, and obtaining permission to reside, and from compliance with other similar requirements applicable to aliens.

ARTICLE 26

1. The same full exemption from customs duties and internal revenue or other taxes imposed upon or by reason of importation shall apply in the receiving state to all articles, including motor vehicles, imported exclusively for the official use of a consular establishment, as applies to articles imported for the official use of the diplomatic mission of the sending state.

2. Consular officers, and employees of the consular establishment, and members of their families residing with them, who are not nationals of the receiving state, and who do not have the status in the receiving state of aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence, shall be granted, on the basis of reciprocity, the same exemptions from customs duties and internal revenue or other taxes imposed upon or by reason of importation, as are granted to corresponding personnel of the diplomatic mission of the sending state.

3. For the purpose of paragraph 2 of this Article the term "corresponding personnel of the diplomatic mission" refers to members of the diplomatic staff in the case of consular officers, and to members of the administrative and technical staff in the case of employees of a consular establishment.

ARTICLE 27

Subject to the laws and regulations of the receiving state concerning zones entry into which is prohibited or regulated for reasons of national security, a consular officer shall be permitted to travel freely within the limits of his consular district to carry out his official duties.

ARTICLE 28

Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, it is the duty of all persons enjoying such privileges and immunities to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving state, including traffic regulations.

ARTICLE 29

1. The rights and obligations of consular officers provided for in the present Convention also apply to members of the diplomatic staff of the diplomatic mission of the Contracting Parties charged with the performance of consular functions in the diplomatic mission and who have been notified in a consular capacity to the foreign affairs ministry of the receiving state by the diplomatic mission.

2. Except as provided in paragraph 4 of Article 10 of the present Convention, the performance of consular functions by the persons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall not affect the diplomatic privileges and immunities granted to them as members of the diplomatic mission.

FINAL PROVISIONS

ARTICLE 30

1. The present Convention shall be subject to ratification and shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the exchange of instruments of ratification, which shall take place in Washington as soon as possible.

2. The Convention shall remain in force until six months from the date on which one of the Contracting Parties informs the other Contracting Party of its desire to terminate its validity.

In witness whereof the Plenipotentiaries of the two Contracting Parties have signed the present Convention and affixed their seals thereto.

Done in Moscow on June 1, 1964 in two copies, each in the English and the Russian language, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America

FOY D. KOHLER
Ambassador of the United States of America to the USSR

For the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

A. GROMYKO
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

PROTOCOL

To the Consular Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

1. It is agreed between the Contracting Parties that the notification of a consular officer of the arrest or detention in other form of a national of the sending state specified in paragraph 2 of Article 12 of the Consular Convention between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of June 1, 1964, shall take place within one to three days from the time of arrest or detention depending on conditions of communication.

2. It is agreed between the Contracting Parties that the rights specified in paragraph 3 of Article 12 of the Consular Convention of a consular officer to visit and communicate with a national of the sending state who is under arrest or otherwise detained in custody shall be accorded within two to four days of the arrest or detention of such national depending upon his location.

3. It is agreed between the Contracting Parties that the rights specified in paragraph 3 of Article 12 of the Consular Convention of a consular officer to visit and communicate with a national of the sending state who is under arrest or otherwise detained in custody or is serving a sentence of imprisonment shall be accorded on a continuing basis.

The present Protocol constitutes an integral part of the Consular Convention between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of June 1, 1964.

Done at Moscow on June 1, 1964 in two copies, each in the English and the Russian language, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America

FOY D. KOHLER
Ambassador of the United States of America to the USSR

For the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

A. GROMYKO
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Narcotic Drugs

Protocol bringing under international control drugs outside the scope of the convention limiting the manufacture and regulating the distribution of narcotic drugs concluded at Geneva July 13, 1931 (48 Stat. 1543), as amended (61 Stat. 2230; 62 Stat. 1796). Done at Paris November 19, 1948. Entered into force for the United States September 11, 1950. TIAS 2308.
Notification received that it considers itself bound: Rwanda, April 30, 1964.

Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Done at Moscow August 5, 1963. Entered into force October 10, 1963. TIAS 5433.
Ratifications deposited: Senegal, June 2, 1964; Syrian Arab Republic, June 1, 1964.

BILATERAL

Japan

Agreement providing economic and technical assistance to promote the economic development of the Ryukyu Islands, with agreed minutes. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo April 25, 1964. Entered into force April 25, 1964.

Korea

Petroleum agreement of 1964, with agreed minutes. Signed at Seoul May 12, 1964. Enters into force 90 days after notification by Korea that it has ratified the agreement.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Appointments

Donald L. Fuller as scientific attaché at New Delhi, India, effective May 25. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 265 dated June 3.)

PUBLICATIONS

Department Publishes Foreign Relations Volume on Europe for 1943

Press release 267 dated June 4, for release June 12

The Department of State on June 12 released *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, Volume II, Europe*, the sixth volume published in the series for that year. The volume contains documentation on the wartime relations of the United States with most of the friendly or neutral governments of Western Europe. The relations of the United States with Great Britain and the British Commonwealth and with the govern-

ments of Eastern Europe in 1943 are covered in volume III, previously published.

Of special importance and interest are the compilations, among others, relating to the overthrow of the Fascist regime in Italy and the emergence of Italy as a cobelligerent; the efforts of the United States to assure the maintenance of Spain's neutrality; American concern over the disunity among Yugoslav resistance forces; attempts to reduce and divert the volume of trade between the Axis Powers and the European neutrals; and the political problems attendant upon the successful military operations in North Africa.

Copies of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, Volume II, Europe* (vii, 1,069 pp.; publication 7679) may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402, for $3.75 each.

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Office of Media Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agreement with Ireland, amending the agreement of March 16, 1956, as amended. Signed at Washington August 7, 1963. Entered into force January 10, 1964. TIAS 5511. 2 pp. 5¢.

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with the Somali Republic. Exchange of notes—Signed at Mogadiscio November 27, 1962 and January 8, 1964. Entered into force January 8, 1964. TIAS 5512. 4 pp. 5¢.

Aviation—Transport Services. Agreement with Mexico, extending the agreement of August 15, 1960. Exchange of notes—Signed at México August 14, 1963. Entered into force provisionally August 15, 1963. Entered into force definitively January 6, 1964. TIAS 5513. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Viet-Nam—Signed at Saigon January 9, 1964. Entered into force January 9, 1964. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5514. 8 pp. 10¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Poland—Signed at Washington February 3, 1964. Entered into force February 3, 1964. With exchanges of notes. TIAS 5516. 19 pp. 15¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Poland—Signed at Washington February 3, 1964. Entered into force February 3, 1964. With exchanges of notes. TIAS 5517. 19 pp. 15¢.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: June 1–7

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Release issued prior to June 1 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 259 of May 28.

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260	6/1	U.S. delegation to ECE Committee on Housing, Building and Planning (rewrite).
*261	6/1	U.S. participation in international conferences.
262	6/1	Consular convention with the U.S.S.R.
263	6/1	Joint communique on U.S.-Rumanian talks (printed in BULLETIN of June 15).
264	6/2	Stevenson: Woman's National Democratic Club.
*265	6/3	Fuller appointed scientific attaché, New Delhi (biographic details).
266	6/3	Governor of Hawaii confers on East-West Center.
267	6/4	*Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, Volume II, Europe* published.
†268	6/5	Mann: "The Democratic Ideal in Our Latin American Policy."
269	6/4	Rostow: "On Working With History."
270	6/5	Cleveland: "Member of the Parish."
271	6/7	Rusk: "The National Interest—1964."

*Not printed.
†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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U.S. Policy Toward Cuba

This 22-page pamphlet, based on an address by Under Secretary George W. Ball at Roanoke, Va., on April 23, 1964, places Castro communism and United States policy toward it in perspective by evaluating the threat of Castro and the present Cuban regime, by defining the two principal lines of United States strategy in dealing with this menace, and by discussing the effectiveness of these policies.

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505.5

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Vol. L, No. 1305

June 29, 1964

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Building a Great World Society

Address by President Johnson [1]

Last year, within 6 months of each other, two of the great men of this century passed from this earth: President John F. Kennedy and Pope John XXIII. They both left a world transformed by their triumphs and lessened by their leaving. They both handed on a heritage of hope, a vision of the future which will occupy the thoughts and labors of men for generations yet to come.

For a generation, Americans have struggled to keep the ambitions of nations from erupting into the annihilation of nuclear war. We have struggled to diminish hostility and to decrease tension, while battling aggression and building our power. The years will not dim, nor the burdens destroy, our resolve to seek and not to yield, to find a way to peace in a world where freedom grows.

But even if we achieve such a world, we will only have taken a first step toward final fulfillment of the hopes of Pope John and President Kennedy. For just as the cold war has consumed our energies, it has often limited our horizons. We have tended to place every challenge in the context of conflict, to regard every difficulty as part of a struggle for domination.

Even if we end terror and even if we eliminate tension, even if we reduce arms and restrict conflict, even if peace were to come to the nations, we would turn from this struggle only to find ourselves on a new battleground as filled with danger and as fraught with difficulty as any ever faced by man. For many of our most urgent problems do not spring from the cold war or even from ambitions of our adversaries.

These are the problems which will persist beyond the cold war. They are the ominous obstacles to man's effort to build a great world society--a place where every man can find a life free from hunger and disease, a life offering the chance to seek spiritual fulfillment unhampered by the degradation of bodily misery.

[1] Made at commencement exercises at the College of the Holy Cross, Worcester, Mass., on June 10 (White House press release; as-delivered text).

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. L, NO. 1305 PUBLICATION 7704 JUNE 29, 1964

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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These long years of conflict have given fresh content to the ancient prophecy that no man, and no community, and no nation, is an island. This truth, borne in upon us by the necessities of our protection, is equally true for those problems which stretch beyond present differences. Those who live in the emerging community of nations will ignore the problems of their neighbors at the risk of their own prosperity.

It may seem difficult to accept the fact that even lasting peace will not bring respite from world responsibility. But if we can bring to the challenges which surpass conflict the same qualities of resolution and compassion that we have brought to the protection of freedom, then your generation can shape the great world society which is the ultimate purpose of peace.

Problems Which Menace Man's Welfare

I would like, briefly, today to mention three problems which menace man's welfare and will threaten it even when armed destruction and war are things of the past. They are the problems of poverty, of disease, and of diminishing natural resources.

First is the problem of poverty—the growing division between the rich and poor nations. Today the per capita product of the developed countries is $1,730 a year. In the developing countries it is $143. And the gap is widening, not narrowing. Our own growth must continue. But we must find ways to step up the growth of others, or we will be an increasingly isolated island of wealth in the midst of mounting misery.

Second is man's struggle against disease—the focal point in his war to control the destructive forces of nature. Each year 3 million people die from tuberculosis. Each year 5 million die from dysentery, 500,000 from measles. In some countries, one-sixth of the entire population suffer from leprosy. Yet we have the knowledge to reduce the toll of these diseases and avert these millions of separate tragedies of needless death and suffering.

Third is the need to develop new resources and new ways to use existing resources. It has been estimated that if everyone in the world were to rise to the level of living of the United States we would then have to extract about 20 billion tons of iron, 300 million tons of copper, 300 million tons of lead, and 200 million tons of zinc. These totals are well over 100 times the world's present annual rate of production.

There is no simple solution to these problems. In the past there would have been no solution at all. Today, the constantly unfolding conquests of science give man the power over his world and nature which brings the prospect of success within the purview of hope.

International Cooperation Year

To commemorate the United Nations' 20th birthday, 1965 has been designated International Cooperation Year.[2] I propose to dedicate this year to finding new techniques for making man's knowledge serve man's welfare. Let this be the year of science. Let it be a turning point in the struggle—not of man against man, but of man against nature. In the midst of tension let us begin to chart a course toward the possibilities of conquest which bypass the politics of the cold war.

For our own part, we intend to call upon all the resources of this great nation—both public and private—to work with other nations to find new methods of improving the life of man.

First, by September I will report to the third international conference in Geneva on the peaceful uses of atomic energy on our new capability to use the power of the atom to meet human needs. It appears that the long-promised day of economical nuclear power is close at hand.

In the past several months we have achieved an economic breakthrough in the use of large-scale reactors for commercial power. As a result of this rapid progress we are years ahead of our planned progress. This new technology, now being applied in the United States, will be available to the world.

Moreover, the development of the large-scale reactors offers a dramatic prospect of transforming sea water into water suitable for human consumption and industrial use. Large-scale nuclear reactors and desalting plants of-

[2] For an address by Assistant Secretary Cleveland on "The Political Year of the Quiet Sun," see BULLETIN of Mar. 23, 1964, p. 452.

fer, in combination, economical electric power and usable water in areas of need. We are engaged in research and development to transform this scientists' concept into reality.

Second, I intend to expand our efforts to provide protection against disease. In the last few years we have conducted pilot projects in West Africa on methods of immunizing young Africans against measles—the single biggest killer of children in that area. The success of that project has enabled us to proceed, this year, with a program to immunize one-fourth of the susceptible population in seven countries of West Africa.

During International Cooperation Year we will expand our efforts to prevent and to control disease in every continent, cooperating with other nations which seek to elevate the well-being of mankind.

No nation can stand idly by while millions suffer and die from afflictions which we have the power to prevent.

Third, we will move ahead with plans to devise a worldwide weather system, using the satellites and facilities of all industrialized countries. The space age has given us unparalleled capacity to predict the course of the weather. By working together, on a global basis, we can take new strides toward coping with the historic enemies of storm and drought and flood.

These are only a few examples of the many fronts on which science can serve the society of man. These are some of the possibilities which unfold as reduced tension opens the way to larger cooperation.

We are going ahead with our determined effort to bring peace to this world.

We are going ahead in our country to bring an end to poverty and to racial injustice. In the last 10 minutes we have made considerable progress when we voted cloture in the Senate today by a vote of 71 to 29.

The message of Pope John and John Kennedy flowed from the message that burst upon the world 2,000 years ago—a message of hope and redemption not for *a* people or for *a* nation but hope and redemption for *all* people of *all* nations.

We now can join knowledge to faith and science to belief to realize in our time the ancient hope of a world which is a fit home for man.

The New Testament enjoins us to "Go ye therefore and teach all nations." Go forth then, in that spirit, to put your hands in the service of man and to put your hearts in the service of God.

U.S. and Germany Reaffirm Agreement on East-West Problems

Following is the text of a joint communique released on June 12 at the conclusion of talks between President Johnson and Chancellor Ludwig Erhard of the Federal Republic of Germany.

White House press release dated June 12

President Johnson and Chancellor Erhard met on June 12 in Washington. They were accompanied by Secretary Rusk, Foreign Minister [Gerhard] Schroeder and other advisers.

The President expressed his pleasure that the Chancellor had come to Washington following his official visit to Canada and receipt of an honorary degree at Harvard, thus providing an opportunity to review the international situation and to discuss areas of mutual interest and concern to the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Chancellor and the President discussed the need for finding a just and peaceful solution to the problem of Germany and Berlin and agreed that efforts to find such a solution must continue. They agreed that a solution must be based upon the right of self-determination and take into consideration the security of Europe as a whole. Every suitable opportunity should be used to bring nearer the reunification of Germany through self-determination. So long as Germany remains divided, Europe will not achieve stability.

The President and the Chancellor noted the Soviet Government's announcement that it signed today [June 12] a Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Cooperation with the so-called German Democratic Republic. They agreed that no unilateral move by the Soviet

Union could in any way affect the rights of the Three Western Powers or modify the obligations and responsibilities of the Soviet Union with respect to Germany and Berlin. They stressed that the Soviet Government would be solely responsible for the consequences of any attempt at interference with Allied rights that might result from implementation of the new treaty. They also reaffirmed that until Germany is unified, only the freely elected and legitimately constituted government of the Federal Republic of Germany and no one else can speak for the German people.

The President restated the determination of the United States to carry out fully its commitments with respect to Berlin, including the maintenance of the right of free access to West Berlin and the continued freedom and viability of the city.

The President and Chancellor stressed the importance of improving relations with the nations of Eastern Europe. The President said that the United States fully supports the actions of the Federal Republic directed toward this goal. They also expressed the conviction that measures designed to reduce the threat of war and to bring about arms control serve to promote the goal of German reunification.

The President and the Chancellor expressed satisfaction at the progress achieved by the nations of the Atlantic Community in developing political stability as well as economic and military strength. They reaffirmed the continuing importance of NATO to the defense and cohesion of the West. They were agreed that the proposed multilateral force would make a significant addition to this military and political strength and that efforts should be continued to ready an agreement for signature by the end of the year. The Chancellor stressed his interest in the promotion of greater political cooperation between the nations of Western Europe.

In their review of the international scene, the President described the serious situation faced by the United States and the free world in Southeast Asia. He and the Chancellor agreed that the Communist regime in Hanoi must cease its aggression in South Viet-Nam and Laos. The two governments also agreed that the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam must be fully supported in its resistance against the Viet Cong. The Chancellor stated that his government would increase assistance to South Viet-Nam in the political and economic fields.

They reviewed the Kennedy Round negotiations underway at Geneva and were agreed that expanded trade in all commodities and substantial tariff reductions would be in the interest of all the nations of the free world.

They were agreed on the vital importance of sustaining the flow of economic aid to the developing countries in order to support the efforts of these countries to maintain their independence and to modernize and expand their economies to the point where further growth could be sustained without extraordinary foreign assistance. They were of the view that strengthening the private sector of the developing economies can play a key role in the process and they recognize the need for official aid as well as for foreign private investment to pro-

U.S. Position on Soviet Treaty With East Germany

Department Statement[1]

The conclusion or implementation of this agreement by the Soviet Union cannot in any case affect Soviet obligations or responsibilities under agreements and arrangements between the Three Powers and the Soviet Union on the subject of Germany, including Berlin.

The Soviet Union remains bound by the engagements which it assumed vis-a-vis the Three Powers, and continues to be responsible for the fulfillment of its obligations to them.

The United States Government considers that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is the only German government freely and legitimately constituted, and therefore entitled to speak for the German people in international affairs.

The United States Government does not recognize the East German regime nor the existence of a state in Eastern Germany. The objective of the United States remains the reunification of Germany in peace and freedom on the basis of self-determination.

[1] Read to news correspondents on June 12 by Richard I. Phillips, Director of the Office of News.

mote this objective. The President stressed his intention to sustain the level of United States aid commitments and expenditures. The Chancellor in turn noted the substantial increase in total aid commitments of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1963 and stated that every effort will be made to increase the level of these commitments this year and next.

The President and the Chancellor reviewed also the constructive steps taken so far by Germany to help reduce its large balance of payments surplus. The President told the Chancellor of his appreciation of German support in helping the United States meet its balance of payments problems.

The President and the Chancellor were both happy to have had this opportunity to consult on common problems, as part of the continuing process of full consultation so indispensable to the maintenance of close relations between the two countries. They were gratified to reaffirm that their governments have established a solid basis of cooperation and mutual understanding in their common quest for peace.

U.S. Reconnaissance Flights Over Laos

Following are three statements read to news correspondents by Department spokesmen regarding U.S. reconnaissance flights over Laos.

STATEMENT OF JUNE 6

A U.S. reconnaissance aircraft has been shot down by ground fire in the area of the Plaine des Jarres over Laos. The pilot was observed to have ejected and landed safely. Efforts to locate and rescue him were underway during the day of June 6.

The U.S. Government had announced these flights on May 21.[1] Such reconnaissance flights are undertaken to disclose information about Pathet Lao and Viet Minh military activity which is in direct violation of the Geneva accords on Laos of 1962. They were initiated in accordance with the appeal of the Prime Minister of the Government of National Union in Laos, Prince Souvanna Phouma, in order, in the Prince's words, "to observe the activities and movements of the forces which are invading, attacking and fighting in Laos."

Information from these flights is being transmitted to the Government of Laos and to the International Control Commission.

With the agreement of the Royal Laotian Government these flights by U.S. aircraft over Laos will continue. The U.S. Government has consulted with the Government of Laos with respect to measures required for the protection of these flights.

STATEMENT OF JUNE 7

An FA–8 aircraft from the carrier *Kitty Hawk* has been shot down by ground fire in the area of the Plaines des Jarres over Laos while participating in a reconnaissance mission. The pilot was observed to have ejected and parachuted to the ground. Efforts to locate and rescue him are underway.

As we have stated previously, the U.S. Government has been undertaking such flights since May 21 to disclose information about Pathet Lao and Viet Minh activity which is in direct violation with the Geneva accords on Laos of 1962.

The flights were initiated in accordance with the appeal of the Prime Minister of the Government of National Union in Laos in order "to observe the activities and movements of the forces which are invading, attacking and fighting in Laos."

Information from these flights is and will continue to be transmitted to the Government of Laos and the International Control Commission.

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[1] On May 21 a Department spokesman made the following statement:

"We are working with the Royal Lao Government in response to its request to assist in every way possible in supplementing its information on intentions and dispositions of attacking forces. For this purpose certain U.S. reconnaissance flights have been authorized in view of the current inability of the International Control Commission to obtain adequate information. Information obtained will be turned over as rapidly as possible to the International Control Commission."

STATEMENT OF JUNE 11

There has been no change in the matter of photo reconnaissance flights. They will be undertaken as necessary and in close consultation with the Royal Government of Laos.

As I have said before, we have been in full consultation with Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma on this problem. Yesterday's meeting between Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and Ambassador [Leonard] Unger was part of the continuing consultation process. We share the conviction of the Lao Government that the refusal of the Communists to allow any effective functioning by the ICC combined with Pathet Lao–Viet Minh recent actions of aggression has created an urgent and continuing need for reliable information on eastern Laos. It is for that reason that we agreed to undertake reconnaissance flights.

These flights have taken place and will take place at the intervals necessary for the purpose of obtaining information. We have a clear understanding on this matter with the Laos Government, and we are in agreement with that Government also that it is not in the interest of the Government of Laos or of those who undertake these hazardous missions that any operational part of their work should be discussed.

The Democratic Ideal in Our Policy Toward Latin America

by Thomas C. Mann
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs [1]

Thirty years ago this month I received a law degree and started out as a young lawyer. Then we were in the throes of the Great Depression and preoccupied with our domestic economic problems. Students on campus were not greatly concerned about foreign affairs in those days.

Today the members of the graduating class of this great Christian university will start their careers at a time when our nation marches forward to new horizons of economic opportunity, individual dignity, and social justice. Technological advances have, however, presented us with new challenges and new opportunities in our relations with other countries. We are caught up, as it were, in a shrinking, interdependent world in which we have great responsibilities and which has suddenly become complex. We can no longer afford to live apart from the rest of the world as if it did not vitally affect our national and individual well-being.

The problems which faced my graduating class 30 years ago, formidable as they seemed to us at the time, were certainly much more elementary, much more simple, and by comparison much less important, than those which face what Latin Americans would call your "generation of 1964."

Within this framework, I would like briefly to discuss with you today one of the problems of our Latin American foreign policy—the problem of what it is we can do to bring about a more effective exercise of representative democracy in the Western Hemisphere. There is no subject concerning our Latin American foreign policy which has over the years generated more debate or a debate which has generated so much heat and, it seems at times, so little light.

[1] Address made at commencement exercises at the University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Ind., on June 7 (press release 268 dated June 5).

The first point I wish to make is that United States foreign policy is firmly and irrevocably committed to the principle that every individual, no matter in what part of the world he lives, has an inalienable right to his individual freedom and to his individual dignity.

For his day, as well as for ours, Benjamin Franklin spoke for the Nation when he expressed the hope that

> . . . a thorough knowledge of the Rights of Man may pervade all nations of the earth, so that a philosopher may set his foot anywhere on its surface and say "This is my country".

More recently, President Johnson, in speaking of the charter of the Alliance for Progress, expressed somewhat the same thought in different words: [2]

> Our charter charges each American country to seek and to strengthen representative democracy. Without that democracy and without the freedom that it nourishes, material progress is an aimless enterprise, destroying the dignity of the spirit that it is really meant to liberate. So we will continue to join with you to encourage democracy until we build a hemisphere of free nations from the Tierra del Fuego to the Arctic Circle.

Yardsticks of Progress

The example of a vigorous representative democracy in the United States that assures equality and dignity to all of our citizens will provide strong support for our policy. A policy of consistent persuasion in discussions with our Latin American friends is another way to help promote democratic progress in the hemisphere.

It has long been, and continues to be, our firm policy to discourage any who conspire to overthrow constitutionally elected governments. But if governments are overthrown, it has long been our practice, in ways compatible with the sovereignty and the national dignity of others, to encourage the holding of free and fair elections—to encourage a return to constitutional procedures. Other American Republics make equally valuable contributions to building a Western Hemisphere tradition of democracy by their example, by the strength of their moral positions, and by expressions of their principles.

[2] Bulletin of June 1, 1964, p. 854.

It is understandable that all of us sometimes become impatient with the rate of progress toward making this ideal a reality everywhere. We have not yet reached perfection in our own country. Many American Republics have made great progress in establishing a democratic tradition within the last few decades. In others, democracy seems at times to take two steps forward only to be temporarily pushed back a step. In Cuba the light of democracy has temporarily been extinguished.

But we should not, I think, judge either the rate or degree of hemisphere progress toward democracy solely by the number of coups d'etat which take place. The degree of individual freedom which exists in the hemisphere, the average life span of *de facto* governments, the extent of political repression, the degree of freedom of the press and of peaceful assembly, and the growing number of people in the hemisphere who consistently support the principle of free and periodic elections, are also relevant yardsticks.

If one looks at the forest instead of the trees, he can see that these quiet, unpublicized efforts on the part of the United States and other American Republics have, along with many other factors, contributed to a wider and deeper observance of the forms of representative democracy in this hemisphere and, perhaps even more important, to a growing respect by governments, in deeds as well as words, for the dignity of man and for his basic human rights. I am confident that the general movement will continue to be forward; I hope it can be accelerated.

Collective Action in Support of Democracy

One way to bring about more rapid progress is by collective action of the community of American states.

As early as 1837 Pedro Vicuña of Chile urged the establishment of a General Congress of American States to oppose tyranny.

In 1945 the Uruguayan Government proposed the doctrine that there is a "parallelism" between peace and democracy. The United States supported this thesis. Only eight American Republics, including the United

States, voted affirmatively for the Uruguayan proposal.

In 1960, at a meeting of foreign ministers in San José,[4] the United States again supported collective action and introduced a new concept: Support of the ideal of representative democracy should not merely be negative in the sense of opposition to a particular dictatorial regime; it should positively insure, by collective action, that peoples have an opportunity, in free and fair elections, to express their will—so that a Batista will not again be followed by a Castro. There was little support for this thesis at the time, although the majority, including the United States, did vote for sanctions against the Trujillo regime.

More recently, Venezuela has taken the lead in proposing informally that the American states agree to consult together when unconstitutional changes of government occur in the hemisphere. We have long since assured the Venezuelan Government of our support.

I would hope that the Venezuelan initiative will be but a step in a future process of developing a new international procedure which, while safeguarding the essential sovereign rights of every nation, defines with care and precision the kinds of violations of basic human rights which are, to use the phrases of a former Secretary of State,[5] of such a "flagrant and notorious character" that they have a "relationship to the maintenance of international peace and security" and hence justify such collective action as may be agreed upon. If this were done, tyranny of the kind we saw under Trujillo, and which we still see under Castro today, could be effectively and legally dealt with.

U.S. Experience With Intervention

It is sometimes said that since the American community of nations has failed to take effective collective action to eliminate dictatorships in the hemisphere, the United States—unilaterally and alone—should undertake to force all Latin American governments to stay on the path of constitutionality. The United States has had a rather full experience in attempting, with the best of motives, to impose democracy on other countries. It is worth while to recall them.

Monroe's Declaration of 1823, in its original intent, was a shield for Latin America against European powers seeking to recover lost colonies and to expand their territories. In the three instances in which it was applied in the manner originally intended—in 1804, 1895, and 1902—it was of considerable help to the Latin American states directly involved.

But in 1904 Theodore Roosevelt presented his now famous corollary:

> Chronic wrongdoing . . . may in America . . . ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation . . . (and) the exercise of an international police power.

The philosophy underlying the Roosevelt corollary was not new; the Platt amendment, which impaired Cuban sovereignty, was already an accomplished fact. But it did open the way for a number of new adventures. In 1906 and 1909 the Marines were sent to Cuba, in 1909 and 1912 to Nicaragua, in 1912 to the Dominican Republic, in 1915 to Haiti.

In 1913 a new moral dimension was added to the Roosevelt corollary in an attempt to justify additional United States interventions. It was stated in these words:

> Cooperation is possible only when supported at every turn by the orderly processes of just government based upon law, not upon arbitrary or irregular force. . . .

Under this doctrine we engaged in a new series of interventions in Mexico. These led to the occupation of Veracruz and to Pershing's expedition. They brought us to the verge of war with our southern neighbor at the very time we were being drawn into the First World War.

Arthur Whitaker in his book *The Western Hemisphere Idea* comes to this conclusion:

> Protective imperialism (under the 1904 corollary) would intervene to correct situations of chronic wrongdoing and chaos only to the extent necessary to prevent European intervention and would then withdraw. The civilizing mission (the 1913 policy), on the other hand, had no such *ad hoc* character or limited objective. The missionary's work is not done when the devils have been cast out; it has hardly begun. He must stay on

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[4] For background, see *ibid.*, Sept. 12, 1960, p. 395.

[5] For text of a statement made by Secretary of State Christian A. Herter on Aug. 20, 1960, see *ibid.*, Sept. 5, 1960, p. 356.

until he has taught his charges how to lead the good life, and that may take quite a long time.

And Howard Cline, in speaking of the 1913 doctrine, reminds us in his book *The United States and Mexico:*

> Thus there were "good" revolutions and "bad" revolutions. . . . The latter brought only venal, unidealistic people to power, while the former put the particular nation back on the constitutional track . . . As events in Mexico and elsewhere ultimately showed, the test of "constitutional legitimacy" was unworkable, especially in Latin America. The United States . . . renounced it as a national policy in 1921. . . .

The words of these two distinguished scholars may, from our point of view, seem rather harsh. Certainly our intentions were good. But few knowledgeable people will deny that they accurately reflect Latin America's bitter reaction to our interventionist activities under doctrines of 1904 and 1913.

Our interventions were, in the Latin American point of view, patronizing in the extreme. By making the United States the sole judge of Latin America's political morality, they were degrading to proud peoples who believed that, in their own wars of independence, they had earned the right to manage their own affairs—to be masters in their own houses. They produced schismatic tendencies in the inter-American family and brought our relations with Latin America to an all-time low.

These historical experiences suggest two things: Unilateral United States interventions in the hemisphere have never succeeded, in themselves, in restoring constitutional government for any appreciable period of time. And they have, in every case, left for our country a legacy of suspicion and resentment which has endured long after our interventions were abandoned as impracticable.

As Cline has observed:

> The lengthy record of discord during the years 1913 and 1914 carries its own lessons. One is that international problems are more complex than sloganmakers sometimes assume. A set of worthy attitudes is no substitute for coherent policy.

Franklin Roosevelt surely had these lessons of history in mind when he not only pledged the United States to the policy of nonintervention but defined his policy of the "good neighbor" as:

> . . . the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others—the neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbors.

Two wrongs do not make a right. We cannot achieve a peaceful world ruled by law if we do not live up to our own obligations.

Latin American Doctrine of Nonintervention

As an answer to the United States interventionist doctrines, Latin Americans developed doctrines of their own. Let there be no mistake: These Latin American counterdoctrines were "tailormade" for the United States; their purpose was to bring an end to United States interventions. I shall mention only one:

By 1928, when the Sixth International Conference of American States met at Habana, a proposal was introduced which stated the simple proposition that "No state has the right to interfere in the internal affairs of another." After a long and somewhat acrimonious debate the United States managed to prevent adoption of the resolution, but the handwriting was on the wall. In 1933, at the Seventh Conference in Montevideo, the United States accepted the doctrine of nonintervention with qualifications. In 1936, at Buenos Aires, we accepted it unconditionally.

This Latin American doctrine of nonintervention is now written into the Charter of the Organization of American States. It is a treaty obligation. Allow me to read to you articles 15 and 16 of the charter:

> ARTICLE 15. No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements.
>
> ARTICLE 16. No State may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of an economic or political character in order to force the sovereign will of another State and obtain from it advantages of any kind.

As the scholars Thomas [Ann Thomas and A. J. Thomas, Jr.] point out in their study of *Non-Intervention:*

The essence of intervention is the attempt to compel. . . .

All of this does not mean that we will in the future recognize all governments which come into power in an unconstitutional manner. Each case must be looked at in the light of its own facts. Where the facts warrant it—where the circumstances are such, to use someone else's phrase, as to "outrage the conscience of America"—we reserve our freedom to register our indignation by refusing to recognize or to continue our economic cooperation.

It does mean that, consistent with our treaty obligations, we cannot put ourselves in a doctrinaire straightjacket of automatic application of sanctions to every unconstitutional regime in the hemisphere with the obvious intention of dictating internal political developments in other countries. As the facts amply demonstrate, this is no departure from the practice which has prevailed in the most recent years.

The third point to which I invite your attention is this: Unilateral intervention for the purpose of forcing constitutional changes in another country does not always serve either the cause of democracy or the national security interests of the United States.

To illustrate, not long ago a majority of the Guatemalan people voted in free elections for Arbenz, a candidate for president. Later the Guatemalan people discovered that Arbenz was a Marxist-Leninist. Colonel Castillo led a successful revolt and was widely acclaimed by his people when he marched into Guatemala City. Had we been unconditionally committed to the support of all constitutional governments under all circumstances, we would have been obliged to do everything within our power to bring about the overthrow of Castillo and to restore a Marxist-Leninist to power against the will of the Guatemalan people.

The question of our relationships with Communist regimes in this hemisphere is, of course, a separate subject and is beyond the scope of these remarks. It raises separate questions, such as our inherent right of self-defense and measures, under existing treaties, to deal with situations which threaten the peace and security of the hemisphere.

Making the Democratic Ideal a Reality

Against this background, what conclusions are to be drawn? What can we do to help make the democratic ideal a reality in this hemisphere? I offer the following suggestions:

First, we should continue, in our bilateral discussions with other governments, to encourage democracy in the quiet, unpublicized way and on the day-to-day basis that I have already referred to; and we should support parallel efforts of other American states. If there is no intent to force the will of a sovereign government, this tactic is entirely compatible with our commitments and with the dignity and self-respect of others.

Second, we should support appropriate measures for broadening the scope of collective action with the aim of addressing ourselves first to those cases where repression, tyranny, and brutality outrage the conscience of mankind. I can think of no way in which the American community of states can better serve the cause of human dignity, individual and national freedom, and representative democracy than to develop a set of procedures for dealing with this type of problem. The United States has never believed that collective action for such purposes is proscribed by the Charter of the Organization of American States; but if the majority of the member states are of a contrary opinion, then let us amend the charter.

Third, in each case where a government is overthrown by force there should be a careful, dispassionate assessment of each situation in the light of all the surrounding facts and circumstances so that decisions concerning recognition, trade, aid, and other related matters can be made which are consistent with our ideals, with international law, and with our overall national interests. In making this assessment, regard should also be paid to the fact that not only is each American Republic different from all the others but that each *de facto* government is likewise different in its aims, its motives, its policies, and in the kinds of problems it faces.

Fourth, if, as a result of this appraisal, a decision is made not to recognize a regime—and this may well be the case in the future

as it has been in the past—then it should be made clear that nonrecognition is based squarely on a failure on the part of another government to abide by the established rules of international conduct.

Fifth, when the decision is made to recognize a regime, it should be clear that there is no basis under international law for equating recognition with United States approval of the internal political policies and practices of another government. Resolution XXXV of the Ninth Inter-American Conference of American States makes this point very clear. It declares:

> That the establishment or maintenance of diplomatic relations with a government does not imply any judgment upon the domestic policy of that government

Sixth, we should continue our established practice of consulting with other American Republics whenever a question of recognition arises.

Finally, let there be no mistake about our consistent and complete devotion to the principles of human dignity and freedom of the individual. We believe that these principles can only be realized in a democratic political system in which governments are the servants of the people and responsive to their will. They are a central element in our foreign policy toward Latin America. We shall in every way consistent with our obligations continue our efforts to help make democracy a reality throughout the entire hemisphere.

As is often the case, there is more to be said than time allows for. I have already presumed on your courtesy by speaking so long. But if I am permitted one word of counsel, it would be this:

I hope you will feel a pride in your university, your church, and your country and in the efforts they are all making to create a peaceful world, ruled by law and Christian charity, which is devoted to both the material and spiritual progress of all mankind in freedom. And I hope that you will look to the future with confidence that freedom and not tyranny is the "wave of the future" in this hemisphere. I think you will see even greater progress toward freedom in your generation than the impressive gains I have seen in my time.

U.S. Welcomes Jurists' Findings on Events in Panama

On June 9 the International Commission of Jurists released at Geneva a report of its findings with regard to the events in Panama in January 1964.[1] Following is a Department statement concerning the report which was read to news correspondents on that day by Richard I. Phillips, Director of the Office of News.

We welcome this detailed study by an impartial body giving an objective account of the unfortunate events of January. The report exonerates the United States of the charge that we violated the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations, a charge which the International Commission of Jurists was asked to investigate by the National Bar Association of Panama.

The report also states that U.S. authorities were entitled to use force to meet a real threat to life and security in the Canal Zone, and it regrets that Panamanian authorities "made no attempt during the critical early hours as well as for almost three days thereafter to curb and control the violent activities of the milling crowds."

We believe that the tragic loss of lives and the destruction of property would have been avoided had adequate measures been taken at the outset.

The report concludes with the hope that the work of the ICJ "will contribute to the growth of understanding, cooperation, and amity between the two countries and their peoples, so that they may move forward in the furtherance of their mutual vital interests."

We fully subscribe to this sentiment.

Harold C. McClellan Named to Business Advisory Committee

Under Secretary Ball announced on June 8 (press release 273) the appointment of Harold Chadwick McClellan to serve as a member of

[1] For background, see BULLETIN of Feb. 3, 1964, p. 152.

the Advisory Committee on International Business Problems.[1]

This Committee, chaired by Clarence B. Randall, counsels with the Secretary of State and the Administrator of the Agency for International Development on the handling of specific business problems abroad. It gives particular attention to the application of the Hickenlooper amendment (section 620e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, which calls for the termination of assistance to countries nationalizing or expropriating U.S.-owned property unless "appropriate steps" are taken to meet its obligations under international law.

The Committee also meets bimonthly to review the handling by the State Department and its missions abroad of specific business complaints submitted by American business in connection with their overseas operations.

U.S.–Israeli Team To Conduct Surveys for Desalting Program

Joint Communique

Press release 281 dated June 11; revised June 22

Further discussions on implementation of the agreement of President Johnson and Prime Minister Eshkol to cooperate in desalting[2] were conducted during the week of June 1.

During these discussions, Minister Peres [Israeli Deputy Minister of Defense Shimeon Peres], Chairman [of the Atomic Energy Commission Glenn T.] Seaborg [A.E.C.] Commissioners [John G.] Palfrey and [James T.] Ramey, and officials of the Department of the Interior agreed that the program would be developed as follows:

(a) A joint U.S.-Israeli technical team will be appointed immediately to conduct, during this summer, surveys to define the scope and requirements for the program.

(b) Based on the results of these surveys detailed engineering and economic studies will be carried out jointly.

(c) It is hoped that, on the basis of these surveys and studies, an economic desalting project of mutual technological interest, producing substantial quantities of water for specialized agricultural and for industrial use, will be undertaken in Israel with the active participation of the United States.

The International Atomic Energy Agency will be invited to participate in the program from the beginning, including acting as an observer in the joint studies this summer. As agreed by the President and the Prime Minister, the knowledge and experience obtained from this program will be available to all countries with water deficiencies.

[1] For announcements of previous appointments, see BULLETIN of Feb. 25, 1963, p. 296; Apr. 8, 1963, p. 540; and Oct. 7, 1963, p. 542.

[2] For text of a joint communique released on June 2 at the conclusion of Prime Minister Eshkol's visit to Washington, see BULLETIN of June 22, 1964, p. 9[illegible].

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

88th Congress, 2d Session

Temporary Suspension of Duties for Metal Scrap. Report to accompany H.R. 10463. H. Rept. 1370. May 4, 1964. 4 pp.

Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, Fiscal Year 1965. Report to accompany H.R. 11134. H. Rept. 1374. May 4, 1964. 43 pp.

A Reduction in the Appropriation for the Peace Corps. Communication from the President transmitting a reduction totaling $3,850,000 in the appropriation requested in the fiscal year 1965 budget for the Peace Corps. H. Doc. 300. May 18, 1964. 2 pp.

Requesting an Additional Amount for Foreign Assistance to Vietnam. Message from the President relative to requesting an additional amount of $125 million in mutual defense and development program funds. H. Doc. 307. May 28, 1964. 3 pp.; and communication from the President to the Speaker of the House, H. Doc. 305, May 18, 1964, 1 p.

Refugees and Escapees. Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee made by its Subcommittee To Investigate Problems Connected With Refugees and Escapees, together with individual views. S. Rept. 1027. May 20, 1964. 14 pp.

Should Weapons Systems Be Placed Under International Control? A Collection of Excerpts and a Bibliography Prepared for the 1964–65 High School Debates. Prepared by the Foreign Affairs Division, Legislative Reference Service, of the Library of Congress. S. Doc. 72. May 1964. 80 pp.

Security Council Team To Examine Cambodia-Viet-Nam Border Areas

Following is a statement made in the U.N. Security Council on June 4 by U.S. Representative Adlai E. Stevenson, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the Council on that day.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR STEVENSON

U.S./U.N. press release 4408

I want to add a few words in explanation of the vote of my delegation on the resolution we have just adopted.

For 2 weeks the Security Council has been occupied with the complaint brought to it with urgency by a member state. In the view of my delegation, as I said here on May 26,[1] our task in the Council has been twofold:

> First, that of weighing the evidence and reaching a careful and balanced evaluation of the full sources and origins of the incidents between Cambodia and the Republic of Viet-Nam.
>
> Second, deciding on practicable steps by which the United Nations can use its peace-keeping experience to meet the needs of a situation which has been characterized by the Government of Cambodia as "an extremely grave threat to the peace and stability of Southeast Asia."

With regard to the first task, no new evidence has been introduced to support the grave charges made against my Government, which, of course, has not deterred the representative of the Soviet Union from repeating them day after day—a Soviet technique which is as ineffective as it is familiar to all of us who have sat in this Council during the past 18 years. Falsehoods do not become facts by mere constant repetition.

I regret that we have been obliged to deny again and again that there is any basis whatsoever for a charge of aggression against my Government; nor has there been any suggestion of hostility toward Cambodia. It is a fact, and a fact for which we have repeatedly expressed regret, that an American adviser was with a unit of the Vietnamese forces which inadvertently crossed the border into Cambodia at Chantréa on March 19. For that we have long since expressed our profound regret. But, as we have repeatedly stated, no Americans crossed the border on May 7 or May 8—the other instances of which Cambodia has complained.

In view of the lack of any evidence to support these charges of repeated acts of aggression, it is appropriate, I think, that the Council should pronounce itself in the draft resolution as it has.

I turn now to the second task, which has assumed increasing importance since the debate began. I must say that the action that the Security Council has today taken hardly corresponds, in our judgment, to the gravity of the situation as set forth by the representatives of Cambodia here in the Council. In our view, the Council might well have taken more far-reaching steps in response to a complaint of this nature—steps in which the United Nations has gained great experience in recent years. But be that as it may, the Council has before it the opportunity to set in motion a procedure by which it can consider further measures to prevent any recurrence of incidents on the Cambodian-Vietnamese border, whatever and whoever may be the cause. This, Mr. President, is a beginning.

[1] BULLETIN of June 15, 1964, p. 937

I am speaking, of course, of paragraph 5, which, in our view, is the most significant and important part of this resolution. Under this paragraph representatives from three members of the Security Council will visit both Viet-Nam and Cambodia, including those areas along the border which have been the scene of recent incidents, in order to examine and to study those measures which, hopefully, can avoid a recurrence of incidents in the future.

I am confident that in undertaking this assignment and in drawing up their report the representatives of the three Council members will choose to scrutinize with the greatest care various needs which have become apparent during the Council's discussion of the Cambodian complaint. I have in mind, in this connection, the need for Vietnamese armed forces to redouble their efforts to avoid inadvertent crossings of the frontier—even in the heat of battle: the need for clearly marking those areas of the frontier which are poorly defined or undefined by nature; and, finally, the need for steps to insure that Viet Cong rebels in their efforts to subvert the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, are not able to take advantage of an ill-marked and inadequately protected border to seek either safe haven or supplies on Cambodian territory.

I note with pleasure also paragraph 4, in which all are requested by the Council "to recognize and respect Cambodia's neutrality and territorial integrity." This is in harmony with what I expressed here on May 26

I should furthermore note that this admonition to all states and authorities clearly must be respected by the Communist regime in Hanoi and by the Viet Cong, whom it both controls and directs.

In this connection may I recall to the attention of members of this Council a passage in a letter dated August 31, 1962, sent by President Kennedy to His Royal Highness Prince Sihanouk:[1]

> . . . the fundamental and abiding objective of the United States is that each country, large and small, live in peace and independence and that its people may prosper, enjoy the fruits of its own endeavors, and pursue a course of international relations of its own choosing. This applies especially to countries with which we have such close friendly relations as we have with Cambodia.
>
> In this spirit and in view of the present preoccupations of Your Royal Highness, I assure you that the United States respects the neutrality, territorial integrity and independence of Cambodia.

That position, Mr. President, remains unchanged.

I repeat that we felt, and still feel, that the Security Council could have dealt more comprehensively and more effectively with the problem before it. It is perhaps understandable that some members of the Security Council have been hesitant to launch the United Nations on a new venture in an area of the world where the United Nations has so far undertaken direct activities only on a very limited scale. Although even here we must recall the United Nations mission in Laos in 1959, the representatives of the Secretary-General now serving in Laos and in Cambodia, the United Nations' Gussing mission,[2] and the subcommittee of the General Assembly which visited Viet-Nam last fall.

Though recognizing that a hesitancy still nevertheless exists, I feel compelled to reiterate our conviction that, since the principal purpose of the United Nations is to keep the peace, it should not exclude itself from any area where disputes or situations likely to endanger international peace and security may exist. In regard to the situation on the Cambodian-Vietnamese frontier we felt and still feel that some form of patrol or surveillance under United Nations auspices would be valuable. We have been encouraged, moreover, to note that the Republic of Viet-Nam, one of the principal parties to the present dispute, would welcome a similar development

We hope and trust that, in their report on measures capable of preventing a recurrence of trouble along this frontier, the three members of the Council will keep in mind not only those views and any other means by which the United Nations could be of assistance but also the broader purpose of the United Nations and its

[1] For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 24, 1962, p. 456.

[2] Nils Göran Gussing, of Sweden, was appointed special representative of the Secretary-General to Cambodia and Thailand on Jan. 1, 1963.

fundamental and indispensable peacekeeping responsibilities.

In conclusion, Mr. President [Arsène Assouan Usher], let me express my delegation's respect and admiration for the patience, insight, and forbearance with which you, as representative of the Ivory Coast, and your distinguished colleague, Ambassador [Ahmed Taibi] Benlunia, have addressed yourselves to the tasks which have been placed before this Council. In our view your efforts well deserve the unanimous support of all members of this Council. And, on behalf of my delegation, we wish to thank you most sincerely.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION[1]

The Security Council,

Considering the complaint by the Royal Government of Cambodia in document S/5697,

Noting the statements made in the Council in regard to this complaint,

Noting with regret the incidents which have occurred on Cambodian territory and the existing situation on the Cambodian-Vietnamese frontier,

Taking note of the apologies and regrets tendered to the Royal Government of Cambodia in regard to these incidents and the loss of life they have entailed,

Noting also the desire of the Governments of the Kingdom of Cambodia and the Republic of Viet-Nam to succeed in restoring their relations to a peaceful and normal state,

1. *Deplores* the incidents caused by the penetration of units of the Army of the Republic of Viet-Nam into Cambodian territory;

2. *Requests* that just and fair compensation should be offered to the Royal Government of Cambodia;

3. *Invites* those responsible to take all appropriate measures to prevent any further violation of the Cambodian frontier;

4. *Requests* all States and Authorities and in particular the members of the Geneva Conference to recognize and respect Cambodia's neutrality and territorial integrity;

5. *Decides* to send three of its members to the two countries and to the places where the most recent incidents have occurred in order to consider such measures as may prevent any recurrence of such incidents. They will report to the Security Council within forty-five days.

[1] U.N. doc. S/5741; unanimously adopted by the Security Council on June 4.

[2] The President of the Security Council announced on June 5 (U.N. doc. S/5749) that he had appointed Brazil, the Ivory Coast, and Morocco to carry out this mission.

18-Nation Disarmament Conference Reconvenes at Geneva

Statement by William C. Foster[1]

First, my delegation would like to associate itself with the tribute with which you, Mr. Chairman [A. Correa do Lago, of Brazil], opened this session. Since the last meeting of the Conference the world has grieved over the death of a great leader, Prime Minister Nehru of India. Our deepest sympathy goes out to the people of India at this time of sadness. The vitality of Indian democratic institutions is one of his legacies. That vitality has been amply demonstrated in the past few weeks. But in India, as in the world at large, mankind has suffered a great loss. As our Indian colleague so ably said, in the disarmament field we shall miss here a genuine source of inspiration. President Johnson has said, in this connection:[2]

> . . . it is not just as a leader of India that he served humanity. Perhaps more than any world leader he has given expression to man's yearning for peace. This is the issue of our age. . . . There could be no more fitting memorial to him than a world without war.

The ideal of Prime Minister Nehru remains our goal; in his memory we renew our pledge to seek its realization.

I should now like to extend greetings to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. [Dragoslav] Protitch, who is again assisting us. Let me also welcome back to our table my distinguished cochairman, Deputy Foreign Minister [Valerian] Zorin, who participated so actively at the beginning of this Conference in the spring of 1962. I am glad also to see so many familiar faces around the

[1] Made before the Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva on June 9. Mr. Foster is Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and head of the U.S. delegation. For texts of statements made by Mr. Foster and by Adrian S. Fisher, Deputy Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, before the session of the Conference which convened Jan. 21, 1964, and recessed Apr. 28, see BULLETIN of Mar. 2, 1964, p. 330; Mar. 9, 1964, p. 376; Apr. 20, 1964, p. 641; and May 11, 1964, p. 750.

[2] For text of a message from President Johnson to President Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan of India, see *ibid.*, June 15, 1964, p. 926.

table—members of delegations who were here when I was last here in February.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to extend particular greetings to you, who have assumed the extra responsibilities of the Chair on your first day at the table, and also I wish to extend greetings to our new colleague from Mexico, Mr. Gomez Robledo. I also welcome those others here who are participating in our deliberations for the first time.

Finally, let me say to our colleague from Ethiopia that we wish our former colleague, Ambassador [Abebe] Agede, an early recovery from his grievous wounds.

Measures To Halt Arms Race Now

I join you here today with President Johnson's instruction to make every effort to find a basis for early agreement on safeguarded—and I emphasize "safeguarded"—alternatives to the arms race.

You may remember that, in his yearend exchange with Chairman Khrushchev, President Johnson said: [1]

> The time for simply talking about peace . . has passed—1964 should be a year in which we take further steps toward that goal.

In a recent speech to the Associated Press in New York [2] President Johnson again made the point that 1964 was a year in which the United States would work "to reach agreement on measures to reduce armament and lessen the chance of war."

Like the measures achieved in 1963, the cutbacks in production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons announced by the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and my country [3] were closely related to our work here. The idea of a cutback as a preliminary step to a cutoff was mentioned in President Johnson's message to this Conference on 21 January of this year.[4] It was discussed here, both privately and in plenary meetings, during February. I mention this because those announcements show again that our work here continuously contributes to steps taken by governments in pursuit of peace.

My delegation will elaborate further on the cutoff at this session, as we will on other proposals in the President's 21 January message.

A theme which runs through many of these proposals—a theme which has already been stressed by other delegations here—is that while we are struggling with the intricate problems

President Calls for Redoubled Efforts To Halt Arms Race

White House Statement

White House press release dated June 9

President Johnson today [June 9] instructed William C. Foster to make every effort at the Geneva Disarmament Conference to find safeguarded alternatives to the arms race. Mr. Foster heads the U.S. delegation to the Conference.

The President said:

"We have taken the first steps down the pathway to disarmament. Last year saw the test ban treaty, the direct communications link, and the U.N. resolution against nuclear weapons in space. This year both the Soviet Union and the United States have announced reductions in the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons.

"Each of these steps points in the direction of effective control of arms. Each moves us a small way down this long and difficult road.

"We must not hesitate now that the journey has been begun. We must redouble our efforts until it is completed."

In January President Johnson presented specific proposals for further steps to the Conference.[1] Today he instructed Mr. Foster to set forth in Geneva our plans for the procedures necessary to verify compliance with a number of his January proposals in order to reach early agreement on them.

The United States has long believed that inspection or other procedures for verification are necessary for significant arms control and disarmament measures to be taken.

The President reemphasized his determination to pursue safeguarded agreements which would permit such action. They would be important, first of all, for peace. But they would also permit us to devote more of our energies and resources to building a greater society for all mankind.

[1] For text, see BULLETIN of Feb. 10, 1964, p. 224.

[1] Ibid., Jan. 27, 1964, p. 121.
[2] *Ibid.*, May 11, 1964, p. 720.
[3] *Ibid.*
[4] For text, see *ibid.*, Feb. 10, 1964, p. 224.

of general and complete disarmament we should give priority to reaching agreement on measures which will halt the arms race now. If we do not, our task of achieving general and complete disarmament will become ever more difficult.

Many of the measures which have been successful so far follow that philosophy. We now have a test ban treaty,[1] which limits the development of larger nuclear weapons. We have an Antarctic treaty, which prohibits the spread of weapons to an area of the earth where they are not now present.[2] We have a General Assembly resolution (A/RES/1884 (XVIII)) against the spread of nuclear weapons to outer space.[3] We have announced reductions in the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons—reductions which should slow down the race for ever-larger stockpiles of such material and, we hope, lead to a cutoff in its production.

Each of these steps limits in some way the production or proliferation of armaments. Each thereby serves our immediate objective of calling a halt to the arms race.

We would move much further toward this goal by adopting the cutoff, the freeze, and the measures we have proposed to stop the spread of nuclear weapons to nations not now controlling them. Moreover, our ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament would be brought closer.

The Problem of Verification

During our last session we discussed collateral measures in greater depth than ever before. Many delegations raised questions about a problem which has seemed so many times to make agreements here more difficult. That problem is verification. To assist the Conference in getting out of this difficulty, my delegation intends to discuss verification in more detail at this session. In particular, we will discuss it as it relates to our proposals for collateral measures.

Verification should be sufficient to assure nations that their security is not being jeopardized through clandestine violations by other nations. This must have been what Foreign Minister [Andrei A.] Gromyko had in mind when he observed:

> Our country does not intend to take anyone at his word. . . . Nor do we expect others to take us at our word.

Our Secretary of State, Mr. Rusk, elaborated on the same point early in this Conference.[4] He said:

> No government, large or small, could be expected to enter into disarmament arrangements under which their peoples might become victims of the perfidy of others.
>
> In other affairs, accounting and auditing systems are customarily installed so that the question of confidence need not arise. Confidence grows out of knowledge; suspicion and fear are rooted in ignorance. This has been true since the beginning of time.
>
> Let me make this point clear: The United States does not ask for inspection for inspection's sake. Inspection is for no purpose other than assurance that commitments are fulfilled.

With that principle in mind, the United States has attempted to design its collateral measures so as to reduce the scope of inspection while providing the necessary assurance of compliance.

We fully recognize that many nations have facilities which cannot be opened to inspection at this time. Certainly my Government has sensitive facilities of this kind, but that does not mean we cannot find a way to reconcile this need with the need for verification. Indeed, that should be one of our primary tasks.

The formulation of verification proposals requires hard work and careful preparation by all of us. The United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and other agencies of my Government have devoted tens of millions of dollars to research programs designed to reconcile the need to provide assurance and the need to protect sensitive facilities. Experts from some of our leading industrial and other concerns and specialists within our Government have devoted many hours to that end.

The verification plans which we will elaborate at future meetings are the end product of that

[1] For text, see *ibid.*, Aug. 12, 1963, p. 239.
[2] For text, see *ibid.*, Dec. 21, 1959, p. 914.
[3] For text, see *ibid.*, Nov. 11, 1963, p. 754.

[4] For text of a statement made by Secretary Rusk before the Conference on Mar. 15, 1962, see *ibid.*, Apr. 2, 1962, p. 531.

effort. Inspection would be confined to those objects—and only those objects—which must necessarily be placed under scrutiny to provide assurance that commitments are fulfilled. In the freeze and the cutoff, for example, the production plants to be regularly observed would be limited to those of a particular type. We would also limit the scope of the inspectors' observations within those plants so as to inhibit their receipt of information which might be of military value. In neither the freeze nor the cutoff would there be inspection to verify the levels of retained armaments.

That is also true of the mutual destruction of B–47's and TU–16's.[11] Here the inspectors would look only at the actual destruction of bombers. They would not explore the countryside to find out how many bombers remained on each side after the bombers were destroyed.

Our purpose in describing verification is clear. We believe a detailed analysis of this subject is essential in order to move us forward toward early agreement on meaningful alternatives to the arms race.

The United States is ready to conclude firm agreements in each of the areas I have mentioned. It is also ready to consider any other reasonable proposal.

My instructions are to pursue every practical means for halting the arms race and reducing armaments. This would be important, first of all, for peace; but it would also permit us to devote more of our energies and resources to building a greater society for all mankind.

The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

Following are statements made in the United Nations Trusteeship Council on May 28 by M. Wilfred Goding, High Commissioner of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and U.S. Special Representative in the Trusteeship Council, and Thomas Remengesau, adviser to the U.S. delegation.

STATEMENT BY MR. GODING

U.S./U.N. press release 4402

It is a privilege and honor to appear again before this body as the Special Representative for the Administering Authority of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.[1] The year which is just concluding has been notable in several respects. It was highlighted by the visit of the sixth United Nations visiting mission and also marked the end of our first full year of operation of a tremendously expanded program in almost every phase of our operations but most particularly in the field of elementary education.

The 1964 visiting mission, which spent approximately 6 weeks in the territory, was, I believe, the most widely traveled of any visiting mission. By plane, boat, jeep, truck, and other miscellaneous conveyances, the mission traversed the territory from one end to the other, meeting with elected councils, district legislatures, holding public gatherings as well as having numerous conferences with administration officials and Micronesian citizens. The 1964 mission had several distinctions. One senior member, the distinguished delegate from China, had served as chairman of the 1959 mission and, thus, was able to bring to the mission a perspective based on firsthand personal analysis of local conditions. The distinguished chairman, the Honorable Frank Corner, brought to the mission his very special knowledge of the Pacific area. The mission also had

[11] For background, see *ibid.*, Apr. 20, 1964, p. 641.

[1] For a statement made by Mr. Goding in the Trusteeship Council on June 5, 1963, see BULLETIN of Aug. 5, 1963, p. 207.

the unique distinction, I believe, of having the first woman member ever to serve on a visiting mission. The distinguished member from Liberia, the Honorable Angie Brooks, proved to be a real inspiration to the women of the territory. The mission was an extremely conscientious and hard-working group, meeting patiently for long hours with various committees and delegations and accepting the discomforts of travel in a remote area with equanimity and cheerfulness. The mission also was the first to travel to the southernmost of our island groups, making a flying trip to our Polynesian atolls of Nukuoro and Kapingamarangi.

On behalf of the Administering Authority, I wish to thank the chairman, Ambassador Corner, for a very intensive and useful report and to assure him and the Council that the recommendations of the mission will be given the fullest possible consideration.

In view of the very detailed report of the visiting mission which has been provided the Council,[2] as well as our annual report for fiscal year 1963, which is up for review,[3] I shall in this presentation sketch only briefly the highlights of our programs since last June 1963 to the present time. I wish to assure the Council that I am, as in former sessions, ready to respond to any questions the members may have or to present additional information which may be desired on any of our programs.

Administration

As I reported to the 13th session, the Congress of the United States in July of 1962 raised our legal authorization for appropriations from $7½ million to $17½ million, thus enabling us to present greatly increased appropriation requests. For fiscal year 1963, the Congress appropriated $15 million, much of which was earmarked for the accelerated elementary education program. A similar appropriation of $15 million was provided for the year we are just concluding, that is, fiscal 1964, and I am gratified to report that for next year (which will open on July 1), an appropriation of $17½ million already has been approved by the House of Representatives and by the Senate Appropriations Committee. It now only awaits final action by the Senate, where I have every expectation that this much increased budget will receive approval as it already has in the House of Representatives.

During the session I shall comment on what I feel we have achieved to date with these increased appropriations and what we expect to achieve in the next several years. I wish here only to stress that our annual appropriation was more than doubled last year and that another very substantial increase is anticipated this coming year.

We were enabled in September 1963 to grant a major upward hourly salary adjustment for the majority of the Micronesian Government employees in the A and B levels of the Micronesian Title and Pay Plan. Similarly, the annual salaries for Micronesians occupying senior professional and executive positions were adjusted upward with an average increase of well over 25 percent.

Supplemental benefits for Micronesian workers also were established. As an interim measure prior to the establishment of a retirement system for Micronesian employees, a death-benefit program was instituted which provides lump-sum cash payments to designated survivors of Micronesian employees who die while in the service of the Government. A sick-leave program for Micronesian employees, similar to that enjoyed by the U.S. civil service worker, also was instituted this past year. We recognize that these and other measures of this nature will be of an interim nature until a workable social security system can be developed for the Micronesian workers.

I am pleased to report that the turnover of senior administrative positions to qualified Micronesians has moved steadily forward. In Ponape District, Mr. Leo Falcam was appointed assistant district administrator. The visiting mission, I am certain, will testify to the ability of this young administrator since he served capably and with distinction as acting district

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[2] U.N. doc. T/1620.

[3] *Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 1963* (Department of State publication 7670); for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402 ($1)

administrator during the period the visiting mission spent in the Ponape District. Appointments of three additional Micronesians to the post of assistant district administrator have been made this month. Mr. Thomas Remengesau, who is serving here as a member of the U.S. delegation, has been appointed assistant district administrator for public affairs, Palau District. In Truk, our largest district, Mr. Raymond Setik has been appointed assistant district administrator in charge of administrative services, while Mr. Tosiwo Nakayama has assumed the post of assistant district administrator for public affairs. The visiting mission members will remember Mr. Setik since he was serving in an acting capacity during their visit. Mr. Nakayama is known to many members of this body from his appearance at the Trusteeship Council in 1961, when he served as adviser on the U.S. delegation.

In three of our six districts, the second senior administrative posts are now held by Micronesians, and plans are being formulated to turn over similar posts in the other districts to qualified Micronesian administrative officers. We have reached the state where young but capable Micronesians are prepared to assume top positions of responsibility. It is our intention to increase the tempo of this turnover, using the American staff, where required, increasingly in the role of advisers, consultants, and technicians.

In the less glamorous but equally important secondary service activities replacement also continued. The last remaining expatriate hospital administrator was replaced this month in Yap by a local staff member. A Trukese assistant supply officer took over the senior post in the supply section a month ago.

With the tremendously expanded programs now in progress, the workload at all levels of activities has increased. This has meant increase in staff, both local and expatriate. The expansion also has intensified the need for specialized training at all levels to meet the demands of our expanding programs. In my comments on functional activities, I intend to describe briefly the types of specialized training we are carrying out, but at this point I would like to note that in addition to our regular scholarship program we propose to provide well over 150 employees and private individuals the opportunity of inservice training in their specialized fields in selected organizations in Hawaii, the United States mainland, as well as in special training centers which will be conducted in the territory this coming year.

During the past year special attention has been given to an analysis of our administrative organization since I have long felt the need for a better coordination and alinement of operating programs at the headquarters level. The result has been a complete reorganization with four major areas of responsibilities each to be headed by an assistant commissioner. These will be public affairs; community services (covering medical and education programs); a unified resources and development department; and an administrative, fiscal, and services operation. Implementation of this organizational setup now is underway, and I am confident that a more realistic and functional alinement of responsibilities as well as more effective coordination in all our efforts will be achieved.

Education

As the visiting mission has noted in its report, a new policy on education has been basic to our work and plans for accelerated development. A year ago an elementary school construction program was launched which calls for a total of 522 new elementary school classrooms and 255 houses for United States teachers to be constructed by the end of 1965. During the past year, 231 new classrooms and 104 teacher houses were constructed, and this coming year another 175 new classrooms and 105 teacher houses will be built.

To insure that the new elementary schools have adequate supplies and equipment, $3,400 per classroom has been budgeted for this item. Most of the school furniture is being constructed by local firms, as noted in the report of the visiting mission. In the past 2 months, two additional contracts have been let for school furniture, one to the Palau Woodworkers Guild and the other to the Micronesian Construction Company of Saipan.

Secondary education now is being provided all districts through the establishment of district public high schools. Starting in September 1962, the 10th grade was added to district junior high schools, this past year the 11th grade was added, and the opening of school this fall will see the 12th grade in operation. Additionally, a new junior high school was established in Ansor, Ulithi, this past year, and a 10th grade will be added to the Kusaie Junior High School in September 1964. This, I know, will be of interest to the members of the visiting mission since the mission received a request for expansion of the Kusaie school during its visit to Kusaie.

The number of scholarships was doubled during the year under review, and a similar increase was possible for this coming year. Just prior to my departure from the territory for this session, I announced the awards of 60 college scholarships in general fields, 12 scholarships in specific degree fields, and 12 grants in premedical or paramedical fields. Through the East-West Center, 25 students received special grants during the past year while 6 students received full degree scholarships from this institution. We expect a similar number of grants from the Center this year. Well over a hundred students of college level will be in universities and colleges on scholarships this school year. And there will be almost another hundred students attending college on their own or on a combination of private resources and partial Administration aid.

An adult education supervisor is being added to each district education staff this fall as well as a supervisor at the headquarters level. In addition to having responsibility for the overall education program, these adult education supervisors will be in charge of educational broadcasting and in this capacity will work closely with the district radio broadcast station managers and programers.

The Micronesian Teacher Education Center in Ponape graduated its first class of 25 teachers this year and now has doubled its enrollment as well as its staff. The Center is operated on a contract arrangement with the University of Hawaii. This fall, however, a fully qualified Micronesian staff member will join the present University of Hawaii faculty members of the Center.

In paragraph 61 of the visiting mission report, the mission noted with approval that a proposal to appoint a supervisor of library services was under consideration. I regret that a misunderstanding on this proposal appears to have occurred since we have had this supervisor of library services on the job for the past year. His headquarters, however, are maintained at PICS [Pacific Islands Central School] in Ponape rather than at our main administrative headquarters in Saipan, and this may have led to the misunderstanding. However, he is on the job and during the past year developed procedures for advising and assisting district educational administrators in reorganizing high school libraries and advising on formation of small libraries for the new elementary schools. This coming month, in cooperation with the South Pacific Commission and the Government of Guam, a training course for further training of Pacific area librarians will be conducted in Guam. We expect to have 14 of our local librarians attending this course.

In our English-language program efforts have centered about providing teachers with suitable texts and materials, especially for the elementary years and the training of teachers in modern methods of language teaching. Workshops for Micronesian and American teachers on language teaching have been held in all districts.

Our Literature Production Center has been strengthened with the appointment of the former director of literature production services of the South Pacific Commission as the new head of our Center. One of his first tasks will be to analyze and assess current literature production and printing needs of the territory. Consideration is being given to the establishment of a modern printing plant.

We have expanded the community development program considerably and plan further expansion this coming year. Working with the theme of community "pilot projects" in depressed areas, we propose to extend the concept of self aid where joint efforts of the government and the people can improve the economic, social, and cultural conditions of the community.

Political Advancement

The Council of Micronesia held two sessions during the year, both devoting major time to recommendations concerning the formation of a territorial legislature. The basic recommendations of the Council were embodied in a draft order calling for the formation of a "Congress of Micronesia." Copies of the draft were given the visiting mission before its visit to the Trust Territory. Since that time further study has been given the various provisions of the draft. Although final decisions have not been reached on all aspects of the proposal, we plan and expect to be able to hold elections for the legislature this fall and fully meet our 1965 target for a functioning legislative body.

In five districts during the year, district legislatures have recommended revised charters streamlining their organization. Many of the former legislative bodies were unwieldy in size. The visiting mission had an opportunity to meet with full complements of the district legislative bodies in the Marianas, Palau, Yap, and Truk Districts and with representative committees of the legislatures in Ponape and the Marshalls. One of the major political tasks from now on will be to work out a satisfactory delineation of authority between the new territorial legislative body and the district legislatures. An additional problem of which we are fully aware is the need for fundamental political education at the municipal level.

Economic Development

Copra production, which remains the backbone of local economic enterprise, continued to show improvement. Copra export revenue for the fiscal year under review was $1.9 million. Production has increased this past year, and if the trend demonstrated by the first 10 months of the fiscal year continues for another 2 months, we anticipate that some 13,800 tons will be exported with export revenues of well over $2,225,000. Due to better shipping and marketing procedures, as well as slightly improved world prices, the Copra Stabilization Board was able to grant two price increases during the year to the copra producers, as well as to increase the Copra Stabilization Fund reserves by some $227,000 to a level of $711,000. While this may seem a relatively small increase, the Council will recall that falling world prices in the previous 2 years had resulted in the Copra Stabilization Fund dropping from a level of well over a million dollars to less than $500,000. During these 2 years of falling copra prices, the administration maintained stabilized prices to the producer by drawing upon the fund. If the present trend continues, it now appears that the board will be able to grant further price increases to the producer this coming year, as well as to continue to build up the Stabilization Fund reserves.

The most significant economic event of the year was the actual construction of the plant required to begin commercial fishing operations in the Palau District under an agreement with the Van Camp Seafood Corporation. Last month materials for erecting a storage freezer and other facilities arrived in Palau. One of the provisions of the agreement provides for the training of Micronesians as tuna fishermen and in the installations ashore where it is anticipated that some 60 or more Micronesians will be employed in the initial phases. Six 25-gross-ton tuna boats are being built and are expected to begin operation from Koror by July 1, 1964. Initially 48 Micronesians will be employed as crewmembers. Local contractors in Palau are participating in the construction of a quarters building to house some 120 tuna fishermen. Other facilities to be built or installed include a 1,500-ton fish storage freezer, icemaking machines, water storage tanks, offices, and houses for technical and managerial staff.

The administration continued to send trainees to Hawaii to learn live-bait tuna fishing. Presently some 23 trainees are undergoing training on tuna boats operating out of Hawaiian ports, and others will be given similar opportunity. It is from this group of trainees that we hope to develop a nucleus of experienced tuna fishermen which can, in turn, train other Micronesians at the local level.

Most of the pilot projects in local fisheries development to date have been concentrated in Palau. With the establishment of a large-scale commercial fisheries venture in Koror, we now propose to establish a pilot fisheries project in the Truk District. This will permit the transfer of the major fisheries development effort to

Truk, where initial emphasis will be given to the development of a fishing industry capable of supplying all local demands for fresh fish. A fisheries officer will still remain in Palau to supervise the fisheries program, but at this stage it is felt that major emphasis must be given to the establishment of fishery facilities in Truk, our largest district. Recruitment of additional fisheries development personnel is also being planned for this coming year.

Boatbuilding operations in Palau are being increased. The Palau Boatbuilders Association during the year completed and sold more than a dozen boats while an additional 15 boats are on order. The Palau Boat Yard now has been established as a government pilot project under the administration boatbuilder and currently has under construction a 75-foot live-bait tuna boat for the local fisheries project. The Palau Boat Yard will also be used as a training center for advanced training for boatbuilders from all over the territory.

The development of cooperatives and credit unions was immeasurably aided during the year by the services of the Deputy Director of Trade and Industry, Government of Papua and New Guinea, who undertook a 6-month assignment as cooperative officer for the Trust Territory. During this period he assisted in drafting legislation governing the establishment and regulation of cooperative associations and credit unions and prepared standard articles of incorporation and bylaws for credit unions. Last month a permanent cooperative officer was appointed to my staff. Additionally, a cooperative officer was stationed in the Palau District, and a cooperative officer for Ponape District has just been appointed. Recruiting for a cooperative officer for Truk currently is underway. Thus we are strengthening the services provided local cooperatives and credit unions.

The Council will recall that at the 30th session I described the Economic Development Loan Fund which had been created to stimulate the development of local business enterprises. This fund now has assets of $200,000, and another $100,000 increment will be placed in it after July 1, 1964. Additionally, in the Chartered Trading Company Loan Fund there is some $870,000. If present legislation now pending in the U.S. Senate is approved, we propose to place the Chartered Trading Company Loan Fund in the general Economic Development Fund. This will give us a very respectable sum for development loans and for loan guaranty purposes.

The Economic Development Loan Committee, which has two Micronesian members, was very active during the period under review. Small-scale loans were made to such business entities as the Micronesian Products Center to set up a revolving fund for purchase of handicraft; to the Palau Handicraft and Woodworkers Guild to expand operations to enable the guild to make furniture for the accelerated elementary education school program; to the Metalanim Housing Corporation, Ponape, to expand operations and purchase materials for construction of low-cost cooperative housing; and to the Rota Shipping and Business Corporation to buy a motor vessel for transportation of fresh produce, meat, fish, and passengers between Rota and Guam. Other loans financed a small-scale local fishing operation in Saipan; the expansion of a local sawmill in Rota; the establishment of a radio repair shop; and the establishment of a repair shop for electrical appliances. Additionally, the Economic Development Loan Fund guaranteed some $104,000 of loans with commercial banks. These guaranties included a loan to the Kwajalein Importing and Exporting Company, Majuro, to increase working capital; a loan to a leading businessman in Saipan to construct a supermarket; a loan guaranty to enable a Saipan businesswoman to purchase and install machinery and equipment to process cassava root for manufacture of starch; and a loan for the establishment of a motel in connection with the tourist trade in Saipan.

Special emphasis during the year was placed on using local contractors wherever possible in the accelerated elementary school construction program. Thus, for example, the Palau Handicraft and Woodworkers Guild was awarded contracts totaling $133,000 for manufacturing elementary school furniture for the new elementary school classrooms now being built. The Metalanim Housing Corporation was granted a contract to construct 10 new ele-

mentary schools on the island of Ponape, and the Micronesian Construction Company of Saipan received a $142,000 contract for manufacture of school furniture. In addition, over 20 small contracts of various types were awarded to various individuals throughout the Trust Territory. Further, although the contract for a second increment of 90 additional teacher houses was awarded to a combine of outside contractors, in certain areas such as Ponapé this firm subcontracted with the Metalanim Housing Corporation for construction of teacher houses on the island of Kusaie.

Tourism in the territory, although still of small magnitude, was given impetus in the Marianas District and Palau District. In the Marianas a private motel is being built and several local groups have plans for developing tourist-type hotels; in Palau the Palau Travel Bureau was formed and sponsored a special "tour package" of Palau during the annual Palau Fair held earlier this month.

The headquarters agriculture staff was strengthened by the addition of an assistant director of agriculture charged with primary responsibility for agriculture extension work and preparation of extension literature; the appointment of a Micronesian assistant staff entomologist; the appointment of a plant pathologist; and the recruitment of a rice technician to be in charge of a pilot rice project in Ponape. The position of staff forester also was approved but had not been filled at the end of the year.

The pepper experimentation in Ponape now has reached a point where a pilot project in pepper development by local farmers is warranted. Accordingly a project has been set up under which 400 local farmers will be subsidized in the planting of pepper gardens over the next 4 years. About 50 pepper gardens are now being established.

The rice development project at Metalanim, Ponape, is well underway. Facilities for milling rice and equipment have been assembled, and a rice technician will be reporting this next month to supervise this pilot project. The Ponapean farmers involved in this project already have cleared some 20 acres of rice paddy land in anticipation of the rice technician's arrival.

In Truk a coir fiber development project has received all its machinery and is in the process of determining maximum production techniques and operation of machinery, training personnel, determining production costs, handling, sorting, and grading and baling of fiber. The visiting mission will recall that in its inspection of the coir fiber project certain of the machinery had not yet arrived. I am pleased to report that the project now is in operation.

A plant pathology division has been set up at Ponape to combat the spread of the cacao canker disease which developed in the past 2 years. Modern laboratory facilities have been provided, and the plant pathologist will visit specialized cacao centers in Central America this summer to study disease prevention methods. In Ponape and Truk Districts, the spread of the cacao canker disease has been checked through strict surveillance of all cacao plantings and the pruning and burning of diseased trees. An intensive education program in the use of proper sanitary practices in pruning cacao is being carried out by agricultural extension agents in our cacao-producing areas.

New plantings of cacao were made during the year in Truk, Ponape, Kusaie, and Palau, and cacao subsidy payments continued as more plantings came into bearing. Export of cacao is still small since many beans are still used for seedlings. However, during the year some 18 tons of cacao was exported—a small quantity but double the amount exported last year. Trust Territory beans have consistently sold at premium prices—that is, 3 to 4 cents above the world market price.

The improvement of coconut groves continued as an integral phase of the overall agricultural development program. New plantings and thinning operations continued with some 200,000 selected coconut seedlings being planted by growers throughout the territory.

In Palau the ramie project attained its goal of having 60 acres under cultivation. Under the pilot project, machinery, fertilizer, plows, and insecticides have been delivered to the growers participating in this pilot project.

The success of the fruitfly eradication program at Rota, under the sterile-fly technique used by the United States Department of Agriculture, brought about the decision to continue

the program for Saipan and Tinian, and a similar eradication program has been launched. It is hoped that both the melon fly and oriental fruitfly will shortly be eliminated from the northern Mariana Islands.

The Marianas District was established as the livestock center for the Trust Territory, and introductions of Santa Gertrudis and Angus breeding bulls and heifers from the United States were made. Pasture and forage improvement was a major accomplishment. Through improved management, the government cattle herd of the Mariannas District increased its calf production from 16 percent to 75 percent during the year. The distribution of high-quality stock of poultry and hogs also continued.

In all districts new or improved agricultural stations were under construction, and new farm equipment was acquired for all stations.

The Trust Territory Farm Institute graduated its first class of 16 trainees in August 1963, and a second class of 28 trainees began classes in March 1964. Four Micronesian agricultural workers were selected to participate in a 4-month practical island horticulture course in Hawaii and Samoa. Preliminary plans were carried out in collaboration with the Institute of Technical Interchange, East-West Center, to hold a coconut seminar in July 1964 at Metalanim, Ponape, with 30 Micronesian coconut growers and agriculturists participating. Specialists in coconut production from all over the Pacific area will joint this seminar as resource staff.

Two more young Micronesians this summer will receive the B.S. degree in tropical agriculture and will be joining district agriculture staffs. Additionally, this year 12 agricultural scholarships were again offered.

Public Health

We are moving ahead rapidly in the improvement of our public-health program. Through our increased appropriations, we were able to raise the public-health operational budget from $601,270 in fiscal year 1962 to $983,526 in fiscal year 1963, and for the current year 1964 to $1,350,000. For the coming fiscal year, which will start this July, $2,120,000 has been budgeted for the medical service and public-health program. In short, in less than 2 years' time, the public-health and medical service budget has more than tripled. Additionally, under the construction program, two new hospitals were built, one in Palau and the other in the Marshalls, and a complete new hospital plant for Truk is funded for this coming year. A new hospital plant in the Marianas District also was completed a year and a half ago.

During the past 10 months a number of major programs in public health either were completed or were well underway.

Six medical doctors were appointed as clinical consultants and practitioners, one in each of the district hospitals. Five of these M.D.'s are on duty, and we anticipate that the sixth will be reporting within the next month. At the headquarters a new director of medical services and an assistant director of medical services were appointed, as well as a chief of public health, thus vastly strengthening our medical staff at the territorial level. I am very pleased to report that the new chief of public health is a Micronesian.

$110,000 was expended this past year to launch a territory-wide immunization program, and the first phase is approximately two-thirds complete. An additional $100,000 to continue this immunization program is included in the forthcoming medical services budget. The immunization program will provide complete coverage for every Micronesian for polio, smallpox, diphtheria, whooping cough, tetanus, typhoid, paratyphoid, and BCG for increasing resistance to tuberculosis infection. By the end of June, some 65,000 of our 85,000 population will have received this immunization protection.

An active TB control program continues. An event of note was the establishment during the year of a tumor registry for the territory.

The polio rehabilitation program in the Marshalls District continued with the polio rehabilitation center nearing completion. Two U.S. physical therapists were appointed to the center and were carrying out a special therapy program for the stricken children for most of the year. It is our proposal to use the new rehabilitation center not only for the polio patients but also as a center for orthopedic work for the entire territory.

Training for Micronesian medical and paramedical staff was greatly increased. Through a joint program with the East-West Center in Hawaii, a postgraduate refresher program for medical officers and nurses was launched. The initial group of medical officers and nurses completed the first course in April, and a second course is in progress. This program will continue until all of the Micronesian medical officers and nurses have an opportunity to receive refresher and postgraduate training in hospitals and clinics in Hawaii. A field training center for Trust Territory sanitarians and community development leaders is scheduled to be held in Truk this June under joint East-West Center and Trust Territory auspices, and it is expected that some 40 staff members will participate. Other inservice training programs which are being worked out with East-West Center officials are a specialized training course for nurse-dietitians, a specialized training course for laboratory technicians, and a refresher course for local hospital administrators.

Various public-health staff members attended medical or health conferences abroad during the year. The territory's nurse supervisor and head nurse of the Saipan Hospital attended a nursing school conference in Fiji; a dietitian attended a nutrition seminar sponsored by the World Health Organization in Manila; the chief of public health attended a World Health Organization conference on health reporting in Manila; and the assistant director of medical services is scheduled to attend a World Health Organization conference in June in Manila on national health planning. Every opportunity is given for local staff members to broaden their perspectives and contacts through attendance at international conferences. A Saipanese medical officer early this month received a diploma of M.P.H. from the School of Public Health, University of the Philippines, under the auspices of a World Health Organization fellowship. He is the second Micronesian medical officer to successfully complete graduate work in public health administration. Additionally, a Yapese medical officer was nominated for a similar World Health Organization public-health administration scholarship for this coming year.

The medical scholar program has been greatly intensified. Twelve special scholarships in premedical education were awarded this year, and the nominees will join the 10 premedical scholars now studying in colleges in the Philippines, Guam, Hawaii, and the United States. Well over a 100-percent increase in medical training funds has been budgeted for this coming year.

A combination medical and field trip ship is being procured to enable the administration to furnish better medical service to the districts where scattered islands pose a special problem in radical servicing.

A program of building new field dispensaries, equipping them, and stocking them with adequate supplies of drugs is underway. Special attention will be given to this program this coming year with refresher training for health aides being an important phase of this program.

During the year the territory again experienced several outbreaks of influenza. Small-scale influenza epidemics appear almost every spring and fall in the territory in spite of all precautions which we can take. For example, last month a gastroenteritis-type influenza broke out in Truk and the Marshalls. The outbreak could be described as a summer flu with a 3-day duration period, but due to the patterns of social living of the Micronesians as well as certain unusual features, such as a prolonged drought in Truk, the spread was unusually rapid. Prompt emergency aid in the form of additional doctors, nurses, and drugs was extended to Truk. Quarantine procedures were instituted to prevent spread to other districts. The quarantine did enable us to prevent the spread to the neighboring island of Ponape, and a U.S. Public Health team was flown to the territory during the outbreak to analyze the type of influenza. Preliminary reports indicate that the influenza was not of an unusual variety but was unique mainly in its rapid spread and number of cases.

Transportation

Of major significance in transportation were the continued efforts toward construction of airfields in the Palau and Ponape Districts. These two areas are now served primarily by amphibious-type aircraft with very limited

cargo and passenger capacity. As the visiting mission saw in Palau earlier this year, work is progressing on the 4,800-foot Airai airfield on Babelthuap Island and is now nearing completion. This particular construction project is of prime importance as it will greatly aid development of the Palau District. Though the DC–4 aircraft does call at Anguar Island periodically, a 5-hour boat trip is required to reach the district center in Koror. Upon completion of the Airai facility, a 20-minute automobile and ferry trip will put all travelers in the district center.

The opening of the Airai airfield will also stimulate the tourist potential of Palau District. Tourist accommodations and air transportation limitations now place a ceiling on the number of tourists which can effectively be handled. Local entrepreneurs are beginning to move into small-scale hotel operation in Koror, but transportation still remains the main bottleneck.

In conjunction with the Airai development, the improved road network on Babelthuap has brought greater numbers of travelers from Koror to Babelthuap. With the opening of regular ferry service just 3 weeks ago, a steady stream of jeeps, automobiles, trucks, and motorcycles can be seen moving from Koror to Babelthuap. Funds have been allocated to begin the complete rehabilitation of the road system on this island—the largest in the territory. Further funding and additional new construction equipment will be made available in the fiscal year beginning July 1. District representatives are highly optimistic in how this project will affect the development of Babelthuap's possibilities.

Upon completion of the Palau airfield, attention will then be shifted to Ponape, which will be the only district not served by multiengine land-based aircraft. Site selections at Ponape have been under review, and it is expected work will begin in 1965.

Improvements to other airfields have been completed in the past few months. Of particular importance are new aviation fueling facilities recently completed at Yap, Truk, and Ponape.

Air transportation requirements in the Trust Territory are growing constantly, particularly in the Guam–Saipan link. Near-capacity space requirements are being reported on practically all flights. An ever-increasing flow of visitors from Guam is being met by Saipan businessmen with projected hotels and other service facilities to cater to the visitors. The visitors represent a definite source of economic growth for Saipan businessmen.

Recent developments in ocean transportation have seen design and construction estimates secured from shipyards for a combination administration-medical vessel. This proposed ship of some 100 feet will serve as an administrative field service vessel for operation in the farflung Marshall Islands District. Estimates have been secured for a 65-foot vessel to meet the administrative requirements in the large Truk lagoon area. Requests for estimates have also been filed for 26 to 36-foot diesel-powered vessels that will be capable of meeting emergency needs in outlying islands. The boats are to be designed so as to permit use in open seas in relative safety. Upon consideration of the various shipyard proposals, contracts will be awarded for the construction of these vessels.

Information and Radio

Radio broadcast facilities in the Trust Territory will see the addition of a district station in Ponape before the end of the year, with other new stations completed in Yap and Saipan by October of this year.

Three stations are now broadcasting daily in the Trust Territory. They are in Palau, the Marshalls, and Truk. All three of these stations are in the process of being modernized. Radio broadcast facilities have figured prominently in the education program in the territory as well as being a necessary tool in the administration of the territory. Health and sanitation officials at both headquarters and district level are making greater use of broadcast facilities to provide a person-to-person contact not otherwise possible in day-to-day activities.

The headquarters tape duplication facility is serving a greater role in the operation of existing stations by providing program material from a wide variety of sources as well as a source of news for rebroadcast.

Ten Micronesians will enter broadcast train-

ing next month at the East-West Center in Hawaii. These men will be provided 15 weeks of instruction in script preparation and broadcast techniques so that greater use of locally produced programs can be used to meet the needs of the individual stations. This is a special training project designed specifically for Pacific area countries.

Three other Micronesians are currently receiving broadcast training through facilities in Washington, D.C. These trainees are receiving advanced instruction which will require 8 months. Upon their return to their respective districts, they will take up responsible administrative positions in their district stations.

Accelerated programs in all areas of the Trust Territory brought about the need for additional information personnel at the headquarters level. To this end, an American information officer has been appointed and is providing inservice training and guidance to our Micronesian information officers.

An informal information training course is to be held this summer with two participants from each district in an effort to establish a working corps of Micronesian reporters. Upon successful completion of this program, a more thorough reporting of interdistrict activities will be enjoyed.

Public Works

Construction activities in the Trust Territory public works department continue to gain momentum with some $12 million budgeted during the past 2 years for construction. In addition to the accelerated elementary school construction program classrooms and teacher housing throughout the territory, the public works department is directly involved in the Babelthuap airfield construction in the Palau District and the construction of five buildings in Saipan being financed through Office of Emergency Planning funds as replacement for buildings lost during the disastrous typhoon Olive of April 1963.

Upon completion of the Office of Emergency Planning projects on Saipan, there will have been constructed a 60- by 200-foot transshipment warehouse, a two-story, 12-unit apartment building, a 200- by 300-foot central supply warehouse building, a 50- by 262-foot central repair shop building, a major repair of the Saipan pier. In all, some $2,241,000 is being expended in a rehabilitation program in conjunction with the Office of Emergency Planning in Saipan and Tinian.

Projects currently in the engineering and estimating section of public works include work on the Palau, Yap, Ebeye, Majuro, and Truk water systems. The water collection and sewage distribution systems of these areas all are slated for major rehabilitation and/or installation of new systems.

A program of replacement of heavy equipment has been instituted which has seen the purchase of 34 new units ranging from dump trucks to large earthmoving equipment for airfield construction work. This includes five heavy-duty earthmoving tractors delivered and five more on order for early delivery.

Road improvement has been continued in all districts through a grant-in-aid approach as well as direct construction work by the administration.

Land Claims

The perplexing problem of settlement for the use and occupancy of certain lands on Kwajalein, Ebeye, and other islands in the Kwajalein and Majuro atolls of the Marshall Islands District was brought at last to a successful conclusion on February 11 and 12, 1964, when agreements were signed by landowners granting to the Trust Territory government certain use rights. One thousand dollars per acre was agreed upon as compensation for past and future use of the lands involved. The agreements culminate several years' negotiation by the Trust Territory government to settle by mutual agreement this longstanding land dispute.

Status of Displaced Rongelapese

Again, as in former years, a medical survey was conducted in March by a joint AEC–Trust Territory medical team, and the visiting mission had an opportunity to meet with representatives of that team when it visited the island of Rongelap. Reports by the AEC medi-

cal officials again found the general health of the Rongelapese to be satisfactory.

Last year the Council will recall that I reported on a bill which will compensate the people of Rongelap and which was passed by the U.S. House of Representatives and forwarded to the Senate Interior Committee. This committee has held hearings on this legislation, and last week staff members of the Senate committee have discussed provisions of the bill with Marshallese representatives of the Rongelap community. I am hopeful that final action will be taken before the end of the present session of Congress.

Plans for Rehabilitation of Ebeye

The visiting mission, I am certain, noted housing, sanitation, and other conditions on the island of Ebeye. Conditions there sorely need improvement. That community has grown without any advance planning or provision for essential public utilities. Overcrowding is serious, as are other problems that go with such an overexpanded island community. Conditions are such that cleanup measures, which are regularly undertaken, can only be palliative and do not get at the core of the essential problem. It is a situation about which I have been particularly concerned and one in which officials in Washington also have been deeply interested. The result has been a thorough analysis of the particular needs of Ebeye. The Trust Territory government is working with interested U.S. Government departments to develop a major program for the thorough upgrading of all housing, water, power, and sewage facilities on Ebeye Island. Conferences on this program recently have been held in Washington, D.C., Kwajalein, and Honolulu. Rehabilitation work will begin at once as soon as final agreement is reached by the cooperating agencies. I have high hopes that I shall be able to report next year to the Council that a complete transformation is taking place on Ebeye.

I am most grateful to have this opportunity to present this brief summary report, and I shall, of course, attempt to provide any additional information that the members of the Council may desire to supplement our annual report or to comment on questions raised in the report of the 1964 visiting mission.

STATEMENT BY MR. REMENGESAU

U.S./U.N. press release 4404

It is indeed a great pleasure to be present before this Council and to have the opportunity to extend to all the honorable members greetings from the people of the vastly scattered but beautiful islands called Micronesia.

I am proud and honored to be the bearer of the Micronesians' greetings to you and to observe at first hand the Trusteeship Council and the Administering Authority in the process of reviewing our current problems as well as the progress made during the year under review. It is a privilege to be an eyewitness to the deliberations of a body which is attempting to aid the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands achieve a harmonious, happy, and enriched life based on equality, justice, and peace with the rest of the world. The people of Micronesia wish to reiterate their faith in the United Nations—for what it has achieved and for what it is endeavoring to attain and maintain for all men and nations, great or small, independent or dependent.

Equally, we have confidence in our Administering Authority, and I am pleased to inform the Council that, while there is still much to be done in our territory, we have benefited by the achievements of the Administering Authority in all phases of territorial developments. The visiting mission, which has just returned from a visit to our territory, will, I am sure, attest to my saying that Micronesia in the past few years has made great strides forward in the political, social, educational, and economic fields.

This does not imply that the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands is making progress without problems or difficulties. On the contrary, each step we take forward means new problems in planning and preparing for the next advanced step. But having problems in advancing step by step, I believe, is not uncommon in the development of new countries of the world.

The significant fact is that, with the guidance and support of the Administering Authority under the watchful eyes of the Trusteeship Council, and with the acceptance and determination of the people of Micronesia, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands has made considerable advancement in all fields during the

past few years. Although the rate of speed may vary from one field of development to the other, real achievement is there to be seen.

The differences in the rates of speed in certain fields of development may be explained by priorities placed on various development programs. These priorities have been necessitated by budgetary conditions in the past as well as the physical resources of the territory. The people of Micronesia well appreciate the difficulties faced by the Administering Authority in its endeavor to promote political, social, educational, and economic conditions in the territory in a manner to enable us to become a self-governing people.

We are happy and grateful for the present accelerated elementary school construction program and for the recruitment of the hundreds of American schoolteachers which is well underway. This is one of the great steps forward. With Americans teaching at the elementary schools, our Micronesian teachers will now be able to acquire modern teaching methods by taking advanced training in the territory or abroad. The teaching of the English language, from the first grade on, will give our children better tools to use in the preparation of their respective fields of endeavors. In addition, the knowledge of and the use of English by Micronesians as a common tool of communication throughout the territory will bring about understanding and trust among all Micronesians who now speak many languages. A common language will solidify the unity of Micronesia and will help to insure the harmonious continuity of whatever political status the Micronesians choose for the future.

It is gratifying to note that the Administering Authority is presently planning, as the next accelerated program, the improvement of public-health facilities and services in the territory. The public-health and medical service program, as with education, is dear to the hearts of Micronesians. We realize that health is as important as education for individuals, for members of their families as well as for the entire community.

While budgetary considerations and other factors in the territory may necessitate emphasizing certain aspects of development programs at different times, I feel that education, economic, and political growth should have the same priority and should move forward together. One cannot be placed above the other, for all must be integrated together. We trust that the Administering Authority is cognizant of these needs and that consideration is being given to accelerate the economic infrastructure. We hope that the number of experts to do needed research on economic potentialities will be increased and that more technicians will be provided to give technical advice and assistance. The problem of how to bring in controlled outside capital investment to develop potential industries which are beyond the capital ability and know-how of the Micronesians should also be given serious consideration.

On the political front, we have certain misgivings on the type of thinking which stresses that the political growth of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands must be pushed as speedily as possible irrespective of other factors. There are those who overemphasize this aspect of speed of political development of our islands. As a Micronesian, I would like to achieve the goal of self-government as quickly as possible. Simultaneously, I believe that the political status we acquire must be the expressed will of the people as a result of a politically informed society and one that is consistent with our maximum potential resources and capacities. In one of our small islands we have a saying which can be translated in several ways. One translation says: "You cannot hasten the ripening of a papaya fruit." Or you can say: "You cannot slow down the processes of the ripening of a papaya." Still another meaning is: "It is like the papaya fruit—when it is ripe, it will show on the surface." So it might be said of our political growth today. In one sense you cannot hasten it; in another, you cannot slow it down; and in the last analysis, when the people are ready for self-government, they will show it and demand it.

While speed of action may seem to some to be the important phase of political development at the present time, most of us feel that the present design of political growth through an evolutionary process, as expressed by the people themselves, is the most significant aspect.

The establishment of a territorial legislature must be the next step in our political growth.

The architectural framework of a proposed territorial legislature or territorial congress was begun 2 years ago by the present Council of Micronesia, and soon we hope that we will see the birth of this new and important body. It is this new territorial legislature which will shape the destiny of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.

This present session of the Trusteeship Council will be followed with much interest and concern by the people of Micronesia. The sixth visiting mission has just returned from the territory and has presented its findings and recommendations to the Council. Thus the Council has before it firsthand information on achievements as well as the current problems of the territory. We, the Micronesians, sincerely trust that this session will result in further assistance and guidance, which will enable us to continue our progressive development in all areas.

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.

General Assembly

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space:
Report of the Scientific Group Established, at the Request of the Government of India, To Visit the Rocket Launching Site at Thumba. A/AC.105/17. February 20, 1964. 51 pp.
Report of the Legal Sub-Committee on the Work of Its Third Session (March 9–26, 1964) to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. A/AC.105/19. March 26, 1964. 64 pp.

International Law Commission. Third Report on the Law of Treaties by Sir Humphrey Waldcock, Special Rapporteur. A/CN.4/167. March 3, 1964. 109 pp.

Special Committee on the Situation With Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The Question of Aden. Report by the Secretary-General. A/AC.109/58. March 17, 1964. 2 pp.

Comments Received from Governments and International Organizations and Institutions Regarding Technical Assistance To Promote the Teaching, Study, Dissemination and Wider Appreciation of International Law. A/5455/Add. 7. March 19, 1964. 21 pp.

Question of Southern Rhodesia. Note by the Secretary-General. A/5691. March 20, 1964. 4 pp.

Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme:
Progress Report on UNHCR Major Aid Programmes (1955–1963) as at 31 December 1963. A/AC.96/228. March 25, 1964. 92 pp.
1964 Programme—New Projects: Proposal for Assistance to Refugees From Rwanda in the Kivu Province of the Congo. A/AC.96/236. April 13, 1964. 19 pp.
1964 Programme—New Projects: Proposal for Assistance to Refugees From Rwanda in Burundi. A/AC.96/240. April 28, 1964. 44 pp.

Consideration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance With the Charter of the United Nations. Report of the Secretary-General on methods of factfinding. A/5694. May 1, 1964. 151 pp.

Draft Recommendation on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages. Memorandum by the Secretary-General. A/5699. May 8, 1961. 11 pp.

Twenty-second Progress Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (November 1, 1963, to April 30, 1964). A/5700. May 11, 1964. 2 pp.

Note Verbale Dated May 14, 1964, from the Secretary-General to the Permanent Representatives of Member States Regarding the Formation of the United Republic of Tanganyika. A/5701. May 18, 1964. 2 pp.

Draft International Covenant on Human Rights. Note by the Secretary-General. A/5705. May 20, 1964. 21 pp.

Economic and Social Council

Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. Report of the Committee on Industry and Natural Resources (16th Session) to the Commission (20th Session). E/CN.11/652. February 19, 1964. 72 pp.

Proposals for a Priority Programme of Co-ordinated Action in the Field of Water Resources Within the Framework of the United Nations Development Decade. Report and recommendations prepared by the U.N. Water Resources Development Center. E/3863. March 10, 1964. 108 pp.

Report of the First Session of the Advisory Committee on the Application of Science and Technology to Development to the Economic and Social Council, February 25–March 6, 1964. E/3866. March 12, 1964. 45 pp.; Add. 1, May 6, 1964, 63 pp.

Social Commission. Report on the World Social Situation: Planning for Balanced Social and Economic Development in India. E/CN.5/346/Add. 12. March 23, 1964. 48 pp.

Report by the Secretary-General on the Desirability of Further Action to Revise or Replace the Convention on Road Traffic (Geneva, September 19, 1949) and the Protocol on Road Signs and Signals (Geneva, September 19, 1949). E/3883. April 28, 1964. 15 pp.

Assessment of Arrangements for Carrying Out United Nations Responsibilities in the Field of the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders. Note by the Secretary-General. E/CN.5/383. April 28, 1964. 28 pp.

Inquiry Among Governments on Problems Resulting From the Reciprocal Action of Economic Development and Population Changes. Report of the Secretary-General. E/3895. May 18, 1964. 89 pp.

International Co-operation in Cartography: United Nations Regional Cartographic Conference for Africa. Report of the Secretary-General. E/3906. May 29, 1961. 4 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Cultural Relations

Agreement on the importation of educational, scientific, and cultural materials, and protocol. Done at Lake Success, November 22, 1950. Entered into force May 21, 1952.[1]
Acceptance deposited: Cameroon, May 15, 1964.

Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April 24, 1964.[1]
Ratification deposited: Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic (with reservation and declaration), May 14, 1964.

Narcotics

Protocol for limiting and regulating the cultivation of the poppy plant, the production of, international and wholesale trade in, and use of opium. Done at New York June 23, 1953. Entered into force March 8, 1963. TIAS 5273.
Notification received that it considers itself bound: Rwanda, April 30, 1964.

Oil Pollution

Amendments to the international convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954 (TIAS 4900). Done at London April 11, 1962.[2]
Acceptance deposited: Denmark, May 22, 1964.

Weather

Convention of the World Meteorological Organization. Done at Washington October 11, 1947. Entered into force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052.
Accession deposited: Kenya, June 2, 1964.

BILATERAL

Argentina

Agreement relating to a military assistance program, with memorandum of understanding. Effected by exchange of notes at Buenos Aires May 10, 1964. Entered into force May 10, 1964.

Amendment to the agreement of June 22, 1962 (TIAS 5125), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington June 8, 1964. Enters into force on the date on which each Government shall have received from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force.

China

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1701–1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at Taipei June 3, 1964. Entered into force June 3, 1964.

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of August 31, 1962, as amended (TIAS 5151, 5282). Effected by exchange of notes at Taipei June 3, 1964. Entered into force June 3, 1964.

Amendment to the agreement of July 18, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3307, 4176, 4514, 5105), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington June 8, 1964. Enters into force on the date on which each Government shall have received from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force.

Dominican Republic

Military assistance agreement. Signed at Santo Domingo March 8, 1962.
Entered into force: June 10, 1964, upon receipt of notification of ratification by the Dominican Republic.

Greece

Amendment to the agreement of August 4, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3310, 4837, 5250, 5251), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington June 8, 1964. Enters into force on the date on which each Government shall have received from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force.

Iceland

Interim agreement revising schedule I of trade agreement of August 27, 1943 (57 Stat. 1075), to conform with Icelandic Tariff Act of 1963 until a revision is negotiated under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Effected by exchange of notes at Reykjavik May 29 and June 2, 1964. Entered into force June 2, 1964.

Iran

Amendment to the agreement of March 5, 1957 (TIAS 4207), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington June 8, 1964. Enters into force on the date on which each Government shall have received from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force.

Thailand

Amendment to the agreement of March 13, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3522, 3842, 4533, 5122), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington June 8, 1964. Enters into force on the date on which each Government shall have received from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force.

United Kingdom

Agreement for minimum import prices on cereals, cereal products and by-products. Effected by exchange of notes at London April 15, 1964. Entered into force April 15, 1964.

Viet-Nam

Amendment to the agreement of April 22, 1959 (TIAS 4251), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington June 9, 1964. Enters into force on the date each Government shall have received from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force.

[1] Not in force for the United States.
[2] Not in force.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Office of Media Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Education—Commission for Educational Exchange and Financing of Exchange Programs. Agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany. Signed at Bonn November 20, 1962. Entered into force January 24, 1964. TIAS 5518. 11 pp. 10¢.

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with the Philippines. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington February 24, 1964. Entered into force February 24, 1964. With exchange of letters. TIAS 5519. 10 pp. 10¢.

Technical Cooperation—Special Technical Services. Agreement with Brazil, extending the agreement of May 30, 1953, as extended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Rio de Janeiro December 27 and 30, 1963. Entered into force December 31, 1963. TIAS 5520. 2 pp. 5¢.

Technical Cooperation—Agriculture and Natural Resources. Agreement with Brazil, extending the agreement of June 26, 1953, as amended and extended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Rio de Janeiro December 27 and 30, 1963. Entered into force December 31, 1963. TIAS 5521. 3 pp. 5¢.

Protocol to the Social Progress Trust Fund Agreement with the Inter-American Development Bank. Signed at Washington February 17, 1964. Entered into force February 17, 1964. TIAS 5522. 2 pp. 5¢.

Financing of Assistance Under Alliance for Progress. Agreement with the Pan American Union, modifying and supplementing the agreement of November 29, 1961. Signed at Washington February 17, 1964. Entered into force February 17, 1964. TIAS 5523. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Pakistan, amending the agreement of October 14, 1961, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Karachi February 10, 1964. Entered into force February 10, 1964. TIAS 5524. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Iceland. Signed at Reykjavik February 13, 1964. Entered into force February 13, 1964. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5525. 9 pp. 10¢.

Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV. Agreement with Iceland. Signed at Reykjavik February 13, 1964. Entered into force February 13, 1964. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5526. 7 pp. 10¢.

Trade—Beef, Veal, and Mutton. Agreement with Australia. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington February 17, 1964. Entered into force February 17, 1964. With Australian letter. TIAS 5527. 5 pp. 5¢.

Trade—Beef and Veal. Agreement with Ireland. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington February 25, 1964. Entered into force February 25, 1964. With Irish letter. TIAS 5528. 5 pp. 5¢.

Trade—Beef and Veal. Agreement with New Zealand. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington February 17, 1964. Entered into force February 17, 1964. With New Zealand letter. TIAS 5529. 5 pp. 5¢.

Defense—Furnishing of Equipment, Materials, and Services. Agreement with the Republic of the Congo. Exchange of notes—Signed at Léopoldville June 24 and July 19, 1963. Entered into force July 19, 1963. TIAS 5530. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV. Agreement with Colombia, amending the agreement of March 27, 1963. Exchange of notes—Signed at Bogotá October 11 and 25, 1963. Entered into force October 25, 1963. TIAS 5531. 3 pp. 5¢.

Defense—Road Construction and Maintenance Capability of Paraguayan Army. Agreement with Paraguay. Exchange of notes—Signed at Asunción February 10, 1964. Entered into force February 10, 1964. TIAS 5532. 4 pp. 5¢.

Tracking Stations. Agreement with Spain. Exchange of notes—Signed at Madrid January 29, 1964. Entered into force January 29, 1964. TIAS 5533. 10 pp. 10¢.

Defense—Military Assistance. Understanding with Brazil. Exchange of notes—Signed at Rio de Janeiro January 30, 1964. Entered into force January 30, 1964. TIAS 5534. 4 pp. 5¢.

Settlement for Logistical Support to Certain Armed Forces for United Nations Operations in Korea. Agreement with Australia (in its own behalf and in behalf of New Zealand and the United Kingdom). Exchange of letters—Signed at Washington February 5, 1964. Entered into force February 5, 1964. TIAS 5538. 2 pp. 5¢.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: June 8–14

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Release issued prior to June 8 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 268 of June 5.

No.	Date	Subject
*272	6/8	U.S. participation in international conferences.
273	6/8	McClellan appointed member of Advisory Committee on International Business Problems (rewrite).
*274	6/9	Wltman sworn in as Ambassador to Togo (biographic details).
*275	6/9	Harriman: General Federation of Women's Clubs, Atlantic City, N.J. (excerpts).
*276	6/9	Cultural exchange (Africa).
*277	6/10	FSI senior seminar commencement.
*278	6/10	Blair sworn in as Ambassador to the Philippines (biographic details).
*279	6/10	Chayes resignation: exchange of letters with President Johnson.
*280	6/11	Annual honor awards ceremony.
281	6/11	U.S.–Israel communique on water desalting program (revised June 22).
†282	6/13	Rusk: commencement exercises at Williams College.

*Not printed.
†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

American Republics. The Democratic Ideal In Our Policy Toward Latin America (Mann) . . 995

Atomic Energy

Building a Great World Society (Johnson) . . 990

18-Nation Disarmament Conference Reconvenes at Geneva (Foster) 1004

Cambodia. Security Council Team To Examine Cambodia–Viet-Nam Border Areas (Stevenson, text of resolution) 1002

Congress. Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy 1001

Disarmament

18-Nation Disarmament Conference Reconvenes at Geneva (Foster) 1004

President Calls for Redoubled Efforts To Halt Arms Race 1005

Economic Affairs

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Harold C. McClellan Named to Business Advisory Committee 1000

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U.S. Position on Soviet Treaty With East Germany 993

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1943, Volume IV, The Near East and Africa

The Department of State recently released *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, Volume IV, The Near East and Africa.*

Most of the content of this volume relates to wartime problems, particularly the defense of the Near East and Africa against Axis penetration or attack. Among the compilations of particular interest are those on United States policy regarding the postwar political organization of Greece, the problems of coalition warfare as they affected Iran, and the attitude of the United States toward the entry of Turkey into the war and toward the future status of Palestine.

Copies of *Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume IV, The Near East and Africa* (publication 7665) may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402, for $4 each.

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